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I. General Introduction 
A. The Issue Addressed in this Thesis: the Prohibition of Performance 
Requirements in International Investment Agreements 
Performance requirement prohibitions (“PRPs”), labelled “the least understood of the 
substantive prohibitions set forth” in international investment agreements (“IIAs”), emerged only 
in the 1970s and 1980s, much later than venerable substantive protection standards such as 
the minimum standard of treatment, the fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) standard and the 
protection against expropriation without compensation, whose roots can be traced back to the 
19th century or even earlier.1  
This thesis focuses on providing answers to two research questions: first, how do States prohibit 
performance requirements in IIAs? And second, how should PRPs in IIAs be interpreted and 
applied?  
B. The Objective of this Thesis 
The goal of this thesis is to chart an approach to PRPs in IIAs that does justice to their complex 
wording and to their specific and broader context essential to properly understanding, 
interpreting and applying them. This thesis aims at elaborating a comprehensive analytical 
framework that provides an overview of drafting options that States have resorted to in 
prohibiting performance requirements and in narrowing the scope and applicability of such 
prohibitions where necessary; such analytical framework also aspires at situating PRPs within 
their proper historical and bilateral, regional and multilateral treaty-making contexts. 
The issue at the heart of this thesis consists of the treaty practice of States when prohibiting 
performance requirements in IIAs and the interpretation and application of PRPs once disputes 
between investors and States arise in relation with PRPs in IIAs. This thesis proposes a unitary 
understanding of PRPs in IIAs through the demonstration of a number of findings. First, the 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (“TRIMs”),2 the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”)3 and PRPs in IIAs share common 
                                                
1 Barton Legum, “Understanding Performance Requirement Prohibitions in Investment Treaties” in Arthur 
W. Rovine (ed), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 
2007 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 53, 55-56.  
2  Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, 15 April 1994, Annex 1A to the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 (“TRIMs Agreement”).  
3  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay 
 
 2 
origins and must be understood in an interconnected fashion. The General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (“GATT”)4 Uruguay Round of negotiations provided a platform that produced terms of 
art and settled meanings for terms that were subsequently widely and consistently reproduced 
within a large number of PRPs in IIAs. Second, the U.S. BIT Programme has proven highly 
influential for PRPs in IIAs and can provide numerous insights into the evolution of PRPs in IIAs. 
Third, PRPs in IIAs systematically reproduce prior models of PRPs or PRPs within other IIAs 
and must be understood through the identification of such drafting patterns. Fourth, the drafting 
of PRPs in IIAs has evolved considerably and multiple recurring techniques have been 
developed to fine-tune their scope and coverage, their applicability and also their inapplicability. 
Fifth, the drafting of PRPs and of reservations thereto present numerous complexities and 
related interpretative challenges. Sixth, intended disruptiveness of most-favoured nation 
(“MFN”) treatment clauses will cause unanticipated havoc in the application of PRPs in IIAs. 
C. The Relevance of this Thesis 
1. Analyses of How PRPs in IIAs are Drafted, Interpreted and Applied are Anecdotal  
While a great number of research endeavours have focused on performance requirements, few 
studies survey PRPs at length.5 A number of international law textbooks, chapters, publications 
and theses address PRPs in IIAs, but allot only a few lines or pages to the topic.6 Professor 
                                                                                                                                                       
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 231 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [“SCM Agreement”]. 
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 15 April 1994, Annex 1A to the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 (“GATT”). 
5 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) and UNCTAD, Handbook for Negotiators of International 
Investment Agreements (December 2012) 86-90; Aaron Cosbey, “Everyone’s Doing It: The Acceptance, 
Effectiveness and Legality of Performance Requirements” 6(1) Investment Treaty News (IISD) (February 
2015) 9-11; Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell, “Transfer Rights, Performance Requirements and 
Transparency” in Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law 
International, 2009) 416-429; Suzy H. Nikièma, “Performance Requirements in Investment Treaties,” IISD 
Best Practices Series (30 December 2014); UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1996: Investment, Trade 
and International Policy Arrangements, UN Doc UNCTAD/DTCI/32 (1996) 134, 148-149, 156, 162; 
UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment and Performance Requirements: New Evidence from Selected 
Countries, UN Doc. No. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/7 (2003) 4-5; WTO and UNCTAD, “Scope and Definition 
Provisions in International Agreements (Part I)” in Trade-Related Investment Measures and Other 
Performance Requirements – Joint Study by the WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats, Committee on Trade-
Related Investment Measures, WTO Doc G/C/W/307 (2001); J. Anthony VanDuzer, Penelope Simons 
and Graham Mayeda, Integrating Sustainable Development into International Investment Agreements: A 
Guide for Developing Country Negotiators (Commonwealth Secretariat, May 2013) 193-204. 
6 Stefan D Amarasinha and Juliane Kokott, “Multilateral Investment Rules Revisited” in Peter Muchlinski, 
Federico Ortino, and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 
(OUP, 2008) 145, 151-152; Rémi Bachand, “Étude comparative des accords et traités d’investissement 
dans les Amériques: existe t-il une alternative au modèle ALENA?” 1(2) Continentalisation, Notes et 
Études (January 2001) 4-5; Freya Baetens, “The Kyoto Protocol Assessed Through the Lens of Investor-
State Arbitration: Reconciling Climate Change and Investment Protection Objectives” in Marie-Claire 
Cordonier-Segger, Markus W. Gehring and Andrew Newcombe (eds), Sustainable Development in World 
Investment Law (Kluwer Law International, 2011) 701-703; Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder and others, 
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Investment Treaties & Why they Matter to Sustainable Development: Questions & Answers (IISD, 2011) 
27-30; Andrea K. Bjorklund, “Improving the International Investment Law and Policy System - Report of 
the Rapporteur Second Columbia International Investment Conference: What’s Next in International 
Investment Law and Policy?” in Jose E. Alvarez and others (eds), The Evolving International Investment 
Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2011) 228; Thomas L. Brewer and 
Stephen Young, “Investment Policies in Multilateral and Regional Agreements: a Comparative Analysis” 
5(1) Transnational Corporations (August 1996), 5-6, 8, 12, 17-18, 23; David Collins, “Sustainable 
International Investment Law After the Pax Americana: The BOOT on the Other Foot” 13(2) Journal of 
World Investment and Trade (2011) 24-25; Aaron Cosbey, A Capabilities Approach to Trade and 
Sustainable Development: Using Sen’s Conception of Development to Re-examine the Debates (IISD, 
2004) 47-48; Aaron Cosbey and others, Investment and Sustainable Development: A Guide to the Use 
and Potential of International Investment Agreements (IISD, 2004) 9, 23, 31-32; Aaron Cosbey and 
others, The Rush to Regionalism: Sustainable Development and Regional/Bilateral Approaches to Trade 
and Investment Liberalization (IISD, 2004) 6-7, 15; Lorenzo Cotula and Kyla Tienhaara, “Reconfiguring 
Investment Contracts to Promote Sustainable Development,” in Karl P. Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on 
International Investment Law & Policy 2011-2012 (OUP, 2013) 293-296; Erik Denters, “Preferential Trade 
and Investment Treaties” in Tarcisio Gazzini and Eric De Brabandere (eds), International Investment Law: 
the Sources of Rights and Obligations (Brill, 2012) 54-56; Rudolf, Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, 
Principles of international investment law (OUP, 2008) 82-84; Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, 
Bilateral investment treaties (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 79–81; Monica Fernandez, Integration of Foreign 
Investment Policies and Regulations in the Western Hemisphere, thesis in partial fulfillment of the degree 
of Master of Laws (LL.M) (McGiIl University, 1997) 25-28, 39, 60-61, 67-69, 101-103, 121, 127; Daniel M. 
Firger and Michael Gerrard, “Harmonizing Climate Change Policy and International Investment Law: 
Threats, Challenges and Opportunities” in Karl P. Sauvant (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment 
Law & Policy 2010-11 (OUP, 2011) 17-18, 49-50; Matthew Happold and Thomas Roe, “The Energy 
Charter Treaty” in Tarcisio Gazzini and Eric De Brabandere (eds), International Investment Law: the 
Sources of Rights and Obligations (Brill, 2012) 88-90; Marie-France Houde, “Novel Features in Recent 
OECD Bilateral Investment Treaties” in International Investment Perspectives 2006 Edition (OECD, 2006) 
147, 151, 154-155, 167, 169, 171, 176; Won Kidane, “The Sources and Content of Current International 
Investment Law” part III ch. 8 in Won Kidane (ed), China-Africa Dispute Settlement: The Law, Economics 
and Culture of Arbitration, International Arbitration Law Library Vol. 23 (Kluwer Law International, 2011) 
135, 141-142, 148, 152-153, 156-157; Howard Mann, International Economic Law: Water For Money’s 
Sake? (IISD, 2004) 15-16; Howard Mann, International Investment Agreements, Business and Human 
Rights: Key Issues and Opportunities (IISD, 2008) 36-38; Howard Mann and others, IISD Model 
International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development (IISD, 2005) 14; Howard Mann and 
Konrad von Moltke, A Southern Agenda on Investment? Promoting Development with Balanced Rights 
and Obligations for Investors, Host States and Home States (IISD, 2005) 3, 9-11; Lindsay Marchessault, 
“Recent Trends in International Investment Agreements in Asia” 8 TDM 1 (2011) 42-47; Graham Mayeda, 
“Sustainable International Investment Agreements: Challenges and Solutions for Developing Countries” in 
Sustainable Development in World Investment Law (2011) 549; Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore, 
Matthew Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles (OUP, 2007) 30; Kate 
Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, Environment and the Safeguarding of Capital 
(CUP, 2013) 365; Konrad von Moltke and Howard Mann, Towards A Southern Agenda on International 
Investment: Discussion Paper on the Role of International Investment Agreements (IISD, 2004) 15, 26-
28, 33; Peter Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises & the Law (OUP, 2007) 258-261; Peter Muchlinski, 
“Regulating Multinationals: Foreign Investment, Development, and the Balance of Corporate and Home 
Country Rights and Responsibilities in a Globalizing World” in Jose E. Alvarez and others (eds), The 
Evolving International Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options (Oxford Scholarship Online, 
2011) 34-38; Peter Muchlinski, “Policy Issues” in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, and Christoph 
Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP, 2008) 31-35; OECD, 
International Investment Perspectives 2004 (OECD, 2005) 116, 118, 120; OECD, Policy Framework for 
Investment: a Review of Good Practices (OECD, 2006) 28-29; Mohamed Oudebji, “Les accords 
internationaux sur l’investissement (AII) et l’Accord sur les MIC dans le contexte Africain” 5 TDM (2006) 
8, 12-13, 17; Luke Eric Peterson, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development Policy-Making (IISD, 
2004) 33-35; Patrick L. Robinson, “Criteria to Test the Development Friendliness of International 
Investment Agreements” 7(1) Transnational Corporations (April 1998) 87-88; Giorgio Sacerdoti, “Bilateral 
Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection” in 269 Hague Academy of International 
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Collins contributed significantly to our knowledge of PRPs. His recently published book provides 
a helpful overview of a number of PRPs that appear in IIAs.7 Nevertheless, the debate over 
performance requirements and the theoretical frameworks about performance requirements 
have centred on whether they should be allowed or prohibited and not on how treaty provisions 
that prohibit performance requirements should be drafted or how PRPs in IIAs should be 
interpreted or applied. This thesis has surveyed the existing literature on TRIMs and PRPs and 
has made use of it where possible. However, the existing literature has yet to produce scholarly 
schools of thoughts on drafting, interpreting or applying PRPs with which one could engage. 
Only arbitral tribunals have formulated views on such matters. This thesis engages fully with 
such views, in a critical manner where necessary, while inserting itself within the mainstream of 
scholarly research in the field of international investment law. 
With an estimated 3,304 IIAs signed by the end of 2015 (2,946 bilateral investment treaties 
(“BITs”) and 358 treaties with investment provisions (“TIPs”)),8 the area in which one may 
unearth PRPs is extremely vast. Nevertheless, no attempt has been undertaken to date to 
conduct an in-depth, systematic analysis of PRPs within a large number of IIAs: studies that 
discuss PRPs identify drafting patterns, but mention only a limited number of scattered 
examples which stunt the taking stock of the spread, frequency, recurrence and 
interconnectedness of PRPs in IIAs. This thesis demonstrates that a number of clear drafting 
patterns emerge among sampled PRPs, that States have resorted to multiple clauses and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Law Collected Courses (1997, Martinus-Nijhoff) 326, 363-368; Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of 
Investment Treaties (OUP, 2010) 130-131, 329-333; Jeswald W. Salacuse, “Towards a Global Treaty on 
Foreign Investment: The Search for a Grand Bargain” in Norbert Horn and Stefan Michael Kröll (eds), 
Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law International, 2004) 56, 66, 73-75; Pierre Sauvé, 
Americo Beviglia Zampetti, “International Investment” in Andrew T. Guzman and Alan O. Sykes (eds), 
Research Handbook in International Economic Law (Edward Elgar, 2007) 223-225; Muthucumaraswamy 
Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge Books Online, 2010) 111-112, 141-
142, 271; Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law 
International, 2000) 334-337; Wenhua Shan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment: a Comparative 
Study (Hart, 2012) 706-707; Wenhua Shan, “The Protection of Foreign Investment” in K.B. Brown and 
D.V. Snyder (eds.), General Reports of the XVIIIth Congress of the International Academy of 
Comparative Law/Rapports Généraux du XVIIIème Congrès de l’Académie Internationale de Droit 
Comparé (Springer, 2012) 488-489; Sūryaprasāda Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling 
Policy and Principle, 2nd ed (Hart, 2012) 36-38; Anastasia Telesetsky, “A New Investment Deal in Asia 
and Africa: Land Leases to Foreign Investors” in Chester Brown and Kate Miles (eds), Evolution in 
Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (CUP, 2011) 556-557; Friedl Weiss, “Trade and Investment” in 
Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law (OUP, 2008) 198-203, 209-210, 219; Jacob Werksman, Kevin A. Baumert and Navroz K. 
Dubash, “Will International Investment Rules Obstruct Climate Protection Policies? An Examination of the 
Clean Development Mechanism” 3 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 
59 (2003) 68, 75, 80. 
7 David Collins, Performance Requirements and Investment Incentives Under International Economic Law 
(Edward Elgar, 2015) 116-131. 




techniques to enlarge or confine the applicability of their PRPs, and that the specific wording of 
PRPs and exceptions, exclusions and/or reservations thereto must be strictly adhered to.  
2. The Interpretation of PRPs by Arbitral Tribunals is Underdeveloped and Generally 
Unsatisfactory 
PRPs fall squarely within public international law and the law of treaties more generally. 
Interpreting and applying PRPs are therefore rooted in rules of treaty interpretation and the 
various elements set forth in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties9 must be exploited to their fullest in providing guidance while accounting for the specific 
nature of each PRP. As will be demonstrated in this thesis, PRPs within distinct IIAs share 
common origins and have evolved in close relation to one another. Treaty interpretation rules 
call for their coherent interpretation and application10 while remaining fully attuned to their 
respective textual, contextual and purposive specificities in order to avoid “gloss[ing] over 
differences” between PRPs.11 
This approach contrasts sharply with the remissness of arbitral tribunals having dealt with PRPs 
to date, which has proven harmful to a proper understanding of PRPs and to their consistent 
and predictable application; their interpretative methodologies reveal shortcomings, detrimental 
patterns and a lack of comprehensiveness. The few analyses of arbitral awards having dealt 
with PRPs prove summary in nature and do not challenge the assertions, assumptions, 
underpinnings or the outcomes of such arbitral awards.12 
The decisions of arbitral tribunals to date have given the unfortunate impression that each PRP 
exists in a vacuum. The “hit or miss” interpretations, the lack of consistency and continuity, and 
                                                
9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [the 
“VCLT”]. 
10 Tomer Broude and Yuval Shany, “The International Law and Policy of Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms” 
in Tomer Broude and Yuval Shany (eds), Multi-sourced Equivalent Norms In International Law, Hart 
(2011) 14; Ulf Linderfalk, “Cross-Fertilisation in International Law,” 84(3) Nordic J. of Int’l L. 428 (2015) 
436, 445-446. 
11  Anne-Marie Carstens, “Interpreting Transplanted Treaty Rules” in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat, 
Matthew Windsor (eds), Interpretation in international law, Oxford University Press (2015) 234, 237. 
12 See e.g., R. Doak Bishop and William Russell, “Survey of Arbitration Awards Under Chapter 11 of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement” 19(6) Journal of International Arbitration 505 (2002) 551-556; 
Charles H. Brower II, “Mobil Investments Canada, Inc. and Murphy Oil Corp. v Canada, High Court, 22 
May 2012” in A contribution by the ITA Board of Reporters (Kluwer Law International, 2013) 8 p.; Charles 
H. Brower II, “S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, and Attorney General of Canada v. S.D. Myers, Inc., [2004] 
F.C. 38” 98(2) American Journal of International Law (2004) 339-348; Collins (n 7) 132-140; Barton 
Legum and Megi Medzmariashvili, “Chapter 30: Performance Requirements” in Meg N. Kinnear, 
Geraldine R. Fischer and others (eds), Building International Investment Law: The First 50 Years of ICSID 
(Kluwer Law International, 2015) 415-430; Rajeev Sharma, “Jurisprudence of NAFTA Article 1106: the 
Prohibition Against Performance Requirements” in Todd Weiler (ed), NAFTA Investment Law and 
Arbitration: Past Issues, Current Practice, Future Prospects (Transnational Publishers, 2004) 77-93. 
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the occasionally misguided and staunch refusal to look beyond the wording of treaty provisions 
have created a poorly endowed body of jurisprudence in respect of PRPs.  
This thesis contends in particular that the arbitral tribunals having interpreted and applied PRPs 
in IIAs misunderstood PRPs, exceptions to PRPs and reservations to PRPs. For example, the 
Mobil & Murphy Tribunal under the NAFTA (1992)13 and the Lemire Tribunal under the Ukraine - 
U.S. BIT (1994)14 opted for sharply contrasting yet equally misguided methods: the Mobil & 
Murphy Tribunal deliberately chose to ignore highly relevant additional sources of information 
pertaining to PRPs, while the approach of the Lemire Tribunal proved conveniently oblivious as 
to the clear wording and operation of the PRP at issue.  
The casual pleadings by disputing parties and analyses by arbitral tribunals on PRP may reflect 
the initial relative unimportance of PRPs as a basis for holding a respondent State liable in 
overall disputes. In all arbitrations except for Mobil & Murphy v Canada, the PRP proved a 
secondary issue given that a finding of liability could be argued more effectively on other, better-
known treaty provisions. NAFTA Article 1106 constituted the sole basis for State liability and for 
the award of damages only in Mobil & Murphy v Canada. Disputing parties had submitted the 
most in-depth arguments on a PRP and the Tribunal produced the most detailed reasons 
regarding a PRP to date. By contrast, the ADM Tribunal15 and the Cargill v Mexico Tribunal16 did 
not even bother considering whether their findings of violations of NAFTA Article 1106 entailed 
compensable damages, and instead focused their assessments of damages on other breached 
NAFTA provisions. 
The recurring lack of interest in PRPs likely has already vanished following the award of more 
than CDN$ 17 million plus interest in damages on the basis of NAFTA Article 1106 alone in 
Mobil & Murphy v Canada.17 As an example of such heightened interest, Mobil filed a Request 
for Arbitration seeking an award that would order Canada to pay damages in excess of CDN$ 
                                                
13 Mobil Investments Canada Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability and Principles of Quantum (22 May 2012); North American Free 
Trade Agreement, U.S. - Can. - Mex., signed 17 December 1992, entered into force 1 January 1994, 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993) (the “NAFTA”).  
14 Joseph Charles Lemire v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability 
(14 January 2010). 
15 Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/5, Award (21 November 2007) paras 261, 269, 295. 
16 Cargill, Incorporated v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award (18 September 
2009) paras 431, 520, 540. 
17 Attorney General of Canada v Mobil Investments Canada Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation, Application 
to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice for an Order Setting Aside the arbitral award made on 20 
February 2015 in Mobil Investments Canada Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v Government of Canada, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4 (19 May 2015). 
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20 million from 2012 onward in relation with a continuing violation of NAFTA Article 1106,18 
while Murphy submitted a Notice of Intent to submit a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim similarly seeking 
CDN$ 5 million in damages.19 
3. The Application of MFN Treatment Clauses to PRPs Remains Unexplored 
Heeding the specific language of each given treaty provision, MFN treatment clauses act as 
streams of undefined international obligations that originate outside of the basic treaty and 
whose existence may precede or follow that of MFN treatment clauses.20 MFN treatment 
clauses multilateralise and harmonise substantive investor protection instruments by elevating 
investor protection by a host State to the highest level conferred by any of its IIAs.21 However, a 
growing number of arbitral tribunals have demurred to the wholesale application of MFN 
treatment clauses. This trend began with investor-State dispute settlement (“ISDS”) and is now 
spreading to substantive investor protection standards. Arbitral tribunals have thus opened the 
door to a number of unpredictable exclusions with uncertain contours that may preclude the 
applicability of MFN treatment clauses in respect of substantive protection standards, including 
PRPs. 
Issues that might arise in relation with the application of MFN treatment clauses to substantive 
protection standards such as PRPs have been left largely unexplored. This thesis will draw from 
a hypothetical example to underline implications of MFN treatment clauses for PRPs. In 
analysing these implications, this thesis will appraise the application of MFN treatment clauses 
to substantive protection standards such as PRPs. Two assumptions are made for purposes of 
exploring such topic on the basis that “no less favourable” treatment within MFN treatment 
clauses of IIAs is meant to ensure equality of competitive opportunities between investors of 
different States.22 First, it is assumed that an IIA which comprises a PRP grants investors more 
favourable treatment than an IIA without a PRP. Second, it is assumed that a PRP which 
                                                
18 Mobil Investments Canada Inc. v Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/6, Notice of Intent with Annexes (16 
October 2014); Mobil Investments Canada Inc. v Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/6, Request for 
Arbitration (16 January 2015). 
19 Murphy Oil Corporation vs Government of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit A Claim to Arbitration 
Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven (16 October 2014). 
20 Pia Acconci, “Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment” in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph 
Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP, 2008) 365, 402, quoted in 
Patrick Dumberry, “The Importation of the FET Standard through MFN Clauses: An Empirical Study of 
BITs” ICSID Review (forthcoming) 3. 
21 Dumberry (n 20) 4, citing Stephan Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (CUP, 
2009) 142. 
22  Study Group on the Most-Favoured-Nation clause, Final Report, Annex to the Report of the 




imposes greater constraints on a State’s ability to adopt performance requirements confers 
more favourable treatment to investors than does a PRP that provides for fewer and narrower 
disciplines in respect of a State’s power to impose performance requirement.  
D. The Scope of this Thesis 
1. Exhaustive Overview of PRPs Within the IIAs of six Countries and Within Model 
BITs 
This thesis does not aim at completing an exhaustive analysis of the occurrences and variations 
of PRPs in all IIAs given the several hundreds of IIAs that could possibly comprise PRPs and 
the thousands of IIAs that would need to be consulted in order to determine whether they 
comprise PRPs. This thesis undertakes the first attempt at developing a detailed typology and 
analysis of PRPs in IIAs. This thesis exhaustively appraises the treaty practice of six States in 
order to provide additional insights as to the practice of States in drafting PRPs and the 
problems that may arise with their interpretation and application. 
First, the United States included a PRP in every BIT Model from 1981 onward and in all of its 
IIAs. The United States also made multiple submissions on performance requirement in the 
GATT forum. This thesis therefore closely scrutinises the American treaty practice on PRPs. 
Second, Canada’s treaty practice was singled out for being at the heart of the elaboration of 
PRPs since the mid-1980s. Canada and the United States negotiated Article 1603 of the 
Canada - United States Free Trade Agreement (“CUSFTA”)23 before replacing it with NAFTA 
Article 1106. NAFTA Article 1106 influenced a large number of subsequent PRPs and has 
generated all but one of the publicly available arbitral awards dealing with PRPs. Canada has 
included PRPs in its Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (“FIPA”) Models 
and in a large number of its IIAs. 
Third, India’s IIAs were added on the basis of having signed a large number of IIAs, of having 
developed a sophisticated approach to BITs as witnessed by its detailed Model Bilateral 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (“BIPA”), and of ensuring that at least one 
Asian country formed part of the sample of IIAs more closely analysed. Moreover, the tension 
between the opposing views on performance requirements of the United States and India 
shaped the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations on performance requirements. Their 
                                                
23 Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States 
of America, Ottawa, 22 December 1987 and 2 January 1988, Washington, 23 December 1987 and Palm 
Springs, 2 January 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) (“CUSFTA”), which includes a PRP in Article 1603. The 
CUSFTA applied between Canada and the United States prior to and was superseded for the greater part 
by the NAFTA. 
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respective treaty practice regarding PRPs could provide insights as to potentially diverging 
approaches to PRPs. Fourth, France was selected for having developed a unique, consistent, 
across the board and long-established practice of including PRPs in its BITs, as well as to 
ensure that the treaty practice of at least one European country formed part of the sample of 
IIAs comprehensively studied. Fifth, Australia was chosen for having developed an elaborate 
practice of signing BITs and various kinds of FTAs, for having recent and elaborate iterations of 
PRPs and for ensuring that the treaty practice of at least one Australasian country formed part 
of the sample of IIAs comprehensively studied. Sixth, Chile was identified on the basis that it 
had developed an elaborate practice of signing BITs and various kinds of FTAs, that it has 
recent, detailed and variable iterations of PRPs, and that the treaty practice of at least one Latin 
American country should form part of the sample of IIAs comprehensively studied. 
Accordingly, this thesis surveys a total of 414 publicly available IIAs entered into as of 1 May 
201624 by six countries: the United States, Australia, Canada, Chile, France and India (63 
American IIAs; 37 Australian IIAs; 50 Canadian IIAs; 81 Chilean IIAs; 107 French IIAs; 76 Indian 
IIAs). Care was given to avoiding the double-counting of IIAs between these same countries. 
Within this sample of 414 IIAs, 196 IIAs comprise treaty provisions which regulate performance 
requirements one way or another (United States: 60; Australia: 9; Canada: 40; Chile: 19; 
France: 64; India: 4). This thesis also scrutinises the publicly available Model BITs of 44 
countries, two non-governmental organisations (“NGOs”) and three intergovernmental 
organisations (“IGOs”), while focusing on the few Model BITs that comprise PRPs that have 
proven extremely influential in the development and spread of PRPs in IIAs. This sample 
provides the basis for the analysis of PRPs in IIAs that was undertaken in this thesis. 
2. Comprehensive Analysis of State Submissions on Performance Requirements and 
Subsidies in the GATT Uruguay Round of Negotiations 
For the first time, this thesis charts the evolution of PRPs over time and draws upon a number of 
State submissions produced within the multilateral trade context in order to shed greater light as 
to the meaning and scope of PRPs in IIAs. Multilateral, bilateral and regional treaty provisions 
on performance requirements apply to the same matter and often between States parties to 
both a given bilateral or regional IIA and to the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. 
Accordingly, the documentation pertaining to performance requirements in the context of the 
multilateral GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations can provide insights in interpreting and 
applying PRPs in IIAs and understanding the inner-workings and purposes of performance 
                                                
24 UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements Navigator, <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA> 
accessed 31 May 2016. 
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requirements. The articulation of the disciplines on performance requirements included within 
the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement can also help improve our understanding of 
PRPs in IIAs by comparing and contrasting the language of various treaty provisions. Moreover, 
PRPs in IIAs may simultaneously apply alongside PRPs in IIAs to a given situation; therefore, a 
comprehensive understanding of PRPs mandates the study of bilateral and regional as well as 
multilateral disciplines on performance requirements.  
3. Comprehensive Analysis of all Arbitral Awards Having Interpreted and Applied 
PRPs in IIAs 
PRPs have played a critical role in a limited number of investor-State disputes to date. Their 
application to unforeseen situations may raise similarly unforeseen dilemmas pertaining to the 
interpretation or application of PRPs. This thesis conducts the first critical and in-depth analysis 
of all arbitral awards which have decided claims based on PRPs within IIAs. Such analysis will 
provide guidance and caution over pitfalls that arise when interpreting and applying PRPs. Only 
two PRPs have been interpreted by arbitral tribunals thus far: Article II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. 
BIT (1994) and Article 1106 of the NAFTA (1992). This thesis expounds on the facts, measures 
at issue and (where available) disputing party submissions and critically assesses decisions of 
arbitral tribunals in respect of these two PRPs. Article II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. BIT forms part 
of the first-generation, open-ended PRPs and its interpretation will therefore be scrutinised first. 
NAFTA Article 1106 signalled the end of open-ended PRPs and constituted the main inspiration 
for PRPs with elaborate and exhaustive lists of performance requirements; its interpretation will 
therefore be appraised second. The analysis of arbitral awards will be conducted with a view to 
providing insights into critical interpretative and application issues of relevance to PRPs in IIAs 
generally.  
4. The Applicability of MFN Treatment Clauses to PRPs 
This thesis explores two scenarios in which the application of MFN treatment clauses to PRPs 
in IIAs can upend treaty rules applicable to performance requirements: first, invoking MFN 
treatment clauses to override narrower and more permissive PRPs with more State-constraining 
PRPs that better shield investors and investments from performance requirements; and second, 
relying upon MFN treatment clauses to import a PRP within an IIA absent any language 
regarding performance requirements in such IIA. These two scenarios would notably include 
instances where MFN treatment clauses would serve to import more State-constraining PRPs 
from prior IIAs into subsequent IIAs that include more permissive PRPs or no PRP; hence this 
thesis will also analyse the issue of antecedent third treaties.  
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This thesis therefore explores the following questions: can MFN treatment clauses serve to 
override a more permissive PRP with a more State-constraining PRP that better shields 
investors and investments from performance requirements? Can MFN treatment clauses serve 
to import a PRP within an IIA absent any language regarding performance requirements in such 
IIA? Can MFN treatment clauses serve to import prior and more State-constraining PRPs from 
an older IIA into a more recent IIA so as to override its more recent, but more permissive PRP?  
To date, no arbitral tribunal has applied MFN treatment clauses to PRPs. As a result, this thesis 
explores arbitral awards dealing more generally with the relationship between MFN treatment 
clauses and substantive investor treaty protections in order to assess how arbitral tribunals 
might apply MFN treatment clauses to PRPs in the future.  
By way of summary, this thesis implements a conventional legal analysis by resorting to detailed 
and comparative textual analyses of PRPs in IIAs, while factoring in the purposes that underlie 
PRPs, the origins of such treaty provisions, principles of treaty interpretation and interpretations 
of PRPs by arbitral tribunals. Every PRP quoted in this thesis was carefully reviewed and 
analysed and every IIA forming part of surveyed treaty practice was reviewed to determine 
whether or not it comprised a PRP of its own. This conventional legal analysis which 
implements standards methodologies for legal research yields a detailed typology of PRPs in 
IIAs, a better understanding of the policy choices that orient the decision to prohibit or allow 
performance requirements, and a helpful analytical framework for drafting, interpreting and/or 
applying PRPs in IIAs. 
E. Overview of this Thesis 
This thesis notably provides an overview of variations of PRPs in IIAs. The exercise of 
identifying and cataloguing differences among the wide array of PRPs allows us to chart their 
“measure of difference” while isolating their “core of equivalence.”25 Part II sets out performance 
requirements and their general objectives, the closely related concept of TRIMs, the 
ubiquitously concomitant investment incentives and the reasons that have compelled a number 
of States to prohibit performance requirements.  
Part III explains why systemic integration and cross-fertilisation are needed to develop a proper 
understanding of PRPs in IIAs and begins by highlighting that PRPs constitute multi-sourced 
equivalent norms (“MSENs”) and transplanted treaty rules. Part III also ascertains the role that 
Model BITs and pioneering IIAs have played in the drafting of PRPs, and notably the influence 
                                                
25 Broude and Shany (n 10) 9. 
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of the American approach toward PRPs. The United States and France actively sought the 
prohibition of performance requirements outside of the GATT during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Their Model BITs comprise PRPs that made their way, integrally or with alterations, into nearly 
all American and French BITs. Moreover, PRPs within American IIAs (including the NAFTA) 
reverberated throughout a large number of non-American IIAs. Part III further explains that 
PRPs in IIAs should be understood in a systemic manner and together with the TRIMs 
Agreement and the SCM Agreement due to their shared origins, their interconnectedness and 
their mutually reinforcing influence. Finally, Part III discusses Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, 
critically appraises the interpretation of PRPs made by prior arbitral tribunals, and calls upon 
arbitral tribunals to make full use of means identified in such provisions when interpreting and 
applying PRPs in IIAs, to the extent that disputing party submissions allow them to conduct such 
analysis.  
Part IV of this thesis aims at developing a comprehensive typology and analysis of PRPs in 
surveyed IIAs that highlights the most frequently recurring variations and prevalent prototypes. 
Part IV first covers non-binding PRPs with narrow coverage. The second section of Part IV 
discusses the applicability of the GATT to performance requirements, the GATT Uruguay Round 
of negotiations on TRIMs, and the disciplines applicable to performance requirements under the 
TRIMs Agreement. The second section then shifts its focus to PRPs which incorporate in whole 
or in part the TRIMs Agreement, as well as to interpretation and application issues that arise in 
respect of such PRPs. The third section of Part IV expands on the interpretative challenge 
posed by open-ended PRPs in IIAs signed by the United States, France and India and fleshes 
out the content and outer limits of such open-ended PRPs by resorting to lists of performance 
requirements submitted by these same States during the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations. 
The third section of Part IV further discusses the interpretation of open-ended PRPs and 
critically assesses the interpretation and application of the PRP at issue carried out by the 
arbitral tribunal in Lemire v Ukraine.  
The fourth section of Part IV focuses on detailed and exhaustive PRPs in IIAs, the paradigm 
shift that followed Article 1106 of the NAFTA (1992), the prevalent prototypes and their 
pervasiveness. The fourth section of Part IV also proposes a working list of performance 
requirements used in PRPs of IIAs whose terms have acquired settled meanings. The fourth 
section of Part IV then maps out the practice of prohibiting detailed lists of mandatory 
performance requirements in PRPs of IIAs and complements such analysis by taking stock of 
arbitral awards having interpreted and applied PRPs in relation to specific performance 
requirements that lied at the heart of PRP-based disputes to date. 
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The fifth section of Part IV analyses PRPs and their (in)applicability to advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements. The fifth section begins with an analysis of the scope and coverage 
of disciplines applicable to advantage-conditioning performance requirements under the TRIMs 
Agreement and the SCM Agreement. The fifth section then moves onto advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements under PRPs in IIAs. The fifth section draws upon the interpretation of 
the term “benefit” as used in the SCM Agreement and carried out in the context of WTO dispute 
settlement in order to shed greater light upon the meaning of the term “advantage” in the TRIMs 
Agreement and in PRPs of IIAs. This section also takes a closer look at the interpretation and 
application of prohibitions of advantage-conditioning performance requirements and notably the 
meaning assigned to the term “advantage” by arbitral tribunals. The sixth section of Part IV 
identifies PRPs that appear in one of or in both trade and investment chapters of TIPs and 
inquires into the reasons that could explain opting for one or more PRPs within a single TIP or 
for a PRP only in a State-to-State, trade-driven chapter. 
Part V of this thesis delves into multiple recurring features that modulate the scope and 
coverage of PRPs in surveyed IIAs, including clarifying provisions, exceptions, exclusions, 
exemptions or reservations. In doing so, Part V contrasts, PRPs that apply to all investments 
with PRPs that apply only to investments of covered investors, as well as PRPs that apply to 
pre-establishment and post-establishment phases of an investment with PRPs that applies to a 
limited number of investment phases. Part V also critically assesses the need for a connection 
between an investment and a performance requirement and arbitral awards having decided on 
such connection issues. Part V then appraises how the opposition between the characteristics 
of measures and their effects played out in arbitral awards on PRPs. 
Part V also investigates the drafting options of States in order to modulate and tailor the breadth 
and applicability of their PRPs and to ensure that States retain sufficient regulatory latitude in 
order to achieve critical policy-making objectives. Finally, Part V analyses interpretation and 
application issues that arise in respect of two types of restrictions to PRPs: provisions that 
exempt government procurement in whole or in part from disciplines on performance 
requirements, and reservations that shield sensitive non-conforming measures or strategically 
important sectors from PRPs.  
Part VI of this thesis anticipates on the consequences of variations in scope and coverage 
between various PRPs by appraising their disruptive broadening by virtue of MFN treatment 
clauses. Part VI assesses the currently straightforward applicability of MFN treatment clauses to 
substantive protection standards and identifies foreseeable cracks in such consensus that could 
complicate the application of MFN treatment clauses to PRPs.  
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Part VII sets out the findings of this thesis and formulates proposals that can help interpret and 
apply existing PRPs and draft future PRPs in a more deliberate and informed way. 
II. Characteristics and General Objectives of Performance 
Requirements and PRPs 
The concept of “‘performance requirement’ is not an unambiguous term,” its meaning likely to 
shift depending notably on the industry sector at issue and on whether goods or services are 
concerned.26 This part will first appraise scholarly and non-treaty-based attempts at defining the 
expression “performance requirement.” Since characterising a measure as a performance 
requirement hinges on “not only the nature, but the end-purpose of a government measure,”27 
this part will identify, in a second section, the legion of purposes pursued through performance 
requirements. The third section of this part will analyse the congenitally dual purposes of PRPs: 
ensuring the operational freedom of investors and lasting trade benefits for home States that 
export goods, services and capital. The fourth section highlights the near inseparability of 
advantages and performance requirements as part of a quid pro quo. 
A. Conceptual Characteristics of Performance Requirements and the Absence 
of a Universally Accepted Definition 
Performance requirements influence the quantity, quality and location of investment 28  by 
increasing or reducing its profitability, by altering its risks, by modifying the location and scale of 
production or by affecting an investor’s import or export decisions.29 They amount to investment 
measures because of their application in connection with authorising an investor to establish, 
acquire, expand or operate an investment in a host country or as pre-conditions to the granting 
of an advantage to an investor.30 Performance requirements act as investment disincentives 
                                                
26  Government of Norway, Comments on the Model for Future Investment Agreements – English 
Translation, 19 December 2007, 25; Government of Norway, Comments on the Individual Provisions of 
the Model Agreement, 13 May 2015, 12. 
27 OECD Secretariat, Conceptual Framework for the Study on International Investment Incentives and 
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Cordier Essay)” 48(1) Journal of International Affairs 251 (Summer, 1994), 253, 264; Guisinger (n 28) 81; 
Theodore H. Moran and Charles S. Pearson, “Tread Carefully in the Field of TRIP Measures” 11(1) The 
World Economy 119 (March 1988), 119; A.E. Safarian, “Investment-Related Trade Issues” in William R. 
Cline (ed), Trade Policy in the 1980s (Institute for International Economics 1983) 613. 
30 European Communities (“EC”), Submission to the GATT Group of Negotiations on Goods – Negotiating 
Group on Trade-Related Investment Measures, MTN.GNG/NG12/W/8 (23 June 1987) 1-2; OECD 
Secretariat, Note on Trade-Related Investment Measures for the Working Party of The Trade Committee, 
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when they compel an investor to conduct its activities contrary to its own best interests.31 
Performance requirements can be understood as “a special category of [investment] 
disincentives that direct an investor to buy from or sell to certain markets.”32 
Performance requirements impose specific operational undertakings upon investors and/or their 
investments33 with a view to serving specific national objectives of the host State.34 Performance 
requirements act as policy instruments for achieving broadly-defined economic and 
developmental objectives, especially industrial and technological development objectives.35 
Although performance requirements were initially construed as imposed upon foreign 
investors,36 the concept now encompasses any condition imposed on domestic or foreign 
investors in a discriminatory or non-discriminatory fashion.37 Performance requirements may 
prescribe the use of inputs or outputs,38 that purchases be made from specific sources or that 
                                                                                                                                                       
TC/WP(87)37 (6 April 1987) (“OECD, First Note on TRIMs”) 4-5, 7, quoting a 1982 study by the United 
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2005) 9. 
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S. Pearson, Trade Related Investment Performance Requirements (study for the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (“OPIC”), March 1987) 9. 
32 Guisinger (n 28) 81; Moran and Pearson, “Careful With TRIPs” (n 29), 120; OECD, First Note on TRIMs 
(n 30) 9. 
33 United States Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis), U.S. Direct Investments 
Abroad, 1977 Benchmark Survey Data, U.S. Government Printing Office (April 1981) 8; WTO Secretariat, 
The Impact of Investment Incentives and Performance Requirements on International Trade, Working 
Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, WTO Doc WT/WGTI/W/56, 30 September 
1998, para 14. 
34 Office of Int’l Finance and Investment, Industry and Trade Admin., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Incentives 
and Performance Requirements for Foreign Direct Investments in Selected Countries 1 (1978), as quoted 
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Response” 14 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1159 (1982-1983), 1181 fn 169; United States, Investment 
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sales be made to specific markets.39 
To some extent, all investment policies inherently distort FDI flows among countries and 
therefore distort trade and production patterns. 40  Performance requirements have been 
described as “the unique barrier that links trade and investment.”41 One way of narrowing the 
field and refining the analysis has consisted of distinguishing between investment measures 
which merely affect trade remotely or indirectly and investment measures which effectively 
distort and/or restrict trade by focusing directly on trade considerations such as exports or 
imports.42 The broader concept of performance requirements therefore encompasses TRIMs, a 
more limited group of measures which basically aim at increasing the exports generated by an 
investment or the proportion of local inputs used by an investment.  
Beyond these general characteristics common to most definitions of performance requirements, 
one must underline the inescapable conclusion that “there is no commonly accepted definition 
of either TRIMs or performance requirements.”43 The multiplication of concepts often add to the 
prevalent confusion since they do not carry universally recognised meanings.44  
Attempts at defining performance requirements do not reflect strictly economic or empirical 
considerations, but rather expediency, practicality and political feasibility, with a view to 
developing a “workable definition.”45 Definitions lack comprehensiveness and definitiveness and 
are not meant to provide a “rigid definitional framework:” they often serve merely as a starting 
                                                
39 Guisinger (n 28) 81. 
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point to ground analyses and to calibrate survey and data collection efforts.46 Definitions often 
skip the conceptual implications and put forward illustrative lists based on a list of priority 
considerations and accompanied by concrete examples of the measures entertained.47  
In this respect, this thesis follows the lead of GATT Members during the negotiation of the 
TRIMs Agreement by defining performance requirements mainly by resorting to illustrative lists 
of measures described as performance requirements and by providing concrete examples of 
such performance requirements. 
B. General Objectives of Performance Requirements 
The myriad measures that can be grouped under the designation of “performance requirements” 
have been invoked as policy instruments in order to achieve numerous objectives pertaining 
directly or indirectly to trade. Generally speaking, States adopt performance requirements with a 
view to maximising the beneficial impacts of FDI on the economy, to bolstering, diversifying and 
expanding a State’s industrial base notably through new products or processes, and to 
increasing the generation of value added from FDI.48 
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Performance requirements are undeniably mercantilist in nature. Many performance 
requirements aim at reducing imports and increasing local production as substitution, regardless 
of the cost of such a policy to the host State or to other States.49 Simply put, many performance 
requirements aim at improving a State’s balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves 
through the reduction of imports and the increase of exports.50 Performance requirements can 
also be understood as instruments through which a host State attempts to appropriate “‘excess’ 
rents” of foreign investments.51 
Performance requirements may also aim to achieve objectives beyond trade. Side effects on 
imports or exports do not always fully explain the motivations behind such measures.52 In the 
1970s, developing countries challenged the neo-classical/traditional economic understanding 
that international investment flows reflect properly functioning free-market competition for fear 
that in the absence of corrective measures, the wealth generated by FDI would find its way back 
to the States of origin, designated as “home States,” of multinational corporations (“MNCs”) and 
other foreign investors.53 Such challenge rested on the view that industry sectors in which 
international investment is concentrated are often characterised by oligopolistic market 
structures and by barriers to the entry of competitors.54 Faced with such imperfect market 
conditions, numerous host States thus embarked on pro-active agendas using performance 
                                                                                                                                                       
Policy” 1(10) World Development (October 1973) 1, 2; UNCTAD, FDI & Performance Requirements (n 5) 
7; Feng Wang, International Law and the Evolving Legal Regime of Foreign Direct Investment - A 
Developing Country's Perspective, thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law in conformity with the 
requirements for the degree of Master of Laws (Queen’s University, 2000) 118-122; Allan W. Wolff, 
“Prepared Statement on behalf of the LICIT” in U.S. Senate Investment Policy Hearings (defined in this 
same footnote above) 36. 
49 Graham (n 42) 121. 
50 Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (“METI”), “Chapter 9: Trade-Related Investment 
Measures,” in 2014 Report on Compliance by Major Trading Trade Partners with Trade Agreements – 
WTO, FTA/EPA, BIT, 503; Nagesh Kumar, “Performance Requirements as Tools of Development Policy: 
Lessons From Developed and Developing Countries” in Kevin Gallagher and Alice H. Amsden (eds), 
Putting Development First: the Importance of Policy Space in the WTO and IFIs, Zed Books (2005) 180; 
OECD, Second Note on TRIMs (n 48) para 8; UNCTAD, WIR 2003 (n 37) 119. 
51 Graham (n 42) 121; Theodore H. Moran, “The Product Cycle Model of Foreign Direct Investment and 
Developing Country Welfare” 6(4) Journal of International Management 297 (2000) 310; Peter J. Buckley, 
“Government Policy Responses to Strategic Rent-Seeking Transnational Corporations” 5(2) 
Transnational Corporations (August 1996), 2. Rents can be defined as excess or above-normal profits 
beyond the minimum necessary to ensure that a business venture or entity remains in operation: see 
James A. Brander, “Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy,” in Paul R. Krugman (ed), 
Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (MIT Press, 1986) 26. 
52 GATT Secretariat, Note on the Meeting of 13-17 June 1988, GATT Group of Negotiations on Goods – 
Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Investment Measures, MTN.GNG/NG12/7 (12 July 1988) para 40. 
53 “Prepared Statement of C. Fred Bergsten” in U.S. Senate Investment Policy Hearings (n 48) 13, 18; 
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, “Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime” 19 Mich. J. 
Int'l L. 373 (1998) 391. 
54 McCulloch and Owen (n 48) 336; WTO and UNCTAD (n 43) 39, 60-61. 
 
 19 
requirements to enrol FDI in their pursuit of social and economic objectives.55  
Most notably, States may use performance requirements in response to two types of market 
imperfections. First, market externality imperfections reflecting a host State’s failure to fully 
capitalise on externalities56 generated by economic activities of foreign investors. A host State 
may impose performance requirements as instruments to improve its capacity to absorb 
spillovers from foreign investors (such as their technological and production know-how), for 
example by improving the number and skillset of local jobs, local employment and local training 
requirements, as well as local R&D requirements. Performance requirements can also help 
foster additional linkages between foreign investors and the local economy by creating 
backward linkages, i.e., commercial relations between subsidiaries of foreign investors in a host 
State and local suppliers of inputs (components, accessories or services) that such subsidiaries 
need in order to produce their goods or deliver their services.57 
Second, performance requirements can also serve to counter market power imperfections 
manifested by the control that parent MNCs may exert by over the operations of their 
subsidiaries through restrictive business practices (“RBPs”). 58  MNCs orchestrate global 
production strategies by allocating tasks to specific subsidiaries which do not always correspond 
to market conditions or economic competitiveness that prevail in their respective host States.59  
For example, export performance requirements (“EPRs”) may be aimed at counteracting a 
subsidiary’s orders from MNC headquarters not to export its production meant to supply the 
host State’s domestic market. As another example, local content requirements (“LCRs”) and 
local sourcing requirements (“LSRs”) may be aimed at encouraging the substitutive use of 
domestic product components or accessories by a subsidiary which is otherwise ordered to 
import goods produced within its MNC’s network abroad. As a third example, technology 
transfer requirements may aim at combating restrictions placed upon a subsidiary by its MNC 
which prevent the use of the MNC’s most advanced technologies in the subsidiary’s host 
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56 Externalities arise when foreign investors generate benefits, such as technological and production 
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Finally, infant industry considerations have served to justify reliance on performance 
requirements to the benefit of domestic producers. The infant-industry argument rests on 
protecting first entrants by delaying the entry of outside competitors onto the domestic market 
created by first entrants while they recover their start-up costs associated with learning 
production processes and while they create a local sales base.61 For example, enacting LCRs 
and LSRs could guarantee nascent local suppliers a market share and shield them from the 
competitive pressures of mature worldwide suppliers.  
C. The Ubiquitous Presence of Advantages Alongside Performance 
Requirements 
While States impose performance requirements as standalone mandatory requirements, they 
also directly condition the conferral of investment incentives upon compliance with performance 
requirements. This section explains the intricate relationship between investment incentives 
(referred to as “advantages” in the TRIMs Agreement and in IIAs) and performance 
requirements. Investment incentives and performance requirements are highly correlated.62 
Investment incentives are used as part of wider efforts to redress the balance of payments, to 
encourage the development of specific regions, to create or maintain jobs, and/or to accelerate 
industrialisation.63 Host States strive to improve their industrial expertise by counting on the 
contribution of foreign-owned subsidiaries within their borders while they do not dispose of their 
own domestic firms with comparable expertise. Foreign subsidiaries that operate in host States 
are owned by or related to parent corporations located in home States where the major and 
most advanced production processes in a given industry sector take place. As a result, host 
States face an uphill battle when they try to convince foreign investors to undertake some of 
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their more sophisticated operations in the host State’s territory. 64  Investment incentives 
influence the location of FDI by increasing the attractiveness of host States offering them.65 Host 
States must offer foreign investors “more-than-compensating incentives to invest”66 for them to 
relocate their more value-added operations within their borders. Host States impose 
performance requirements that may sometimes induce costs for investors67 in part in order to 
recoup part of the cost of investment incentives.68 Host States thus trigger a bargaining process 
between a host State and a foreign investor.69 While incentive and performance requirement 
packages70 can be negotiated on a case-by-case basis, States can also set out such packages 
in regulations that condition the conferral of incentives on compliance with specified 
performance requirements.71 
D. Prohibiting Performance Requirements Aims at Ensuring the Operational 
Freedom of Investors and Lasting Trade Benefits for Home States 
Trade and FDI have become inseparable as a result of the operations of MNCs: MNCs scatter 
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various operations within their production chains in different countries according to cost-benefit 
considerations and in order to avail themselves of the best options in terms of production and 
sale. In some instances, MNCs engage in transactions that fall within trade policies of States 
(the cross-border sales of goods or services), while in others MNCs opt for cross-border 
investment (notably by purchasing production or sales facilities within different States), with the 
resulting FDI flows falling within investment policies of States. MNCs thus contributed to the 
creation of integrated cross-border trade and investment networks.  
The convergence of trade and investment within operations of MNCs prompted a similar 
convergence within State policies. Performance requirements and their prohibition in a number 
of IIAs provide examples of such convergence. Performance requirements initially became a 
concern on the basis of trade considerations from the vantage point of home States (as 
opposed to that of their investors abroad). Home States realised that they had much to gain 
from increased outward FDI.72 If guaranteed operational freedom, subsidiaries of MNCs abroad 
would likely choose, as suppliers of product components or accessories or as service providers, 
corporations related through their common MNC links and located in the home States of MNC 
subsidiaries abroad. Such purchases would increase exports originating in the home State and 
stimulate outward-oriented domestic production of home States.  
The following remarks stem from documentation pertaining to the American foreign investment 
policy, but they reflect a reality shared by all capital-exporting countries. The United States 
considered that additional American outward FDI would spur American exports to and economic 
activity in developing countries, that the interests of all countries mandated free-flowing FDI, and 
that such openness toward FDI would foster the growth of international trade.73 The American 
approach to IIAs clearly insisted on the interconnectedness of investment and trade:74 American 
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IIAs also serve American commercial interests and are also meant to generate trade benefits.75  
The American policy towards performance requirements underlines “investment and trade as 
two sides of the same coin” and that “the ability to invest in manufacturing, sales and service 
operations is a primary vehicle of trade.”76 Outward FDI generates significant demand for home-
State exports of goods and services,77 since foreign subsidiaries are the “best customers” of 
home-State exporters.78 Establishing foreign subsidiaries and having “on-site presences” proved 
essential for providing the necessary services in the insurance, banking and computer sectors 
abroad and for maximising sales and distribution networks.79  
Prohibiting performance requirements gained traction in the United States at the same time as 
an increase in American outward FDI during the 1970s.80 From the vantage point of the neo-
classical economic theory embraced among others by the United States, 81  performance 
requirements clearly distort trade and investment flows, negatively impact global and host State 
welfare (through misallocation of resources and nullification of international comparative 
advantage) 82  and potentially disrupt investment decisions compared to business-as-usual 
scenarios.83 The United States considered that some performance requirements (and notably 
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LCRs) can cancel out the positive effects of outward FDI for a home State by reducing both 
home-State exports and host-State imports.84 American labour and industry representatives 
expressed concerns over trade-distorting performance requirements due to their negative 
effects on home States which include “direct transfers of investment, jobs and production to the 
country which imposes them – and away from other countries.”85 Performance requirements 
were criticised as “a new form of beggar-thy-neighbour policy” whose alleged and at best 
minimal increase the economic welfare of the host State imposing them would come at the 
expense of other countries. 86  Performance requirements were also viewed as threats to 
America’s manufacturing base.87 The United States considered that performance requirements 
(notably LCRs, EPRs and technology transfer requirements) can deprive American producers of 
foreign market access, increased exports, and of the repatriation of specialised knowledge 
acquired thanks to increased commercial activity in host States.88 
The United States aimed at eliminating performance requirements for both trade and investment 
considerations. Performance requirements reduce balance of trade benefits generated by FDI 
that would otherwise accrue to home States by reducing American exports that can reach 
American subsidiaries abroad and domestic markets of host States. 89  Performance 
requirements further distort FDI flows.90 Performance requirements therefore became a home-
State/foreign subsidiary issue as well as a trade/investment issue. While export ambitions of 
home States originally drove PRPs, performance requirements fall on a fault line common to 
trade and to investment policies by causing potential distortions to both trade and investment.91 
PRPs in American IIAs, in the same way as was noted for Article 1106 of the NAFTA (1992) and 
more generally in the same way as most if not all PRPs in IIAs, are meant to achieve two 
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distinct objectives: first, PRPs are meant to eliminate trade-distorting performance requirements, 
and second, PRPs eliminate performance requirements which hinder entrepreneurial autonomy 
and side-line investors’ best judgment and business-as-usual decision-making in exchange for 
politically-motivated objectives.92 PRPs in IIAs aim at addressing the dual distorting impact of 
performance requirements on both investment and trade.93 PRPs are meant to do so in a 
number of ways: first, by increasing foreign market access for foreign investors and home-State 
exports; second, by preventing the compulsory export of production by investors; third, by 
eliminating host-State import restrictions on investors; and fourth, by freeing investors to source 
their inputs from producers based abroad (instead of using low-quality and overpriced domestic 
substitutes).94  
The previous overview depicted the main features and objectives of performance requirements. 
This depiction highlighted characteristics common to all performance requirements, but also that 
different types of performance requirements exist and that objectives vary among these different 
categories of performance requirements. The previous overview also explained the main 
motivations for prohibiting performance requirements. While numerous justifications exist for 
prohibiting performance requirements, these same justifications underpin all PRPs within the 
surveyed IIAs. The following part focuses on the reasons that explain the numerous shared 
traits of PRPs within the surveyed IIAs reflect and their similar or identical wordings, in addition 
to the common purposes that drive these PRPs and to the fact that they apply to the same sets 
of measures. 
III. Systemic Integration and Cross-Fertilisation for a Proper 
Understanding of PRPs in IIAs 
This part develops these three main ideas in turn. First, PRPs systematically reproduce a pre-
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existing PRP from a prior IIA or Model BIT. Second, the U.S. BIT Programme proved highly 
influential for PRPs in IIAs. Third, the TRIMs Agreement, the SCM Agreement and PRPs in IIAs 
are joined at the hip. These three ideas justify cross-fertilisation and systemic integration when 
interpreting and applying PRPs in IIAs. The fourth section of this part critically appraises the 
interpretation of PRPs made by prior arbitral tribunals and recommends that the interpretation of 
PRPs in IIAs reflect and enhance these synergies.  
Cross-fertilisation can be defined as the process of understanding legal expressions through 
analysing the relationships and interactions between the various manifestations of such legal 
expressions.95  The “principle of systematic integration” stands for interpreting international 
obligations by reference to their wider normative environment.96 Cross-fertilisation and systemic 
integration between PRPs scattered in autonomous and seemingly unrelated treaties can be 
justified in substantive terms (through the origins, content and wording of PRPs) and 
methodological terms (through treaty interpretation rules), which highlight the close 
interrelatedness and interconnectedness between PRPs found within a great number of IIAs 
and whose understanding can be improved by drawing up commonalities and differences.97 
A. PRPs Must be Understood in a Systemic Fashion: PRPs as MSENs and 
Transplanted Treaty Rules 
In substantive terms, PRPs can first be likened through their common substantive content and 
can be characterised as treaty-based “legal utterances” (or terms of art) and as “multi-sourced 
equivalent norms (MSENs).”98  PRPs share many common features, while many are even 
identically worded. Moreover, PRPs address the same concerns, they propose similar solutions 
and “point in the same direction,” and distinct PRPs can prove binding upon the same States 
and/or investors. Pooling the analysis of the various kinds of treaties (bilateral, regional, 
multilateral investment and/or trade treaties) in which the related concepts “performance 
requirements” and “TRIMs” are used can enhance our understanding of PRPs by providing us 
with numerous helpful insights. 
Along similar substantive lines, PRPs in IIAs can be construed as “transplanted treaty rules:” 
“transplantation” can be defined as the incorporation of pre-existing treaty rules into a 
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subsequent treaty between different parties.99 Transplanted treaty rules can be traced back to 
“source rules,” i.e. the original treaty rules from which transplanted treaty rules are derived.100 
With respect to PRPs in IIAs, source rules consist of one or more of the following: the TRIMs 
Agreement and related negotiating documents produced during the Uruguay Round, Article 3 of 
the SCM Agreement pertaining to prohibited subsidies (when conditioned to LCRs or EPRs), 
previously signed BITs and TIPs which include PRPs, as well as the U.S. BIT Programme, 
related U.S. Model BITs and Model BITs of other countries, NGOs or IGOs.  
Negotiating State Parties resort to transplanted PRPs in order to ensure legal uniformity of 
PRPs under international law, in order to improve the efficiency of negotiations and in order to 
avoid rehashing controversial topics and risking an uncertain outcome.101 Heightened difficulties 
can be encountered when interpreting PRPs far removed from the source rules and thus 
isolated from additional materials that could shed light onto their meaning, purpose and scope 
and coverage: source treaty provisions are debated more extensively and generate greater 
scrutiny than subsequent transplanted treaty rules, which often give rise to little discussion or 
negotiation.102 Moreover, there is a risk that transplanted PRPs are incorporated into IIAs 
without a comprehensive awareness by all Parties to the IIAs as to their ramifications and 
subtleties; that is especially true when a sharp contrast exists between the respective prior 
experiences of Parties with drafting and having to comply with PRPs.103 Acknowledging an 
otherwise undisclosed transplantation when interpreting transplanted PRPs can help improve 
the interpretation of PRPs and provide us with insights that only the identification of the exact 
origins of PRPs can yield.104  
B. PRPs in IIAs Systematically Replicate PRPs of Model BITs and/or of 
Previous IIAs 
1. The Few Model BITs that Comprise PRPs, as Well as the PRPs of Pioneering IIAs, 
Have Proven Extremely Influential 
PRPs appear only in a handful of Model BITs. Based on the Model BITs made available by 
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UNCTAD,105 the Model BITs of only six countries (out of 44)106 and one NGO107 comprise PRPs. 
The Model BITs of one NGO108 and two IGOs109 reject PRPs. Nevertheless, as will be discussed 
in greater detail below, some of the few Model BITs to comprise PRPs, especially those of 
Canada, France and the United States, as well as Article 1106 of the NAFTA (1992) and Article 
V(2) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) have been extremely influential in the development 
and spread of PRPs in IIAs and multiple instances of transplanted PRPs can be identified. 
Negotiating BITs on the basis of a model BIT is reminiscent of transplantation, with the 
difference that the source rule of a PRP included in such a BIT could be traced back to the PRP 
of a model BIT.110  
2. The U.S. BIT Programme, Spearhead of PRPs 
This section shows that the U.S. BIT Programme was meant to create new rules of international 
law and to influence its development, and that to this end, the United States deliberately 
attempted to sign uniform BITs. The U.S. BIT Programme proved highly influential for the 
development of PRPs in IIAs. While France also included its own distinct type of PRPs in its 
BITs starting in the early 1980s, the French approach to PRPs did not repeat itself among 
surveyed IIAs beyond French IIAs. By comparison, many PRPs in IIAs, both American and non-
American, find their origins in pre-existing PRPs from prior American IIAs or Model BITs.  
a) The U.S. BIT Programme Created and Exerted a Profound Influence on International 
Law  
The contribution of American outward FDI to American exports legitimised the interest in 
investment matters of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) who exercised 
oversight jurisdiction over the U.S. BIT Programme from its very beginnings.111 The USTR 
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completed the first version of a U.S. Model BIT in December 1981, announced it in January 
1982 and which came in handy as soon as January 1982 when BIT negotiations were launched 
in earnest.112 The United States developed multiple Model BITs in quick succession, especially 
in the early years of the U.S. BIT Programme, in response to a constant feedback loop provided 
by unfolding BIT negotiations from the 1980s onward: American Model BITs were produced in 
1983, 1984, 1987, 1991, 1994, 2004113 and 2012.114 The United States began referring to the 
PRP as a “core provision” of its BITs in the course of signing American BITs from the end of the 
1980s onward.115 For instance, the submittal letter accompanying the Sri Lanka - U.S. BIT 
enumerated six main objectives of BITs, adding as second objective freedom from performance 
requirements.116 The United States considered PRPs as one of “six basic guarantees” within its 
BITs. 117  The United States confirmed that PRPs constituted a key objective of its BIT 
Programme and made it clear that it sought to include PRPs in all of its BITs.118  
American BITs were negotiated in three waves: first, from 1980-1982 to 1986, second from 
1989 to 1999, and third from 2004 onward, when FTAs with investment chapters became the 
norm and BITs the exception.119 American BITs included PRPs from their inception; PRPs 
followed a curve of increasing complexity via exceptions and increasing detail.120 The U.S. BIT 
Programme primarily aimed at creating a body of State practice that supported, reaffirmed and 
amplified American views on the protection of foreign investment under international law,121 that 
locked-in key host countries, and that contributed to bringing about a “pro-investment 
consensus” which would reverberate notably on the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations and 
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on NAFTA negotiations. 
b) The U.S. BIT Programme Uncompromisingly Strove for a Uniform Outcome 
The United States sought to avoid departures from the Model BIT and adopted an intransigent 
negotiating stance in the hope of creating a uniform body of State practice through its BITs.122 It 
entered into BITs only when the outcome would closely resemble its Model; few variations 
among BITs were anticipated when the United States began its implementation of the U.S. BIT 
Programme 123  and the United States eventually concluded many BITs with very similar 
content.124 In order to ensure the greatest conformity possible between its BITs and its Model 
BITs and to leave the main text of the BIT unchanged, the United States would place 
clarifications, altering language and other departures from the Model BIT in protocols to BITs.125 
Through their bilateral negotiations, the United States was “advocating global standards, not ad 
hoc standards for each country” and sought the same standards regardless of the signatory 
country.126 
The United States rejected opting for greater flexibility in its U.S. Model BIT. It refused to 
prioritise provisions on dispute settlement, transfer of funds and expropriation while sacrificing 
rights of establishment and PRPs. The United States viewed all principles enshrined in its Model 
BIT (including its PRP) as crucial to fostering an attractive and secure investment climate for its 
outward FDI and to ensuring that outward FDI would be “free to flow to its most efficient use.”127 
The United States were interested in negotiating BITs with States who would depart as little as 
possible from its Model.128 
For example, the U.S. BITs with Congo (Brazzaville), Sri Lanka, and the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republics adopted the PRP that appeared in the relevant U.S. Model BIT,129 and both 
the Grenada - U.S. BIT (1985) and the Congo (Brazzaville) - U.S. BIT (1990)130 were negotiated 
at lightning speed and simply integrated the relevant U.S. Model BIT unchanged. U.S. BITs 
signed with Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics followed the same trend.131 
The consistent formulation of PRPs in American IIAs likely contributed to their growing 
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C. The TRIMs Agreement, the SCM Agreement and PRPs in IIAs are Joined at 
the Hip 
This section investigates how GATT/WTO disciplines on performance requirements came to 
evolve at the same time as the highly influential PRPs in American BITs during the 1980s and 
early 1990s. First, the slow and unfulfilling progress made in the GATT forum fuelled bilateral 
American negotiations on performance requirements. Second, negotiations on subsidies during 
the GATT Uruguay Round addressed preoccupations very similar to those on TRIMs. 
1. Limited Achievements in the Multilateral GATT Forum Fuelled Intertwined Bilateral 
American Negotiations on Performance Requirements  
In 1981-1982, the United States deployed interwoven efforts through multilateral and bilateral 
avenues.132 American policymakers viewed international law, including American Treaties of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (“FCN”)133 as inadequate for addressing investment 
incentives and performance requirements.134 The United States announced its intention of 
negotiating “new multilateral disciplines” in the GATT forum,135 as well as drumming up the 
prospect of dispute settlement under existing rules, 136  to curb the use of performance 
requirements.137 The first such discussions occurred in March 1981 at the behest of the United 
States.138  
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The implementation of the U.S. BIT Programme, launched in 1977,139 started producing tangible 
results in 1982,140 at the same time as American efforts to discuss performance requirements 
within the GATT sputtered. 141  The United States considered multilateral disciplines on 
performance requirements as the most desirable outcome and thus prioritised this option.142 
BITs comprising PRPs were launched with the hope that they would pave the way to a 
multilateral agreement on performance requirements.143 
The United States played a “leading and perhaps exclusive role” in drawing attention to 
performance requirements.144 Developing countries, and notably the Group of 77 opposed 
addressing performance requirements within the GATT and saw the American offensive on 
performance requirements as an assault onto their sovereignty over investment matters.145 
Moreover, developing countries insisted on situating performance requirements within “the 
broader context of social and economic policy objectives” and of development,146 notably in 
matters of industry, technology and exports, in order to address their balance-of-payments 
concerns, 147  and in matters of economic restructuring, production diversification, local 
employment promotion or technological upgrading of the economy.148 Developing countries 
construed GATT jurisdiction as restricted to measures explicitly restrictive of trade in goods; 
performance requirements should therefore not be disciplined under the GATT since they focus 
on production and investment while affecting trade only residually and marginally.149 Moreover, 
the European Community and Japan clearly expressed that performance requirements did not 
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constitute a high priority for the GATT Secretariat.150 As a result, multilateral efforts to discipline 
performance requirements faltered early on.151 
Nevertheless, the United States nearly single-handedly inserted investment matters into the 
Uruguay Round negotiating mandate in July 1986,152  with Brazil and India exhibiting the 
strongest opposition to addressing performance requirements within the GATT.153 The result 
consisted of a lukewarm negotiating mandate:  
Trade-related investment measures  
Following an examination of the operation of GATT Articles related to the trade restrictive and 
distorting effects of investment measures, negotiations should elaborate, as appropriate, further 
provisions that may be necessary to avoid such adverse effects on trade.154 
States thus prioritised further analysis of the applicability of existing GATT rules to performance 
requirements and confined optional negotiations to potentially adverse trade effects of what 
subsequently became known as TRIMs. Many States reiterated their opposition to addressing 
investment matters within the GATT155 and their refusal of any disciplines over performance 
requirements, since their creation fell outside the negotiating mandate.156 The lack of proof 
regarding the adverse trade effects of performance requirements constituted a stumbling block 
to achieving comprehensive multilateral disciplines on performance requirements.157 At the 
same time, the United States was signing multiple IIAs with PRPs, thus linking WTO disciplines 
on performance requirements and PRPs in IIAs from their inception. 
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2. GATT Uruguay Round of Negotiations on Subsidies Addressed Preoccupations 
Very Similar to Those on TRIMs 
Article XVI of the GATT on subsidies, predecessor to the SCM Agreement, is reminiscent of the 
objectives that shaped Uruguay Round negotiations on TRIMs, as it applies to subsidies that 
increase exports or reduce imports of the State adopting such subsidies. GATT Uruguay Round 
negotiations on subsidies were meant to improve GATT disciplines with respect to subsidies 
“that affect international trade.” Some GATT Members highlighted the close connection between 
TRIMs and subsidies and called for a coherent approach during GATT negotiations. 158 
Singapore noted a “deliberate mixing up of subsidies and incentives during the discussions on 
TRIMs.”159 
Aspirations similar to those pursued in respect of TRIMs were voiced at the very beginning of 
the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations on subsidies: a number of delegations supported the 
enlargement of prohibited subsidies to “other trade distorting subsidies” and supported the 
prohibition and/or strengthening of disciplines regarding all export subsidies and import 
substitution measures.160 Numerous GATT Members maintained their support for prohibiting 
export subsidies and “other trade-related subsidies,” more specifically subsidies conditioned 
upon EPRs or LCRs (viewed as “clearly trade-distorting” subsidies), all along the 
negotiations.161 GATT Members needed to “accept the basic premise that subsidies should not 
be used in ways that distort comparative advantage and increase exports or reduce imports.”162 
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The United States further advocated for prohibiting “trade-related subsidies” notably when such 
subsidies would be granted based on meeting any of the following conditions: LCRs; 
requirements to generate a net trade balance; manufacturing requirements; technology transfer 
requirements, and EPRs.163 
Many GATT Members expressed the view that they could not agree to outright prohibitions of 
subsidies without providing for differential treatment in respect of developing countries.164 
Delegations of numerous Members raised the same developmental concerns as the ones raised 
in the context of TRIMs negotiations.165 Restricting the use of subsidies proved controversial 
during the Uruguay Round: many States considered that their prohibition, even limited, “would 
amount to interference into their sovereignty.”166  
Uruguay Round negotiations on subsidies therefore clearly reflected the close connection 
between the TRIMs Agreement, the SCM Agreement and PRPs in IIAs and the presence of 
investment incentives/advantages/benefits alongside performance requirements.  
D. Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT and Maximising Interpretative Gateways to a 
Comprehensive Understanding of PRPs 
This section takes stock of treaty interpretation rules under the VCLT and appraises how they 
should operate in respect of PRPs in IIAs. This section begins by evaluating the use of Articles 
31 and 32 of the VCLT by arbitral tribunals having decided claims of PRP breaches. This 
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section then considers what the context of PRPs in IIAs could amount to. This section next 
moves onto assessing how systemic integration could play out when interpreting and applying 
PRPs in IIAs. Thereafter this section fleshes out supplementary means that could help interpret 
PRPs in IIAs and what could come into play as part of the circumstances of their conclusion. 
Finally, this section will point to multiple indicators that reinforce the need for a systemic 
interpretation and application of PRPs in IIAs and for a cross-fertilisation with GATT/WTO 
disciplines. 
Although all arbitral tribunals having considered PRPs acknowledged the central role played by 
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT,167 none of them made full use of the elements at their disposal 
pursuant to Article 31 of the VCLT, let alone Article 32, in order to elucidate the meaning of 
terms used in PRPs, their context or their object and purpose. In CPI v Mexico, the Tribunal 
allotted only two paragraphs to the PRP at issue (NAFTA Article 1106), underlining that claimant 
Corn Products International, Inc. (“CPI”) “freely admitted” that its alleged violation of Article 1106 
was “without precedent” and deciding that CPI clearly had “not made out its case” under Article 
1106.168  However, as will be demonstrated, CPI’s claim was not “without precedent” and 
although it was put forward in a summary fashion, it was far from baseless; quite the contrary. 
Based on what can be gleaned from the Tribunal’s Decision, neither disputing party put forward 
diligently researched arguments on the PRP at issue: CPI provided no detail regarding its 
alleged violation, while Mexico did nothing other than characterise CPI’s claim as “fanciful.”169 
The palpable lack of seriousness demonstrated by the disputing parties to the alleged violation 
of NAFTA Article 1106 is startling. 
In Cargill v Mexico, Cargill, Inc. (“Cargill”) invoked the award in ADF v United States as support 
for its alleged violation of Article 1106 of the NAFTA.170 However, the ADF Tribunal provided no 
support nor guidance to Cargill’s argument as NAFTA Article 1106 was not discussed by the 
Tribunal other than to acknowledge the United States’ acquiescence to the argument that the 
measures at issue would likely have had breached NAFTA Article 1106 were it not for a 
reservation under NAFTA Article 1108. The Cargill v Mexico Tribunal noted the paucity of 
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interpretative guidance in respect of a small and infrequent number of claims in respect of 
NAFTA Article 1106.171 The Tribunal may have been prevented from conducting an in-depth 
analysis of performance requirements by the meagre submissions of disputing parties on this 
issue.  
In Lemire v Ukraine, the Tribunal disregarded the clear language and ordinary meaning of the 
terms used in the PRP at issue in order to avoid finding that a sensitive and critical cultural 
measure had breached the PRP.172 The Tribunal hastily asserted compatibility between the 
respective purposes arbitrarily assigned to the cultural measure and the PRP without invoking 
any evidence or authorities to support its interpretation. The Tribunal aimed at excluding cultural 
measures from the scope of the PRP even though the relevant IIA provided for no exception, 
exclusion or reservation to its broadly-worded, open-ended PRP.  
1. The Context of PRPs in IIAs 
In order to properly understand PRPs, one must establish the context that saw PRPs emerge 
and the characteristics that bind PRPs together.173 Article 31(1) of the VCLT, which refers to 
“the terms of the treaty in their context,” allows for the consideration of additional related treaties 
and materials when interpreting a treaty provision.174 Although it has been suggested that Article 
31(2) VCLT assigns a somewhat narrow meaning to the term “context,”175 the WTO Appellate 
Body has preferred a broader understanding of “context.”176 Moreover, the VCLT does not 
exhaustively define the term “context” as used in Article 31 of the VCLT. 177  Caution is 
nevertheless warranted not to infinitely expand such context:178 referring to Articles 31 and 32 of 
the VCLT, the ADF Tribunal spoke of the need to relate a NAFTA provision to its context, which 
primarily consists other relevant NAFTA provisions and of NAFTA’s overall structure, while 
elucidating “the real shape and content of the bargain actually struck by the three sovereign 
Parties” as embodied within a specific NAFTA provision.179 By contrast, the approach of the 
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S.D. Myers Tribunal offers a glimpse of a broad interpretative approach when it stated that in 
order to interpret the term “expropriation” in NAFTA Article 1110, the Tribunal had to consider 
“the whole body of state practice, treaties and judicial interpretations of that term in international 
law cases.”180 The S.D. Myers Tribunal also considered that interpreting the expression “like 
circumstances” under NAFTA Article 1102 compelled the Tribunal to consider the “legal context” 
of the NAFTA, which included legal principles affirmed in related international instruments.181 An 
interpretative approach that accurately takes into account the context of a given PRP must look 
beyond its IIA to normatively connected PRPs within other IIAs, as well as to the TRIMs 
Agreement and SCM Agreement and related documentation produced during the GATT 
Uruguay Round of negotiations. 
Unfortunately, most arbitral tribunals faced with the interpretation of a PRP either ignored or 
restrictively defined its context: the ADF and S.D. Myers Tribunals did not refer to the context of 
the PRP at issue (NAFTA Article 1106). In Mobil & Murphy v Canada, Canada had 
recommended a holistic approach to individual performance requirements enumerated in the 
PRP at issue (NAFTA Article 1106), which need to be “understood in their economic policy 
context and in the context of the NAFTA and other international treaties.”182 Disputing parties 
cited numerous policy documents and international legal instruments that could have shed 
additional light onto NAFTA Article 1106.183 Instead, the Tribunal narrowly circumscribed the 
context of the relevant performance requirement within NAFTA Article 1106 in support of its 
interpretation and refused to consider anything other than the NAFTA itself and an English 
dictionary.184 The Tribunal should have engaged more with the documentation submitted by the 
disputing parties in order to better ascertain the meaning of terms used in NAFTA Article 1106.  
2. Applying the “Principle of Systematic Integration” to PRPs in IIAs 
None of the arbitral tribunals having decided alleged breaches of PRPs considered the principle 
of systematic integration. The reference to relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between State Parties to a given treaty in Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT is often viewed 
as embodying the “principle of systematic integration.” The expression “shall be taken into 
account” in Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT accomplishes “a systemic function” by “linking 
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specialised parts to each other.”185 The principle of systemic integration does not mean that an 
arbitral tribunal seised of a dispute regarding a specific PRP can extend its jurisdiction beyond 
the confines of the IIA at issue; indeed, while one may draw parallels between the PRP of an IIA 
and the GATT-WTO rules, one must nevertheless avoid interpreting such PRP in a way that 
would amount to applying other rules of international law in its place.186 
Rather, the principle of systemic integration merely means that “other” rules of international law 
(notably other treaties) forming part of the normative environment relevant to a given PRP 
should be taken in consideration when interpreting and applying such PRP.187 Considering 
similar PRPs, many of which were drafted and/or negotiated around the same time and involved 
the same State Parties, can help better grasp the meaning and purpose of a given PRP. Indeed, 
analogous treaties may help elucidate the “justifiable meaning” of the PRP at issue.188  
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT limits the array of relevant rules that can be considered by resorting 
to the expression “applicable in the relations between the parties.”189 In the great majority of 
cases, this pre-condition presents no obstacle to considering GATT-WTO materials while 
interpreting PRP in IIAs subject to the Parties to IIAs being GATT-WTO Members. While this 
limiting language could prevent considering analogous PRPs from other IIAs between State 
Parties that are not also Parties to the IIA whose PRP is being interpreted, such other IIAs could 
be considered if they substantiate the Parties’ common understanding of the terms used in the 
PRP at issue.190 Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT can thus act as a gateway to the GATT, to the 
TRIMs Agreement, to the SCM Agreement and to the hefty documentation that preceded their 
signature, when interpreting PRPs of IIAs. 
In Mobil & Murphy v Canada, the TRIMs Agreement, the SCM Agreement and the CUSFTA 
could have been considered pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT as “relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between” the NAFTA Parties. However, the Tribunal 
erroneously declared that these materials offered no interpretative assistance and therefore did 
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not consider whether any of these materials fell within Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.191  
3. Supplementary Means of Interpretation and Circumstances of Conclusion of PRPs 
in IIAs 
Article 32 of the VCLT enumerates the preparatory work (or travaux préparatoires) and the 
circumstances of conclusion of the treaty at issue as part of a non-limitative list of extrinsic, 
supplementary materials that can be turned to in order to confirm or clarify the meaning of the 
treaty provisions at issue. IIAs often do not leave much by way of preparatory work mentioned in 
Article 32 of the VCLT and when they do, deriving any clear indication of sometimes 
contradictory and often changing draft versions constitutes a perilous exercise.192 The lack of 
travaux préparatoires regarding IIAs with PRPs acts as an invitation to extend beyond their 
realm and to explore documentation related to their source rules: the TRIMs Agreement, the 
SCM Agreement, prior IIAs with PRPs and U.S. BITs and Model BITs.193 As part of the Uruguay 
Round, GATT Members and the GATT Secretariat produced a significant amount of negotiating 
documents of various kinds on performance requirements. Such documents can provide 
numerous insights into the views of States on performance requirements and into the meaning 
of PRPs in IIAs. Such written submissions can improve our understanding of the contours and 
inner-workings of performance requirements, TRIMs and other related concepts, and the 
options available to States when prohibiting performance requirements. Moreover, the large 
number of States involved in the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations on TRIMs and 
subsidies, the fact that Parties to subsequent IIAs were most of the time involved in the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations, and the sharing and accessibility of GATT documentation between 
GATT States justify assuming that Parties to subsequent IIAs were at the very least aware of 
such documentation and that such documentation has played a formative role in negotiating 
PRPs within such IIAs, not only by informing the understanding of PRPs by Parties, but also by 
conferring settled meanings upon terms of art used to refer to performance requirements.194 
The circumstances surrounding the conclusion of treaties mentioned in Article 32 of the VCLT 
can be interpreted broadly in respect of PRPs in IIAs and can notably open the door to a 
historical and contemporaneous analysis of PRPs: this ground serves as further justification for 
investigating the efforts undertaken by the United States, intergovernmental organisations and 
the GATT-WTO and its Members during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s in respect of performance 
requirements.  
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Article 1131(1) of the NAFTA (1992) mandates that it not be read in isolation from public 
international law, including international trade law.195  In S.D. Myers v Canada, Dissenting 
Arbitrator Schwartz further considered that the drafters of the NAFTA used standard phrases 
from other BITs with the intent that “they would have their standard meaning, or something very 
close to it.”196 Numerous concepts and legal terms included in the NAFTA originated in the 
GATT-WTO system; the GATT-WTO case law can “provide considerable guidance,”197 and the 
TRIMs Agreement and NAFTA Article 1106 exhibit clear similarities.198 The interconnectedness 
between PRPs of IIAs and the GATT-WTO system occurs with even greater clarity when PRPs, 
as does NAFTA Article 1106(6), provide for exceptions to justify necessary measures using 
language strongly reminiscent of the general exceptions under GATT Article XX,199 or when (as 
discussed in greater detail below) PRPs of IIAs merely incorporate the TRIMs Agreement. 
Given the lingering ambiguity and obscurity surrounding PRPs, it is advisable to resort to 
supplementary means of interpretations and to investigate more closely the circumstances 
surrounding the conclusion of IIAs. For instance, investment-related treaties often serve similar 
purposes and use similar language; taking into account general drafting trends among treaties 
that serve similar purposes can shed some light on the meaning of specific terms and is 
considered an “accepted and established practice.”200 Moreover, despite complications related 
to the timing of supplementary means of interpretation when compared to the treaty under 
interpretation, there exists a margin of appreciation within which supplementary means of 
interpretation prior and subsequent to the drafting of the treaty under interpretation can be taken 
into consideration, granted that the appropriate interpretative safeguards regarding relevance 
are applied.201  
By contrast, none of the arbitral tribunals invoked Article 32 of the VCLT, even if only to confirm 
the meaning of terms used within PRPs. In Mobil & Murphy v Canada, the Tribunal formulated 
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pointed criticisms with respect to supplementary means of interpretation before peremptorily 
rejecting them altogether due to their limited or non-existent relevance and assistance.202 
Ultimately, the Tribunal considered that the conditions of Article 32 of the VCLT for considering 
supplementary means of interpretation – ambiguous or obscure meaning or manifestly absurd 
or unreasonable result – were not met.203 However, the Tribunal did not need to meet either of 
these criteria to broaden its analysis and could have turned to such resources if only to confirm 
its interpretation. Moreover, a broader interpretative context and approach would have better 
served the Tribunal, regardless of the outcome. The Tribunal expressed numerous concerns 
regarding supplementary means of interpretation and extraneous materials. The Tribunal stated 
that the materials invoked by Canada “are not the NAFTA,”204 that they did not involve “entirely 
the same parties to the negotiation,”205 that they raised inter-temporal discontinuities, that their 
influence on drafting and negotiating the NAFTA was not substantiated, and that their purposes 
were “not identical to that of the NAFTA.”206 However, these legitimate concerns should not lead 
to discarding supplementary means of interpretation altogether. Rather, these concerns should 
be used to grant supplementary means of interpretation an impact proportional to their 
relevance. Moreover, the Tribunal impliedly recognised the usefulness of supplementary means 
of interpretation when it called upon such means to confirm its preordained interpretation.207 
4. Terms of Art and the Settled Meaning of Terms Used in PRPs 
Article 31(1) of the VCLT refers to the “ordinary meaning” of terms used in a treaty. It has been 
suggested that the ordinary meaning could serve as a gateway to source rules when 
interpreting transplanted treaty rules. It is arguably permissible to determine the ordinary 
meaning of terms used in the PRP of an IIA by referring to the TRIMs Agreement, the SCM 
Agreement and related GATT Uruguay Round negotiating documents produced by GATT 
Members, as well as to other IIAs that use identical terms. Their pervasiveness makes it 
appropriate to assume that Parties to IIAs that comprise PRPs were fully aware of such 
instruments when negotiating these IIAs, and that they also deliberately used widely 
disseminated expressions as terms of art carrying settled meanings.208 Although the expression 
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“ordinary meaning” has traditionally been interpreted more narrowly and might not offer the most 
solid grounds for a broad inquiry into the meaning of terms used in PRPs,209 Article 31(1) of the 
VCLT sets the terms of a treaty as a “starting point,” not as a limitation: the different interpretive 
instruments identified in Article 31 extend beyond the text of the treaty at issue, are expressed 
in mandatory terms and form part of a unified method of interpretation that must be applied in its 
entirety.210 The VCLT framework therefore affords sufficient interpretative flexibility to consider 
PRPs within their proper context and in relation to all relevant rules of international law.211  
Article 31(4) of the VCLT, which provides that a term can be assigned a special meaning if it 
can be proven that the Parties to a treaty so intended, provides an additional line of inquiry as to 
the meaning of terms used in PRPs of IIAs. Article 31(4) of the VCLT offers untried 
interpretative potential. However, the high evidentiary burden mandated by Article 31(4) of the 
VCLT renders it very difficult to prove that States Parties to a given treaty intended a special 
meaning in the absence of direct evidence of such a meaning (such as a definition in the treaty 
itself). Joint interpretations, exchanges of letters or preparatory work could potentially indicate 
that given terms carry a specific meaning, but those sources may more likely amount to context 
allowing to identify the ordinary meaning of such terms.212   
Rather than insisting on establishing special meanings as construed under Article 31(4) of the 
VCLT for terms used in PRPs, one can more easily ascertain that such terms have undoubtedly 
acquired settled meanings that could amount to ordinary meanings under Article 31(1) of the 
VCLT in the specific context of IIAs and of GATT/WTO agreements and documentation. This 
thesis notably demonstrates that multilateral trade negotiations produced definitional efforts that 
equipped negotiators of IIAs with an elaborate vocabulary and settled meanings for terms of art 
that feature in all PRPs surveyed for purposes of this thesis. 
5. All Signs Point to a Systemic Interpretation and Application of PRPs in IIAs and to 
a Cross-Fertilisation with GATT/WTO Disciplines 
Fully reaping the insights to be derived from the nature of PRPs as “legal utterances,” MSENs 
and transplanted treaty rules through the framework of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT 
constitutes a delicate task. These Articles essentially restrict recourse to interpretative means 
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extraneous to the treaty at issue.213 However, pigeon-holing the various instruments is helpful to 
the interpretation of PRPs in IIAs into concepts such as context, relevant rules applicable 
between State Parties or supplementary means of interpretation may not constitute the most 
vital of exercises since “‘interpretation pursuant to the customary rules codified in Article 31 ... is 
ultimately a holistic exercise that should not be mechanically sub-divided into rigid 
components’.”214  
A proper understanding of PRPs in IIAs compels consideration of the U.S. BIT Programme and 
multilateral trade documentation pertaining to the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. 
Provided that textual/contextual/purposive/substantive differences are duly taken into account, 
the documentation pertaining to performance requirements and produced prior to, during and 
after the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations and the entry into force of the TRIMs Agreement 
and the SCM Agreement can provide valuable help in interpreting and applying PRPs and 
understanding the inner-workings and purposes of performance requirements. 
The same is true for the highly influential U.S. BIT Programme: the United States articulated 
rationales against performance requirements through congressional hearings and formulated 
elaborate and influential PRPs which set a tone that was subsequently reproduced in many IIAs 
that comprise PRPs. By contrast, even by 1998, performance requirements had generated no 
noticeable interest among Member States of the European Community, India or Turkey in the 
context of their IIAs: none of them mentioned performance requirements in overviews of their 
IIAs before the WTO Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment 
(“WGTI”). 215  In 2002, the European Community barely acknowledged that performance 
requirements could affect the establishment of FDI.216 This thesis did not set out to focus on the 
U.S. BIT Programme; rather, it could not identify another comparably insightful and influential 
source of information on performance requirements. 
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Many instances provide support for developing a systemic understanding of PRPs within 
different IIAs, regardless of which basis in Articles 31 or 32 of the VCLT is invoked for their 
consideration. First, both Canada and the United States drew from the U.S. BIT Programme for 
shedding light onto NAFTA Article 1106: Canada readily admitted that its origins can be traced 
back and likened to PRPs contained in many U.S. BITs from the 1980s.217 Second, the United 
States confirmed that with respect to investment, their U.S. BITs pursued the same objectives 
as their FTAs and more particularly as the NAFTA,218 and such objectives included prohibiting 
“trade and investment distorting” performance requirements.219 Third, the U.S. Department of 
State further acknowledged the influence of BITs from other OECD countries and of the GATT 
Uruguay Round of negotiations as providing ongoing feedback loops pursuant to which the 
United States periodically adjusts its Model BIT. 220  Fourth, Canada’s Statement of 
Implementation of the NAFTA clearly recognises the mutual influence and the 
interconnectedness between the WTO Agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round and the 
NAFTA, noting that they “cover much of the same ground,” that “the two sets of rules are largely 
complementary and mutually reinforcing,” and that each outcome fed on the progress made and 
understandings developed in the other’s negotiating process.221 Fifth, the U.S. Department of 
State expressed the view that the definition of a term in a subsequent BIT can “influence 
interpretation of a similar term in previous treaties” where such previous BITs leave such similar 
term undefined, since all U.S. BITs are linked by underlying U.S. Model BITs.222 Sixth, Canada 
has previously relied on 13 U.S. BITs which replicated the PRP from the relevant U.S. Model 
BIT, as well as on 5 Japanese BITs for purposes of interpreting NAFTA Article 1106.223 
Seventh, in its Draft Model BIT released in May 2015, Norway clearly linked PRPs in IIAs with 
the TRIMs Agreement and the GATS 224  and clearly promoted consistent WTO and BIT 
negotiating strategies in respect of performance requirements, with a view to ensuring that 
Norway negotiate PRPs that at least meet the demands voiced by Norway in WTO 
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IV. Typology and Analysis of PRPs in IIAs  
This part proposes an overview and a detailed analysis of the various types of PRPs 
encountered in the IIAs surveyed for purposes of this thesis. It discusses non-binding PRPs with 
narrow coverage first. Second, this part analyses performance requirements under the GATT, 
the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations on TRIMs, the TRIMs Agreement and PRPs that 
incorporate the TRIMs Agreement, as well as the interpretation and application issues that arise 
in respect of such PRPs. Third, this part surveys open-ended PRPs in IIAs and proposes to 
clarify the precise measures that such PRPs would prohibit. To do so, the third section makes 
use of submissions made by GATT Members during the Uruguay Round to spell out and 
circumscribe the scope of open-ended PRPs in American, French and Indian BITs. This section 
also critically appraises the sole arbitral award having interpreted and applied an open-ended 
PRP in Lemire v Ukraine.  
Fourth, this part scrutinises detailed and exhaustive PRPs in IIAs, the emerging patterns and 
their widespread repetition. This part also defines 14 categories of measures systematically 
referred to as performance requirements, identifies the terms of art and the settled meanings 
that they have acquired, and provides examples where available. This part then critically 
assesses interpretations by arbitral tribunals to date of performance requirements specifically 
prohibited within detailed and exhaustive PRPs.  
Fifth, this part investigates the prohibition of advantage-conditioning performance requirements. 
That fifth section will kick off its analysis with the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. 
The fifth section then moves onto advantage-conditioning performance requirements under 
PRPs in IIAs. The fifth section differentiates between PRPs that omit advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements, PRPs that prohibit them by incorporating the TRIMs Agreement, 
PRPs of American and Canadian IIAs with EU Member States that are accompanied by 
clarifying statements, PRPs that exclude advantage-conditioning performance requirements 
from their scope, as well as PRPs that prohibit a narrower list of advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements than the mandatory performance requirements that they prohibit. 
The fifth section derives guidance from the interpretation of the term “benefit” under the SCM 
Agreement in order to improve our understanding of the term “advantage” in the TRIMs 
Agreement and in PRPs of IIAs. The fifth section then identifies a number of measures that 
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would arguably amount to advantages while concluding with an appraisal of arbitral awards 
having considered advantages in the context of PRPs in IIAs.  
Finally, this part discusses the practice of prohibiting performance requirements in trade-related 
chapters of TIPs, in investment chapters of TIPs or in both. This section reflects on the practice 
by certain States of providing for PRPs in trade treaty instruments as an illustration of the dual 
nature of PRPs (both trade- and investment-driven) as well as of the dual interests (those of 
home States and those of investors) that they set out to protect. 
A. Non-Binding PRPs With Narrow Coverage 
The PRP “generally has been one of the most difficult BIT provisions on which to reach 
agreement”226 and their quality within the first ten U.S. BITs has been euphemistically described 
as variable.227 In spite of American best efforts, PRPs in a number of U.S. BITs signed between 
1982 and 1990 underwent significant alterations when compared with corresponding U.S. Model 
BITs.228 American diplomatic efforts against performance requirements sputtered early on as 
seven of its first ten U.S. BITs, entered into respectively with Egypt, Haiti,229 Zaire (renamed 
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) in 1997 (“Zaire/DRC”)), Morocco, Turkey, Bangladesh 
and Tunisia provided only for “best effort” commitments to avoid performance requirements.230 
American BIT negotiations were then suspended for three years while the U.S. Senate 
formulated its advice and consent to ratification of U.S. BITs signed between 1982 and 1986. 
During this process, the U.S. Senate expressed concern at the lack of conformity of PRPs within 
such U.S. BITs with the PRPs found within corresponding U.S. Model BITs and at their lack of 
compulsoriness.231 
The United States signed its first BIT with Egypt on 29 September 1982232 which comprises a 
PRP deprived of any binding character as Article II(6) of the Egypt - U.S. BIT (1982) amounts to 
a “best efforts” provision:233  
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In the context of its national economic policies and objectives, each Party shall seek to avoid the 
imposition of performance requirements of the investment of nationals and companies of the 
other Party. [Emphasis added.] 
Article II(7) of the Haiti - U.S. BIT (1983) incorporates a very similar provision. Pursuant to 
Article II(7) of the U.S. - Zaire/DRC BIT (1984), State Parties “endeavor to avoid imposing” 
LCRs or EPRs.234 Zaire/DRC refused to prohibit performance requirements since these were 
used by Zaire/DRC in its pursuit of development objectives. As a result, the United States had to 
agree to non-binding “best effort” language in Article II(7) the U.S. - Zaire/DRC BIT. Moreover, 
the PRP in Article II(7) the U.S. - Zaire/DRC BIT  is not open-ended: rather, it is limited to LCRs 
and EPRs. Article II(7) of the U.S. - Zaire/DRC BIT further recalls the importance of “national 
economic policies and goals,” and Zaire/DRC insisted on adding a sentence which explicitly 
preserves the right to impose import restrictions on goods.235 
The PRP in Article II(5) of the Morocco - U.S. BIT (1985) is particularly weak: it uses non-
binding “best effort” language, it is limited to LCRs and EPRs, and it is “without prejudice to the 
general import programs and the national economic policy” of each Party. Article II(7) of the 
Turkey - U.S. BIT (1985) is also limited to non-binding “best effort” language.236 Article II (6) of 
the Bangladesh - U.S. BIT (1986) resorts to a hortatory “shall seek to avoid” formulation and 
recalls that a State adopts performance requirements “in the context of its national economic 
policies and objectives.” Bangladesh strongly insisted that attracting FDI was meant to 
“generate foreign exchange and to utilise local resources” and Bangladesh had to preserve its 
right to impose performance requirements to in order to achieve such purposes.237 The PRP in 
Article II(6) of the Tunisia - U.S. BIT (1990) also provides for hortatory language and a “best 
effort” commitment to eliminate performance requirements;238 the United States took solace 
from the fact that although Tunisia was unwilling to commit to an outright prohibition of 
performance requirements, Tunisia had apparently eliminated all of its performance 
requirements at the time of signing the BIT.239 
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The U.S. State Department inaccurately portrayed the discrepancies between the PRP within 
the corresponding U.S. Model BIT and the PRPs within the Morocco - U.S. BIT (1985), the U.S. 
- Zaire/DRC BIT (1984), the Turkey - U.S. BIT (1985), the Bangladesh - U.S. BIT (1986) and the 
Tunisia - U.S. BIT (1990) as “not represent[ing] major substantive departures from text” and as 
“differ[ing] in minor respects from the U.S. model text.” Contradicting itself, the State 
Department conceded that variations within its PRPs constituted one of the “most noteworthy 
changes” and admitted that these countries, as well as Haiti240 and Senegal,241 wished “to retain 
the right to use some limited local content/export incentives or requirements as part of their 
national economic development policies.”242 
Aside from comprising non-binding PRPs, the seven U.S. BITs entered into respectively with 
Egypt, Haiti, Zaire/DRC, Morocco, Turkey, Bangladesh and Tunisia nevertheless comprise 
separate provisions on transfers that compel State Parties to authorise unfettered financial 
transfers in and out of State Parties. The United States secured binding prohibitions of 
remittance restrictions separately from their PRPs. 
B. PRPs & TRIMs 
1. The Applicability of the GATT to Performance Requirements and the GATT-FIRA 
Panel Report 
TRIMs were “not precisely defined”243 under the GATT. The lack of explicit applicability of GATT 
rules to performance requirements could have opened the door to a proliferation of performance 
requirements.244 Since the United States viewed performance requirements as trade distortions 
“contrary to the spirit, if not the letter of the GATT,”245 a few observers called for “test cases” in 
order to determine and clarify the applicability of existing GATT rules to performance 
requirements, to spur the development of international law on performance requirements, and to 
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“put the world community on notice about the U.S. position on performance requirements.”246  
The United States therefore initiated dispute settlement proceedings under the GATT in order to 
obtain a decision confirming that performance requirements violate GATT disciplines. The 
United States targeted Canada’s then Foreign Investment Review Act (“FIRA”), enacted in 
1973, as a mechanism used to impose a significant number of trade-distorting performance 
requirements on foreign and especially American investors. As a leading recipient of outward 
American FDI,247 Canada was setting a bad precedent for other countries to follow; moreover, 
the United States was having a hard time convincing other countries to move away from 
performance requirements while Canada was still imposing them.248  
The GATT-FIRA Panel 249  was tasked with examining Canada’s practice of entering into 
agreements with foreign investors which required of investors that they favour the purchase of 
Canadian goods and that they comply with specified export targets.250 The FIRA conditioned 
approvals of acquisitions of Canadian investments or new investments to whether such 
transaction would prove of “significant benefit to Canada.” Written undertakings by foreign 
investors constituted one of five factors that could be taken into account for assessing benefits 
to Canada. The FIRA did not make such undertakings mandatory, but over time foreign 
investors routinely submitted such undertakings alongside large investment proposals. Most of 
the undertakings reflected the outcome of prior negotiations between foreign investors and 
Canada; undertakings would relate to employment, local R&D, participation of Canadian 
shareholders and/or management personnel to proposed investment, as well as purchasing, 
manufacturing and/or export practices. 251  Undertakings needed not follow any prescribed 
formula or content and varied on a case-by-case basis. Although voluntarily provided, local 
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content or export undertakings became legally biding and enforceable following the approval of 
the investment. However, the Canadian government never sought a remedial order from 
Canadian courts and instead opted for deferral, waiver or replacement of undertakings should 
investors fail to live up to their commitments.252 
The GATT-FIRA Panel began by finding that manufacturing requirements fell outside of its 
terms of reference and were therefore not examined.253 The GATT-FIRA Panel then assessed 
undertakings to purchase goods of Canadian origin or from Canadian sources in light of the 
national treatment rule enshrined in GATT Article III:4 which states that requirements affecting 
the sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of imported products must afford imported 
products treatment no less favourable than that afforded to domestic products. The GATT-FIRA 
Panel found that the judicially enforceable written undertakings provided by foreign investors 
constituted “requirements” for purposes of GATT Article III:4. The GATT-FIRA Panel recalled 
that GATT Article III:1 forbids GATT Members from using internal measures to afford protection 
to domestic production. The GATT-FIRA Panel decided that unqualified undertakings to 
purchase goods of Canadian origin, as well as undertakings to purchase from Canadian 
suppliers subject to their availability on competitive terms, impaired the purchase of imported 
goods and afforded them treatment less favourable than that afforded to domestic goods in 
violation of GATT Article III:4.254 The GATT-FIRA Panel further ruled that the local purchase 
undertakings could not be justified under the exception provided by Article XX(d) of the GATT 
since they did not prove necessary to secure compliance with the FIRA. The GATT-FIRA Panel 
considered that foreign investments could generate significant benefits to Canada even in the 
absence of local purchase undertakings.255  In respect of undertakings to export specified 
quantities or proportions, the GATT-FIRA Panel found that no GATT provision forbids 
requirements to export production and to sell it onto foreign instead of domestic markets, nor 
does the GATT compel GATT Members to prevent dumping. Accordingly, the GATT-FIRA 
Panel decided that a GATT Member could impose EPRs onto privately-owned investors without 
violating the GATT.256 In a nutshell, GATT rules prohibited LCRs, but not EPRs.  
2. Performance Requirements Under the TRIMs Agreement  
This section delves into the scope and coverage of disciplines applicable to performance 
requirements under the TRIMs Agreement. This section explains how GATT Members 
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compromised on a list-driven concept of TRIMs in a pragmatic attempt to circumvent the thorny 
issues arising from assigning specific effects or purposes of performance requirements. This 
part also assesses the assertion that the TRIMs Agreement did not create new disciplines, but 
merely clarified the applicability of GATT Articles III (national treatment) and XI (quantitative 
restriction) to performance requirements. This section also appraises the Illustrative List 
annexed to the TRIMs Agreement so as to better understand which performance requirements 
are explicitly prohibited under the TRIMs Agreement.  
a) The Endorsement of TRIMs as a Political Compromise 
Given the blurry meaning of performance requirements and TRIMs, attempts to define TRIMs 
beyond a strict understanding of direct trade-relatedness occurred with consistency over time.257 
Recasting performance requirements as trade-driven measures under the TRIMs concept, an 
“artificial construct,” 258  was made necessary by the trade-defined multilateral negotiating 
platform offered by the GATT.259 The creation of GATT/WTO disciplines could succeed only in 
respect of performance requirements that would fall within the jurisdiction of the GATT by 
demonstrably distorting and/or restricting trade.260  
The negotiation of such disciplines, spearheaded by the United States, revealed a wide 
spectrum of hardly reconcilable positions among GATT Members. Some GATT Members, 
notably India, refused outright the notion of disciplining investment matters in the GATT 
forum.261 India considered that performance requirements comprise, but extend largely beyond 
TRIMs that would consist of trade policy measures meant to directly tackle imports and exports 
and which cause direct trade effects.262  
Intermediary definitions of TRIMs, including those of the European Communities (“EC”), Japan 
and Switzerland, focused on “inherently trade-distorting”263 investment measures having a direct 
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IMF and the World Bank; Narasimham (n 48) 1-2; OECD, Framework – Investment Disincentives (n 27) 
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258 Deluca (n 29), 253. 
259 India Submission 18 (n 35) paras 3, 20. 
260 Switzerland (n 42) 2. 
261 GATT Group of Negotiations on Goods, Sixteenth meeting: 9 April 1990, MTN.GNG/22 (8 May 1990) 
6-7; Deluca (n 29), 274. 
262 India Submission 18 (n 35) para 23. 
263 European Communities, Submission to the GATT Group of Negotiations on Goods – Negotiating 
Group on Trade-Related Investment Measures, MTN.GNG/NG12/W/22 (16 November 1989) 3; GATT, 
Note on TRIMs (October 1990) (n 145) para 30 (EC). 
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and substantial effect on international trading patterns264 and impacting “the business behaviour 
of the investor during the production process.”265  
Other GATT Members, notably the United States, embraced an all-encompassing prohibition of 
all performance requirements under GATT rules, whether directly or indirectly related to trade. 
The United States defined TRIMs more expansively as measures “likely to impact trade” and/or 
that have trade motivations266 and as measures that artificially altered imports or exports of the 
State adopting such measures. 267  The United States equated TRIMs with performance 
requirements.268  
These definitions demonstrate the lack of unanimity and consistency in defining TRIMs. It is 
apparent that the notion of TRIMs as enshrined in the TRIMs Agreement reflects a political 
compromise rather than a settled understanding of performance requirements related to trade. 
Even if agreement had been reached around notions such as “direct impact on trade” as 
guidance for prohibiting performance requirements, the dilemma would then have shifted to the 
threshold for determining that measures impact international trade directly, while further leaving 
unresolved the measurement of such impact. The separation line between performance 
requirements directly related to trade and those indirectly related to trade rested on inconclusive 
empirical assessments of their sometimes subtle impacts on trade and therefore provided shaky 
grounds for defining the outer reaches of or the differences between TRIMs and performance 
requirements.  
The definition of TRIMs used in the GATT forum needed to translate into “operational 
solutions.”269 GATT Members predictably failed in finding an “operational definition” for the 
                                                
264 European Communities, Submission to the GATT Group of Negotiations on Goods – Negotiating 
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MTN.GNG/NG12/W/20 (13 September 1989) 5-6. See also Greenaway (n 31) 140; Moran and Pearson, 
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268 U.S. Submission 14 (n 267) 18-20. 
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expression “inherently trade distorting.”270 Agreeing on examples of performance requirements 
that cause trade distorting effects proved easier.271  The following section investigates the 
alternative approach that GATT Members chose: identifying TRIMs by relying on illustrative lists 
of measures272 “which had a direct and significant restrictive or distorting effect on trade, and 
which had a direct link to existing GATT Articles.”273  
b) Scope and Coverage of the TRIMs Agreement and of PRPs Which Incorporate the 
TRIMs Agreement 
The TRIMs Agreement makes no attempt at defining TRIMs. 274  Article 1 of the TRIMs 
Agreement explicitly restricts its application to investment measures related to trade in goods, 
thereby excluding any application to trade in services. Disciplines under the TRIMs Agreement 
essentially reaffirm GATT Articles III (National Treatment) and XI (General Elimination of 
Quantitative Restrictions) while making explicit the applicability of such GATT provisions to 
TRIMs.275 Article 2(1) of the TRIMs Agreement prohibits TRIMs by referring to GATT Article III 
for internal measures and GATT Article XI for border measures.276 The TRIMs Agreement thus 
does not apply to performance requirements equally applicable to goods of domestic and 
foreign investors.277 Article 3 of the TRIMs Agreement clearly states that GATT exceptions can 
apply to validate TRIMs that would otherwise violate the TRIMs Agreement.278 Most notably, 
GATT Article III:8 would therefore provide for an exception authorising TRIMs in the context of 
government procurement, while GATT Article XX potentially provides a number of justifications 
for TRIMs that would otherwise violate the TRIMs Agreement.  
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Article 2(2) of the TRIMs Agreement and Article 1 of the Illustrative List deem two TRIMs to be 
inconsistent with GATT Article III:4: LCRs and trade-balancing requirements, provided that they 
discriminate against imported goods by comparison with domestic products. Article 2(2) of the 
TRIMs Agreement and Article 2 of the Illustrative List deem three different types of TRIMs 
inconsistent with GATT Article XI:1: trade-balancing requirements and foreign exchange access 
restrictions, both depicted as import restrictions, as well as export restrictions. Article 2(a) of the 
Illustrative List further prohibits general import restrictions. These performance requirements, as 
well as general import restrictions, are explicitly prohibited both when they are mandatory and 
when imposed as conditions for obtaining an advantage. 279  Accordingly, performance 
requirements enumerated in the TRIMs Agreement can therefore nevertheless be adopted if 
they do not discriminate between foreign and national products and if they do not amount to 
quantitative restrictions. 
Many performance requirements are thus not explicitly subject to the disciplines instituted by the 
TRIMs Agreement,280 including: EPRs;281 local equity requirements (“LERs”) (along with joint 
venture requirements (“JVRs”) and foreign ownership limitations); technology transfer 
requirements, licensing requirements and R&D requirements; foreign exchange earning 
requirements; remittance restrictions; manufacturing requirements; manufacturing limitations; 
local employment and/or training requirements; investment localisation requirements; domestic 
sales requirements, and product mandating requirements. However, the Illustrative List to the 
TRIMs Agreement is not exhaustive.282 Although prohibited measures would extend beyond the 
Illustrative List extends only insofar as such measures violate the broader underlying obligations 
of GATT Articles III or XI,283 an open-ended illustrative list increases insecurity as to the scope 
of disciplines under the TRIMs Agreement.  
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3. PRPs That Incorporate the TRIMs Agreement 
PRPs become explicitly “multi-sourced” and equivalence is established with an outside source 
in instances where IIAs directly refer to and/or incorporate the TRIMs Agreement.284 There is 
little doubt that the direct incorporation of the TRIMs Agreement within an IIA in order to prohibit 
certain performance requirements provides an additional clear instance of treaty rule 
transplantation. Thirteen of the surveyed IIAs285 reiterate, incorporate or refer specifically to the 
TRIMs Agreement, although as will be shown, they go about it in slightly different ways. 
PRPs which incorporate the TRIMs Agreement in its entirety or refer to its disciplines in general 
terms raise an interesting question: are such TRIMs limited to those explicitly prohibited in the 
TRIMs Agreement’s Illustrative List? Rather, it appears that absent wording to the contrary, the 
non-limitative and non-exhaustive nature of the TRIMs Agreement’s Illustrative List is also 
incorporated into PRPs that incorporate the TRIMs Agreement, provided of course that any 
performance requirement thus challenged would need to violate GATT Article III:4 or XI:1. Such 
PRPs could therefore potentially apply to performance requirements beyond the ones 
enumerated in the TRIMs Agreement’s Illustrative List. 
Article 9 of the Canada - China FIPA (2012) incorporates and makes part of the FIPA Article 2 
and the Annex to the TRIMs Agreement, thereby prohibiting the same mandatory and 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements than those prohibited under the TRIMs 
Agreement. Article 6.23 of the India - Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (“CECA”) (2005) incorporates all provisions of the TRIMs Agreement within the 
CECA. 
Article 14.9(1) of the Australia - Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (“EPA”) (2014), Article 
12.6 of the Australia - Malaysia FTA (2012) and Article 5 of ASEAN - Australia - New Zealand 
FTA (“AANZFTA”) Chapter 11 (Investment) (2009) incorporate the TRIMs Agreement in the 
same way by prohibiting any measure which is inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement. Such 
drafting suggests that measures inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement, but not explicitly 
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enumerated in its Illustrative List would nevertheless be prohibited under Article 12.6. Articles 
5(1) and 5(2) of the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”) (1994) reproduce the exact same disciplines 
as those set forth in the TRIMs Agreement and refer to Articles III and XI of the GATT, but not to 
the TRIMs Agreement, most likely because the TRIMs Agreement had not yet been signed. 
Article 11(1) of Chapter IV (Development of Investment Relations) to the U.S. - Vietnam Trade 
Relations Agreement (“TRA”) (2000) provides for a PRP that applies to TRIMs referred to in 
Annex I of the U.S. - Vietnam TRA (2000) which reproduces the TRIMs Agreement’s Illustrative 
List. The wording of Annex I reiterates unchanged the open-ended language of the TRIMs 
Agreement’s Illustrative List, while also reiterating the need to violate GATT Articles III:4 or XI:1. 
It would therefore appear as though this PRP could extend beyond the measures explicitly 
identified in Annex I.  
Some PRPs appear to have been drafted with a view to incorporating a prohibition limited to the 
performance requirements explicitly laid out in the Illustrative List to the TRIMs Agreement. 
Article VI of the Canada - Costa Rica FIPA (1998) prohibits imposing performance requirements 
“set forth” in the TRIMs Agreement. This formulation suggests that only the performance 
requirements explicitly enumerated in the Illustrative List of the TRIMs Agreement are prohibited 
and that Article VI applies to a closed set of measures. 
In a provision on the scope of application of the BIT, Article 3(2)(b) of the Brazil - Chile BIT 
(2015) merely provides, for greater certainty, that nothing in the BIT limits in any way rights and 
benefits conferred upon covered investors by municipal law and international law, including by 
the TRIMs Agreement. This formulation rings strange since the TRIMs Agreement constitutes 
an agreement between States and does not directly confer rights upon investors; one wonders 
whether it can operate so as to incorporate the disciplines prohibiting the performance 
requirements enumerated in the TRIMs Agreement.  
A number of PRPs that incorporate the TRIMs Agreement also prohibit additional performance 
requirements. Article V(2) of the Canada - Thailand FIPA (1997) prohibits performance 
requirements enumerated in the TRIMs Agreement and further prohibits technology transfer 
requirements in connection with the establishment or acquisition of an investment or the 
enforcement of such requirements in connection with the subsequent regulation of an 
investment. Article 9(1) of the Canada - Mali FIPA (2014) and Article 9(1) of the Canada - 
Kuwait FIPA (2011) reiterate the TRIMs Agreement and incorporate all of its provisions into their 
respective FIPAs. Both Article 9(2) of the Canada - Kuwait FIPA (2011) and Article 9(2) of the 
Canada - Mali FIPA (2014) further prohibit mandatory EPRs, LCRs, technology transfer 
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requirements and product mandating requirements. In addition to the incorporation of the TRIMs 
Agreement under Article 11(1) of Chapter IV (Development of Investment Relations) to the U.S. 
- Vietnam TRA (2000), Article 7 of Chapter IV separately prohibits technology transfer 
requirements. 
Article 10.5(3) of the India - Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (“CEPA”) 
(2009) attempts an impossible reconciliation between the PRP in Article 10.5 and the TRIMs 
Agreement. Article 10.5(3) states that nothing in Article 10.5 of the India-Korea CEPA must be 
construed so as to derogate from the State Parties’ rights and obligations under the TRIMs 
Agreement. However, Article 10.5(1) of the India - Korea CEPA prohibits the same list of 
mandatory performance requirements as does NAFTA Article 1106(1), a list that prohibits many 
measures not prohibited under the TRIMs Agreement. Moreover, Article 10.5(2) of the India - 
Korea CEPA prohibits many more advantage-conditioning performance requirements than 
those set out in the TRIMs Agreement. The only possible effective interpretation of Article 
10.5(3) consists of equating the verb “derogate” with “diminish”; accordingly, the PRP under 
Articles 10.5(1) and 10.5(2) of the India - Korea CEPA cannot diminish the rights and obligations 
of State Parties under the TRIMs Agreement, but it can increase such rights and obligations.  
C. Open-Ended PRPs in IIAs 
State submissions on performance requirements made in a multilateral trade context can 
improve our understanding of PRPs in IIAs notably when attempting to accomplish the following: 
first, unfurling the undefined expression “performance requirements,” and second, fleshing out 
open-ended expressions such as “any other similar requirements.” The following subsections 
canvass BITs signed by the United States and France which use such open-ended expressions 
and then proceeds to exploring their outer-contours by turning notably to submissions made by 
India, the United States and the EC on performance requirements during the GATT Uruguay 
Round of negotiations.  
India signed only one BIT that comprises a PRP: Article 4(4) of the India - Kuwait BIT (2001) 
provides that investments must not be subject to “additional performance requirements.” The 
following analysis of U.S. and French BITs will in turn help shed greater light onto the meaning 
of this undefined, open-ended and broad expression. 
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1. First-Generation PRPs in American BITs (1982-1995) 
The first U.S. Model BIT to be published in 1983286 contained the first standalone PRP, “[a] 
uniquely U.S. provision.”287 Article II(7) of the 1983 U.S. Model BIT reads as follows: 
7. Neither Party shall impose performance requirements as a condition of establishment, 
expansion or maintenance of investments owned by nationals or companies of the other Party, 
which require or enforce commitments to export goods produced, or which specify that goods or 
services must be purchased locally, or which impose any other similar requirements. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Prior draft versions of the original U.S. Model BIT comprised an additional limiting clause 
worded as follows: “and which potentially or actually have an adverse effect on the trade and/or 
investments of the nationals or companies of the other Party.”288 The United States appears to 
have opted for a broadly-worded PRP by deleting such limiting language or any explicit 
reference to trade or adverse effects. The PRP within the 1983 U.S. Model BIT singles out two 
performance requirements: LCRs and EPRs, while leaving the door wide open for reading-in by 
analogy a number of additionally prohibited performance requirements in combination with the 
undefined expression “performance requirements”.  
Article II(5) of the 1984 U.S. Model BIT reproduces in a substantively identical fashion the PRP 
found in Article II(7) of the 1983 U.S. Model BIT with one inconsequential change: the omission 
of the terms “by nationals or companies of the other Party.” Article II(5) of the 1987 U.S. BIT 
Model, Article II(5) of the 1991 U.S. BIT Model and Article II(5) of the 1992 U.S. BIT Model all 
reproduced the same PRP as that found in Article II(5) of the 1984 U.S. Model BIT.289 The 1983 
and 1984 U.S. Model BITs, and by extension the revised versions of 1987, 1991 and 1992, take 
“a broad approach to performance requirements” according to the U.S. State Department.290 In 
1992, the U.S. State Department viewed “the core rights” of its BIT Model, including freedom 
from performance requirements, as having been marginally improved through the successive 
versions of its Model BIT and as having remained unchanged for the most part.291 
The following subsections presents and discusses the open-ended wording of PRPs in 21 
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American BITs, attempts within a number of American BITs to circumscribe such open-ended 
wording, and subsequent statements intended to clarify the reach of such PRPs while blurring 
their meaning and scope.   
a) American BITs With PRPs That Reproduce PRPs from U.S. Model BITs 
PRPs in 21 American BITs signed between 1982 and 1995 include identically-worded PRPs 
which replicate the prohibition of mandatory performance requirements found in the 1983 and 
1984 U.S. Model BITs (and whose PRPs were themselves replicated in the 1987, 1991 and 
1992 U.S. Model BITs).292 These PRPs make use of concise and non-limitative illustrative lists 
of prohibited mandatory performance requirements which explicitly mention LCRs and EPRs 
and leaved uncharted the outer contours of such open-ended prohibitions; they also omit any 
reference to advantage-conditioning performance requirements. 
b) Attempts in American BITs to Address the Open-Ended Broadness of PRPs 
The broadness of the expression “performance requirements” poses serious problems of 
unpredictability as to which measures could ultimately fall within the scope of an open-ended 
PRP. This unpredictability was detected prior to the signature of the Argentina - U.S. BIT (1991): 
Argentina and the United States agreed to deploy their best efforts in avoiding a 
misinterpretation of the PRP (Article II(5)) which would “adversely affect” Argentina's 
privatisation process in progress at the time of signing the BIT.293 Argentina wished to preserve 
unabated its free rein in imposing operational and other restrictions, such as the mandatory 
provision of specified services, upon new owners of public utilities and other previously State-
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owned assets.294 However, the United States refused to spell out the delimitations of the 
concept of performance requirements through reliance on an exhaustive list of measures. As a 
result, Argentina could not ascertain which measures, adopted as part of the privatisation 
process could, would or would not fall within the PRP. The Protocol therefore recalls exchanges 
between the Parties over Argentina’s concerns and their shared understanding that the PRP 
should not hinder Argentina’s privatisation process.295 
The broadness of such open-ended PRPs soon proved unsatisfactory for other State Parties: 
for example, paragraph 7 of the Supplementary Protocol (1986) to the Egypt - U.S. BIT (1982) 
later modified Article II(5) of the BIT by defining “performance requirements” as limited to LCRs 
and EPRs, the two examples mentioned in Article II(5), thus emptying the terms “any other 
similar requirements” of any meaning.296 In an ineffectual attempt to constrain the scope and 
applicability of the PRP in Article II(8) of the Senegal - U.S. BIT (1983), paragraph 3 of the 
Protocol to the Senegal - U.S. BIT acknowledges that the domestic sourcing of locally 
competitive goods or services can contribute to the economic objectives of the Parties.297 
c) Rejecting Haphazard Attempts at Narrowing the Scope of Open-Ended PRPs in 
American BITs 
It has been suggested on occasion that wide-ranging formulas should be read so as to comprise 
a limitation to performance requirements related to trade. For example, BITs based on the 1992 
U.S. BIT Model, which include the Estonia - U.S. BIT (1994), the Latvia - U.S. BIT (1995) and 
the Lithuania - U.S. (1995) BITs, were described as providing for open-ended PRPs effectively 
limited to trade-distorting performance requirements.298 It has been stated that PRPs were 
meant to prevent host States from imposing upon American investors “inefficient and trade 
distorting practices,”299 yet such trade-focused language is nowhere reflected in any American 
PRP. Instead of being meant to narrow the scope of such PRPs, the expression “inefficient and 
trade distorting practices” seems to have been used during U.S. Senate hearings300 in an 
attempt to discuss the coverage of PRPs more concretely. Moreover, even if the expressions 
“other similar requirements” or “performance requirements” were intended to be limited to 
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TRIMs (as opposed to an allegedly broader notion of performance requirements), the United 
States insisted that all performance requirements it put forward during the GATT Uruguay 
Round of negotiations caused significant adverse trade effects and equated TRIMs with 
performance requirements.301 Adopting a narrower interpretation would in effect limit prohibited 
requirements only to the ones specifically enumerated within open-ended PRPs of American 
BITs and deprive their open-ended and broad terms of any useful effect.  
Scattered statements which arbitrarily narrow open-ended PRPs in American BITs appear to 
amount to impromptu attempts at providing examples of performance requirements that would 
be subject to such open-ended PRPs. For instance, PRPs within eight American BITs, i.e. those 
signed with Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Zaire/DRC, Senegal, Bangladesh, Cameroon and 
Grenada, allegedly applied only to four “investment measures:” LCRs, EPRs, LERs, and 
remittance restrictions.302 Along the same lines, PRPs of the nine American BITs (those with 
Albania, Belarus (not in force), Estonia, Georgia, Jamaica, Latvia, Mongolia, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Ukraine) allegedly apply only to LCRs/LSRs, EPRs, technology transfer 
requirements, to domestic sales requirements and to foreign exchange earning requirements.303 
These attempts at clarifying open-ended PRPs within the aforementioned American BITs by 
narrowing their scope rest on no explicit rationale nor do they find support on any authority or 
statement attributable to the United States or to any signatory State.  
Regrettably, when the question was raised as to who would determine the “inefficient and trade-
distorting” character of a measure in order to decide the applicability of a PRP to a specific 
measure, the issues of defining the expression “performance requirements” or clarifying what 
the expression “any other similar requirements” stands for were swept under the carpet. 
Instead, reference was made to the “detailed list” approach subsequently put forward in the 
PRP of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT.304 However, one cannot contend that open-ended PRPs within 
American BITs should be equated to detailed and exhaustive lists of performance requirements 
included in PRPs of subsequent American IIAs. On the contrary, subsequent PRPs with more 
specific coverage should be viewed as a tightening and a reduction of coverage compared with 
intentionally and admittedly broader prior PRPs.305  
It is true that most PRPs in BITs signed from 1994 onward, and beginning with the Georgia - 
                                                
301 U.S. Submission 14 (n 267) 18-20. 
302 Holmer (n 74) 10. 
303 Price (n 92) 30. 
304 “Questions by Sen. Pell and Replies by Daniel Price” in 1995 U.S. Senate Hearings on BITs (n 74) 32-
33. 
305 Supplementary Protocol (1986) to the Egypt - U.S. BIT (1982): Letter of Submittal (n 290). 
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U.S. BIT (1994), gave more concrete form to the goal of eliminating “inefficient and trade 
distorting practices” by enumerating the specific types of prohibited performance requirements. 
This drafting practice rendered moot the interpretative task of delimitating the contours of the 
expression “performance requirements” and the need for concepts such as “inefficient and trade 
distorting practices.”306 However, none of these alleviations apply to open-ended PRPs within 
first-generation American BITs. 
2. Open-Ended PRPs in French BITs  
a) France’s Model PRP 
France has produced two publicly available Model BITs: one dated 1998 307  and another 
undated.308 The PRPs in both French Model BITs are identical and show that France has opted 
for an altogether unique approach to prohibiting performance requirements. The PRP can be 
found in the FET provision of each Model BIT (Article 4 of France’s 1998 Model BIT and Article 
3 of France’s undated Model BIT). France’s Model PRP reads as follows: 
En particulier, bien que non exclusivement, sont considérées comme des entraves de droit ou de 
fait au traitement juste et équitable, toute restriction à l’achat et au transport de matières 
premières et de matières auxiliaires, d’énergie et de combustibles, ainsi que de moyens de 
production et d’exploitation de tout genre, toute entrave à la vente et au transport des produits à 
l’intérieur du pays et à l’étranger, ainsi que toutes autres mesures ayant un effet analogue. 
Drawing from the PRP appearing in the Protocol regarding Article 3 of the Ethiopia - France BIT 
(2003), available in both English and French, France’s PRP Model can be translated as follows: 
In particular though not exclusively, shall be considered as de jure or de facto impediments to fair 
and equitable treatment any restriction on the purchase or transport of raw materials and auxiliary 
materials, energy and fuels, as well as the means of production and operation of all types, any 
hindrance of the sale or transport of products within the country and abroad, as well as any other 
measures that have a similar effect. 
                                                
306 “Questions by Sen. Pell and Replies by Daniel Price” in 1995 U.S. Senate Hearings on BITs (n 74) 32-
33. 
307 “Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement ________________ 
sur l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements” in UNCTAD, International 
Investment Instruments: A Compendium, Vol. V: Regional Integration, Bilateral and Non-governmental 
Instruments (UNCTAD/DITE/2, 2000), 283. 
308  “Projet d’accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement 
________________ sur l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements” in UNCTAD, 
International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, Vol. III: Regional Integration, Bilateral and Non-
governmental Instruments (UNCTAD/DTCI/30, 1996), 159. 
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France’s Model PRP characterises performance requirements as one category of measures that 
breach the guarantee of FET. It is broadly worded and is couched in words that differ from those 
usually used to evoke performance requirements explicitly. France’s Model PRP is also not 
written in prohibitive terms; rather, it declares that the targeted measures breach the duty to 
provide for FET. The generic language used in the PRPs within France’s BITs might explain 
why they have rarely been discussed in analyses of PRPs. 309  Moreover, specifying that 
measures deemed to violate FET include restrictions on the purchase or the transportation of 
raw materials, auxiliary materials, energy, fuels, means of production and means of operation of 
all types gives a deceitful impression of narrowness while in fact the Model PRP displays a 
broad scope of application. This broadness is reinforced by preceding such enumeration with 
the terms “though not exclusively” and by the one aspect reminiscent of the terminology used in 
first-generation American PRPs: the open-ended nature of France’s Model PRP in that it further 
prohibits “any other measures that have a similar effect” to those of the depicted measures.  
The measures prohibited in France’s Model PRP consist of two broad categories: first, 
restrictions on the purchase or transport of raw materials and auxiliary materials, energy and 
fuels, as well as of means of production and operation of all types; and second, any hindrances 
of the sale or transport of products within the country and abroad. Restrictions on or hindrances 
of purchases, sales or transportation encompass performance requirements applicable to 
purchases or sales of investors and would therefore include LCRs, EPRs, trade-balancing 
requirements, export restrictions, foreign exchange restrictions (including foreign exchange 
earning or neutrality requirements), domestic sales requirements and product mandating 
requirements. In addition, France’s Model PRP prohibits measures that would produce similar 
effects to the measures that fall within these two already broadly depicted categories.  
b) 64 French BITs with Open-Ended PRPs 
Forty-eight of France’s 64 BITs that include PRPs replicate the text from France’s Model BIT: 28 
BITs signed between 1989 and 2007 incorporate PRPs identical to France’s PRP Model.310 
                                                
309 See the absence of French BITs in for example APEC & UNCTAD, Handbook (n 2) 86-90. However, 
see UNCTAD, “HCOMs” (n 44) 37-38 and Collins (n 7) 127-128 for a discussion of PRPs in French BITs.  
310 Article 4 of the Djibouti - France BIT (2007); Article 4 of the France - Senegal BIT (2007); Article 4 of 
the France - Seychelles BIT (2007); Article 3 of the Bahrain - France BIT (2004); Article 4 of the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina - France BIT (2003); Article 4 of the France - Tajikistan BIT (2002); Article 3 of the 
France - Zimbabwe BIT (2001); Article 3 of the Cambodia - France BIT (2000); Article 3 of the Dominican 
Republic - France BIT (1999); Article 3 of the Azerbaijan - France BIT (1998); Article 3 of the France - 
Namibia BIT (1998); Article 4 of the France - Nicaragua BIT (1998); Article 3 of the France - Macedonia 
BIT (1998); Article 4 of the France - Guatemala BIT (1998); Article 3 of the France - Georgia BIT (1997); 
Article 3 of the France - Moldova BIT (1997); Article 3 of the Croatia - France BIT (1996); Article 3 of the 
Armenia - France BIT (1995); Article 3 of the France - South Africa BIT (1995) (very nearly identical, with 
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Between 1983 and 2002, France signed an additional 20 BITs whose PRPs are nearly identical 
to France’s PRP Model: three French BITs comprise PRPs in which only a few inconsequential 
words were added or deleted without altering the substance of the PRP,311 while 17 French BITs 
comprise PRPs which are worded in the same way as France’s Model PRP, but appear in a 
Protocol, an Annex or an Exchange of Letters appended to the BIT.312  
The remaining 16 BITs of France comprise PRPs that differ from France’s PRP Model while 
retaining the Model PRP’s open-ended language by reiterating nearly identical open-ended 
expressions to the Model PRP’s “as well as any other measures that have a similar effect.” 
Within these 16 BITs, three include PRPs which differ from France’s Model PRP by providing 
much more comprehensive protection to investors against performance requirements and a 
wide array of other measures; in addition to such broad coverage, all three PRPs reiterate the 
prohibition of “any other measures that have a similar effect.”313 Within these same 16 BITs with 
PRPs that differ from France’s Model PRPs, 11 include PRPs limit their prohibition of purchase 
or transportation restrictions and/or sale or transportation hindrances by adding an additional 
criterion that they also be arbitrary, unfair and/or discriminatory.314 The final 2 of 16 French BITs 
                                                                                                                                                       
a few identical words appearing at the end rather than at the beginning); Article 3 of the Albania - France 
BIT (1995); Article 3 of the France - Oman BIT (1994); Article 4 of the Ecuador - France BIT (1994); 
Article 3 of the France - Kyrgyzstan BIT (1994); Article 3 of the France - Ukraine BIT (1994); Article 3 of 
the France - Turkmenistan BIT (1994); Article 3 of the France - Uzbekistan BIT (1993); Article 3 of the 
France - Mongolia BIT (1991); Article 3 of the Bolivia - France BIT (1989). 
311 France - Saudi Arabia BIT (2002), Protocol regarding Article 2; Article 3 of the France - Peru BIT 
(1993); France - Viet Nam BIT (1992), Article 1 of the Exchange of Letters dated 26 May 1992.  
312 Ethiopia - France BIT (2003), Protocol regarding Article 3; Article 2 of the Protocol to the France - 
Mozambique BIT (2002); France - Kazakhstan BIT (1998), Protocol regarding Article 3; France - Slovenia 
BIT (1998), Protocol regarding Article 4; Article 1 of the Protocol to the Cuba - France BIT (1997); Annex 
to the France - Qatar BIT (1996); France - Uruguay BIT (1993), Protocol regarding Article 3; France - 
Latvia BIT (1992), Exchange of Letters dated 15 May 1992; France - Lithuania BIT (1992), Exchange of 
Letters dated 23 April 1992; France - Romania BIT (1995), Protocol regarding Article 3; Article 1 of the 
Protocol to the France - Lao People’s Democratic Republic (“Lao PDR”) BIT (1989); Article 1(a) of the 
Protocol to the France - Kuwait BIT (1989); Article 1(a) of the Protocol to the France - Haiti BIT (1984); 
France - Yemen BIT (1984), Article 3 of the Exchange of Letters dated 27 April 1984; Costa Rica - France 
BIT (1984), Article 1(a) of the Exchange of Letters dated 8 March 1984; France - Israel BIT (1983), Article 
1(a) of the Exchange of Letters dated 9 June 1983; Exchange of Letters No 1 dated 2 May 1983 
pertaining to the France - Nepal BIT (1983). 
313 Article 3 of the France - Madagascar BIT (2003) further deems the unusually broad category of 
measures which can affect, directly or indirectly, investments of covered investors to breach FET; Article 
3 of the France - Zambia BIT (2002) prohibits “any restriction to free mouvment [sic], purchase and sale 
of goods and services;” Article 3 of the France - Uganda BIT (2003) uses a treaty provision worded 
identically to Article 3 of the France - Zambia BIT (2002). Perhaps the comprehensiveness of these three 
treaty provisions renders inappropriate their labelling as PRPs, but it is suggested that at the very least 
they prohibit all performance requirements that hinder the free movement, purchase and sale of goods 
and services. 
314 Article 3 of the France - Venezuela BIT (2001) (“arbitrary and discriminatory”); Article 4 of the France - 
Honduras BIT (1998) (“discriminatory”); Article 1 of the Exchange of Letters dated 28 November 1996 
pertaining to the France - Lebanon BIT (1996) (“discriminatory”); Article 1(a) of Annexed Letter 1 to the 
France - Pakistan BIT dated 1 June 1983 (“discriminatory”); Exchange of Letters 13 January 1996 
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which differ from France’s Model PRP adopt a different approach: performance requirements 
and any other measures of equivalent or analogous effect are viewed as “less favourable 
treatment” within national treatment and/or MFN treatment provisions.315 
3. GATT Uruguay Round Submissions as Tools for Expounding the Content and 
Outer Contours of Open-Ended PRPs in American, French and Indian BITs 
The attempts at defining TRIMs during the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations 
simultaneously defined performance requirements.316 The notions of performance requirements 
and TRIMs might have proven elastic. However, the concentric core of what amounts to TRIMs 
and the outer edges of what constitutes performance requirements have remained the same 
among all proposed definitions. 
This section evolves toward a working definition of performance requirements by identifying the 
measures most frequently identified as such. In doing so, a number of consistent findings can 
be derived from lists of performance requirements elaborated by GATT Members and by the 
OECD. First, this section sets forth and focuses on a narrower list of measures unanimously 
regarded as TRIMs. Second, this section discusses in detail the finding that the United States, 
the EC, India and the OECD each identified the same 11 measures as performance 
requirements as part of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations on TRIMs. Given that a 
significant number of American and French BITs with open-ended PRPs, as well as the India - 
Kuwait BIT (2001), were negotiated at the same time as or within a few years following the 
conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round, one would expect that France, India and the United 
States were referring to performance requirements explicitly identified in their respective 
submissions made during the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations on TRIMs when using in 
their respective PRPs undefined expressions such as “performance requirements” and open-
ended expressions such as “any other similar requirements,” or “any other measures that have 
a similar effect.”  
                                                                                                                                                       
pertaining to the France - Morocco BIT (“abusive or discriminatory”); Article 1(a) of the Second Letter 
dated 5 November 1982 pertaining to the France - Panama BIT (“abusive or discriminatory”); Article 3 of 
the France - Philippines BIT (1994) (“unfair”); Article 3 of the France - Trinidad and Tobago BIT (1993) 
(“unreasonable or discriminatory”); Protocol regarding Article 3 of the Chile - France BIT (1992) 
(“discriminatory”) and Exchange of Letters to the Estonia - France BIT dated 14 May 1992 
(“discriminatory”); Article 2 of the Protocol to the France - United Arab Emirates BIT (1991) (“unfair and 
discriminatory”). 
315 Article 4 of the France - Iran BIT (2003) and Exchange of Letters No 3 regarding the Bangladesh - 
France BIT (1985). 
316 OECD, First Note on TRIMs (n 30) para 23. 
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a) Clearly (and Directly) Trade-Related Performance Requirements: LCRs, EPRs and 
Trade-Balancing Requirements 
First, LCRs and EPRs constitute “the most obvious generic examples” of performance 
requirements and have been consistently identified as such since the end of the 1970s.317 A 
third type of measure, import-export (or trade) balancing requirements essentially blend LCRs 
and EPRs into a single measure and exhibit clear trade-relatedness by imposing either export 
increases or import reductions. 318  LCRs are identified in all studies on performance 
requirements.319 LCRs and EPRs were still considered the most prevalent TRIMs at the turn of 
the 1990s. 320  Numerous GATT Members singled out LCRs and EPRs as the two main 
categories of performance requirements321 described as “directly related to trade”322 and as 
having “a direct impact on … trade”323 and “a direct and significant restrictive or distorting effect 
on trade.”324 
The EC,325 Japan,326 Nordic Countries (Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden),327 Switzerland328 
and the United States329 all identified LCRs, EPRs and trade-balancing requirements as TRIMs 
aside from additional performance requirements. Even India acknowledged that LCRs, EPRs 
and trade-balancing requirements directly impact trade.330  
The OECD,331 UNCTAD,332 the WTO Secretariat333 and scholars334 all identify LCRs, EPRs and 
                                                
317  GATT, G-18 Note on Performance Requirements (n 157) para 6; Bergsten, Performance 
Requirements (n 34) 1-2; Narasimham (n 48) 1-2. 
318 India Submission 18 (n 35) para 23; LICIT (n 48) 56. 
319 OECD, Third Note on TRIMs (n 70) para 13. 
320 David Greenaway, “Why are we Negotiating on TRIMs?,” in David Greenaway and others (eds), 
Global Protectionism, Macmillan (1991) 154, 155-163; Greenaway, “Political Economy of TRIMs” (n 62) 
372, 376; see also: Graham and Krugman (n 245) 463-490. 
321 Bergsten (n 53) 13, 15. 
322 Bergsten (n 53) 13, 15. 
323 Bale (n 83) 180, 185. 
324 GATT, Note on Uruguay Round (1987) (n 165) para 49. 
325 EC Submission 10 (n 264) para 3. 
326 Japan Submission 20 (n 264) 5-6. 
327 Nordic Countries (n 243) 1-2; Nordic Countries, Submission to the GATT Group of Negotiations on 
Goods – Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Investment Measures, MTN.GNG/NG12/W/23 (22 
November 1989), para 12; GATT, Note on Trims (April 1990) (n 147) para 29 (views of the Nordic 
Countries). 
328 Switzerland Submission 16 (n 42) 3. Singapore opined that the Swiss proposal “simply treats TRIMs 
as if they are subsidies:” Singapore (n 148) para 17. 
329 U.S., Trade & FDI (n 266), quoted in OECD, First Note on TRIMs (n 30) 5-6; U.S. Submission 4 (n 
267) 3-5; U.S. Submission 14 (n 267) 5, 9, 11, 16-20. See also: Bale (n 83) 180, 185; Brock (n 83) 21, 24. 
See also: “U.S. State Dept. Responses to Sen. Pell” (n 78); Tarullo (1992) (n 74) 7; Papovich (n 94) 73. 
The United States developed an additional list of TRIMs in 1989 which reiterated all previously mentioned 
measures but for domestic sales requirements: see UNCTC and UNCTAD (n 43) 23-24. 
330 India Submission 18 (n 35) para 23. 
331 OECD, First Note on TRIMs (n 30) paras 4-12, 23-24; OECD, Second Note on TRIMs (n 48) para 10; 
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trade-balancing requirements as performance requirements. These three measures constitute 
the unquestionable core to both performance requirements and TRIMs. The following section 
will show that efforts that led to identifying these three categories of measures also revealed 
that an additional set of measures were consistently put forward as part of negotiations over 
performance requirements.  
b) The American/European/Indian/OECD List of Performance Requirements 
As part of the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations on TRIMs, the European Communities 
(“EC”),335 India336 and the United States337 identified between 1987 and 1989 the same 11 
performance requirements:  
1) LCRs; 
2) EPRs; 
3) Trade balancing requirements; 
4) LERs;  
5) Technology transfer, licensing and local R&D requirements;338  
                                                                                                                                                       
OECD, Third Note on TRIMs (n 70) paras 7, 13-27. 
332 UNCTC, Transnational Corporations in World Development: Third Survey (United Nations, 1983) 63; 
UNCTAD, WIR 1996 (n 5) 179; see also UNCTAD, “HCOMs” (n 44) 2-3, 8-9, 12-14. 
333 WTO and UNCTAD (n 5) para 15. 
334 Coughlin (n 36) 133; McCulloch and Owen (n 48) 335-336; Safarian (n 29) 613; Greenaway (n 31) 
141-142; Greenaway, “Political Economy of TRIMs” (n 62) 369-371; Greenaway, “Why Negotiate on 
TRIMs” (n 320) 148; Kumar, “Effectiveness of Performance Requirements” (n 48) 60-61. 
335 EC Submission 10 (n 264) para 3. 
336 India Submission 18 (n 35) paras 11, 16, 20-21, 23.  
337 U.S., Trade & FDI (n 266), quoted in OECD, First Note on TRIMs (n 30) 5-6; U.S. Submission 4 (n 
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see UNCTC and UNCTAD (n 43) 23-24. The American definition of performance requirements and later 
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requirements (LCRs, EPRs, a broad and vague category titled “import restrictions,” local employment 
requirements and LERs – see David W. Loree, Stephen E. Guisinger, “Policy and Non-Policy 
Determinants of U.S. Equity Foreign Direct Investment” 26(2) Journal of International Business Studies 
281 (1995) 286 – for LERs, see also Bergsten (n 53) 13, 15. In 1981-1982, the United States broadened 
its list of “trade-related performance requirements” to seven types of measures, shedding import 
restrictions and adding technology transfer, licensing and royalty requirements, investment localisation 
requirements and remittance restrictions: see Bale  (n 83) 180-181, 185; Frank G. Yukmanic (U.S. Dept. 
of Treasury), Performance Requirements: the General Debate and a Review of Latin American Practices, 
August 1982, quoted in OECD, First Note on TRIMs (n 30) 7-8. The United States also additionally 
identified a number of general and vague categories of measures unhelpful to fleshing out performance 
requirements further.  
338 Both the EC and the United States define local R&D requirements as a subset of technology transfer 
requirements: see U.S. Submission 4 (n 267) 2; United States, Submission to the GATT Group of 
Negotiations on Goods – Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Investment Measures, 
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6) Foreign exchange restrictions;  
7) Remittance restrictions;  
8) Manufacturing requirements;  
9) Manufacturing limitations;  
10) Product mandating requirements; and  
11) Domestic sales requirements.  
The OECD339 identified the same 11 performance requirements as the EC, India and the United 
States. The 11 measures identified as performance requirements by the United States, the EC, 
India and the OECD show remarkable equivalence and contribute to shaping a common and 
settled meaning for the expressions “performance requirements,” “any other measures that 
have a similar effect” or “any other similar requirements” used in open-ended PRPs of IIAs. One 
would expect that France, India and the United States were referring to these 11 performance 
requirements when using, in their respective PRPs, open-ended expressions such as “any other 
similar requirements,” or “any other measures that have a similar effect” and undefined 
expressions such as “performance requirements.” 
One can conclude that the precise contents or the outer limits of PRPs that make use of 
undefined expressions are not inherently clear or easily spelled out. This complexity may 
partially explain why States moved away from vague and open-ended PRPs and opted instead 
for enumerating specifically prohibited performance requirements within exhaustive PRPs. 
4. The Cargill v Poland Tribunal and the Lemire Tribunal’s Interpretations of Open-
Ended PRPs 
At the moment of writing these lines, Cargill v Poland340 and Lemire v Ukraine were the only 
publicly disclosed investment arbitrations that led arbitral tribunals to interpret PRPs within IIAs 
other than the NAFTA (1992).  
The Cargill v Poland underlines the discomfort of tribunals with the actual wording of PRPs and 
the tendency to read-in unwritten criteria in addition to those set out in a given PRP. In Cargill v 
Poland, the successive Polish Sugar Laws of 1994, 1996 and 2001 (and, subsequently to 
                                                                                                                                                       
MTN.GNG/NG12/W/9 (9 February 1988) 5; EC Submission 10 (n 264) para 3 (item xii). 
339 OECD, First Note on TRIMs (n 30) paras 4-12, 23-24; OECD, Second Note on TRIMs (n 48) para 10; 
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340 Cargill, Incorporated v. Republic of Poland, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/2, Final Award 
(29 February 2008), paras 532-554 (Article II(4) of the Poland - U.S BIT (1990)). 
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Poland’s accession to the EU, the relevant EU regulation) stipulated that production of 
isoglucose (also known as high fructose corn syrup (“HFCS”)) beyond a given threshold (and 
referred to as “Quota C” production) had to be exported outside of Poland.341 The Tribunal 
concluded that the measures at issue constituted a performance requirement (an EPR).342 
Instead of focusing on the wording of the applicable PRP (Article II(4) of the Poland - U.S. BIT 
(1990)), the Tribunal reached this finding by relying on a generic definition of performance 
requirements provided by UNCTAD.343 While the outcome may have been the right one, the 
method of straying away from the treaty provision being interpreted and applied does not follow 
the approach set out in Article 31 of the VCLT. 
At the same time, the Tribunal concluded that the measures at issue did not breach the 
applicable PRP (Article II(4) of the Poland - U.S. BIT (1990)) since the EPR was not imposed as 
“a condition of establishment, expansion or maintenance of investments.” The investments 
under consideration were admittedly already established when the EPR was adopted, but the 
Tribunal appears to have narrowly construed the references in Article II(4) to performance 
requirements as conditions of maintenance or expansion of investments. 344  The Tribunal 
concluded that that since the quotas and the EPR were not in place at the time of rendering its 
decision, while the claimant still maintained its investment in Poland at that time, then the EPR 
could not be viewed as a condition for the maintenance of the investment.  
The Tribunal then decided that for a performance requirement to be imposed as a condition of 
expansion of an investment, that performance requirement had to hinder the expansion of the 
investment.345 That unwritten additional criterion unduly restricted the scope of Article II(4) of the 
Poland - U.S. BIT (1990) and led the Tribunal to conclude that the claimant had failed to 
demonstrate that its decision not to export its Quota C production was due to the EPR. Instead, 
the Tribunal decided that the claimant did not export its Quota C production based on 
commercial considerations; therefore, the EPR did not condition the expansion of claimant’s 
investment.346 The Tribunal did not entertain the idea that the claimant could and would have 
sold its Quota C production domestically had it not been compelled to export it and that 
therefore its expansion had been thwarted by the obligation to export instead of selling its 
production domestically.  
                                                
341 ibid paras 77, 81, 115.  
342 ibid paras 544-545. 
343 ibid para 541. 
344 ibid paras 550, 554. 
345 ibid para 550. 
346 ibid paras 553-554. 
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The Lemire v Ukraine arbitration demonstrates the perils of assigning “purposes” to an open-
ended PRP and to the measure at issue as a “method” of delimitating and determining the 
scope and applicability of a PRP.  
In Lemire v Ukraine, Claimant Joseph Charles Lemire, a national of the United States 
(“Lemire”), was the majority shareholder of a licensed radio station in Ukraine. Among other 
alleged violations, Lemire alleged that Article 9.1 of the 2006 Law on Television and Radio 
Broadcasting (the “LTR”) imposed an LCR to the effect that 50% of the broadcasting time of 
each radio organisation had to consist of music produced in Ukraine (the “Radio Broadcasting 
LCR”). “Music produced in Ukraine” included any music where the author, the composer or the 
performer was Ukrainian.347 
Claimant Lemire argued that Article 9.1 of the LTR amounted to an LCR prohibited by Article 
II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. BIT (1994), an open-ended PRP which reiterates unchanged the 
previously discussed PRP from the corresponding U.S. Model BIT. Faced with a broad and 
open-ended PRP unmitigated by reservations or exceptions, the Lemire Tribunal opted for a 
roughhewn reasoning that belied its intent of granting regulatory flexibility to Ukraine in 
implementing cultural policies, a considerably sensitive matter of national sovereignty. The 
Tribunal accordingly framed the question as whether Article II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. BIT, an 
open-ended PRP applicable notably to LCRs, applies to a “cultural restriction” such as the 
Radio Broadcasting LCR. 348  The Tribunal had to divert its analysis away from the clear 
language of the PRP, which undoubtedly prohibits LCRs, and the translucent nature of the 
Radio Broadcasting LCR in order to avoid finding a breach of Article II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. 
BIT. The Tribunal set the tone with an unwarranted and inappropriate analysis that the Tribunal 
itself qualified as “really obiter dicta” under the FET standard, even though claimant Lemire had 
not alleged that the Radio Broadcasting LCR violated the FET standard. 349  The Tribunal 
affirmed Ukraine’s inherent right, as a sovereign State, “to regulate its affairs and adopt laws in 
order to protect the common good of its people” 350  and asserted a “high measure of 
deference” 351  in respect thereof made even more compelling with respect to regulations 
affecting “deeply felt cultural or linguistic traits of the community.”352 The Tribunal added a 
second line of justification for Ukraine’s measure within its obiter dicta relating to the FET 
standard: protecting national culture is a concern shared and acted upon by many States 
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around the world. The Tribunal considered that “a rule cannot be said to be unfair, inadequate, 
inequitable or discriminatory, when it has been adopted by many countries around the world.”353 
Underlining the non-discriminatory application to all broadcasters of the Radio Broadcasting 
LCR, the Tribunal ended its obiter dicta by declaring the Radio Broadcasting LCR compatible 
with the FET standard under the Ukraine - U.S. BIT.354 These remarks thus clearly indicated 
where the Tribunal stood in its appreciation of the legitimacy of Radio Broadcasting LCR prior to 
having undertaken its analysis under the PRP. 
Ironically, the Lemire Tribunal kicked off its analysis of Article II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. BIT by 
insisting that the starting point of its analysis lied in the “ordinary meaning” of the terms used in 
the PRP.355 The Tribunal unconvincingly described the Radio Broadcasting LCR as mandating 
that 50% of the music broadcast by radio stations be authored, produced or composed by 
Ukrainians without specifically mandating that goods or services be purchased locally, in an 
attempt to view the Radio Broadcasting LCR as compatible with Article II(6) of the Ukraine - 
U.S. BIT. However, the Tribunal recognised the limited persuasive effect of its depiction of the 
Radio Broadcasting LCR given that the authors, composers and producers of Ukrainian music 
are effectively located in Ukraine.356 The Tribunal hastened to add that the terms of the PRP 
should be assigned an ordinary meaning in light of the object and purpose of the Ukraine - U.S. 
BIT357 and shifted its focus onto the object and purpose of Article II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. BIT 
in order to construct a “correct interpretation.”358 
The Lemire Tribunal invoked no authorities as support for assigning an object and purpose to 
the PRP at issue; its interpretation of Article II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. BIT, which it construed as 
“trade-related” and as aimed at avoiding the imposition of “[LCRs] as a protection of local 
industries against competing imports” rested solely on the preamble of the Ukraine - U.S. BIT.359 
However, the preamble to the Ukraine - U.S. BIT does not even mention the term “trade” and its 
goal of promoting greater economic cooperation is qualified by a reference to cross-border 
bilateral investment. These elements of the preamble to the Ukraine - U.S. BIT do not lend 
support to restricting the scope Article II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. BIT to performance 
requirements directly related to trade. The Lemire Tribunal then erroneously characterised 
                                                
353 ibid para 506. 
354 ibid para 506. 
355 ibid paras 508-509. 
356 ibid para 509. 
357 ibid para 508. 
358 ibid para 510. 
359 ibid para 510. 
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Article II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. BIT as a “local content rule:”360 by its illustrative and open-
ended language, Article II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. BIT is an open-ended PRP that applies to a 
much larger number of performance requirements than LCRs and which is not inherently limited 
to performance requirements directly related to trade. 
Having assigned a “purpose” to Article II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. BIT, the Lemire Tribunal 
compared such “purpose” with that of the Radio Broadcasting LCR, purportedly intended “to 
promote Ukraine’s cultural inheritance” and not “to protect local industries and restrict 
imports.”361 Having deemed compatible the respective purposes of the Radio Broadcasting LCR 
and of Article II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. BIT, the Tribunal decided that the Radio Broadcasting 
LCR did not violate the PRP: the Tribunal disregarded the terms of the PRP, but even by 
narrowing the PRP’s scope to requirements that “goods or services must be purchased locally,” 
the Radio Broadcasting LCR still amounted to a prohibited performance requirement and could 
not be validated even by overemphasising its purposes.362  
The Tribunal hastily asserted compatibility between the respective purposes arbitrarily assigned 
to the Radio Broadcasting LCR and to Article II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. BIT without invoking any 
evidence or authorities to support its interpretation. This compatibility of purposes justified 
finding that no violation of the PRP had occurred,363 obscured the clear incompatibility between 
the Radio Broadcasting LCR and the PRP, and avoided the second-guessing of Ukrainian 
cultural policy-making by holding it liable for attempting to preserve its cultural identity. Although 
plausible, the Tribunal cited no support for its determination of the purpose underlying the Radio 
Broadcasting LCR. Moreover, the nobleness of Ukraine’s objectives cannot whitewash the true 
nature of the Radio Broadcasting LCR: a performance requirement clearly prohibited by the 
PRP at issue cannot be validated and excluded from the scope of such PRP on the grounds 
that such performance requirement aims at achieving important, legitimate and/or sensitive 
public policy purposes.364 One should resist calls to insist on the positive objectives of certain 
performance requirements as exculpatory justifications when these performance requirements 
are specifically prohibited.365 Preserving performance requirements deemed critical should be 
achieved through specific exceptions, exclusions or reservations. The understandably delicate 
                                                
360 ibid para 511. 
361 ibid para 510. 
362 ibid para 511. 
363 ibid para 511. 
364 GATT, Note on Trims (April 1990) (n 147) paras 32, 36, 42. 
365 For an example of a country that recommends discarding negative trade effects on the basis of 
positive objectives, see: GATT Secretariat, Note on the Meeting of 26 November 1987, GATT Group of 
Negotiations on Goods – Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Investment Measures, MTN.GNG/NG12/5 
(14 December 1987) para 21. 
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position of the Lemire Tribunal provides a compelling explanation for why broadly-worded PRPs 
with unfettered applicability were progressively abandoned by the United States to be replaced 
by detailed PRPs applicable to a limited number of explicitly identified performance 
requirements and confined by a number of exceptions, exclusions and reservations, and for why 
this more comprehensive approach to performance requirements was reproduced with much 
greater frequency.  
D. Detailed and Exhaustive PRPs in IIAs 
1. Prohibiting Detailed Lists of Mandatory Performance Requirements: the 
Widespread Recurrence of a Limited Number of Patterns 
Article 1106 of the NAFTA (1992) signalled a more elaborate and complex approach to PRPs. 
The NAFTA was negotiated and signed at the same time as GATT Uruguay Round negotiations 
on TRIMs were taking place. Negotiations on TRIMs influenced NAFTA Article 1106, which in 
turn greatly influenced the 1994 U.S. Model BIT, the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994),366 the 2004 
U.S. Model BIT and the 2004 Canada Model FIPA, as well as the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and the 
2012 Canada Model FIPA. All seven instruments provide for detailed and exhaustive lists of 
prohibited performance requirements. As will be detailed below, the IIAs that follow any of these 
PRPs also comprise a plethora of treaty provisions that impact the scope and coverage and the 
interpretation of their PRPs. A great number of American and Canadian IIAs reproduce NAFTA 
Article 1106, Article VI of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT, Article V(2) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA 
(1994), Article 8(1) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT or Article 7(1) of the 2004 Canada Model FIPA, 
while these model and treaty PRPs also widely influenced PRPs of IIAs between States other 
than Canada or the United States.  
Forty-six of the IIAs currently surveyed comprise PRPs that apply to the same list of seven 
mandatory performance requirements as does NAFTA Article 1106(1): EPRs and export 
restrictions, LCRs, LSRs, trade-balancing requirements, restrictions on domestic sales of goods 
or services which link such sales to the volume or value of exports or to foreign exchange 
earnings (“domestic sales restrictions”), technology transfer requirements and product 
mandating requirements. Seven Canadian FTAs,367 four Chilean IIAs368 and one Indian IIA369 
                                                
366 The Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) is the first IIA that Canada signed following the NAFTA and set the 
tone for numerous subsequent Canadian FIPAs. 
367 Article G-06(1) of the Canada - Chile FTA (1996); Article 807(1) of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); 
Article 807(1) of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008); Article 9.07(1) of the Canada - Panama FTA (2008); 
Article 10.7(1) of the Canada - Honduras FTA (2013); Article 8.8(1) of the Canada - Korea FTA (2014); 
Article 8.5(1) of the Canada - EU CETA (2014). 
368 Article 9-07(1)(c) of the Chile - Mexico FTA (1998); Article 10.7(1)(c) of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003); 
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use language nearly identical to that of NAFTA Article 1106(1). PRPs in 12 Canadian FIPAs370 
that reproduce the 2004 Canada Model FIPA apply to the same mandatory performance 
requirements and exhibit a single difference compared with the NAFTA: they prohibit EPRs and 
export restrictions only in respect of goods and not services. PRPs in 22 of the currently 
inventoried IIAs371 whose PRPs are based on Article 8 of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT apply to the 
same mandatory performance requirements and exhibit two differences compared with the 
NAFTA: first, their prohibition of LSRs applies only in respect of goods and not services, and 
second, their prohibition of mandatory product mandating requirements uses different language 
than that of the NAFTA, but with the same intended meaning.372  
Many IIAs prohibit a more limited range of mandatory performance requirements than those 
prohibited by the NAFTA. Article V(2) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) prohibits the 
imposition of EPRs and export restrictions (in respect of goods only), LCRs, LSRs, trade-
balancing requirements and technology transfer requirements, but does not prohibit domestic 
sales restrictions or product mandating requirements contrary to the NAFTA. Thirteen Canadian 
FIPAs replicate the narrower list of prohibited mandatory performance requirements put forward 
in the Canada - Ukraine FIPA.373 Among Canadian IIAs, only the Canada - Venezuela FIPA 
                                                                                                                                                       
Article 9.6(1)(c) of the Chile - Colombia FTA (2006); Article 77(1)(c) of the Chile - Japan EPA (2007). 
369 Article 10.5(1) of the India - Korea CEPA (2009). 
370 Article 7(1) of the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006); Article 10(1) of the Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 
9(1) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); Article 9(1) of the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 
9(1) of the Canada - Nigeria FIPA (2014); Article 9(1) of the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); Article 9(1) of 
the Canada - Senegal FIPA (2014); Article 9(1) of the Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); Article 9(1) of 
the Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 9(1) of the Canada - Guinea FIPA (2014); Article 9(1) of 
the Canada - Hong Kong, China FIPA (2016). Article 7(1) of the Canada - Jordan FIPA (2009) prohibits 
the same performance requirements as NAFTA Article 1106, but its prohibition of mandatory performance 
requirements applies only to covered investors. 
371 American FTAs: Article 15.8(1)(c) and (g) of the Singapore - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 10.5(1)(c) and 
(g) of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 11.9(1)(c) and (g) of the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 
10.8(1)(c) and (g) of the Morocco - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.9(1)(c) and (g) of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. 
FTA (2004); Article 10.9(1)(c) and (g) of the Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.8(1)(c) and (g) of the 
Oman - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(1)(c) and (g) of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(1)(c) and 
(g) of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 11.8(1)(c) and (g) of the Korea - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 
9.10(1)(c) and (g) of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) (2015). American BITs: Article 8(1)(c) of the 
U.S. - Uruguay BIT (2005); Article 8(1)(c) of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT (2008). Australian Agreements: Article 
14.9(2)(c) and (g) of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014) (the prohibition of product mandating requirements 
is stylistically altered); Article 11.9(1)(c) and (g) of the Australia - Korea FTA (2014); Article 5(1)(c) and (g) 
of the Singapore - Australia Free Trade Agreement (2003) (“SAFTA”), Revised Chapter 8 (Investment) 
(2011); Article 7(1)(c) and (g) of the Protocol on Investment to the Australia - New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement (2011) (“CERTA Investment Protocol”); Article 10.7(1)(c) and (g) of 
the Australia - Chile FTA (2008). Chilean Agreements: Article 10.8(1)(c) and (g) of the Pacific Alliance 
Protocol (2014); Article 11.6(1)(c) of the Chile - Peru FTA (2006), but it reproduces NAFTA’s wording for 
product mandating requirements; Article 10.5(1)(c) and (g) of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003).  
372 Vandevelde (n 84) 404. Article 9(1)(g) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA also opted for a redrafted 
prohibition of product mandating requirements, as does Article 8.5(1) of the Canada - EU CETA (2014). 
373 Article V(2) of the Canada - Trinidad and Tobago FIPA (1995); Article V(2) of the Canada - Philippines 
FIPA (1995); Article V(2) of the Canada - South Africa FIPA (1995); Article V(2) of the Canada - Ecuador 
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(1996) comprises a PRP that does not replicate a previously existing PRP model. Article II(6) of 
the Annex to the Canada - Venezuela FIPA (1996) applies only to goods and not services and 
prohibits LCRs, trade-balancing requirements, foreign exchange restrictions, export restrictions 
and technology transfer requirements. Article VI of the Chile - Dominican Republic BIT (2000) 
prohibits four performance requirements: EPRs and export restrictions, LCRs, LSRs and trade-
balancing requirements. This PRP focuses on performance requirements most closely related to 
trade.  
A number of IIAs prohibit a greater number of mandatory performance requirements than those 
prohibited by the NAFTA. Article VI of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT prohibits the following 
mandatory measures: LCRs and LSRs; trade-balancing requirements; EPRs and export 
restrictions; domestic sales restrictions; technology transfer requirements; and, on top of what 
the NAFTA prohibits, R&D requirements. Article VI of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT does not 
address product mandating requirements on a standalone basis, but does add to its prohibition 
of EPRs and export restrictions requirements to export a particular type, level or percentage of 
products or services to a specific market region. Thirteen American BITs comprise PRPs which 
replicate the PRP found in the 1994 U.S. Model BIT: six American BITs reproduce an identical 
PRP to that found in the 1994 U.S. Model BIT,374  while seven additional American BITs 
reproduce the PRP from the 1994 U.S. Model BIT with minor stylistic changes.375 Article 89(1) of 
the India - Japan CEPA (2011) prohibits the same mandatory performance requirements as 
those enumerated in NAFTA Article 1106(1), but further prohibits export restrictions and 
requirements to appoint high-ranking employees of a given nationality. 
Article 8(1) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT is the same as Article 8(1) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, 
except that it further prohibits, under Article 8(1)(h), requirements to purchase, use, or accord a 
preference to a “technology of the Party or of persons of the Party,” as well as requirements 
which prevent from purchasing, using or granting a preference to a particular technology; Article 
9.10(1)(h) of the TPP (2015) is the only treaty provision that reproduces Article 8(1)(h). Article 
                                                                                                                                                       
FIPA (1996); Article V(2) of the Canada - Panama FIPA (1996); Article V(2) of the Canada - Egypt FIPA 
(1996); Article V(2) of the Barbados - Canada FIPA (1996); Article VI of the Canada - Croatia FIPA 
(1997); Article VI of the Canada - Lebanon FIPA (1997); Article V(2) of the Armenia - Canada FIPA 
(1997); Article VI of the Canada - Uruguay FIPA (1997); Article V(2) of the Canada - Latvia FIPA (2009); 
Article V(2) of the Canada - Romania FIPA (2009). 
374 Article VI of the Georgia - U.S. BIT (1994); Article VI of the U.S. - Uzbekistan BIT (1994) (signed, but 
not in force); Article VI of the Honduras - U.S. BIT (1995); Article VII of the Croatia - U.S. BIT (1996); 
Article VI of the Azerbaijan - U.S. BIT (1997); Article VI of the El Salvador - U.S. BIT (1999) (signed, but 
not in force). 
375 Article VI of the Trinidad and Tobago - U.S. BIT (1994); Article VI of the Albania - U.S. BIT (1995); 
Article VI of the Nicaragua - U.S. BIT (1995) (signed, but not in force); Article VI of the Jordan - U.S. BIT 
(1997); Article VI of the Bolivia - U.S. BIT (1998); Article VI of the Mozambique - U.S. BIT (1998); Article 6 
of the Bahrain - U.S. BIT (1999). 
 
 77 
9.10(1)(i) of the TPP goes a step farther and prohibits requirements of a given rate or amount of 
royalty or a given duration in license contracts.376 
Following the approach set out in all American BITs signed prior to the NAFTA, at a time when 
negotiating binding PRPs proved very difficult,377 all American, Canadian, French and Indian 
Model BITs include standalone disciplines on free transfers that ensure unfettered transfers and 
prohibit remittance restrictions.378 One can logically infer and assume that a large number of 
IIAs that comprise detailed and exhaustive PRPs (perhaps even all of them) followed the lead of 
Article 1109 of the NAFTA by ensuring unfettered transfers and prohibiting remittance 
restrictions separately from their PRPs.  
The previously discussed American, EC, Indian and OECD GATT Uruguay Round submissions 
identify LERs as a performance requirement. The NAFTA prohibits LERs, but within its national 
treatment provision (Article 1102(4)(a)) and not as part of its PRP. None of the Model BITs of 
Canada, France, the United States or India explicitly prohibits LERs either as part of their PRPs 
or in a distinct provision. American, Canadian, French and Indian BITs that comprise PRPs 
appear to logically follow these Model BITs by making no explicit reference to LERs.379 The 
United States, Canada, France and India have chosen not to prohibit LERs explicitly in their IIAs 
that include detailed and exhaustive PRPs.  
Accounting for variations as to the precise number and formulation of prohibited performance 
requirements, the great majority of PRPs within surveyed IIAs remain very close to the standard 
set by NAFTA Article 1106 and rely upon very similar wording. This show of near-uniformity 
reinforces the need for a systemic understanding of PRPs within IIAs and for interpreting PRPs 
in accordance with their shared terms of art and settled meanings, but also heightens the need 
                                                
376 Article 9.10(3)(h) of the TPP (2015) provides an exception specific to these two additional prohibitions. 
377 Article V of the Egypt - U.S. BIT (1982); Article VI of the Panama - U.S. BIT (1982); Article V of the 
Haiti - U.S. BIT (1983); Article V of the Senegal - U.S. BIT (1983); Article V of the U.S. - Zaire/DRC BIT 
(1984); Article IV of the Morocco - U.S. BIT (1985); Article IV of the Turkey - U.S. BIT (1985); Article V of 
the Bangladesh - U.S. BIT (1986); Article V of the Cameroon - U.S. BIT (1986); Article IV of the Grenada - 
U.S. BIT (1986); Article IV of the Congo (Brazzaville) - U.S. BIT (1990); Article V of the Poland - U.S. BIT 
(1990); Article IV of the Tunisia - U.S. BIT (1990); Article IV of the Argentina - U.S. BIT (1991); Article V of 
the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic - U.S. BIT (1991); Article IV of the Sri Lanka - U.S. BIT (1991); 
Article IV of the Armenia - U.S. BIT (1992); Article IV of the Bulgaria - U.S. BIT (1992); Article IV of the 
Romania - U.S. BIT (1992); Article IV of the Russia - U.S. BIT (1992). 
378 Article V of the 1983 U.S. Model BIT reproduced in Kunzer (n 112) A-7; Article V of the U.S. Model BIT 
(1994); Article 7 of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT; Article 7 of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT; Article 14 of the 2004 
Canada Model FIPA; Article 11 of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA; Article 6 of French Model BIT (undated); 
Article 7 of the French Model BIT (1998); Article 7 of the India Model BIT (2003); Article 6 of the India 
Model BIT (2015). 
379 For example, the Egypt - U.S. BIT (1982), the Rwanda - U.S. BIT (2008), the Canada - Ukraine FIPA 
(1994), the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014), the Armenia - France BIT (1995), the France - Senegal BIT 
(2007) and the India - Korea CEPA (2009) do not explicitly prohibit LERs. 
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to remain vigilant in respect of slight variations specific to any given PRP.  
2. A Working List of Performance Requirements Whose Terms of art Have Acquired 
Settled Meanings: Definitions and Examples 
This section explains the settled meanings which have crystallised over time in respect of the 14 
categories of measures consistently construed as performance requirements and provides 
illustrative examples for each of them. These settled meanings should be carefully considered 
when interpreting and applying PRPs in IIAs in order to assign the proper scope, breadth and 
specificity to terms of art used within PRPs. This section also resorts to examples of such 
measures and to treaty provisions, when available among those surveyed, that apply to a 
specific performance requirement in order to increase familiarity with the relevant wording used 
in respect of each such requirement. 
UNCTAD and its predecessor the UNCTC identified 12 measures as performance 
requirements:380  
1) LCRs/LSRs;  
2) EPRs;  
3) Trade-balancing requirements;  
4) Export controls; 
5) LERs and JVRs; 
6) Technology transfer and/or local R&D requirements;  
7) Foreign exchange earning requirements; 
8) Manufacturing requirements,  
9) Product mandating requirements;  
10) Domestic sales requirements;  
11) Local employment and/or employee training requirements; and  
12) Investment localisation requirements. 
                                                
380 UNCTC (n 332) 63; Moran, “Impact of TRIMs” (n 43) 55; UNCTC and UNCTAD (n 43) 2, 11-12; 
UNCTAD, WIR 1996 (n 5) 179; UNCTAD, “HCOMs” (n 44) 2-3, 8-9, 12-14; UNCTAD, FDI & Performance 
Requirements (n 5) 2-3; WTO and UNCTAD (n 5) para 15. All performance requirements recurrently 
identified by economists and analysts are included within UNCTAD’s 12 performance requirements: see 
Coughlin (n 36) 133; Greenaway (n 31) 141-142; Greenaway, “Political Economy of TRIMs” (n 62) 369-
371; Greenaway, “Why Negotiate on TRIMs” (n 320) 148; Kumar, “Effectiveness of Performance 
Requirements” (n 48) 60-61; McCulloch and Owen (n 48) 335-336; Safarian (n 29) 613. 
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A number of remarks can be formulated on the basis of a comparison between the 
American/EC/Indian/OECD list on one hand and the UNCTAD list on the other hand. First, and 
contrary to UNCTAD, the United States did not reiterate previously mentioned investment 
localisation requirements or local employment and/or employee training requirements in its 1987 
and 1989 definitions, nor did the EC, India or the OECD label such measures as performance 
requirements. Moreover, contrary to UNCTAD, the American/EC/Indian/OECD list of 
performance requirements does not include LSRs (although they do mention LCRs), foreign 
exchange earning requirements (although they do mention foreign exchange restrictions) or 
export controls or restrictions (although they do include EPRs). Second, and contrary to the 
American/EC/Indian/OECD list of performance requirements, UNCTAD did not include in its 
own list of performance requirements remittance restrictions, foreign exchange restrictions 
(while mentioning foreign exchange earning requirements), manufacturing limitations (while 
mentioning manufacturing requirements) and technology licensing requirements, but also 
excluded an overly broad category of measures described as import restrictions of capital 
goods, spare parts and manufacturing inputs.381 
By combining the American/EC/Indian/OECD list and the UNCTAD list, one arrives at 14 
categories of measures consistently construed as performance requirements by States, IGOs 
and/or scholars which have acquired settled meanings:  
1) LCRs/LSRs;  
2) EPRs;  
3) Trade-balancing requirements; 
4) Export controls or restrictions;  
5) Local employment and employee training requirements;  
6) LERs and JVRs; 
7) Technology transfer, licensing and local R&D requirements;  
8) Foreign exchange restrictions and/or earning requirements;  
9) Remittance restrictions;  
10) Investment localisation requirements;  
11) Manufacturing requirements;  
                                                
381 UNCTAD, WIR 1996 (n 5) 176, 179. 
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12) Manufacturing limitations;  
13) Domestic sales requirements; and  
14) Product mandating requirements. 
a) LCRs/LSRs 
LCRs/LSRs are sometimes referred to as “import-substitution,”382 “minimum value-added,”383 
“domestic value-added”384 or “local sourcing”385 requirements; their effects can be likened to 
those of import quotas.386 LCRs/LSRs essentially ask that investors carry out in or purchase 
from within the host State a specified percentage or amount of investors’ production; 387 
LCRs/LSRs limit imports directly or indirectly through requirements to use a proportion or type of 
local inputs.388 LCRs/LSRs cause effects similar to import restrictions, since the compulsory use 
of local products will reduce the import of foreign products which likely enjoy a comparative 
advantage (otherwise the LCR/LSR would prove redundant as the investor would voluntarily 
source locally). 389  LCRs/LSRs can help retain within a host State rents generated by 
subsidiaries of MNCs which would otherwise tend to repatriate such rents back to the MNCs’ 
home States.390  
LCRs/LSRs can kick-start and accelerate changes in the operational patterns of host-State 
subsidiaries of MNCs by shifting their attention onto affordable opportunities within a host State, 
such as resorting to local suppliers of product components, accessories or services at 
advantageous prices, instead of importing same and ignoring or not seeking out local 
alternatives. 391  LCRs/LSRs can be adopted for structural adjustment purposes; moreover, 
                                                
382 Yukmanic (n 337) 7-8. The expression “import substitution requirements” appears to have been used 
as an equivalent to LCRs: EC Submission 10 (n 264) para 3; U.S. Submission 9 (n 338) 3. 
383 Coughlin (n 36) 133. 
384 Value-added requirements and LCRs are synonymous to a large extent: see Graham (n 42) 121. 
385 OECD, First Note on TRIMs (n 30) para 12; U.S. Submission 9 (n 338) 3. 
386 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and others, Local Content Requirements: A Global Problem (Peterson Institute 
for International Economics 2013) 3; Bale (n 83) 180, 181; see also Bergsten (n 53) 13, 15; LICIT (n 48) 
56. 
387 LICIT (n 48) 56; EC Submission 8 (n 30) 2; Nordic Countries (n 243) 1-2; Nordic Countries Submission 
23 (n 327) 4; U.S. Submission 9 (n 338) 3; Jan-Christoph Kuntze and Tom Moerenhout, Local Content 
Requirements and the Renewable Energy Industry – a Good Match? (International Centre for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (“ICTSD”), June 2013) 5. 
388 OECD, First Note on TRIMs (n 30) para 12. 
389 Japan Submission 7 (n 264) 3-4; Nordic Countries (n 243) 1-2; WTO and UNCTAD, “Evidence on the 
Use, the Policy Objectives, and the Impact of Trade-Related Investment Measures and Other 
Performance Requirements,” Part II in Trade-Related Investment Measures and Other Performance 
Requirements – Joint Study by the WTO and UNCTAD Secretariats, Committee on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures, WTO Doc G/C/W/307/Add.1, 2002, para 63. 
390 UNCTC and UNCTAD (n 43) 36-37. 
391 Kumar, “Effectiveness of Performance Requirements” (n 48) 65. 
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LCRs/LSRs can generate positive trade effects, such as broadening the domestic market, 
intensify technology transfer and diffusion, contribute to the training of local employees, improve 
the comparative advantage of the host State, provide opportunities for local producers to perfect 
production methods necessary for supplying its domestic corporations with requisite 
components and accessories.392 
Article 1(a) of the Illustrative List to the TRIMs Agreement puts forward three variations of 
prohibited LCRs/LSRs: LCRs/LSRs that impose the purchase or use of specific domestic 
products, LCRs/LSRs that require the purchase or use of a specified volume or value of 
domestic products, and LCRs/LSRs that mandate that a specified proportion (volume or value) 
of an enterprise’s local production be of a domestic origin or source. As further examples of 
treaty provisions that prohibit LCRs/LSRs, NAFTA Articles 1106(1)(b) and (c) and 1106(3)(a) 
and (b) prohibit mandatory and advantage-conditioning requirements to “achieve a given level 
or percentage of domestic content,” mandatory requirements to “purchase, use or accord a 
preference to goods produced or services provided” in a host State’s territory, as well as 
advantage-conditioning requirements “purchase, use or accord a preference to goods 
produced” in a host State’s territory. 
LCRs/LSRs include requirements to use domestic raw materials and natural resources and to 
process them domestically, local manufacturing requirements,393  requirements to purchase 
components and inputs domestically, as well as requirements to use local service providers.394 
Japan mentioned three examples of LCRs/LSRs: first, requirements that products of investors 
comply with a local content ratio in respect of their inputs and/or product components; second, 
requirements that products must comprise specific components to be procured domestically; 
third, requirements that investors manufacture components or parts of products locally, thus 
effectively compelling local sourcing.395 India formulated two similar examples of LCRs: first, 
requirements that investors manufacture its product components or parts locally, and second 
that investors procure their product components or parts from vendors having manufactured 
them locally.396 The United States provided example of an LCR whereby a foreign investor in 
the automotive sector must comply with the requirement that 25% of the value of each car 
produced must originate from inputs produced in the host State.397 
                                                
392 GATT, Note on TRIMs (1988) (n 52) para 40. 
393 EC Submission 8 (n 30) 2. 
394 UNCTC (n 332) 63. 
395 Japan Submission 12 (n 264) 8-9. 
396 India Submission 18 (n 35) para 30. 
397 U.S. Submission 9 (n 338) 3. 
 
 82 
States adopt LCRs/LSRs in order to increase industrialisation, to create local employment, to 
favour local companies in their infancy by assuring them of demand for their products,398 notably 
in high-tech sectors such as information technology and renewable energy, to increase the 
creation of added value locally, and to ensure that local companies can supply large foreign or 
domestic investment projects (creation of backward linkages).399 LCRs/LSRs occurred with the 
greatest frequency in the computer/electronics/informatics/software and automotive sectors400 
during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, while most recently LCRs/LSRs have often been used in 
renewable energy programmes,401 although no exhaustive global study of the use of LCRs has 
been undertaken, making the assessment of their recurrence a hazardous exercise.402 One 
estimate numbered more than 117 new LCRs/LSRs proposed or adopted between 2008 and 
2013.403 
Two examples of LCRs/LSRs can serve to illustrate this type of measures more concretely: first, 
Indonesia’s 1993 car programme which conditioned tax and customs duty advantages upon 
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compliance with LCRs which stipulated that finished cars had to incorporate a specified 
percentage of domestic content.404 Second, the Canadian Province of Ontario’s feed-in tariff 
programme (“FIT Programme”), launched in 2009, imposed LCRs as conditions for concluding 
FIT Programme electricity purchase contracts that provided guaranteed fixed prices over 20 or 
40 years: a certain percentage of the wind turbines or solar panels used to generate the 
purchased electricity had to be produced in Ontario.405 
b) EPRs 
EPRs entail the export of a specified proportion, percentage or minimum amount of goods 
produced locally by reference to value or quantity of local production or to a proportion of an 
investor’s imports.406 EPRs notably aim at increasing the amount of foreign exchange acquired 
by a host State.407 EPRs can serve to improve the integration of local producers into the global 
production networks of MNCs, to indirectly compel the use of world-calibre technology and 
production processes, and to increase the opportunities for local producers to capture 
spillovers.408  
As an example of treaty provision prohibiting EPRs, NAFTA Article 1106(1)(a) prohibits 
requirements “to export a given level or percentage of goods or services.” The United States 
provided two examples of EPRs.409 First, an investor producing machinery equipment intends to 
build a plant in a host State in order to circumvent import tariffs; the investor plans on exporting 
5-10% of its local production. The host States notifies the investor that fiscal incentives would be 
available upon exporting 25% of its production, while export 50% of its production would entitle 
the investor to a five-year tax exemption. Second, flourishing domestic sales convince an 
investor to expand its local production capabilities by building a second food processing plant. 
The investor intends to export 25% of increased production; however, host State authorities 
caution the investor that regulatory approvals needed for building the second plant will be 
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issued only if the investor exports 50% of its increased production. 
By imposing EPRs on foreign investors, a host State indirectly reduces their supply onto its 
domestic market and therefore lessens foreign competitive pressure on local producers.410 The 
EC consider that restrictions on the right to develop local distribution systems could amount to a 
indirect EPRs, since they limit local sales and therefore compel the investor to export more of its 
production than otherwise contemplated.411 
c) Trade-Balancing Requirements  
While some definitions distinguish EPRs from trade-balancing requirements,412 many definitions 
of EPRs also include trade-balancing requirements (or export-import linkage requirements),413 
which consist of limiting imports of investors to a proportion or equivalent quantity of their 
exports notably through requirements that investors generate sufficient foreign exchange 
earnings with their exports in order to cover, in whole or in part, or exceed their foreign 
exchange expenses incurred by importing inputs in the host State. Trade-balancing 
requirements aim at eliminating adverse effects of foreign investment on the host State’s 
balance of payments or overcoming foreign exchange shortages 414  and are sometimes 
subsumed into EPRs since they are said to cause effects very similar to those of EPRs by 
compelling investors to increase exports.415 Trade-balancing requirements have been described 
as indirect EPRs.416 Trade-balancing requirements can also act as import restrictions or indirect 
LCRs since they can compel investors to limit imports to the level of their exports by increasing 
the local sourcing of their inputs.417 
Article 1(b) of the Illustrative List to the TRIMs Agreement provides an example of trade-
balancing requirements as measures that limit an enterprise’s purchase or use of imported 
products to an amount based on the volume or value of that enterprise’s export of local 
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products. Article 2(a) of the Illustrative List to the TRIMs Agreement provides a further example 
of trade-balancing requirements as measures which restrict imports to an amount based on the 
volume or value of local production that the enterprise exports. NAFTA Articles 1106(1)(d) and 
1106(3)(c) prohibit mandatory and advantage-conditioning requirements that “relate in any way 
the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of exports or to the amount of foreign 
exchange inflows associated with such investment.” 
The United States provided an example of a trade-balancing requirement.418 An investor intends 
to build a tractor-producing plant in a host State for the exclusive purpose of supplying its 
domestic market. The investor must import tractor transmissions from its home State while 
multiple components would be imported from a number of third States. The host State 
conditions the approval of the project on the requirement that the investor pay for its imports 
with foreign exchange generated by its exports. The investor considers its export target 
unattainable during the first years of operating its tractor plant. The investor would consequently 
be unable to import the necessary components, thus delaying and complicating production. The 
investor invites its suppliers abroad to establish production facilities in the host State so as to 
secure its access to vital production inputs. Failing such relocation of production, the investor 
would need to turn to other local suppliers. 
EPRs and trade-balancing requirements were common in the automobile and computer 
industries in the 1960s,419 the 1970s and 1980s420 and have subsisted well into the 1990s and 
2000s. 421  Numerous countries, including Brazil, Chile, China, India Malaysia, Mexico and 
Thailand, have resorted to them.422 
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d) Export Controls or Restrictions  
During the Cold War, export restrictions (also referred to as export controls) were imposed for 
military security or related foreign policy concerns, notably to prevent adversaries from acquiring 
sensitive military equipment or coveted goods or services; over time, export restrictions have 
been contemplated beyond military or security-related equipment and for purposes other than 
simply denying adversaries access to specific goods or services, such as avoiding technology 
transfers that could strengthen adversaries and weaken employment prospects by increasing 
foreign competition.423 Export restrictions can notably link the quantity of authorised exports to 
the sales on the host State’s market. 424  The EC considered that product mandating 
requirements amounted to export restrictions, since they forbid the export by investors of 
specified products from third countries.425 Japan considered that domestic sales requirements 
constituted export restrictions since they prevented the export of goods that instead had to be 
sold on the host State’s domestic market.426 
Export restrictions are infrequent and have more often been analysed from the vantage point of 
home States rather than host States since their circumvention can constitute a primary 
motivation for investing abroad.427  
Article 2(c) of the Illustrative List to the TRIMs Agreement prohibits three types of restrictions on 
an enterprise’s exports or sale for exports: first, restrictions on the export of specified products; 
second, export restrictions based on the volume or value of products; third, export restrictions 
based on a proportion of volume or value of that enterprise’s local production. NAFTA Article 
1106(1)(a) provides a further example by prohibiting requirements “to export a given level or 
percentage of goods or services.” 
e) Local Equity Requirements (“LERs”), Joint Venture Requirements (“JVRs”) and/or 
Foreign Ownership Limitations 
LERs stipulate that local investors hold or control a specified proportion of the equity of a 
corporation created by foreign investors; inversely, LERs may cap foreign-owned equity of 
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domestic corporations.428  LERs may increase the percentage of local ownership over the 
duration of an investment and may specify which contributions are computed within foreign and 
local equity percentages (for example, whether making a certain technology available counts as 
part of a foreign investor’s equity share in a corporation).429 LERs can serve to increase the 
proportion of profits generated by an investment which will be attributed to domestic 
corporations.430 LERs often occur through joint ventures and have alternatively been referred to 
as minority foreign ownership requirements, 431  foreign ownership limitations 432  or in some 
instances majority domestic equity requirements.433  
LERs aim at preserving and strengthening partial or majority local management control over 
foreign investments; they may also contribute to technology transfers and can also be used to 
address national security concerns.434 LERs can serve to increase exposure to and absorption 
of know-how held by foreign investors, as well as developing local entrepreneurial management 
expertise.435 LERs were frequently imposed in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, notably in the 
automotive and computer sectors and notably in Brazil, China, India, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria 
and Venezuela.436 It has been suggested that LCRs, EPRs and LERs would prove more 
effective in improving a host State’s access to foreign technology than technology transfer 
requirements.437 
The United States provided two examples of LERs.438 First, a foreign investor is looking to 
establish a corporation dedicated to producing industrial machinery. The host State conditions 
its approval of the foreign investment to the creation of a joint venture with a local partner which 
will oversee the investment. The local partner must hold at least 40% of the joint venture’s 
equity; the local partner’s equity share will be increased to 51% after 5 years.  
Second, a foreign investor in pharmaceuticals is willing to operate through a joint venture with a 
local partner, but insists on preserving a majority ownership in the joint venture for quality 
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control purposes. The host State normally imposes a 49% foreign ownership limitation in its 
corporations, but ultimately relents after having extracted from the foreign investor commitments 
to transfer technology into the host State and to undertake R&D activities in the host State. 
f) Technology Transfer, Licensing and/or Local R&D Requirements 
Technology transfer requirements compel investors to using production or processing 
techniques that entail superior technology to that otherwise contemplated by the investor in the 
host State.439 They can be construed as requirements to introduce new products or high-level 
technology onto the host State market440  or as entailing the commitment to use specific 
proprietary methods or processes.441 The host State will often compel the investor to enter into a 
technology licensing agreement which will stipulate the conditions (including royalty caps) for 
the supply of technological products or proprietary knowledge or processes.442 The host State 
may also order a foreign investor to produce technologically advanced components in the host 
State instead of importing such components, thus engendering a technology transfer to the host 
State.443 Technology transfer requirements may also take the form of local R&D requirements 
which impose upon investors to conduct a specified minimum amount of R&D in the host 
State. 444  Host States use technology transfer and licensing requirements with a view to 
acquiring advanced technology that would otherwise elude the host States and to diffuse related 
production know-how; host States may also merely use such requirements in order to improve 
their bargaining position vis-à-vis foreign investors, notably by requesting access to technology 
unrelated to proposed investments through licensing agreements to the benefit of domestic 
corporations.445 
NAFTA Article 1106(1)(f) provides an example of treaty provision that prohibits requirements “to 
transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its 
territory.” The United States provided an example that illustrates both a technology transfer 
requirement and a technology licensing requirement: a foreign investor in the computer sector 
wishes to build a mini-computer production facility whose output would be both sold on the 
domestic market and exported. The host State requires that the foreign investor transfer the 
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technology needed to produce the high-speed circuit components within the mini-computers as 
a condition for authorising the foreign investor’s project.446 The United States provided a further 
example of a technology licensing requirement: a foreign investor in the chemicals sector 
contemplates setting up a subsidiary that would build a plant to produce solvents for waste 
disposal. The solvent plant will import sophisticated ingredients and will source other 
components from the domestic market. Unsettled by the quantity of necessary imports, the host 
State conditions its approval of the solvent plant to the foreign investor’s agreement to license 
its technology for producing agricultural fertilisers to a State-owned enterprise. The host State’s 
condition casts doubt’s on the foreign investor’s resolve to go forward with its investment since 
the agricultural fertiliser technology has no connection with the contemplated investment and 
since the foreign investor already produces those same agricultural fertilisers in a nearby State 
for domestic sales and export.447 
The United States also provided an example of a local R&D requirement: a foreign investor in 
the computer sector wishes to build a mini-computer production facility whose output would be 
both sold on the domestic market and exported. The host State requires that the foreign investor 
conduct a minimum amount of R&D in the host State over the entire duration of the project.448 
Mandatory technology licensing requirements have been used from the 1960s and 1970s 
onward, notably in the automotive and computer sectors and notably in Japan and Korea,449 in 
China,450 in Brazil and Malaysia451 and in India.452  
g) Foreign Exchange Restrictions and/or Earning Requirements 
Foreign exchange restrictions limit an investor’s access to foreign currency and correspondingly 
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reduce an investor’s import capacity since an investor needs foreign currency to purchase its 
imports.453 Restrictions which condition an investor’s access to foreign exchange upon foreign-
exchange inflows attributable to that same investor,454 or which obligate an investor to use only 
the foreign exchange generated by its exports in order to purchase imports essentially amount 
to trade-balancing requirements and closely resemble EPRs.455 Foreign exchange neutrality 
requirements have been referred to as indirect EPRs.456 Foreign exchange restrictions aim at 
easing pressures on a host State’s balance of payments. 457  Foreign exchange access 
restrictions reduce the availability of foreign currency necessary for an enterprise to pay for 
goods from abroad and therefore restrain an enterprise’s ability to import and to a certain extent 
can be construed as import quotas.  
Article 2(b) of the Illustrative List to the TRIMs Agreement describes foreign exchange access 
restrictions as measures which restrict an enterprise’s access to foreign exchange to an amount 
based on the foreign exchange inflows attributable to that enterprise. NAFTA Articles 1106(1)(d) 
and (e) and 1106(3)(c) and (d) indirectly prohibit foreign exchange access restrictions and 
earnings requirements by prohibiting mandatory and advantage-conditioning requirements that 
correlate imports to the foreign exchange inflows of an investment or that correlate domestic 
sales of goods or services to the foreign exchange earnings of an investment. 
The United States provided a trade-balancing requirement as example of a foreign exchange 
restriction: a foreign investor intends to establish a subsidiary in a host State in order to produce 
agricultural machinery which will depend in part on importing a number of components. The host 
State notifies the foreign investor that due to the balance-of-payment deficit, the host State must 
impose a requirement that 50% of the foreign investor’s necessary foreign exchange must 
originate from its exports.458 
h) Remittance Restrictions 
Remittance restrictions limit a foreign investor’s ability to repatriate profit, dividends, royalties, 
capital and other investment-related funds.459 Remittance restrictions share the same objective 
                                                
453 EC Submission 8 (n 30) 5; EC Submission 22 (n 263) 4; U.S. Submission 14 (n 267) 5, 8. 
454 UNCTAD, FDI & Performance Requirements (n 5) 2-3; UNCTAD, “HCOMs” (n 44) 3, 5, 12. 
455 EC Submission 8 (n 30) 2, 4, 6; EC Submission 10 (n 264) 2; U.S. Submission 9 (n 338) 8; U.S. 
Submission 14 (n 267) 11, 14. 
456 Kumar, “Effectiveness of Performance Requirements” (n 48) 60-61. 
457 India and others, GATT Communication 25 (n 48) para 8. 
458 U.S. Submission 9 (n 338) 8. 
459 EC Submission 10 (n 264) 3; U.S. Submission 4 (n 267) 3, 5; McCulloch and Owen (n 48) 335-336; 
UNCTAD, FDI & Performance Requirements (n 5) 2; UNCTAD, “HCOMs” (n 44) 5; UNCTAD, WIR 1996 
(n 5) 178. 
 
 91 
as that of foreign exchange restrictions: improving a host State’s balance of payments.460 
The United States provides two examples of remittance restrictions.461 First, a foreign investor is 
planning to invest through a joint venture in the construction of a plant that would produce road 
construction machinery to supply the host State’s domestic market and other countries in the 
region. The host State conditions approval of the investment on a requirement that the investor 
limit annual profit repatriation to 20% of the original value of the investment and that the 
investor’s total profit repatriation over the life of the investment does not exceed the original 
value of the investment. 
Second, a foreign investor intends to establish a subsidiary in a host State in order to produce 
agricultural machinery which will depend in part on importing a number of components. The host 
State notifies the foreign investor that annual profit remittances are capped at 15% of imported 
equity capital, while investment capital may be repatriated over a period of at least three years 
which begins two years after the original investment was made. 
i) Local Employment and/or Training Requirements  
Local employment and/or training requirements are imposed to correct (regional and/or ethnic) 
unevenness in hiring practices, to increase the skillfulness of local employees and indirectly to 
increase the number of skilled workers in the host State.462 
Local employment requirements can notably consist of imposing minimum thresholds for 
different ethnic groups that must be met at any or every employment level within targeted 
corporations; for example, since 1971 Malaysia has imposed employment requirements with a 
view to increasing the number of workers belonging to the Bumiputera ethnic group.463 South 
Africa similarly required that corporations submit employment equity plans consisting notably of 
initiatives to increase employment for individuals from disadvantaged designated groups.464 
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Local employee training requirements can notably take the form of compulsory contributions to 
skills or human resources development funds and have been imposed notably by Malaysia and 
South Africa.465 Local employment and training requirements have further been adopted by 
Angola, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria.466 
j) Investment Localisation Requirements 
Performance requirements can also serve as regional development tools: in instances where 
goods or services produced in or supplied from disadvantaged areas cannot overcome 
competitive shortcomings, host States may compel investors displaying more advanced 
production capabilities to locate their activities in such areas instead of directly subsidising 
production in disadvantaged areas over long periods.467 
For example, through its Regional Selective Assistance (“RSA”) programme in place since the 
1970s, the United Kingdom has attributed discretionary grants to corporations located in 
disadvantaged regions plagued notably by high unemployment.468 As a further example, Mexico 
made use of localisation requirements as part of its Programme for Promoting the 
Manufacturing of Electronic Computer Systems, Their Main Modules and Their Peripheral 
Equipment, known as the 1981 Computing Programme: one of the numerous eligibility 
requirements in order to access incentives consisted of establishing operations anywhere but in 
areas of maximum industrial concentration.469 
k) Manufacturing Requirements 
Manufacturing requirements stipulate that an investor manufacture specified goods (products or 
components) in the host State, with a view to replacing imports by local production; 
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manufacturing requirements generate the same effects as LCRs.470 
Manufacturing requirements closely resemble LCRs since they can entail a requirement to 
produce components locally; they differ from classical LCRs by imposing manufacturing as 
opposed to purchasing obligations and by targeting specific components instead of asking that a 
percentage of production be undertaken locally.471 
The United States provided an example of a manufacturing requirement: a foreign investor in 
pharmaceuticals wishes to open up a subsidiary in a host State. The host State conditions its 
approval of the subsidiary on a commitment by the foreign investor to produce low-cost, generic 
consumer drugs for supplying the domestic market.472 
l) Manufacturing Limitations 
Manufacturing limitations may positively compel investors to produce locally only specified 
goods; they may alternatively restrict or prohibit foreign investors from producing specified 
goods with a view to entrusting the exclusive production of such goods to local producers.473 By 
prohibiting or restricting the production of certain goods, manufacturing limitations also act as 
export restrictions since they force investors to forego production potentially destined to be 
exported.474 
The United States provided an example of a manufacturing limitation: a host State notifies 
would-be high-technology foreign investors that it has conditioned access to its large domestic 
market on the following manufacturing limitation: foreign investors are barred from 
manufacturing or importing high-technology goods produced or soon to be produced by 
domestic corporations.475 
m) Domestic Sales Requirements 
Domestic sales requirements compel investors to sell a certain proportion or a set value of their 
output on the host State’s domestic market; the compulsoriness of such requirements is 
generally made necessary because prices on the domestic market are lower and thus less 
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attractive than those on world markets.476 A host State resorts to domestic sales requirements 
with a view to guaranteeing availability of specified products on its domestic market at set 
prices. 
The United States provided the following example of a domestic sales requirement: A foreign 
investor intends to take over an operating copper mine. The host State conditions its approval of 
the acquisition on the foreign investor entering into a production-sharing arrangement pursuant 
to which the foreign investor will dedicate half of its production to supplying a State-owned 
enterprise at discounted prices.477 
The NAFTA does not prohibit domestic sales requirements, but rather mandatory and 
advantage-conditioning restrictions on domestic sales of goods or services in the host State that 
relate such sales to the exports or foreign exchange earnings of an investment (Articles 
1106(1)(e) and 1106(3)(d)).  
n) Product Mandating Requirements 
Product mandating requirements compel investors to assign to a designated plant or operation 
the exclusive right to manufacture specified products or to provide specified services, with the 
output mandatorily destined to supply specified markets, whether national, regional or global; 
alternatively, product mandating may simply require that investors export a specified quantity or 
proportion of its output to a designated market, in which case they closely resemble EPRs.478  
Product mandating requirements amount to restrictions on the choice of goods that investors 
can produce and/or on the geographic market that investors can supply, by forcing investors to 
commit to produce specific components or goods and to sell to designated areas, often to the 
worldwide market.479  
The United States provided two examples of product mandating requirements.480 First, a foreign 
automobile manufacturer intends to build a light-truck factory to supply the domestic market of 
its host State. The host State informs the foreign manufacturer that its factory project will be 
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approved only if the foreign manufacturer incorporates into its factory a production line of 
passenger cars for export to a third country. Second, a foreign-owned, electronics-
manufacturing corporation decides to expand into microchip production. The host State subjects 
its approval of such endeavour to the corporation’s commitment that it export 50% of its 
production to a designated region. 
NAFTA Article 1106(1)(g) prohibits mandatory requirements “to act as the exclusive supplier of 
the goods it produces or services it provides to a specific region or world market;” Article 8(1)(g) 
of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT opted for a slightly reformulated provision that prohibits mandatory 
requirements “to supply exclusively from the territory of the Party the goods that such 
investment produces or the services that it supplies to a specific regional market or to the world 
market.” Article 8(1)(g) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT reiterated this revised formulation.  
This section analysed measures generally recognised as performance requirements. This 
section also reviewed the terms of art with settled meanings that are widely disseminated within 
PRPs.  The following discusses arbitral awards that have applied NAFTA Article 1106 with a 
view to shedding greater light on interpretive efforts to date.  
3. Interpreting Specifically Prohibited Performance Requirements  
This section analyses the interpretation and application of NAFTA Article 1106 by arbitral 
tribunals to date and focuses on the nature and functioning of the measures alleged to have 
violated NAFTA Article 1106 on the basis that they constituted one of the following prohibited 
performance requirements: LCRs, EPRs and export restrictions, domestic sales restrictions and 
LSRs. This section also explains and where necessary critically assesses the methodology and 
end-result of relevant arbitral awards and decisions.  
a) The Application of Detailed PRPs to LCRs 
In S.D. Myers v Canada, claimant S.D, Myers, Inc. (“SDMI”), an American corporation, 
conducted Polychlorinated biphenyl (“PCB”) remediation among other activities. 481  SDMI 
incorporated S.D. Myers (Canada), Inc. (“Myers Canada”) under the Canada Business 
Corporations Act in 1993 with a view to remedying Canadian PCB waste at SDMI’s facility in the 
United States. PCBs have been used for insulation mainly in electrical equipment and have a 
very slow biodegrading rate; their elimination requires either incineration at very high 
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temperatures or chemical processing.482 PCB remediation consists of removing PCBs from 
electrical equipment, decontaminating and recycling the electrical components and destroying 
the PCBs.483 In 1990, Canada adopted the PCB Waste Export Regulations, which banned the 
export of PCB waste from Canada to all countries other than the United States. The PCB Waste 
Export Regulations allowed exports to the United States only if previously approved by the 
American Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).484 On October 26, 1995 the American EPA 
issued an “enforcement discretion” allowing SDMI to import PCB waste from Canada during a 
period of approximately two years.485 In November 1995, the Minister of the Environment of 
Canada signed an Interim Order banning the exports of PCBs from Canada and requiring that 
PCB wastes be managed in Canada.486 In February 1996 the Interim Order became a Final 
Order (together the “PCB Export Ban”).487 As a result of measures adopted by Canada, PCB 
waste could not be exported from Canada to the United States from November 1995 to 
February 1997 when Canada re-authorised PCB exports to the United States.488 SDMI argued 
that the PCB Export Ban effectively forced SDMI to dispose of PCB waste in Canada, which 
amounted to a mandatory LCR and a mandatory LSR, in violation of NAFTA Articles 1106(1)(b) 
and (c).489  
The S.D. Myers Majority decided that the PCB Export Ban did not breach NAFTA Article 1106 
on the grounds that there existed no performance requirement in the first place (an aspect 
discussed in greater detail in the later section entitled “existence of a ‘requirement’”),490 while 
Professor Bryan P. Schwartz dissented solely to the extent that he found a breach of NAFTA 
Article 1106.491 Dissenting Arbitrator Schwartz opined that the “practical effect” of the PCB 
Export Ban imposed an LCR in violation of NAFTA Article 1106(1)(b): the PCB Export Ban 
effectively meant that SDMI could undertake remediation of PCB waste found in Canada only if 
the physical destruction of PCB waste occurred in Canada, which amounted to mandating that 
the service of destroying PCB waste consist of Canadian content.492 By its very design, the PCB 
Export Ban did not amount to an LCR, and one would need to focus solely on its effects to 
characterise it as such, thus converting the PRP into potential catchall provision. The derogatory 
character of the PCB Export Ban would be more fittingly addressed under other substantive 
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treaty protection standards. Dissenting Arbitrator Schwartz suggested that the PCB Export Ban 
might also have violated NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c) by necessarily implying the purchase of 
various goods and services from local suppliers and the hiring of local employees. However, 
Dissenting Arbitrator Schwartz left undecided the applicability of NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c) due 
to lack of evidence.493 
b) The Application of Detailed PRPs to EPRs and Export Restrictions 
In Pope & Talbot v Canada, Pope & Talbot, an American corporation wholly owned a Canadian 
subsidiary (“Pope & Talbot International Ltd.”) which in turn wholly owned Canadian subsidiary 
Pope & Talbot Ltd. (“Pope & Talbot Canada”). Pope & Talbot Canada manufactured and sold 
softwood lumber and exported the greater part of its sales to the United States. Canada and the 
United States entered into the Softwood Lumber Agreement (the “SLA”) in 1996. The SLA 
established limits on softwood lumber exports from four provinces of Canada (Alberta, British 
Columbia, Ontario and Quebec) to the United States. Article 2.1 of the SLA required that 
Canada place softwood lumber on its Export Control List under the Exports and Permits Act. As 
a result, softwood lumber exports to the United States mandated an export permit.494  
Article 2.2 of the SLA established a three-tiered system governing softwood lumber exports to 
the United States: (1) under the Established Base (“EB”), 14.7 billion board feet could be 
exported free of charge; (2) the Lower Fee Base (“LFB”) imposed a fee of USD50 per thousand 
board feet for exports between 14.7 billion board feet and 15.35 billion board feet; and (3) the 
Upper Fee Base (“UFB”) imposed a fee of USD100 per thousand board feet for exports beyond 
15.35 billion board feet. In accordance with Article 2.4 of the SLA, Canada would annually divide 
up the EB and LFB amounts among softwood lumber exporters by allocating export permits.495 
On June 21, 1996 Canada implemented the SLA by adopting the Softwood Lumber Export 
Permit Fees Regulations (the “Export Control Regime”) which introduced: (1) the payment of an 
administrative fee for the issuance of a softwood lumber export permit to the United States 
regarding exports in the EB bracket, and (2) pursuant to the SLA, the payment of a USD50 fee 
regarding every thousand board feet of exports in the LFB bracket and a USD100 fee regarding 
every thousand board feet of exports in the UFB bracket.496 
Pope & Talbot argued that Canada’s Export Control Regime imposed EPRs or export 
                                                
493 ibid para 197. 
494 ibid para 30.  
495 ibid. 
496 ibid para 34. 
 
 98 
restrictions contrary to NAFTA Article 1106(1)(a), notably by imposing a lower than business-as-
usual export level and thus an export restriction due to export fees imposed on lumber falling 
within the LFB and UFB brackets.497 Pope & Talbot argued that NAFTA Article 1106(1)(a), 
which states “to export at a given level,” prohibits requirements which result in an upward or 
downward change in export amounts compared to what an investment would have otherwise 
exported were prohibited.498  
Canada argued that NAFTA Article 1106(1)(a) prohibits only EPRs and not export restrictions, 
that the Export Control Regime did not require Pope & Talbot Canada to increase its exports 
and therefore that it could not be prohibited by NAFTA Article 1106(1)(a).499 Canada further 
argued that NAFTA Article 1106(1)(a), by using the expression “a given level or percentage of 
goods or services,” entails a “prescribed or identifiable level of export,” as supported by the 
dictionary definition of “given.”500 The Investor’s attempt to subject the Export Control Regime to 
NAFTA Article 1106 “clearly conflict[ed] with the ordinary meaning” of NAFTA Article 1106.501 
With respect to NAFTA Article 1106 as a whole, Canada considered that the general aim of 
performance requirements is to reduce imports or increase exports, to raise foreign exchange 
earnings and to create jobs in the export sector without exposing domestic producers to 
additional competition.502 
The Pope & Talbot Tribunal decided that no violation of NAFTA Article 1106(1)(a) had taken 
place.503 The Export Control Regime did not impose or enforce an EPR or an export restriction 
and simply established a three-tiered system governing the fees applicable to softwood lumber 
exports to the United States: the EB fee-free and the LFB brackets, each for their specified and 
distinct amounts of exports, and the UFB higher fee bracket for unlimited amounts beyond the 
EB and LFB amounts.504 The Tribunal agreed with Canada and made an unhelpful obiter dictum 
pronouncement to the effect that all performance requirements prohibited under NAFTA Article 
1106 generally aim at raising foreign exchange earnings, increasing employment in the export 
sector and increasing exports.505 Nevertheless, the Tribunal refused to endorse its own general 
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understanding of performance requirements in its ruling on NAFTA Article 1106(1)(a). The 
Tribunal underlined that the wording of NAFTA Article 1106(1)(a) is not expressly circumscribed 
to requirements imposing a higher level or percentage of exports and that NAFTA Article 
1106(1)(a) applies to requirements imposing any level or percentage of exports, including export 
restrictions.506 
The Tribunal’s decision lends support to the view that within a single PRP, purposes underlying 
the prohibition of certain performance requirements may vary from one another and that not all 
prohibited performance requirements are equally trade-driven, import-related or export-related. 
A single PRP may prohibit directly trade-related performance requirements and indirectly and 
remotely trade-related performance requirements. Accordingly, PRPs are better understood 
when each prohibited performance requirement is considered separately from other enumerated 
performance requirements and when overarching statements as to purposes or the nature of 
performance requirements are avoided. 
In Merrill & Ring v Canada, claimant Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. (“Merrill & Ring”) alleged 
violations of NAFTA Chapter 11 resulting from Canada’s implementation of its Log Export 
Regime and its application to Merrill & Ring’s operations in British Columbia. Merrill & Ring 
focused its grievances on log surplus testing procedures and advertising requirements Merrill & 
Ring had to carry out prior to receiving authorisation for removing or exporting logs.507  
Merrill & Ring argued that Canada had violated NAFTA Article 1106(1)(a) by requiring as a 
precondition for export approval the prior advertisement for sale of logs from remote areas; 
advertised amounts had to fall between a minimum (2,800 m3) and a maximum (15,000 m3) 
amount. According to Merrill & Ring, the advertisement precondition for export approval meant 
that any advertised logs falling outside those levels could not be exported and that this 
amounted to a requirement to export at a given level. 508  Canada denied that the prior 
advertisement requirement had any connection with exports or that it obligated Merrill & Ring to 
export at a given level.509 Canada further relied on a general obiter dictum statement by the 
Pope & Talbot Tribunal in order to argue that all performance requirements prohibited under 
NAFTA Article 1106 are “designed to oblige an investor to export more than it otherwise would 
have exported.”510  
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The Merrill & Ring Tribunal found Merrill & Ring’s position “difficult to reconcile with the terms” of 
NAFTA Article 1106(1)(a).511 By comparison, the Tribunal found Canada’s argument convincing 
in that a requirement related to the advertisement of goods, which amounts to one of many 
conditions that must be complied with for obtaining an export permit, cannot amount to an 
export restriction. Spurred on by Canada’s “persuasive argument,”512 the Tribunal stated that by 
their very terms, all performance requirements enumerated in NAFTA Article 1106 “are related 
to the export of goods and services and the conditions under which such exports are made”513 
and are “designed to restrict or enhance exports.”514 The Tribunal went a step further and 
decided that a requirement “needs to be directly and specifically connected to exports”515 to 
qualify as a performance requirement under NAFTA Article 1106. The Tribunal wrongly 
narrowed the scope of NAFTA Article 1106 to export-related measures in spite of Article 1106’s 
undisputed application to LCRs, LSRs, technology transfer requirements and product-
mandating requirements which are not meant to increase or reduce exports. 
Both the Pope & Talbot and the Merrill & Ring Tribunals made unfortunate pronouncements that 
lumped all performance requirements into a one-dimensional pool of export-driven trade policy 
instruments, while clearly some performance requirements prohibited under NAFTA Article 1106 
relate only remotely and indirectly to exports, imports or even to trade. These statements 
obscure the distinct and settled meanings of the various performance requirements prohibited 
under NAFTA Article 1106. 
c) The Application of Detailed PRPs to Domestic Sales Restrictions 
In Pope & Talbot v Canada, Pope & Talbot argued convolutedly that Canada related Pope & 
Talbot Canada’s sales of lumber bound for the United States to American customers in Canada 
to its United States-bound export volumes by allegedly reducing sales below business-as-usual 
levels using a “punitive export permit fee” which allegedly reduced exports, an export-based 
restriction on domestic sales in violation of NAFTA Articles 1106(1)(e) and 1106(3)(d).516 
Canada counter-argued that the Export Control Regime did not limit Pope & Talbot Canada’s 
sales in Canada in any way.517  
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The Pope & Talbot Tribunal rejected both of Pope & Talbot’s claims based on NAFTA Articles 
1106(1)(e) and 1106(3)(d).518 The Tribunal pointed to the identical text of both provisions and 
noted that “sales of goods in its territory” meant in this case sales of softwood lumber in Canada 
for use or consumption within Canada.519 The Tribunal decided that “sales of goods in its 
territory” does not cover sales of softwood lumber for export to the United States, even where 
title to the goods was transferred to the American purchaser while the lumber was still in 
Canada, or where it was sold to a Canadian party for export to the United States. Rather, such 
instances amounted to “exports” within the meaning of NAFTA Articles 1106(1)(e) and 
1106(3)(d), and not to “sales.”520 
The Tribunal criticised Pope & Talbot for using the terms “exports” and “sales” interchangeably 
and for ignoring the distinction between domestic sales and sales for export. Pope & Talbot’s 
approach led to “relating or comparing ‘exports’ to ‘exports’,” while the requirements envisioned 
by NAFTA Articles 1106(1)(e) and 1106(3)(d) must restrict domestic sales by relating them to 
exports or foreign exchange earnings. Pope & Talbot’s approach did “violence to the text of 
Articles 1106(1)(e) and 1106(3)(d), standing those provisions on their head.”521 
In Merrill & Ring v Canada, Merrill & Ring argued that Canada had imposed an export-based 
restriction on its domestic sales in violation of NAFTA Article 1106(1)(e) by relating its sales of 
logs from remote areas to the volume of its exports. Merrill & Ring convolutedly argued that the 
minimum (2,800 m3) and maximum (15,000 m3) advertisement volumes of logs from remote 
areas resulted in volume restrictions linked to Merrill & Ring’s exports, which would then 
somehow translate in some form of restriction on its domestic sales.522 The Merrill & Ring 
Tribunal found Merrill & Ring’s position “difficult to understand.”523 The Tribunal summarised 
Merrill & Ring’s argument as identifying the existence of a restriction on its domestic sales of 
logs related to the volume of its exports through export volume “restrictions” allegedly resulting 
from the minimum and maximum volume log advertisement requirements.524  The Tribunal 
rejected Merrill & Ring’s allegation and held that Merrill & Ring could sell as many logs on the 
Canadian domestic market as it wished and that the level of such sales was in no way related to 
minimum or maximum volume log advertisement requirements, which needed to be complied 
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with solely in order to acquire log export permits.525 
d) The Application of Detailed PRPs to LSRs 
In Merrill & Ring v Canada, the claimant alleged that Canada had imposed LSRs in violation of 
NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c) by requiring to cut, sort, boom, deck and/or scale its logs in 
accordance with the specifications of the “Coast Domestic Market End Use Sort Description,” 
including “normal log market practices” (an undefined expression) and the requirement to scale 
timber rafts metrically. According to Merrill & Ring, these cutting, sorting and scaling 
requirements accorded a preference to goods that met domestic market requirements and a 
preference to local service providers that were hired to carry out these requirements, in breach 
of NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c).526  
Canada denied having accorded any preference to Canadian-produced logs in violation of 
NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c), adding somewhat jeeringly that the logs were produced in Canada 
simply because they grew there.527 Moreover, Canada argued that its requirement that logs be 
scaled in conformity with the metric system had no connection with the manufacture or sale of 
logs. Canada explained that the measurement of logs in “board feet,” prevalent in the United 
States Pacific Northwest, differs from the measurement system in Canada, which relies on cubic 
or linear meters, and that the measurement system applicable to logs must conform to local 
market requirements.528 Canada also denied that Merrill & Ring was compelled to accord a 
preference to Canadian service suppliers in having its logs metrically scaled: Merrill & Ring was 
free to hire service suppliers from outside Canada. Hiring Canadians to accomplish such work 
stemmed from a purely commercial decision and not from a requirement.529 
With respect to claimant Merrill & Ring’s first alleged violation of NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c), the 
Merrill & Ring Tribunal found the claimant’s allegation “difficult to reconcile with the terms of the 
provision.” The Tribunal decided that the requirement to cut, sort and scale logs in accordance 
with the “Coast Domestic Market End Use Sort Description” did not amount to an LSR.530 
Indeed, the Tribunal noted that scaling according to the metric system constituted a measure 
simply related to the measurement system used throughout Canada.531 With respect to Merrill & 
Ring’s second alleged violation of NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c), the Tribunal held that Canada had 
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convincingly demonstrated that the claimant could have hired service providers outside of 
Canada and that hiring Canadian service providers was primarily motivated by business 
considerations and the higher cost of hiring outside of Canada.532 
However, the Merrill & Ring Tribunal erroneously considered the absence of intent to restrict or 
enhance exports as grounds for concluding that the cutting, sorting and scaling requirements 
did not constitute an LSR.533 Similarly, the Tribunal erroneously considered the remote and 
indirect connection between the exports of claimant’s investment and the (alleged and non-
existent) requirement to resort to Canadian service providers for cutting, sorting and scaling logs 
as grounds for concluding that there existed no LSR.534 The Tribunal made an erroneous 
general pronouncement when declaring that a measure “needs to be directly and specifically 
connected to exports” in order to qualify as any of the performance requirements prohibited 
under NAFTA Article 1106.535 The lack of direct and specific connection between the measures 
at issue and the exports of a claimant’s investment is irrelevant in order to determine whether 
prohibitions of LSRs such as NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c) are breached. Moreover, many other 
performance requirements prohibited under NAFTA Article 1106, such as LCRs, product 
mandating requirements and technology transfer requirements, have nothing to do with exports.  
In Mobil & Murphy v Canada, the claimants, Mobil Investments Canada Inc. and Murphy Oil 
Corporation (“Mobil and Murphy”), two Delaware corporations, had invested in the Hibernia and 
Terra Nova offshore petroleum projects (the “Projects”), located off the coast of the Province of 
Newfoundland and Labrador (“Province”) in Canada. The Projects were governed by parallel 
provincial and federal legislation (together, the “Accord Acts”)536 that created the Canada-
Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (the “Board”). The Claimants, like any other 
prospective offshore oil operator, had to submit benefits plans containing provisions ensuring 
that research and development (“R&D”) and education and training (“E&T”) expenditures would 
be made in the Province. The Accord Acts granted the Board discretionary power to issue 
guidelines regarding benefits plans.537 In 2004, the Board adopted the Guidelines for Research 
and Development Expenditures (the “2004 Guidelines”), which were at the heart of the dispute 
before the Tribunal.538 The 2004 Guidelines departed from previous guidelines, notably by 
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imposing compulsory fixed amounts for R&D expenditures in the Province.539 Mobil and Murphy 
alleged that the 2004 Guidelines compelled them to spend fixed amounts for R&D activities in 
the Province as a condition of operating their investments in the Projects and that this local R&D 
requirement constituted an LSR in violation of NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c).540  
The Mobil & Murphy Tribunal unanimously decided that the 2004 Guidelines violated NAFTA 
Article 1106(1)(c).541 Even though Mobil and Murphy’s claim rested only on the local R&D 
expenditure requirements imposed by the 2004 Guidelines, the Tribunal framed the main 
interpretative question as whether the term “services,” as used in NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c), 
encompasses R&D and E&T. 
In its submissions, Canada referred to a consistent differentiation between LCRs and LSRs on 
one hand and R&D and E&T requirements on the other hand.542 Canada argued that NAFTA 
Article 1106(1)(c) applies only to a “closed set of performance requirements that would 
otherwise reduce the cross-border flow and importation of goods and services,” 543  which 
therefore would have excluded R&D requirements aimed at “increasing the knowledge base of 
the country.”544 Canada argued that while the TRIMs Agreement prohibits LCRs and LSRs, it 
does not specify R&D requirements.545 Canada further quoted UNCTAD which had construed 
NAFTA Article 1106 as permitting R&D requirements and which identified numerous other IIAs 
which also permitted R&D requirements.546 Along the same lines, LCRs and LSRs should not 
include E&T requirements whose largely differing and non-trade purposes547 warranted tailored 
treatment under IIAs and which were generally authorised by IIAs according to UNCTAD.548 
Canada also invoked the varying economic policy objectives as grounds for distinguishing LCRs 
and LSRs from R&D and E&T requirements: neither R&D nor E&T requirements serve as 
instruments to reduce imports or protecting the domestic market to the benefit of local goods 
producers or service providers.549 Canada was effectively arguing that LCRs and LSRs and 
                                                
539 ibid para 46. 
540 ibid paras 100-101. 
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542 Mobil & Murphy – Counter-Memorial of Canada (n 182) paras 161-162, 171. 
543 Mobil & Murphy (Majority) (n 13) para 222. 
544 ibid para 222; Mobil & Murphy – Counter-Memorial of Canada (n 182) paras 169-170. 
545 Mobil & Murphy – Counter-Memorial of Canada (n 182) paras 162-164. 
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R&D and E&T requirements had to be understood on the basis of their respective settled 
meanings, that the settled meanings of LCRs and LSRs had never been intended to encompass 
R&D and E&T requirements and that States have clearly distinguished between these different 
types of requirements. 
The Mobil & Murphy Tribunal rejected Canada’s approach and stated that excluding R&D and 
E&T from the term “services” “… because the form of transmission is not always cross-border” 
demanded assigning “a special meaning” to the term “services” that the NAFTA text did not 
reflect.550 The Mobil & Murphy Tribunal simply justified its interpretation with a dictionary-driven 
ordinary meaning, a narrowly-construed context and with the trade-liberalising and investment-
increasing objects and purposes of the NAFTA as set forth in Articles 102(1)(a) and 102(1)(c).551 
The Tribunal incorrectly isolated the term “services” from the rest of NAFTA Article 1106(1) and 
decontextualised such term before framing its ordinary meaning in an overly broad manner, 
mainly by relying on dictionary definitions of the term.552 The Tribunal decided that the ordinary 
meaning of the term “services” in NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c) “is broad enough to encompass 
R&D and E&T.”553 The Tribunal considered that R&D and E&T “may be seen as mainstream 
forms of service sector activity,” that “there is nothing inherent in the term ‘services’ in NAFTA 
Article 1106(1) that necessarily excludes R&D and E&T,”554 and that R&D and E&T “fit into that 
broad definitional category of economic activity.”555 
Drawing further support for its interpretation from the context of NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c), the 
Tribunal limited such context to considering the use of the term “services” within the NAFTA. 
The Tribunal zeroed in on the use of the term “services” within the Common Classification 
System for services regarding Government procurement (NAFTA Appendix 1001.1b-2-B) and 
noted that the Common Classification System suggests a broad definition for the term “services” 
that explicitly mentions E&T and R&D services.556  
The Tribunal further inferred from NAFTA Article 1106(4) that the Parties to the NAFTA 
excluded R&D and E&T requirements from the prohibition of advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements under NAFTA Article 1106(3), 557  but not from Article 1106(1). 
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However, the Tribunal did not point out that within Article 1106(4), NAFTA Parties distinguished 
between “provid[ing] a service,” “train[ing] or employ[ing] workers,” and “carry[ing] out research 
and development,” distinctions that suggest that the term “service” does not automatically 
include R&D or E&T and that its meaning does not enjoy the clarity that the Tribunal willingly 
assigned to it using a minimalistic contextual approach. 
By contrast with the wording of the NAFTA, Article VI(f) of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT, as well as 
the 13 American BITs that reproduce such provision, specifically prohibit local R&D 
requirements in addition to prohibiting LSRs. The prohibition of local R&D requirements was 
subsequently omitted from Article 8(1) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT and from the previously 
discussed 20 IIAs that reproduce such provision, since the United States was unsure whether 
its own practice complied with such prohibition.558 It is obvious that the United States and the 
other State Parties to these 20 IIAs did not remove the prohibition of mandatory local R&D 
requirements on the basis that they considered it redundant in the presence of prohibitions of 
LSRs. Rather, these State Parties did not wish to prohibit mandatory local R&D requirements. 
Arguing that their prohibitions of LSRs also prohibit mandatory local R&D requirements could 
not be easily reconciled with their intent.  
With its decision, the Mobil & Murphy Tribunal incorrectly transformed the prohibition of LSRs 
into a catchall provision, ignored its clear delimitations and also ignored the respective settled 
meanings of LSRs, R&D requirements and E&T requirements that differentiate one such set of 
measures from another. Instead, the 2004 Guidelines should not have fallen within the scope of 
mandatory performance requirements prohibited under NAFTA Article 1106(1) as they do not 
amount to LSRs. Canada should have been allowed to adopt the 2004 Guidelines under NAFTA 
Article 1106(1).  
E. Prohibiting Advantages Conditioned Upon Performance Requirements 
It has been argued that in instances where subsidiaries abroad deliberately accept performance 
requirements prior to or simultaneously to their investment decision, prohibiting performance 
requirements is unnecessary, 559  especially if such subsidiaries receive compensating 
investment incentives, since MNCs and their subsidiaries abroad can then be assumed to have 
calculated that complying with performance requirements would net them benefits.560 
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560 Bergsten (n 53) 14-15; Claude G. B. Fontheim and R. M. Godbaw, “Trade Related Performance 
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However, acceptance of performance requirements by targeted investors would cover only the 
effects incurred by the targeted investors and would do nothing to mitigate the adverse impacts 
on the trade interests of the home States of such investors or on third States.561 Welfare losses 
caused by performance requirements (notably through reduced exports) are then mainly felt by 
home States and not by the targeted subsidiaries abroad,562 as well as by other investors in a 
competitive relationship with recipients of advantages. The EC and a number of other States 
shared these concerns and unequivocally asserted that agreement by an investor to comply 
with TRIMs does nothing to mitigate the adverse trade effects incurred by home or third States 
or by other investors by virtue of such TRIMs. 563  Prohibiting advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements therefore appear as a rational means for home States to protect their 
interests at stake in relation with outward FDI.564 
This section first investigates the disciplining of advantage-conditioning performance 
requirements under the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. Second, this section 
surveys the various approaches that PRPs in IIAs have espoused in respect of advantage-
conditioning performance requirements. Third, this section attempts to define the notion of 
“advantage” as used in PRPs of IIAs by drawing from the notion of “advantage” under the 
TRIMs Agreement the notion of “benefit” under the SCM Agreement. Finally, this section 
appraises the interpretation of the term “advantage” by arbitral tribunals having applied 
prohibitions of advantage-conditioning performance requirements. 
1. Scope and Coverage of Disciplines Applicable to Advantage-Conditioning 
Performance Requirements Under the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement 
This section analyses the scope and coverage of disciplines applicable to advantage-
conditioning performance requirements under the TRIMs Agreement and the WTO SCM 
Agreement taking into account the fact that disciplines applicable to mandatory performance 
requirements under the TRIMs Agreement have been previously discussed. This section then 
scrutinises the contiguous concepts of “advantages” (TRIMs Agreement, PRPs in IIAs) and 
“benefits” (the SCM Agreement). This section also explores the interconnection between the 
notions of advantage and benefit and how the notion of benefit in the SCM Agreement can help 
interpret the term “advantage” used in the TRIMs Agreement and in PRPs of IIAs. 
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The TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement specifically prohibit conditioning the receipt of 
an advantage on compliance with enumerated performance requirements, albeit both in respect 
of goods only. A clear complementarity and a convergence of concerns exist between the 
TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement.565 Articles 1 and 2 of the TRIMs Agreement’s 
Illustrative List explicitly prohibit identified TRIMs (LCRs, trade-balancing requirements, foreign 
exchange restrictions, export restrictions and import restrictions) “compliance with which is 
necessary to obtain an advantage,” while the SCM Agreement prohibits two advantage-
conditioning performance requirements. Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement prohibits subsidies 
contingent upon EPRs, while Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement prohibits subsidies 
contingent upon LCRs. While TRIMs Agreement also prohibits advantage-conditioning LCRs, it 
fell short of explicitly prohibiting advantage-conditioning EPRs, its disciplines having been 
confined to export restrictions. The SCM Agreement therefore increases the scope of WTO 
disciplines applicable to performance requirements beyond the reach of the TRIMs Agreement 
in respect of advantage-conditioning EPRs, while mandatory EPRs that do not condition the 
grant of incentives are not prohibited under WTO Agreements.  
During the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations, some GATT Members pointed to the fact that 
the proposed prohibited subsidies were already prohibited under GATT Articles III (subsidies 
contingent on LCRs) and XVI:4 (subsidies contingent on EPRs), while States supporting such 
prohibitions argued that improved clarity and certainty nevertheless warranted their designation 
as prohibited subsidies.566 
2. The Regulation of Advantage-Conditioning Performance Requirements by PRPs in 
IIAs 
a) PRPs Which Remain Silent in Respect of Advantage-conditioning Performance 
Requirements 
During the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations, the EC pointed out that not prohibiting 
performance requirements when they act as conditions for the receipt of investment incentives 
would provide States with a loophole to PRPs, and that performance requirements should be 
                                                
565  See Indonesia — Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WTO Panel Report, 
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prohibited regardless of whether they are mandatory or condition the conferral of advantages.567 
The United States considered that combining performance requirements with incentives would 
only exacerbate their trade-distorting effect568 and originally called for international disciplines 
applicable to both sets of measures.569 And yet, a great number of PRPs in IIAs do not explicitly 
address performance requirements imposed as conditions for the receipt of advantages. What 
are the implications of such silence? Given the frequent presence of advantages alongside 
performance requirements, this question can significantly impact the scope of advantage-silent 
PRPs depending on how this question is answered. This question can notably be answered in 
two ways. First, performance requirements imposed as conditions for the receipt of an 
advantage are not prohibited in the absence of explicit reference to the term “advantage.” 
Second and alternatively, such performance requirements are prohibited in spite of the absence 
of reference to advantages in a PRP. Advantage-conditioning performance requirements could 
be prohibited by advantage-silent PRPs notably if such PRPs use wording that refers to the 
establishment, expansion, operation, conduct or maintenance of investments, since advantage-
conditioning performance requirements may indeed fall within such scenarios of investment-
related activities. Advantage-conditioning performance requirements could also fall within the 
broad expression “any other similar requirements” or “toutes autres mesures ayant un effet 
analogue” in instances where PRPs use such wordings and where PRPs do not restrict their 
applicability to specific activities of an investment that would not encompass advantage-
conditioning performance requirements.  
All of France’s 64 BITs which comprise PRPs are silent with respect to advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements. Perhaps the predominant French approach, which consists of 
framing the PRP as a subcategory of FET, may provide sufficient breadth to encompass 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements, at least in respect of the 48 French BITs 
whose PRPs replicate the PRP from France’s Model BIT (see above), and in respect of the 
three similarly-constructed French BITs whose PRPs provide more comprehensive protection to 
investors than the PRP from France’s Model BIT (see above). While it might be more difficult, in 
respect of the 13 French BITs with PRPs which prohibit only arbitrary, unfair, abusive and/or 
discriminatory Performance Requirements (11 as part of FET, one as part of national treatment 
and one as part of MFN treatment), to argue that advantage-conditioning performance 
requirements are arbitrary, unfair, abusive and/or discriminatory to the point of breaching such 
BIT provisions, nothing would explicitly prevent such PRPs from applying to advantage-
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conditioning performance requirements in the same way as they would apply to mandatory 
ones. Accordingly, the 64 French BITs with PRPs would in principle apply to advantage-
conditioning performance requirements. 
The previously discussed 21 American BITs with practically identically-worded PRPs signed 
between 1982 and 1995 prohibit the imposition of performance requirements as conditions for 
the establishment, expansion or maintenance of investments, but make no mention of 
advantages conditioned on compliance with performance requirements. Among those 21 
American BITs, nine address performance requirements as conditions for the receipt of an 
advantage in IIA sections distinct from the PRP text itself.570 First, paragraph 2 of the Agreed 
Minutes to the Panama - U.S. BIT (1982), which was meant to clarify the intent of the PRP and 
forms an “integral part” of the BIT, acknowledges the existence of Panama’s incentive laws 
which confer benefits to companies having signed contracts with the Government of Panama 
and pursuant to which these companies agree to comply with performance requirements stated 
in such contracts. Paragraph 2 does not impose any obligation upon Panama to terminate its 
incentive laws or to remove performance requirements from contracts entered into or to be 
signed in the future. 571  Interpreting such “clarifying language” so as to make the PRP 
inapplicable to advantage-conditioning performance requirements may render the PRP 
meaningless and would constitute the most significant discrepancy compared to the 
corresponding U.S. Model BIT.572 However, such “clarifying language” falls short of explicitly 
authorising advantage-conditioning performance requirements. 
Second, the PRP included in the Sri Lanka - U.S. BIT (1991) departed from the U.S. Model BIT 
via paragraph 4 of its Protocol, which acknowledged Sri Lankan laws that grant incentives to 
investors on compliance with EPRs or technology transfer requirements.573 Paragraph 4 of the 
Protocol to the Sri Lanka - U.S. BIT (1991) ambiguously and implicitly suggests that the 
otherwise broad and open-ended PRP does not apply to performance requirements imposed as 
conditions for the receipt of an advantage.574 The U.S. State Department stated that paragraph 
4 of the Protocol to the Sri Lanka - U.S. BIT (1991) was meant to clarify “the U.S. position that 
such incentive-based commitments are not to be considered performance requirements” for 
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purposes of the PRP since “[s]uch incentives are acceptable parts of any country's economic 
policy and are also used quite extensively in the United States.”575 Nevertheless, the United 
States viewed the Sri Lankan incentive programme as a potential barrier to American FDI; the 
United States and Sri Lanka therefore agreed in the Protocol that either Party to the BIT could 
request consultations aimed at eliminating adverse effects brought about by such incentive 
laws.576 
The United States appears to have construed the faltering language in the Panama - U.S. BIT 
(1982) and the Sri Lanka - U.S. BIT (1991) as rendering their PRPs inapplicable to advantage-
conditioning performance requirements. The U.S. Department of State seems to have partially 
approved interpreting PRPs in BITs signed before 1992 restrictively and as inapplicable to 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements. The U.S. State Department considered that 
most tax matters fell outside of the scope of these same 21 American BITs signed between 
1982 and 1995, and that as a result, those U.S. BITs do not prohibit performance requirements 
imposed as conditions for granting tax incentives.577 These comments were construed as 
meaning that these same 21 American BITs did not prohibit advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements.578  
As will be seen in greater detail in the following section, the other eight U.S. BITs to explicitly 
address advantage-conditioning performance requirements within a treaty instrument external to 
their PRPs were signed respectively with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. The PRPs of these eight BITs also do not apply to 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements.  
Article V(2) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) applies only to mandatory performance 
requirements and does not explicitly address performance requirements imposed as conditions 
for the receipt of advantages. Moreover, Article VI(2)(b) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) 
excludes from its PRPs “subsidies or grants provided by a government or a state enterprise, 
including government-supported loans, guarantees and insurance.” Fourteen Canadian FIPAs 
replicate this same silence regarding advantage-conditioning performance requirements and 
this same exclusion of subsidies or grants from their PRPs.579 Silence and exclusion could 
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translate into inapplicability of these 15 PRPs to advantage-conditioning performance 
requirements. However, as will be explained below, the term “advantage” is broader than 
subsidies and grants combined. Some advantage-conditioning performance requirements could 
conceivably still fall within the scope of the PRPs while not being excluded since they would not 
amount to subsidies or grants. These 15 Canadian FIPAs therefore remain ambiguous and do 
not explicitly exclude the application of their PRPs to all instances of advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements. By comparison, and as will be seen in the following section, two 
Canadian FIPAs (with Latvia and Romania) clearly render their PRPs inapplicable to advantage-
conditioning performance requirements in order to address concerns of the European 
Commission.  
b) PRPs Which incorporate the TRIMs Agreement Prohibit Advantage-Conditioning 
Performance Requirements Unless Specified Otherwise 
PRPs which simply incorporate the TRIMs Agreement or its Illustrative List in their entirety 
incorporate by the same token the TRIMs Agreement’s prohibition of advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements. Article 14.9(1) of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014) also incorporates 
the TRIMs Agreement’s prohibition of advantage-conditioning performance requirements by 
committing State Parties not to apply any measure inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement “in 
connection with investment activities of an investor.” 
Article VI of the Canada - Costa Rica FIPA (1998), Article 12.6 of the Australia - Malaysia FTA 
(2012) and Article 5 of AANZFTA (2009) Chapter 11 (Investment) also prohibit advantage-
conditioning performance requirements, so long as such requirements are “in connection with 
the establishment, acquisition or subsequent regulation of an investment” (Canadian IIA) or “in 
connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, or 
sale or other disposition of an investment” (Australian IIAs). 
Article 14.9(2) of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014) further prohibits “[w]ithout prejudice to 
paragraph 1” (which incorporates the TRIMs Agreement) the same detailed list of prohibited 
mandatory performance requirements as the ones enumerated in NAFTA Article 1106(1). The 
only way to reconcile the two subsections of Article 14.9 of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014) 
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consists of considering advantage-conditioning performance requirements prohibited under the 
TRIMs Agreement as prohibited under Article 14.9(1) and to consider the mandatory 
performance requirements explicitly enumerated in Article 14.9(2), including those not prohibited 
under the TRIMs Agreement, as prohibited.  
Article 6.2(5) of the India - Singapore CECA (2005) directly contradicts the prohibition of 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements enumerated in the TRIMs Agreement by 
specifying that nothing in Chapter 6 (Investment) applies to subsidies or grants provided by a 
State Party or to any conditions attached to their receipt. This contradiction could perhaps be 
resolved in favour of circumscribing the application of the TRIMs Agreement to mandatory 
performance requirements enumerated therein by resorting to Article 6.16(2)(a) of the India - 
Singapore CECA (2005), which specifies that the PRP (Article 6.23) does not apply to 
exceptions specified by the Parties. A negative inference that would make its PRP inapplicable 
to advantage-conditioning performance requirements could further be drawn from the absence 
of an exclusion of the PRP from its exception rendering the investment chapter inapplicable to 
subsidies or grants; by comparison, Article 10.2(6) of the India - Korea CEPA (2009) provides 
for the same exception that renders its investment chapter inapplicable to subsidies or grants, 
but excludes its PRP (Article 10.5) from this exception. 
Article 9(3) of the Canada - Kuwait FIPA (2011) and Article 9(3) of the Canada - Mali FIPA 
(2014) provide “[f]or greater certainty” that the enumerated mandatory performance 
requirements prohibited under their respective Articles 9(2) (EPRs and export restrictions, LCRs, 
technology transfer requirements and product mandating requirements) are not prohibited when 
they are imposed as conditions for the receipt of advantages. Articles 9(3) of the Canada - 
Kuwait FIPA (2011) and of the Canada - Mali FIPA (2014) bring about a partial and 
unaddressed contradiction at least in respect of LCRs and export restrictions, since Article 9(1) 
of the Canada - Kuwait FIPA (2011) and Article 9(3) of the Canada - Mali FIPA (2014) 
incorporate in full the TRIMs Agreement into the FIPA and since advantage-conditioning LCRs 
and export restrictions are prohibited under the TRIMs Agreement. An additional source of 
conflict stems from Article 16(6) of the Canada - Kuwait FIPA (2011) and Article 16(7) of the 
Canada - Mali FIPA (2014), which render a number of provisions within their respective FIPAs 
inapplicable to “subsidies or grants provided by a Party, including government-supported loans, 
guarantees and insurance:” Article 16(6) of the Canada - Kuwait FIPA (2011) and Article 16(7) 
of the Canada - Mali FIPA (2014) do not render their respective PRPs inapplicable to grants or 
subsidies, hence subsidies or grants, which arguably amount to advantages as understood 




c) American and Canadian IIAs That Address Concerns of the European Commission in 
Respect of Advantage-conditioning Performance Requirements 
In September 2003, the United States, the European Commission and eight European countries 
on the verge of joining the European Union (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic) reached an understanding according to 
which identical Additional Protocols were entered into by the United States separately with 
these eight countries in order to ensure the compatibility with EU law of these eight BITs.580 
These eights BITs did not address advantage-conditioning performance requirements within 
their PRPs. The European Commission requested identical exchanges of letters between the 
United States and each of the eight BIT Parties that would “interpret” each of the eight PRPs 
with a view to confirming their mutual understanding that the eight PRPs do not apply to 
performance requirements imposed as conditions for the receipt or continued receipt of an 
advantage. 581  These exchanges of letters simply aimed at “making explicit,” through an 
“interpretation,” what many other American BITs provide for in writing.582  
Article V(2) of the Canada - Latvia FIPA (2009) and Article V(2) of the Canada - Romania FIPA 
(2009) prohibit listed mandatory performance requirements and do not refer to advantages. 
Article V(4) of the Canada - Latvia FIPA (2009) and Article V(4) of the Canada - Romania FIPA 
(2009) explicitly address advantages and concerns pertaining to the accession of Latvia and 
Romania to the EU by clearly declaring that their respective PRPs do not “… extend to 
conditions for the receipt or continued receipt of an advantage, such as any advantage resulting 
from the establishment of a marketing organisation for agricultural products and its market 
stabilizing effects.” This outcome is reinforced by the fact that Article VI(2)(b) of the Canada - 
Latvia FIPA (2009) and Article VI(2)(b) of the Canada - Romania FIPA (2009) clearly render 
their respective PRPs inapplicable to “subsidies or grants provided by a government or a state 
enterprise, including government-supported loans, guarantees and insurance.” 
                                                
580 Vandevelde (n 84) 78-79. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU on 1 January 2007, while the 
remaining six countries joined the EU on 1 May 2004. 
581 Article II(B) of the Understanding Concerning Certain U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, United States 
Senate Executive Report 108-13 – Protocols Amending Existing Bilateral Investment Treaties With new 
European Union Member Nations, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. (4 May 2004) 7; see e.g., Exchange of Letters 
Between the Embassy of the United States of America to Latvia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Latvia, 11 December 2003 reproduced in Additional Investment Protocol With the Republic of 
Latvia, United States Senate, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., Treaty Doc. 108–20 (2004). 
582 See e.g., Letter of Submittal from the Secretary of State to the American President in respect of the 
Additional Protocol Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Republic of Latvia to the Treaty for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment of 
January 13, 1995, signed at Brussels on September 22, 2003, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, Treaty Doc. 
108–20, U.S. Government Printing Office (2004), at VI. See also Vandevelde (n 84) 398-399. 
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d) Explicitly Excluding Advantage-Conditioning Performance Requirements from PRPs 
A number of PRPs in American BITs clearly state their inapplicability to at least some 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements. For example, the final sentence of Article 
II(5) of the Jamaica - U.S. BIT (1994) states that nothing in the PRP can preclude State Parties 
from “providing benefits and incentives” on the condition that investments carry out EPRs. The 
U.S. Department of State described such additional sentences not as a change of policy, but 
rather as a clarification of what had been the intention under prior U.S. Model BITs and prior 
U.S. BITs and as “clarifying what is implicit in this paragraph – that this agreement does not 
preclude such measures as a condition for receipt of an advantage.”583 It is worth noting that the 
views of the U.S. State Department, which considered all advantage-conditioning performance 
requirements as excluded from the scope of the PRP in the Jamaica - U.S. BIT (1994), extend 
far beyond the limitation set out in Article II(5) to the Jamaica - U.S. BIT (1994), which explicitly 
excludes from the PRP’s scope only EPRs that condition the conferral of “benefits and 
incentives.” 
Article VI in fine of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT stipulates that prohibited requirements “do not 
include conditions for the receipt or continued receipt of an advantage.” Thirteen American BITs 
authorise advantage-conditioning performance requirements in the same way as does Article VI 
of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT.584 The United States and signatory State Parties to these 13 BITs 
can accordingly lawfully secure an investor’s acceptance of a performance requirement by 
conferring an advantage in return. Similarly, the last sentence of Article VI of the Bolivia - U.S. 
BIT (1998) and Article 1 of the Protocol to the Bolivia - U.S. BIT (1998) clearly acknowledge the 
preserved right of Parties to impose performance requirements as conditions for the receipt of 
an advantage, including in the context of government procurement. 
                                                
583 Jamaica - U.S. BIT (1994): Letter of Submittal from the Department of State to the President, 
Washington, 7 September 1994, 103rd Cong. 2nd Sess., Senate Treaty Doc. 103-35, 1994; Vandevelde 
(n 84) 390. 
584 Article VI of the Georgia - U.S. BIT (1994); Article VI of the U.S. - Uzbekistan BIT (signed in 1994, but 
not in force); Article VI of the Albania - U.S. BIT (1995); Article VI of the Honduras - U.S. BIT (1995); 
Article VII of the Croatia - U.S. BIT (1996); Article VI of the Jordan - U.S. BIT (1997); Article VI of the 
Azerbaijan - U.S. BIT (1997); Article VI of the Bolivia - U.S. BIT (1998); Article VI of the Mozambique - 
U.S. BIT (1998); Article VI of the El Salvador - U.S. BIT (signed in 1999, but not in force); Article VI of the 
Bahrain - U.S. BIT (1999). Article VI of the Trinidad and Tobago - U.S. BIT (1994) and Article VI of the 
Nicaragua - U.S. BIT (signed in 1995, but not in force) also follow the 1994 U.S. Model BIT in respect of 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements, except that the exclusion of advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements comes in a separate paragraph and such paragraph refers to benefits and 
incentives in lieu of advantages. 
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e) Replicating the NAFTA Approach: Prohibiting Limited Lists of Advantage-Conditioning 
Performance Requirements 
The fact that a number of PRPs explicitly prohibit advantage-conditioning performance 
requirements even in instances where complying with such requirements may turn out to be 
profitable for complying investors suggests a favourable bias toward the interests of home State 
exporters of goods and services compared with the interests of home-State foreign investors 
abroad. This pro-trade and pro-export bias may be explained by the significant trade deficits of 
some home States, such as the United States, and the fact that more and more PRPs form part 
of FTAs whose approval by elected officials and their constituents hinges upon the ability of 
FTAs to increase home State exports.585 
NAFTA Article 1106(3)586 prohibits a lesser number of advantage-conditioning performance 
requirements compared to prohibited mandatory performance requirements: LCRs, LSRs in 
respect of goods, trade-balancing requirements and domestic sales restrictions. The four 
performance requirements in NAFTA Article 1106(3) are identically worded as four of the seven 
performance requirements found in Article 1106(1). Accordingly, EPRs and export restrictions, 
technology transfer requirements and product mandating requirements can lawfully condition 
the receipt of an advantage.587 Thirty-one IIAs among those surveyed follow the exact same 
approach to advantage-conditioning performance requirements.588 American BIT negotiators 
explained during negotiations that the significant trade-distortedness of these four types of 
performance requirements warranted their prohibition even when imposed as a condition for the 
                                                
585 Vandevelde (n 84) 394. 
586 Article 8(2) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, Article 8(2) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and Article 9(3) of the 
2012 Canada Model FIPA prohibit advantage-conditioning performance requirements in the same 
manner. 
587 Pope & Talbot (n 167) para 72. 
588 American FTAs: Article 15.8(2) of the Singapore - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 10.8(2) of the Morocco - 
U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.9(2) of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.8(2) of the Oman - U.S. 
FTA (2006); Article 10.9(2) of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(2) of the Colombia - U.S. FTA 
(2006); Article 10.9(2) of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 11.8(2) of the Korea - U.S. FTA (2007). 
American BITs: Article 8(2) of the U.S. - Uruguay BIT (2005); Article 8(2) of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT 
(2008). Australian Agreements: Article 11.9(2) of the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.7(2) of the 
Australia - Chile FTA (2008); Article 5(2) of SAFTA Revised Chapter 8 (Investment) (2011); Article 7(2) of 
the CERTA Investment Protocol (2011); Article 14.9(3) of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014); Article 
11.9(2) of the Australia - Korea FTA (2014). Canadian TIPs: Article G-06(3) of the Canada - Chile FTA 
(1996); Article 807(3) of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008); Article 807(3) of the Canada - Peru FTA 
(2008); Article 9.07(3) of the Canada - Panama FTA (2008); Article 10.7(3) of the Canada - Honduras 
FTA (2013); Article 8.8(3) of the Canada - Korea FTA (2014); Article 8.5(2) of the Canada - EU CETA 
(2014); Article 9.10(2) of the TPP (2015). Chilean Agreements: Article 9-07(3) of the Chile - Mexico FTA 
(1998); Article 10.5(2) of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 10.7(3) of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003); 
Article 9.6(2) of the Chile - Colombia FTA (2006); Article 11.6(2) of the Chile - Peru FTA (2006); Article 
77(2) of the Chile - Japan EPA (2007); Article 10.8(2) of the Pacific Alliance Protocol (2014). 
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receipt of an advantage.589 Ten Canadian FIPAs590 reproduce Article 7(3) of the 2004 Canada 
Model FIPA itself the same as NAFTA Article 1106(3). 
Other IIAs yield seemingly irreconcilable provisions that confuse the authorised/prohibited status 
of advantage-conditioning performance requirements. Pursuant to Article 16(9) of the Canada - 
Tanzania FIPA (2013), Tanzania preserves its right to grant special incentives to its nationals 
and companies with the avowed objective of “strengthen[ing] the capacity of national 
entrepreneurs.” Tanzania commits to progressively eliminating such special incentives after 
having strengthened the capacity of local industries. Article 16(9) renders Article 4 (National 
Treatment) inapplicable to such special incentives on the condition that these incentives “do not 
significantly affect the investments and activities of investors of the other Party.” However, 
Article 16(9) says nothing about Article 9 (the PRP); the absence of explicit exclusion of such 
special incentives from the scope of the PRP raises serious doubts as to whether the exception 
in their favour should prevail over the explicit prohibition of enumerated advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements under Article 9(3). 
A number of IIAs go farther than NAFTA Article 1106(3) and prohibit a greater number of 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements. For example, Article 10.5(2) of the India - 
Korea CEPA (2009) prohibits advantage-conditioning EPRs, LCRs, LSRs in respect of both 
goods and services, trade-balancing requirements and domestic sales restrictions, while Article 
89(2) of the India - Japan CEPA (2011) prohibits advantage-conditioning EPRs, LCRs, LSRs in 
respect of both goods and services, trade-balancing requirements, domestic sales restrictions, 
export restrictions and requirements to appoint high-ranking employees of a given nationality. 
Since both Canada and the United States, as well as their respective signatory partner 
countries, considered it necessary to explicitly exclude advantage-conditioning performance 
requirements from their PRPs, the straightforward wording of advantage-silent PRPs in 
American, Canadian and French IIAs suggests that such PRPs cannot be deemed inapplicable 
to advantage-conditioning performance requirements on that basis alone and in the absence of 
explicit language to that effect, either in the PRP itself or in an instrument forming part of the IIA 
or accompanying it. As a result, proving the existence of an advantage conferred in relation with 
the imposition of a performance requirement should not automatically exclude such 
                                                
589 Vandevelde (n 84) 394. 
590 Article 7(3) of the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006); Article 7(3) of the Canada - Jordan FIPA (2009); Article 
10(3) of the Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 9(3) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); Article 9(3) 
of the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); Article 9(3) of the Canada - Senegal FIPA (2014); Article 9(3) of the 
Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); Article 9(3) of the Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 9(3) of 
the Canada - Guinea FIPA (2014); Article 9(3) of the Canada - Hong Kong, China FIPA (2016). 
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performance requirement from the scope of advantage-silent PRPs. Rather, one should 
consider whether the wording of a given PRP would encompass advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements, notably by considering them imposed as conditions for the 
establishment, operation, maintenance, expansion, sale or disposition of an investment.  
The U.S. Department of State, when commenting the Additional Protocols entered into with the 
European Commission regarding eight U.S. BITs, considered that the silence of American BITs 
in respect of advantages reflected the standard policy of considering advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements as a valid and legitimate policy-making exercise. However, it is 
difficult to identify such a purportedly clear approach in the absence of a clear authorisation of 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements within PRPs whose wording and scope could 
be interpreted as applicable to advantage-conditioning performance requirements. 
3. Defining Contiguous Concepts: Advantages Under the TRIMs Agreement and in 
PRPs of IIAs and Benefits under the SCM Agreement 
PRPs which address advantage-conditioning performance requirements within surveyed IIAs 
uniformly use the term “advantage,” yet none of these IIAs provides a definition for such term, 
and nor does the TRIMs Agreement.591 Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement only prohibits LCRs 
and EPRs that are contingent upon subsidies as defined under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. 
The jurisprudential definition of the term “benefit” for purposes of the SCM Agreement can 
improve our understanding of the term “advantage” used in the TRIMs Agreement and within 
PRPs of IIAs. 
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement narrows down the definition of the term “subsidy” by requiring 
the presence of two elements: first, a financial contribution (a term itself defined in a limited 
fashion) or income or price support as defined by GATT Article XVI, and second, a benefit. It is 
submitted that the term “advantage” is clearly reminiscent of the concept of “benefit” as used 
under Article 1 of the SCM Agreement since its shape or form is not narrowed by any additional 
criteria, either in the TRIMs Agreement or in PRPs of IIAs that make use of the concept of 
advantage. Moreover, WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body have equated 
“conferring a benefit” with “providing an advantage.”592 The EC considered that advantages for 
purposes of an agreement on TRIMs are broader than the concept of subsidies, since the 
undefined notion of advantage is not constrained by the additional criteria of financial 
                                                
591 de Sterlini (n 250) 449. 
592 Canada—FIT ABR (n 283), para 5.148; Canada—FIT Panel (n 274), para 7.271. 
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contributions or income or price support.593 
In line with the plain and simple wording of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, which limits 
itself to stating: “a benefit is thereby conferred,” the benefit test should remain simple and focus 
on its alleged recipients in light of the recipients’ position in the marketplace with and without the 
advantage.594 The benefit test could also be formulated as whether a benefit or an advantage 
“makes the recipient ‘better off’ than it would otherwise have been,” absent that benefit or 
advantage.595 According to the WTO Appellate Body, a benefit requires the existence of an 
advantage that places its recipient in a more advantageous position than that provided by the 
market absent the advantage;596 such a test has been coined “the private market test.”597 A 
lengthy list of measures could amount to advantages based on such a test. In Pope & Talbot v 
Canada, the claimant argued that the undefined term “advantage” used in NAFTA Article 
1106(3) has a special meaning when used in trade agreements and defined “advantage” as “a 
more favourable or improved position or a ‘superior position’” by relying upon a WTO Appellate 
Body report.598 
4. Interpreting and Applying Prohibitions of Advantage-Conditioning Performance 
Requirements and the Term “Advantage”  
Advantages consist of a wide array of measures. In two recent disputes, WTO dispute 
settlement panels decided that mere participation in State-run renewable energy programmes 
which guarantee long-term purchases of electricity at fixed economically beneficial rates 
constitutes an advantage.599  
Many arbitral tribunals interpreted the term “advantage” as used in NAFTA Article 1106 and. In 
Pope & Talbot v Canada, the claimant argued that the Export Control Regime imposed 
conditions upon the receipt of the fee-free (EB) and reduced-fee (LBF) export quotas, both of 
                                                
593 GATT, Note on TRIMs (n 60) para 5. 
594 Canada—FIT ABR (n 283), para 5.148; Canada—FIT Panel (n 274), para 7.271. 
595 Canada—FIT ABR (n 283), para 5.130 and fn 624, citing Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of 
Civilian Aircraft (Complaints by Canada and Brazil) (1999), WTO Doc WT/DS70/AB/R (Appellate Body 
Report) <docsonline.wto.org> (Canada – Aircraft ABR), para 157. 
596 Rajib Pal, “Has the Appellate Body’s Decision in Canada—Renewable Energy / Canada—Feed-in 
Tariff Program Opened the Door for Production Subsidies?” 17(1) J Int’l Econ L 125 (2014) 131, citing 
Canada – Aircraft ABR (n 595), para 149. 
597 Dominic Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Balancing Policy 
Space and Legal Constraints, Cambridge University Press (2014), 60. 
598 Pope & Talbot – Investor Memorial (n 497) para 105, citing Brazil – Export Financing Programme for 
Aircraft – Report of the Appellate Body (2 August 1999), WT/DS46/AB/R, para 177. 
599 Canada—FIT Panel (n 274), paras 7.164-7.165; India—Solar Cells (n 274), paras 7.70-7.72.  
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which allegedly constituted “advantages” under NAFTA Article 1106(3). 600  The claimant 
therefore argued that Canada had conferred an advantage by granting softwood producers 
export fee-free or reduced export fee amounts of lumber on certain conditions.601 Canada 
ultimately acknowledged that the right to export fee-free constituted an advantage.602 The Pope 
& Talbot Tribunal agreed with the view commonly held by disputing parties.603 
At the time of initiating their respective arbitrations, Archer Daniels Midland (“ADM”) and Tate & 
Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc (“TLIA”),604 CPI and Cargill (the “Sweetener Claimants”) were all 
American corporations that manufactured and distributed HFCS in Mexico. The Sweetener 
Claimants challenged the same measures within the same timeframe. The Sweetener 
Claimants sold most of their HFCS to Mexican soft drink bottlers and competed with domestic 
cane sugar producers as a sweetener for soft drinks.605 HFCS quickly gained a competitive 
edge over cane sugar due to its lower production cost, the consistency of its quality and a 
greater ease for storage and distribution.606 Once HFCS became available in Mexico during the 
1990’s, Mexican soft drink producers started replacing cane sugar with HFCS to the point where 
in 1997 HFCS occupied a 25% market share, up from 0% in 1991.607 By 2001 the use of HFCS 
by the soft drink industry had grown substantially, which significantly reduced domestic sugar 
consumption in Mexico.608 
On December 30, 2001 the Mexican Congress amended the Ley del Impuesto Especial sobre 
Producción y Servicios, (the “IEPS Amendment”) and imposed a 20% excise tax on soft drinks 
and on services used to transfer and distribute soft drinks that use any sweetener other than 
cane sugar (the “Sweetener Excise Tax”).609 When the IEPS Amendment was being introduced 
before Congress, a Representative of the Mexican Congress stated clearly that the IEPS 
Amendment was aimed at protecting the domestic cane sugar industry from HFCS.610 The 
Sweetener Excise Tax applied to soft drinks that used any sweetener other than cane sugar 
(most notably HFCS), while soft drinks sweetened exclusively with cane sugar were exempted, 
the whole in order to protect the domestic cane sugar industry from HFCS.611 The obligation to 
                                                
600 Pope & Talbot (n 167) para 48. 
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603 Pope & Talbot (n 167) para 73. 
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605 ADM (n 15) paras 40, 48-49, 70; Cargill v Mexico (n 16) paras 1, 6, 66-67; CPI (n 167) para 2. 
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608 ibid para 70. 
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pay the Sweetener Excise Tax was incumbent upon Mexican bottlers when selling or importing 
soft drinks that comprised a sweetener other than cane sugar and/or upon purchasing services 
used to transfer and distribute same products.612  
The Sweetener Excise Tax effectively translated into a 400% increase of the HFCS purchase 
price.613 The Sweetener Claimants argued that immediately following the entry into force of the 
Sweetener Excise Tax, Mexican soft drink bottlers replaced HFCS with cane sugar as a 
sweetener in order to avoid paying the Sweetener Excise Tax, destroying the Sweetener 
Claimants’ market share.614 By 2001, HFCS had become the predominant sweetener used by 
the Mexican soft drink industry; within a year of its advent in 2002, the Sweetener Excise Tax 
had virtually excluded HFCS from the Mexican soft drink market.615 
The Sweetener Claimants argued that the exemption from the Sweetener Excise Tax 
constituted an advantage conditioned on the use of domestic cane sugar in soft drink 
production, which amounted to according a preference to goods produced in Mexico, in violation 
of NAFTA Article 1106(3).616 Mexico conceded, in ADM v Mexico, that exemption from the 
Sweetener Excise Tax constituted an advantage in favour of Mexican bottlers that used only 
cane sugar to sweeten their soft drinks,617 but denied that NAFTA Article 1106(3) could apply to 
the Sweetener Excise Tax.618  
The ADM Tribunal found a breach of NAFTA Article 1106 and considered that Mexico conferred 
an advantage to Mexican cane sugar producers by conditioning the exemption from the 
Sweetener Excise Tax (the “Sweetener Tax Exemption Advantage”) upon the use of cane sugar 
as a soft drink sweetener, thus placing foreign HFCS producers at a competitive disadvantage 
compared to Mexican cane sugar producers.619 The ADM Tribunal thus characterised the 
Sweetener Excise Tax as an LCR and an LSR by exposing the almost exclusively domestic 
origin of cane sugar consumed in Mexico.620 The ADM Tribunal concluded that based on the 
essentially domestic nature of the Mexican cane sugar industry,621 and based on the underlying 
protectionist intent of the Sweetener Excise Tax and of the Sweetener Tax Exemption 
                                                
612 CPI (n 167) para 44; see also ADM (n 15) paras 103, 108, 215, 217; see also Cargill v Mexico (n 16) 
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Advantage, the requirement of using only cane sugar as a soft drink sweetener in order to 
benefit from the Sweetener Tax Exemption Advantage discriminated against the HFCS industry, 
including the claimants and their investment, in violation of NAFTA Article 1106(3)(a) or (b).622  
In Cargill v Mexico, Cargill argued that the Sweetener Excise Tax violated NAFTA Article 
1106(3)(b) because the Sweetener Tax Exemption Advantage was conditioned on the LSR of 
using domestic cane sugar.623 Mexico did not deny the existence of an advantage624 and the 
Cargill v Mexico Tribunal held that the Sweetener Tax Exemption Advantage constituted an 
advantage under NAFTA Article 1106(3) whose receipt was conditioned upon the performance 
requirement to use domestically produced cane sugar in violation of NAFTA Article 1106(3), but 
did not specify which subparagraph of NAFTA Article 1106(3) had thus been violated.625 In CPI 
v Mexico, the CPI Tribunal did not pronounce itself on the existence of an advantage and limited 
itself to succinctly rejecting the alleged breach of NAFTA Article 1106.626 
The notion of advantage is broad and its interpretation has yet to face any difficulties in the 
context of investor-State arbitration. The arbitral tribunals in the previously discussed disputes 
rightly concluded that an advantage existed in the disputes before them and this conclusion 
flowed naturally from the lack of factual ambiguity. This thesis suggests that should any 
difficulties arise in the future, arbitral tribunals may turn to the interpretation of the term “benefit” 
carried out by WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body when deciding disputes 
under the SCM Agreement for guidance. It is true that the WTO dispute settlement body faces 
its own set of challenges related notably to the complexity of the relevant provisions of the SCM 
Agreement and to the intricate fact patterns of trade disputes. Nevertheless, as discussed 
above, WTO jurisprudence can help flesh out basic tests to guide arbitral tribunals when tasked 
with determining if a given investor received an advantage. The criteria for establishing the 
existence of an advantage should remain simple and focus on its alleged recipients in light of 
the recipients’ position in the marketplace with and without the alleged advantage. The criteria 
for ascertaining the conferral of an advantage could consist of determining whether an 
advantage makes its recipient “better off” than without the advantage. 
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F. PRPs in Trade and/or Investment Chapters of TIPs 
1. TIPs with two PRPs Reflect Dual Trade and Investment Concerns 
The dual and variable trade/investment nature of performance requirements renders them ill 
fitted for uniform disciplining. The investment-driven purposes of BITs can act as straitjackets 
onto PRPs which address multiple trade concerns alongside investment concerns. At the same 
time, aggregating a wide variety of performance requirements into the same PRP, which 
consequently exhibits an overall trade and investment nature, may lead to the better known 
performance requirements directly related to trade obfuscating the remote and indirect relation 
to trade of other performance requirements. PRPs should not be confined to the investment 
objectives of BITs or to the trade concerns of their most obvious trade-related performance 
requirements. PRPs should be construed in a way that accounts for the varying degrees of 
trade or investment relatedness of the distinct measures that they prohibit.  
Disciplining performance requirements in TIPs lends itself to adopting two separate PRPs. A 
number of States have opted for two PRPs in their TIPs: they prohibit a number of performance 
requirements directly related to trade in their trade-focused chapters while prohibiting the same 
performance requirements directly related to trade, along with other performance requirements, 
in their investment-focused chapters. Following the lead of the NAFTA in this respect, 14 TIPs627 
among those surveyed prohibit performance requirements in two distinct chapters: first, in a 
chapter focused on trade in goods and market access, and second, in a chapter focused on 
investment. Exhibiting a different approach, six TIPs628 do not comprise an investment chapter, 
but nevertheless prohibit performance requirements in their respective trade chapters.  
The 15 previously identified TIPs (including the NAFTA) that prohibit performance requirements 
in both trade and investment chapters prohibit a larger number of mandatory performance 
requirements in their investment chapters than those contemplated by the PRPs in their 
respective trade chapters. They also prohibit advantage-conditioning performance requirements 
only in their investment chapters. Trade-chapter PRPs and investment-chapter PRPs both 
target EPRs, LCRs, LSRs (although this requirement is strangely limited to goods in the 
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investment-chapter PRPs)629 and trade-balancing requirements. Contrary to their trade-chapter 
PRPs, the investment-chapter PRPs do not specify import substitution, but in addition to the 
performance requirements targeted in trade-chapter PRPs, investment-chapter PRPs prohibit 
domestic sales restrictions, technology transfer requirements and product mandating 
requirements. 
In the same way as does NAFTA Article 318, 16 TIPs630  among those surveyed define 
performance requirements as one of five requirements: EPRs, import substitution requirements, 
LSRs, LCRs and trade-balancing requirements. This list of prohibited performance requirements 
is clearly predicated on their trade-relatedness. Somewhat incoherently however, all but the 
trade-balancing requirements (silent as to goods or services) are drafted as encompassing 
measures applicable to goods and to services, even though this definition of performance 
requirements forms part of chapters focused solely on trade in goods. Of these 16 TIPs, the 10 
American FTAs and the TPP (2015) exclude from their definitions four measures that would 
otherwise have fallen within EPRs and import substitution requirements: the requirement to 
subsequently export an imported good; the requirement to use an imported component for 
producing a good to be subsequently exported; the requirement that an imported component be 
substituted by an identical or similar component for use in producing a good to be subsequently 
exported; and the requirement that an imported good be substituted by an identical or similar 
good to be subsequently exported. By contrast, three Chilean TIPs631 have left the expression 
“performance requirement” undefined and therefore do not properly delineate the open-ended 
scope of their trade-chapter PRPs. 
Eighteen TIPs 632  prohibit conditioning import licenses on compliance with a performance 
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630 Article C-18 of the Canada - Chile FTA (1996); Article 3.24 of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 2.12 
of the Bahrain - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 2.11 of the Morocco - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 2.13(11) of the 
Australia - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 3.31 of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 3.16 of the Chile - 
Panama FTA (2006); Article 2.22 of the Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 2.12 of the Oman - U.S. FTA 
(2006); Article 2.22 of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 3.32 of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 
2.15 of the Korea - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 3.1(j) of the Australia - Chile FTA (2008); Article 3.1 of the 
Chile - Vietnam FTA (2011); Article 3.1 of the Pacific Alliance Protocol (2014); Article 2.1 of the TPP 
(2015).  
631 The Chile - Colombia FTA (2006); the Chile - Hong Kong FTA (2012); the Chile - Thailand FTA (2013). 
632 Article 3.11(2)(b) of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 2.8(2)(b) of the Bahrain - U.S. FTA (2004); 
Article 2.8(2)(b) of the Morocco - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 2.9(2) of the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 
3.8(2)(b) of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 3.4(2)(b) of the Chile - Colombia FTA (2006); Article 
3.8(2)(b) of the Chile - Panama FTA (2006); Article 2.8(2)(b) of the Oman - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 
2.8(2)(b) of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 2.8(2)(b) of the Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 
3.8(2)(b) of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 3.9(2)(b) of the Australia - Chile FTA (2008); Article 
2.8(2)(b) of the Korea - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 3.6(2)(a) of the Chile - Vietnam FTA (2011); Article 
3.6(4)(b) of the Chile - Hong Kong FTA (2012); Article 3.8(2)(b) of the Chile - Thailand FTA (2013); Article 
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requirement, a scenario unaddressed in the NAFTA and in the Canada - Chile FTA (1996). In 
the same way as does NAFTA Article 304, 13 TIPs633 prohibit conditioning the waiver of 
customs duties upon the implicit or explicit compliance with performance requirements.  
Article 13 of the Israel - U.S. FTA (1985) bears the heading “trade-related performance 
requirements” and prohibits mandatory EPRs and LCRs as a condition of establishment, 
expansion or maintenance of investments by State Party investors, as well as advantage-
conditioning LCRs. One can easily ascertain its palpable focus on performance requirements 
most egregiously related to trade. 
By drawing up two different PRPs within a single TIP, a number of State Parties clearly 
differentiated between performance requirements directly related to trade listed in trade-chapter 
PRPs and performance requirements indirectly or remotely related to trade that are prohibited in 
their investment-chapter PRPs. The approach of creating trade-chapter PRPs and investment-
chapter PRPs has the merit of greater clarity, can facilitate their interpretation and application 
and better addresses the interests of home States at stake in relation to performance 
requirements by giving States access to dispute settlement mechanisms. 
2. Conflicting Interests of Home States and Their Outward Investors Warrant State-
to-State Disciplines on Directly Trade-Related Performance Requirements  
The unilateral initiatives of the United States against performance requirements 634  clearly 
                                                                                                                                                       
3.6(2)(b) of the Pacific Alliance Protocol (2014); Article 2.10(2)(b) of the TPP (2015). 
633 Article C-03 of the Canada - Chile FTA (1996); Article 3.6 of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 2.4 of 
the Bahrain - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 3.4 of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 2.4 of the Morocco 
- U.S. FTA (2004); Article 3.4 of the Chile - Panama FTA (2006); Article 2.4 of the Oman - U.S. FTA 
(2006); Article 2.4 of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 2.4 of the Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 3.4 
of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 2.4 of the Korea - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 3.11 of the Pacific 
Alliance Protocol (2014); Article 2.5 of the TPP (2015). 
634 In the early 1980s, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (“OPIC”) could refuse to insure 
American FDI abroad when bound by performance requirements that substantially reduce trade benefits 
accruing to the United States as a result of such FDI. Refusing insurance coverage was aimed at 
deterring American FDI from flowing into host States whose performance requirements reduced American 
exports: see Coughlin (n 36) 135; Jacobsen (n 34) 1191-1192 and fn 239; see also Roberts (n 136) 175. 
Section 212(c) of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) of 1983 enabled the President 
to confer unilateral preferential trade and tax benefits upon CBERA candidate countries drawing negative 
inferences from the reliance by candidate countries on distortive export subsidies, EPRs or LCRs: see 
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Overview and Compilation of U.S. 
Trade Statutes Part I of II, 111th Congress, 2nd Session, U.S. Doc No WMCP: 111-6, 2010 Edition 
(December 2010), U.S. Government Printing Office, 25-27; United States International Trade Commission 
(“ITC”), Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act: Impact on U.S. Industries and Consumers and on 
Beneficiary Countries, 21st Report 2011–12, Investigation No. 332-227, USITC Publication 4428 
(September 2013), i, ix, 1-1, 1-4, 1-5. Section 203(d) of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), 
enacted on December 4, 1991, identically enabled the American President to factor-in the use of 
distortive export subsidies, LCRs or EPRs upon considering whether a country should receive ATPA 
 
 126 
expressed concerns only over the harmful trade impacts of a select number of closely trade-
related performance requirements from the vantage point of the United States as a home State 
and especially as an exporter of goods and services. These examples suggest that addressing 
performance requirements directly related to trade through State-to-State negotiations, 
disciplines and dispute settlement could prove more in line with the predominant motivations for 
disciplining such measures in the first place.  
Interests of home States and those of their outward investors may be at odds when assessing 
host-State performance requirements.635 For example, in the 1970s, 1980s and even beyond, 
American subsidiaries in host States and host States cooperated on performance requirements 
to the detriment of the United States as a home State.636 As a result of such cooperation, 
American MNCs that had concluded contracts with host States binding them to comply with 
performance requirements in exchange for advantages feared the entry into such markets of 
new, performance requirement-free competitors.637  For example, the Argentina - U.S. BIT 
(1991) comprises a PRP whose temporal applicability was adjusted in order to assuage the 
fears of first-mover American MNCs and notwithstanding that the immediate application of the 
PRP would have been much more in line with American interests.638 The Protocol to the 
Argentina - U.S. BIT (1991) provides that Argentina could “maintain, but not intensify” existing 
performance requirements in the automotive industry for eight years following the entry into 
                                                                                                                                                       
benefits: see U.S. House of Representatives, Compilation of Trade Statutes (defined in this same 
footnote above) 41-44; United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”), Andean Trade Preference 
Act: Impact on U.S. Industries and Consumers and on Drug Crop Eradication and Crop Substitution, 2013 
Sixteenth Report, 2013, Investigation No. 332-352, USITC Publication 4486 (September 2014), 1-2. The 
United States Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Renewal Act of 1984 conditioned eligibility to 
the U.S. GSP inter alia on the extent to which developing countries had “reduce[d] distorting investment 
practices and policies (including [EPRs]):” see Ronald Arun Nair, “The Role of India’s Foreign Investment 
Laws in Controlling Activities of Multinational Corporations” 14 Syracuse J. Int’I L. & Comm. 519 (1988) 
542-543, fn 139, 141. Pursuant to the 1984 U.S. Trade and Tariff Act amendment of Section 301 of the 
1974 U. S. Trade Act, the President may act against any country which burdens or restricts American 
trade by adopting trade-related performance requirements, and according to Section 307(b) of the U.S. 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, the USTR may undertake consultations with or retaliation against a country 
which imposes EPRs that adversely affect the United States: see Moran and Pearson, “Careful With 
TRIPs” (n 29) 129-130; Moran and Pearson, TRPRs OPIC (n 31) 58-59; Nair (679) 545-546, fn 150. 
635 Ariff (n 40) 352; Bergsten (n 60) 41, 43; Greenaway, “Political Economy of TRIMs” (n 62) 374-375; 
Greenaway (n 31) 148; Jacobsen (n 34) 1182-1183; Moran and Pearson, TRPRs OPIC (n 31) 59-60; 
David Robertson, Investment Incentives in Home and Host Countries, Report to the Task Force on 
Private Foreign Investment of the IMF-World Bank Joint Development Committee, DC/TF/PFI/80-5 
(January 25, 1980) 1, 26; UNCTC and UNCTAD (n 43) 54, 61. 
636 Bergsten, “Investment Wars” (n 420) 143; Jacobsen (n 34) 1181-1184; Moran, “FDI and Host Country 
Development” (n 65) 285; Theodore H. Moran, “FDI and Development: What is the Role of International 
Rules and Regulations?” 12(2) Transnational Corporations (August 2003) 1, 8-9; Moran, Graham and 
Blomström (n 65) 383. 
637 Coughlin (n 36) 137. 
638 Argentina - U.S. BIT (1991): Letter of Submittal from the Department of State to the President, 13 
January 1993, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Treaty Doc. 103-2; paras 9, 11 of the Protocol to the 
Argentina - U.S. BIT (1991), as discussed in Vandevelde, “The Second Wave” (n 112) 674, 689. 
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force of the BIT. Argentina also had to apply residual performance requirements so as to not 
competitively disadvantage existing investments compared with new automotive investments.639 
This specification was meant to appease the Ford Motor Company which had made large-scale 
investments prior to the conclusion of the BIT.640 Had the Protocol to the Argentina - U.S. BIT 
(1991) not deferred the application of its PRP, investors establishing themselves after the BIT’s 
entry into force would have benefitted from the protection of the PRP upon first investing in 
Argentina. They never would never have had to organise their activities in accordance with 
economically suboptimal performance requirements. Ford needed time to restructure its 
operations in order to respond to the Argentinian market’s changing competitive pressures 
following Argentina’s removal of performance requirements and related investment incentives. 
Trade interests of home States figure prominently in PRPs, at least in respect of LCRs/LSRs, 
EPRs, export restrictions and trade-balancing requirements. Trade considerations therefore 
constitute an essential and definitional component of such performance requirements. Non-
trade driven measures should therefore not fall within the meaning of LCRs/LSRs, EPRs or 
trade-balancing requirements. 
PRPs should therefore not be framed or construed solely by reference to the investors that must 
comply with performance requirements. The harm caused by directly trade-related performance 
requirements is often felt by home States of targeted investors and not by targeted investors 
themselves. PRPs should therefore be drafted and interpreted so as to address the negative 
impacts of performance requirements on the party effectively injured, including home States of 
targeted investors. The fact that only States can institute disputes over disciplines on 
performance requirements in trade chapters of TIPs adds clarity as to their purpose, their scope 
and their interpretation.  
V. Recurring Features that Modulate the Scope and Coverage of 
PRPs in IIAs 
This part draws from the survey of IIAs covered in this thesis to identify and analyse patterns in 
the drafting and structuring of PRPs that alter their scope and coverage. The first section 
distinguishes between two notable trends within PRPs in respect of investments and investors: 
PRPs that apply to investments and investors originating from any State (State Parties and non-
Party States) as well as to domestic investments and investors, and PRPs that apply only to 
investments and investors originating from State Parties.  
                                                
639 Paragraph 9 of the Protocol to the Argentina - U.S. BIT (1991). 
640 Vandevelde, “The Second Wave” (n 112) 689. 
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Second, this part appraises whether the applicability of PRPs hinges on a connection between 
an investment and a performance requirement, whether some PRPs apply only to specific 
phases of an investment, and whether some PRPs distinguish between or apply equally to the 
pre-establishment and post-establishment phases of an investment. This second section will 
briefly touch upon the only pronouncement by an arbitral tribunal to have discussed the link 
between a performance requirement and a given phase of an investment as a condition for the 
applicability of a PRP.  
Third, this part identifies a number of PRPs whose very wording may defeat the original purpose 
sought when prohibiting advantage-conditioning performance requirements. This third section 
also appraises erroneous arbitral interpretations of the expression “in connection with” in 
NAFTA Article 1106(3) and the danger that such interpretations could deprive prohibitions of 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements of any effectiveness. 
Fourth, this part analyses PRPs that consider commitments or undertakings as performance 
requirements when seeking to achieve any of the enumerated performance requirement 
objectives. This fourth section assesses the impact of distinguishing between de facto and de 
jure performance requirements in decisions of arbitral tribunals. This fourth section also tackles 
how arbitral tribunals approached the idea that substance should prevail over form and how 
they balanced the inherent characteristics of a measure with its effects when deciding whether a 
measure constitutes a performance requirement. Finally, this fourth section weighs the 
importance granted by arbitral tribunals to the statements, encapsulated in NAFTA Article 
1106(5), that PRPs are exhaustive and apply only to specifically enumerated requirements. 
Fifth, this part investigates mechanisms used to ensure that specific performance requirements 
remain lawful in the presence of PRPs. More often than not, IIAs comprise a number of 
recurring provisions that ensure their PRP’s inapplicability to measures deemed sufficiently 
important to warrant explicit assurances. This fifth section singles out multiple mechanisms that 
achieve this.   
Sixth, this part analyses underlines the critical importance for States to retain sufficient latitude 
for imposing performance requirements as part of government procurement and analyses the 
features of treaty provisions drafted to ensure that the wholesale application of PRPs to 
procurement. This sixth section discusses an arbitral award that applied the corresponding 
NAFTA provisions. The seventh section will investigate the closely related disciplines on 
performance requirements within TIP chapters focused on government procurement, in which 
the term “offsets” replaces the expression “performance requirements,” and their links with 
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similar GATT-WTO treaty instruments.  
Finally, this part highlights the crucial importance of reservations in striking the appropriate 
balance between ensuring a stable regulatory framework for investors and preserving sufficient 
policy-making flexibility for States. The eighth section scrutinises the inner-workings of 
reservations that shield measures that existed at the time of an IIA’s signature. This eighth 
section also raises questions as to the significant unpredictability that could ensue from a 
number of Canadian FIPAs whose reservations open the door to validating measures beyond 
those explicitly set out in Annexes. This eighth section then turns to sectoral reservations that 
shield existing and future non-conforming measures from PRPs and points to a limited number 
of noteworthy departures from the NAFTA approach. This eighth sections ends with a critical 
appraisal of the sole arbitral award having conducted an in-depth analysis of reservations and 
with a warning that the complex practical implications of reservations leave the door open to 
considerable uncertainty.  
A. PRPs, Investments and Investors 
This section distinguishes between PRPs that apply to all investments and investors and PRPs 
that apply only to covered investments and investors. 
1. PRPs Applicable to All Investments 
Thirty-one of the currently surveyed IIAs641 specify that their PRPs apply to all investments in 
                                                
641 American FTAs: Articles 10.1(1)(c), 10.5(1) and 10.5(2) of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Articles 
15.2(c), 15.8(1) and 15.8(2) of the Singapore - U.S. FTA (2003); Articles 11.1(1)(c), 11.9(1) and 11.9(2) of 
the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004); Articles 10.1(c), 10.8(1) and 10.8(2) of the Morocco - U.S. FTA (2004); 
Articles 10.1(c), 10.9(1) and 10.9(2) of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Articles 10.1(1)(c), 10.8(1) and 
10.8(2) of the Oman - U.S. FTA (2006); Articles 10.1(1)(c), 10.9(1) and 10.9(2) of the Peru - U.S. FTA 
(2006); Articles 10.1(1)(c), 10.9(1) and 10.9(2) of the Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); Articles 10.1(1)(c), 
10.9(1) and 10.9(2) of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Articles 11.1(1)(c), 11.8(1) and 11.8(2) of the 
Korea - U.S. FTA (2007). American BITs: Articles 2(1)(c), 8(1) and 8(2) of the U.S. - Uruguay BIT (2005); 
Articles 2(1)(c), 8(1) and 8(2) of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT (2008). Australian IIAs: Articles 10.2(1)(c), 10.7(1) 
and 10.7(2) of the Australia - Chile FTA (2008); Articles 3(1)(c), 7(1) and 7(2) of the CERTA Investment 
Protocol (2011); Articles 2(1)(b), 9(1) and 9(2) of SAFTA Revised Chapter 8 (Investment) (2011); Articles 
14.1(1)(c), 14.9(2) and 14.9(3) of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014); Articles 11.1(1)(c), 11.9(1) and 
11.9(2) of the Australia - Korea FTA (2014). Canadian FTAs: Articles G-01(1)(c), G-06(1) and G-06(3) of 
the Canada - Chile FTA (1996); Articles 801(1)(c), 807(1) and 807(3) of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); 
Articles 801(1)(c), 807(1) and 807(3) of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008); Articles 9.02(1)(c), 9.07(1) 
and 9.07(3) of the Canada - Panama FTA (2008); Articles 10.2(1)(c), 10.7(1) and 10.7(3) of the Canada - 
Honduras FTA (2013); Articles 8.1(1)(c), 8.8(1) and 8.8(3) of the Canada - Korea FTA (2014); Article 
8.2(1)(c), 8.5(1) and 8.5(2) of the Canada - European Union (“EU”) Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (“CETA”) (2014) (refers to “any investments” instead of non-Party investors); Articles 9.2(1)(c), 
9.10(1) and 9.10(2) of the TPP (2015). Chilean IIAs: Articles 9-02.1(c), 9-07(1) and 9-07(3) of the Chile - 
Mexico FTA (1998); Articles 10.2(1)(c), 10.7(1) and 10.7(3) of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003); Articles 
9.1(1)(c), 9.6(1) and 9.6(2) of the Chile - Colombia FTA (2006); Articles 11.1(1)(c), 11.6(1) and 11.6(2) of 
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the territories of the relevant State Parties (and not only to investments by investors of other 
State Parties), thus reproducing NAFTA Article 1101(1)(c).642 NAFTA Articles 1106(1) and 
1106(3) 643  further provide that their prohibitions of mandatory and advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements apply to investments by both investors of a Party and investors of a 
non-Party; 41 IIAs among those currently surveyed (the 31 previously identified IIAs in addition 
to 10 Canadian FIPAs644 which do not reproduce NAFTA Article 1101(1)(c)) similarly render 
their PRPs applicable to non-Party investors. The PRPs in France’s 64 BITs that include such 
provisions do not refer to investors or investments and prohibit the measures in and of 
themselves, regardless of which investor they apply to; they would accordingly apply to any 
investment by any investor in the host State’s territory. Pursuant to such treaty provisions, the 
imposition of a performance requirement is a breach per se since a State Party cannot impose 
performance requirements on covered investors, on its own domestic investors or on third-State 
investors even if all such investors are treated equally upon the imposition of a performance 
requirement.  
A State can impose performance requirements not only onto foreign investors, but also onto 
purely domestic investors. Arguments in favour of their prohibition resonate in the same way for 
both foreign and domestic investors.645 Rendering a PRP applicable to all investments and 
investors, as opposed to only covered investments by covered investors, aims at achieving 
objectives in addition to investor protection that go beyond the interests of investors directly 
affected by performance requirements. It aims more particularly at serving the economic 
development interests of home States. The State more likely to act as a home State in a cross-
border investment relationship may wish to draft the PRP in a way that ensures that the PRP 
fully serves to promote its exports. To do so, the PRP must remove any home-State export 
restrictive measure that a host State can impose on any investor (domestic, from the home-
                                                                                                                                                       
the Chile - Peru FTA (2006); Articles 72(1)(c), 77(1) and 77(2) of the Chile - Japan EPA (2007); Articles 
10.2(1)(c), 10.8(1) and 10.8(2) of the Pacific Alliance Protocol (2014). 
642 Article 2(1)(c) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, Article 2(1)(c) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and Article 
2(1)(c) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA essentially reproduce NAFTA Article 1101(1)(c). 
643 Article 8(1) and 8(2) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the 2004 Canada Model 
FIPA, Article 8(1) and 8(2) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and Article 9(1) and 9(3) of the 2012 Canada 
Model FIPA opt for the same approach as that of the NAFTA. 
644 Canadian FIPAs: Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006); Article 10(1) and 10(3) of 
the Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 9(1) and 9(3) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); Article 9(1) 
and 9(3) of the Canada - Senegal FIPA (2014); Article 9(2) of the Canada - Mali FIPA (2014); Article 9(1) 
and 9(3) of the Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); Article 9(1) and 9(3) of the Canada - Guinea FIPA 
(2014). Article 9(1) and 9(3) of the Canada - Nigeria FIPA (2014) and Article 9(1) and 9(3) of the Canada 
- Serbia FIPA (2014) render their PRPs applicable to a covered investment “or any other investment.” 
Article 9(1) of the Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2015) renders its mandatory PRP applicable to a covered 
investment “or any other investment,” while its advantage-conditioning PRP under Article 9(3) applies to 
investments by investors of the other Party or by non-Party investors. 
645 Bergsten, Performance Requirements (n 34) 4. 
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State or from a third State) in the host State. Unhindered investors in the host State Party (for 
example, State B), whether bearing the nationality of the host State (State B), of the home State 
Party (for example, State A) or of a third non-Party State (State C), may elect to import goods or 
services from home State Party A if given freedom of choice thanks to the PRP’s broad 
application within the IIA entered into by State A and State B, thus increasing the exports of 
home State Party A.646  
For example, in ADM, CPI and Cargill, the obligation of paying Mexico’s Sweetener Excise Tax 
rested with Mexican soft drink bottlers and arose when they sold or imported soft drinks that 
comprised a sweetener other than cane sugar and/or upon purchasing services used to transfer 
and distribute same products. Immediately following the entry into force of the Sweetener 
Excise Tax, Mexican soft drink bottlers began replacing HFCS (imported from the United States) 
with domestically-produced cane sugar as a sweetener in order to avoid paying the Sweetener 
Excise Tax. Within a year of its advent, the Sweetener Excise Tax had virtually excluded HFCS 
from the Mexican soft drink market. The Sweetener Excise Tax acted as an LCR/LSR which 
conditioned an advantage (the exemption from the Sweetener Excise Tax). NAFTA Article 
1106(3) set out to prohibit those types of measures. The prohibition of the Sweetener Excise 
Tax meant the preservation of American exports as a home State to Mexico as a host State. 
Rendering a PRP applicable to all investors and investments also aims at avoiding that covered 
investors and investments be placed at a disadvantage as a result of prohibiting advantage-
conditioning performance requirements. PRPs applicable to all investors and investments make 
it impossible for host States to offer to any investor advantages in exchange for compliance with 
performance requirements. If a PRP were applicable only to covered investors or investments, 
nothing would prevent a host State from making compliance with performance requirements 
profitable for a non-covered investor or investment, thus harming the competitiveness of 
covered investors or investments.647 
2. PRPs Applicable Only to Covered Investments and Investors 
By contrast, a host State may prefer to retain greater discretion to impose performance 
requirements. One way of achieving this is to narrow the applicability of a PRP to covered 
investors and investments. Contrary to NAFTA Article 1101(1)(c), Article V(2) of the Canada - 
Ukraine FIPA (1994) does not apply to all investments and applies instead to “an investment,” a 
term defined under Article 1(f) as made by an investor of one State Party in the territory of 
                                                
646 Vandevelde (n 84) 391. 
647 Vandevelde (n 84) 392. 
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another State Party. Twenty-one Canadian FIPAs followed the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) in 
this respect.648 Based on their identical definitions of the term “investment,” the open-ended 
PRPs of the 21 American BITs signed between 1982 and 1995 which replicate the PRP found in 
the 1983 or 1984 U.S. Model BITs apply to investments in one Party made by investors of the 
other Party. Similarly, Article VI of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT and the 13 American BITs with 
identical PRPs649 apply only to “a covered investment” by a covered investor. Three Indian 
IIAs650 also provide that their respective PRPs apply only to covered investments from covered 
investors.  
IIAs surveyed in this section show a 60/40 split in favour of rendering their PRPs applicable to 
all investments (103 IIAs) by comparison with limiting their applicability only to covered 
investments and investors (60 IIAs). 
B. Activities to Which PRPs Apply and the “Connection” Prerequisite 
This section explores the wording that specifies which types of activities are governed by PRPs 
in IIAs. This section also evaluates whether there is a need for measures to be “in connection 
with” an investment, and if so, with which investment (i.e., that of the claimant investor or that of 
a third investor) in order to qualify as performance requirements under PRPs in IIAs. NAFTA 
Article 1106(1)651 deems the prohibitions of mandatory performance requirements applicable “in 
connection with” a number of specified phases of an investment: the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct or operation” of an investment. The only arbitral 
pronouncement regarding such issue was made by Dissenting Arbitrator Schwartz in S.D. 
Myers v Canada, who deemed the PCB Export Ban (and the implied requirement that PCB 
                                                
648 The Canada - Trinidad and Tobago FIPA (1995); the Canada - Philippines FIPA (1995); the Canada - 
South Africa FIPA (1995); the Canada - Ecuador FIPA (1996); the Canada - Venezuela FIPA (1996); the 
Canada - Panama FIPA (1996); the Canada - Egypt FIPA (1996); the Barbados - Canada FIPA (1996); 
the Canada - Thailand FIPA (1997); the Canada - Croatia FIPA (1997); the Canada - Lebanon FIPA 
(1997); the Armenia - Canada FIPA (1997); the Canada - Uruguay FIPA (1997); the Canada - Costa Rica 
FIPA (1998); the Canada - Latvia FIPA (2009); the Canada - Romania FIPA (2009); the Canada - Jordan 
FIPA (2009); the Canada - Kuwait FIPA (2011); the Canada - China FIPA (2012); the Cameroon - 
Canada FIPA (2014); the Canada - Hong Kong, China FIPA (2016). 
649 Article VI of the Georgia - U.S. BIT (1994); Article VI of the U.S. - Uzbekistan BIT (signed in 1994, but 
not in force); Article VI of the Trinidad and Tobago - U.S. BIT (1994); Article VI of the Albania - U.S. BIT 
(1995); Article VI of the Honduras - U.S. BIT (1995); Article VI of the Nicaragua - U.S. BIT (signed in 
1995, but not in force); Article VII of the Croatia - U.S. BIT (1996); Article VI of the Jordan - U.S. BIT 
(1997); Article VI of the Azerbaijan - U.S. BIT (1997); Article VI of the Bolivia - U.S. BIT (1998); Article VI 
of the Mozambique - U.S. BIT (1998); Article VI of the El Salvador - U.S. BIT (signed in 1999, but not in 
force); Article VI of the Bahrain - U.S. BIT (1999). 
650 Article 6.2(1) of the India - Singapore CECA (2005); Articles 10.2(1), 10.5(1), 10.5(2) of the India - 
Korea CEPA (2009); Articles 83(1), 89(1) of the India - Japan CEPA (2011). 
651 Article 7(1) of the 2004 Canada Model FIPA and Article 9(1) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA 
reproduce the same approach, as do other IIAs which reproduce NAFTA Article 1106(1).  
 
 133 
remediation take place in Canada) “in connection with” the expansion of claimant SDMI’s 
operations in Canada on the basis that the PCB Export Ban was imposed in response to SDMI’s 
push to expand its operations into Canada.652  
PRPs in the previously discussed 21 American BITs that replicate the PRP within the 1983 and 
1984 U.S. Model BITs apply to the establishment, expansion or maintenance of an investment. 
Article VI of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT and the previously discussed 13 American BITs that 
reproduce its wording prohibit mandatory performance requirements “as a condition for” the 
same phases as the ones targeted by NAFTA Article 1106(1), as well as performance 
requirements imposed as commitments or undertakings in connection with the receipt of a 
governmental permission or authorisation. Article 8(1) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT and the 
previously discussed 20 IIAs that reproduce its wording apply to the same phases of investment 
as those identified in NAFTA Article 1106(1), but further apply to mandatory performance 
requirements in connection with “the sale or other disposition of an investment.”653 Article V(2) of 
the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) and IIAs that reproduce its wording prohibit the imposition of 
enumerated mandatory performance requirements “in connection with permitting the 
establishment or acquisition” or with the subsequent regulation of an investment. Article VI of 
the Chile - Dominican Republic BIT (2000) prohibits performance requirements imposed upon 
the establishment, expansion, management or acquisition of an investment. The PRPs 
previously described, as well as PRPs that reproduce such wording, thus apply to both pre-
establishment and post-establishment phases of an investment and to most of its spheres of 
activity.  
By contrast, a number of PRPs opted instead for a narrower applicability. PRPs in French BITs 
that reproduce the French Model apply to purchase or transport restrictions and to sale or 
transport hindrances, which suggests that French PRPs apply only to the post-establishment 
phases of an investment. As a further example, Article 4(4) of the India - Kuwait BIT (2001) 
starts out as a seemingly broad PRP, but ends up constraining India or Kuwait in a lessened 
fashion through added qualifying elements. Article 4(4) of the India - Kuwait BIT (2001) qualifies 
the undefined and open-ended expression “additional performance requirements” by prohibiting 
only performance requirements that investments are “subjected to” once they are established 
(post-establishment PRP) and only those requirements that may “hinder or restrict” the 
expansion or maintenance of established investments that are subjected to such requirements, 
that may “adversely affect” such investments or that may “be considered as detrimental to their 
                                                
652 S.D. Myers – Dissent (n 197) para 196. 
653 Article 9.10(1) of the TPP (2015) also reproduces this approach. 
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viability.” A host State is therefore free to condition the establishment of investments upon 
compliance with any performance requirement; only once the host State attempts to regulate 
already established investments is such State prevented from imposing performance 
requirements. The post-establishment PRP under Article 4(4) is nevertheless quite far-reaching; 
it essentially prohibits any performance requirement proven harmful to established investments 
that are subjected to such performance requirements.  
By comparison, other PRPs may apply only to the pre-establishment phase of an investment. 
For example, Article II(4) of the Panama - U.S. BIT (1982) prohibits performance requirements 
only when they are imposed as a condition for the establishment654 of an investment by a 
covered investor and remains silent in respect of performance requirements imposed once an 
investment is already established. Article II(4) of the Panama - U.S. BIT (1982) therefore 
provides for a PRP applicable to new investments upon their establishment, but not to existing 
investments or to their subsequent expansion or operation.655 
NAFTA Article 1106(3) 656  and a great number of prohibitions of advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements opt for a much simpler text by simply applying to requirements which 
“condition the receipt or continued receipt of an advantage, in connection with an investment.” 
NAFTA Article 1106(3) and similarly drafted prohibitions of advantage-conditioning performance 
requirements therefore apply when the investment receiving an advantage must also comply 
with the requirement.657 
The prohibitions of advantage-conditioning performance requirements under Article 8(2) of the 
2004 U.S. Model BIT, the previously discussed 20 IIAs that reproduce its wording and Article 
8(2) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT are more detailed and less expansive than that found in NAFTA 
Article 1106(3), since they reiterate the same applicability as that put forward in respect of 
mandatory performance requirements: in order to be prohibited, enumerated performance 
requirements must condition advantages “in connection with the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, or sale or other disposition” of an investment.658 
Article 8.5(2) of the Canada - EU CETA (2014) proceeds in the same way, minus sale or 
disposition. 
                                                
654 Sachs (n 72) 208-209. 
655 Deluca (n 29) 272; Sachs (n 72) 208. 
656 Article 7(3) of the 2004 Canada Model FIPA and Article 9(3) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA 
reproduce the same approach. 
657 Pope & Talbot – Counter-Memorial of Canada (n 217), paras 342-344. 
658 Article 9.10(2) of the TPP (2015) also reproduces this approach. 
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C. The Looming Ineffectiveness of Disciplines on Advantage-Conditioning 
Performance Requirements  
This section highlights the differences in wording between prohibitions of mandatory 
performance requirements and prohibitions of advantage-conditioning performance 
requirements, which opt for comparatively simpler and shorter formulations. In analysing 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements, this section identifies a number of PRPs 
whose very wording may defeat the original purpose sought when prohibiting advantage-
conditioning performance requirements by focusing unduly onto the investor made to comply 
with such performance requirements. This section also appraises erroneous arbitral 
interpretations of the expression “in connection with” in NAFTA Article 1106(3) and will explain 
how they risk depriving prohibitions of advantage-conditioning performance requirements of any 
effectiveness. This investigation will prove just as useful for NAFTA Article 1106 as for the 
plethora of PRPs that use the expression “in connection with.” 
1. Prohibitions of Advantage-Conditioning Performance Requirements Whose Very 
Wording Deprive them of any Effectiveness 
Some IIAs prohibit advantage-conditioning performance requirements in ways that deprive them 
of any effectiveness. For example, Article 9(3) of the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014) 
reproduces the NAFTA approach, but provides that a State Party may not adopt advantage-
conditioning performance requirement “without the investor’s consent.” Similarly, Article 9(3) of 
the Canada - Nigeria FIPA (2014) provides that a State Party may not adopt enumerated 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements “without an undertaking of the investor.” 
Prohibitions of advantage-conditioning performance requirements made subject to the absence 
of a complying investor’s consent face at least three difficulties. First, by their very essence, 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements apply on a voluntary basis and are not 
mandatory. Investors who seek to receive a State-conferred advantage freely choose to comply 
with conditioning performance requirements and would do so only if the related advantage 
renders such compliance profitable. Advantage-conditioning performance requirements will 
therefore always apply with the complying investor’s consent or undertaking to comply with such 
measures.  
Second, prohibiting advantage-conditioning performance requirements only in the absence of a 
complying investor’s consent amounts to validating advantage-conditioning performance 
requirements altogether. These two provisions read as a double negative: “may not, without … 
[the investor’s consent or undertaking]” and therefore can also read as “may, with … [the 
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investor’s consent or undertaking].” The investor’s explicit willingness to comply with a 
performance requirement authorises a State Party to condition an advantage on that basis.  
Third, prohibitions of advantage-conditioning performance requirements are not intended to 
protect complying investors who receive advantages or to grant the right for investors to receive 
unencumbered advantages. They mean to achieve a level playing field among all investors in a 
host State by ensuring their equal treatment and by removing the conferral of State advantages 
and the imposition of State conditions that alter the competitive conditions between them. 
Prohibiting advantage-conditioning performance requirements only in the absence of a 
complying investor’s consent achieves nothing from the vantage point of third investors who do 
not receive such advantage and who compete with the advantage-recipient investor. Third 
investors are the ones who incur losses or damages when a State imposes advantage-
conditioning performance requirements that give a competitive edge to their rival advantage-
recipient investors. These prohibitions merely legalise the competitive disadvantage that causes 
a loss or damage to these third investors.  
2. The Erroneous Arbitral Interpretations of “in Connection With” in NAFTA Article 
1106(3) 
The expression “in connection with” has sparked a recurrent debate surrounding its precise 
implications within NAFTA Article 1106: does the performance requirement have to be 
connected to the claimant’s investment or can the performance requirement be connected to the 
investment of another investor?  
In ADM v Mexico, the Tribunal framed the question to be decided as whether NAFTA Article 
1106(3) applies to all investors in a Party's territory (in this case Mexico) or only to investors of 
the other NAFTA Parties.659 The Tribunal linked the interpretation of NAFTA Article 1106(3) to 
the scope and coverage of NAFTA Chapter 11 laid out in Article 1101(1)(c), which states that 
NAFTA Article 1106 applies to measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to all 
NAFTA and non-NAFTA investments in the territory of the Party, including a State Party’s own 
investors; however, the Tribunal wrongly narrowed NAFTA Article 1106 to investments by “any 
investor from the NAFTA region.”660 Moreover, the Tribunal avoided answering its own question 
and decided instead that the receipt of the Sweetener Tax Exemption Advantage was in 
connection with the investments of claimants ADM and TLIA in Mexico since the Sweetener Tax 
                                                
659 ADM (n 15) para 218. 
660 ibid para 221. 
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Exemption Advantage had a detrimental impact on their investment’s profitability.661  
In Cargill v Mexico, the Tribunal identified the meaning of the expression “in connection with” as 
the main question it faced in interpreting NAFTA Article 1106(3).662 The Tribunal formulated 
various iterations of the “central question” to be decided.663 The Tribunal went on to hold that the 
Sweetener Tax Exemption Advantage constituted an advantage under NAFTA Article 1106(3) 
whose receipt, conditioned upon the performance requirement to use domestically produced 
cane sugar in violation of NAFTA Article 1106(3), was “in connection with” the operation of 
claimant’s investment (Cargill de Mexico) 664  given that the Sweetener Tax Exemption 
Advantage was “integrally related”665 to Cargill de Mexico. The Tribunal based this connection 
on the Sweetener Excise Tax’s design aimed at restricting or even eliminating the sale by 
Cargill and its investment Cargill de Mexico of HFCS to Mexican soft drink bottlers.666 The 
Tribunal therefore held that Mexico had violated NAFTA Article 1106(3) without specifying which 
paragraph thereof had thus been violated.667  
Both the ADM and the Cargill v Mexico Tribunals therefore misconstrued NAFTA Article 1106(3) 
by mandating a connection between a claimant’s investment and the performance requirement 
at issue: it is inaccurate to equate the “investment” that must be connected to an advantage 
under NAFTA Article 1106(3) with the “investment” of the claimant investor.  
A close reading of NAFTA Article 1106(3) indicates that “an advantage” can be connected to “an 
investment” of “an investor” of a NAFTA Party or of a non-NAFTA Party. NAFTA Article 
1101(1)(c) plainly indicates that NAFTA Article 1006 applies to all investments and not only to 
investments made by investors of NAFTA Parties. NAFTA Article 1106 thus clearly prohibits 
performance requirements connected to investments made either by covered Party investors or 
non-Party investors, as do 39 previously discussed IIAs that follow the NAFTA in this respect.  
Let’s take a scenario whereby an advantage-conditioning performance requirement applies to a 
non-NAFTA investor. Let’s assume that the non-NAFTA investor benefits from the advantage 
enough to offset any cost related to complying with the advantage-conditioning performance 
requirement. Investments of NAFTA investors that compete with this non-NAFTA investor are 
not connected to this non-NAFTA investor’s investment, yet let’s assume that this loss of 
                                                
661 ADM (n 15) para 227. 
662 Cargill v Mexico (n 16) para 314. 
663 ibid paras 308, 313, 316. 
664 ibid para 318. 
665 ibid para 317. 
666 ibid para 317. 
667 ibid paras 319, 552, 557. 
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competitiveness have caused them losses or damages. Could it be said that NAFTA Parties 
intended to leave investors of NAFTA Parties in a comparatively disadvantageous situation to 
that of non-NAFTA investors? Moreover, what would be the purpose served by NAFTA Article 
1106(3) in such a scenario if only non-NAFTA investors whose investment is connected to the 
advantage-conditioning performance requirement could claim protection, when in fact they could 
not bring a claim due to lack of standing under NAFTA Articles 1116 or 1117, and when the 
advantage conferred would render them highly unlikely to bring such a claim? 
Under ISDS provisions of IIAs, only covered investors can submit claims of breaches to 
arbitration. Interpreting NAFTA Article 1106(3) in conformity with its plain wording and so as to 
give it effet utile would confer NAFTA investors the ability to challenge an advantage-
conditioning performance requirement connected to a non-NAFTA investor’s investment, even 
when such advantage-conditioning performance requirement is not connected to the investment 
of complaining NAFTA investors, so long as complaining NAFTA investors “incurred loss or 
damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach” as stipulated for example in ISDS-related 
NAFTA Articles 1116 and 1117. 
By logical extension, the language of NAFTA Article 1106 and similarly worded PRPs in other 
IIAs also allow claimant investors to challenge performance requirements connected to the 
investment of another covered investor.668 Otherwise, a claimant investor could never complain 
under NAFTA Article 1106(3) of a performance requirement acting as a condition for an 
advantage conferred to another investor even though such advantage causes loss or damage to 
the claimant investor, notably by detrimentally altering the competitive relationship between the 
recipient investor and the claimant investor.  
Unfortunately and erroneously, the Cargill v Mexico Tribunal construed the “in connection with” 
element in NAFTA Article 1106(3) in the same way as the standing test for bringing a claim 
under NAFTA Articles 1116 or 1117. In both ADM v Mexico and Cargill v Mexico, it should have 
sufficed to decide that the Sweetener Tax Exemption Advantage was connected with (domestic) 
investments of Mexican soft drink bottling companies for the Sweetener Tax Exemption 
Advantage to be challenged by claimants ADM, TLIA and Cargill, so long as ADM and Cargill 
could link their damages or losses to the Sweetener Tax Exemption Advantage and the 
performance requirement that conditioned its receipt. By insisting on connecting the Sweetener 
Tax Exemption Advantage to the respective investments of ADM and Cargill as claimants, the 
ADM and Cargill Tribunals needlessly narrowed the scope and coverage of NAFTA Article 
                                                




In CPI v Mexico, the Tribunal predicated its decision that the challenged Sweetener Excise Tax 
did not constitute a performance requirement and its rejection of the claim under NAFTA Article 
1106 notably on concluding that Mexico had imposed no requirement on claimant CPI upon 
enacting the Sweetener Excise Tax. Mexico had required no increased investment, no increase 
in local procurement and no hiring of local employees from CPI, nor did any measure of Mexico 
prescribe any level for the domestic sales, exports, imports or foreign exchange earnings of 
CPI.669 The Tribunal did recognise that the intent and effect of the Sweetener Excise Tax was to 
reduce CPI’s customer base; however, the Sweetener Excise Tax applied only to soft drink 
bottlers and therefore CPI could not challenge the Sweetener Excise Tax. The Tribunal wrongly 
construed NAFTA Article 1106 as mandating the direct applicability of a challenged 
performance requirement to the claimant’s investment.  
D. The Existence of a “Requirement” as a Condition for the Applicability of 
PRPs in IIAs 
This section scrutinises how arbitral tribunals grappled with de facto and de jure performance 
requirements, whether substance should prevail over form in analysing measures allegedly 
amounting to prohibited performance requirements, and whether “incidentally adverse effects” 
of measures should suffice for characterising them as performance requirements. This section 
also weighs the importance granted by arbitral tribunals to the statement, encapsulated in 
NAFTA Article 1106(5), that NAFTA Article 1106 is exhaustive. 
1. Commitments or Undertakings as Performance Requirements  
NAFTA Article 1106(1), specifies that State Parties may not impose any requirement or enforce 
any commitment or undertaking to achieve any of the enumerated performance requirement 
objectives. Article VI of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT,670 Article V(2) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA 
(1994), Article 8(1) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, Article 7(1) of the 2004 Canada Model FIPA, 
Article 8(1) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and Article 9(1) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA, along 
with all IIAs that reproduce any of these PRPs, also reiterate the dual applicability to 
requirements imposed or commitments or undertakings enforced.671  
                                                
669 ibid paras 9, 80. 
670 Article VI of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT uses the verbs “mandate or enforce” (in lieu of “impose”), an 
inconsequential change: see Vandevelde (n 84) 389. 
671 Article VI of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT further provides that “any requirement” includes any commitment 
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A number of IIAs comprise provisions aimed at narrowing the instances where measures are 
subject to their prohibition of mandatory performance requirements. Some of these treaty 
provisions likely echoed and responded to the GATT-FIRA Panel finding that judicially 
enforceable written undertakings provided by foreign investors constituted “requirements” for 
purposes of GATT Article III:4.672 For example, Article 8(5) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, Article 
8(5) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and the twenty-eight IIAs among those surveyed that reproduce 
this same provision specify that the enforcement by a State Party of any commitment, 
undertaking, or requirement entered into between private parties and that was not imposed by a 
Party is not prohibited under its PRP, a scenario not explicitly addressed in the NAFTA.673  
2. The Notion of “Requirement” According to Arbitral Tribunals 
Arbitral tribunals have had to grapple with what a “requirement” consists of exactly. In S.D. 
Myers v Canada, the S.D. Myers Majority found that the PCB Export Ban did not amount to a 
“requirement” as per NAFTA Article 1106, notably given that the PCB Export Ban “was not cast 
in the form of express conditions attached to a regulatory approval.”674 Looking beyond form, 
focusing on the “substance and effect” of the PCB Export Ban and relying on the “literal 
wording” of NAFTA Article 1106, the Majority decided that Canada did not impose on SDMI a 
“requirement” under NAFTA Article 1106.675 As a result, the Majority concluded that SDMI’s 
claim was “not a ‘performance requirements’ case.”676  
In Pope & Talbot v Canada, the Tribunal decided that no violation of NAFTA Article 1106(1)(a) 
                                                                                                                                                       
or undertaking “in connection with the receipt of a governmental permission or authorization.” 
672 GATT–FIRA Panel Report (n 249), paras 5.4-5.11. 
673 American FTAs: Annex 15B of the Singapore - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 10.8(5) of the Morocco - U.S. 
FTA (2004); Article 10.9(5) of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.8(5) of the Oman - U.S. FTA 
(2006); Article 10.9(5) of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(5) of the Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); 
Article 10.9(5) of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 11.8(5) of the Korea - U.S. FTA (2007). American 
BITs: Article 8(5) of the U.S. - Uruguay BIT (2005); Article 8(5) of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT (2008). 
Australian Agreements: Note at the end of Article 14.9 of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014); Article 
11.9(10) of the Australia - Korea FTA (2014); Article 5(5) of SAFTA Revised Chapter 8 (Investment) 
(2011); Article 7(9) of the CERTA Investment Protocol (2011); Article 10.7(5) of the Australia - Chile FTA 
(2008); Article 11.9(5) of the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004). Article 11.9(10) of the Australia - Korea FTA 
(2014) specifies that private parties include designated monopolies or state enterprises which are not 
exercising delegated government authority. Canadian FTAs: Article 807(6) of the Canada - Colombia FTA 
(2008); Article 9.07(7) of the Canada - Panama FTA (2008); Article 10.7(6) of the Canada - Honduras 
FTA (2013); Article 8.8(8) of the Canada - Korea FTA (2014); Article 9.10(6) of the TPP (2015). Chilean 
Agreements: Article 10.8(10) of the Pacific Alliance Protocol (2014); Article 9.6(4) of the Chile - Colombia 
FTA (2006); Article 11.6(5) of the Chile - Peru FTA (2006); Article 10.7(8) of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003); 
Article 10.5(5) of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 9-07(7) of the Chile - Mexico FTA (1998); Footnote 2 
to Article G-06 of the Canada - Chile FTA (1996). 
674 S.D. Myers – Majority (n 167) para 273. Dissenting Arbitrator Schwartz discarded this finding by the 
S.D. Myers Majority despite agreeing with it: see S.D. Myers – Dissent (n 197) para 192. 
675 S.D. Myers – Majority (n 167) paras 273-274, 277. 
676 S.D. Myers – Majority (n 167) para 278. 
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had taken place677 on the basis that the Export Control Regime did not impose or enforce a 
requirement to export below or above a given amount.678 Although the Export Control Regime 
may have discouraged exports to the United States, the Tribunal distinguished export 
deterrence attributable to a government measure from an EPR or an export restriction imposed 
or enforced in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct 
or operation of an investment.679 In Mobil & Murphy v Canada, the Tribunal determined that a 
measure had to exhibit “a degree of legal obligation” and a “degree of compulsion”680 in order to 
constitute a requirement for purposes of NAFTA Article 1106(1). 
In CPI v Mexico, the Tribunal predicated its decision that the challenged Sweetener Excise Tax 
did not constitute a performance requirement and its rejection of the claim under NAFTA Article 
1106 notably upon concluding that the Sweetener Excise Tax did not impose a mandatory 
requirement. In addition to concluding that the Sweetener Excise Tax applied to soft drink 
bottlers and not to HFCS producers such as claimant CPI, the Tribunal insisted that the 
Sweetener Excise Tax was not even mandatory for soft drink bottlers without elaborating any 
further. 681  However, the Sweetener Tax Exemption Advantage was designed precisely to 
persuade Mexican soft drink bottlers to replace HFCS with cane sugar as the only means to 
avoid paying the Sweetener Excise Tax. Mexico did not impose a mandatory performance 
requirement, but it did condition the receipt of the Sweetener Tax Exemption Advantage upon 
the use by Mexican soft drink bottlers of (domestically produced) cane sugar instead of (foreign-
produced) HFCS. The lack of mandatory nature of the Sweetener Excise Tax might have 
sufficed to prevent the application of NAFTA Article 1106(1). Nevertheless, the requirement of 
using of cane sugar instead of HFCS clearly acted as an advantage-conditioning performance 
requirement prohibited under NAFTA Article 1106(3). 
In Merrill & Ring v Canada, Canada argued, and the Tribunal agreed, that nothing in its Log 
Export Regime amounted to the imposition or enforcement of a requirement, commitment or 
undertaking as construed under NAFTA Article 1106: nothing compelled Merrill & Ring to 
increase or limit its log exports, Merrill & Ring remained free at all times to sale any amount of 
logs both on the domestic and on foreign markets, and Merrill & Ring could freely retain service 
suppliers in Canada or abroad in order to carry out the log cutting, sorting and measuring 
                                                
677 Pope & Talbot (n 167) para 76. 
678 Pope & Talbot (n 167) para 75. 
679 Pope & Talbot (n 167) para 75. 
680 Merrill & Ring (n 167) para 234. 




These pronouncements by arbitral tribunals lend support to the correct guiding notion that a 
measure must clearly compel the achievement of precisely what a prohibited performance 
requirement consists of. The equivalence between a given measure’s effects and those 
normally attributable to prohibited performance requirements provides insufficient grounds for 
characterising a given measure as a prohibited performance requirement. In addition to its 
effects, a given measure’s purpose and its nature as a requirement, or as a condition attached 
to the granting of an advantage, must correspond to those of a prohibited performance 
requirement as outlined in a given PRP.  
3. The Unavailing De Facto vs. de Jure Conundrum, Incidental Effects and Explicit 
Limitations to Performance Requirements set Forth 
PRPs of French BITs that reproduce the French Model make use of the de jure and de facto 
concepts and state that “shall be considered as de jure or de facto impediments to [FET]” any of 
the enumerated restrictions and any measures of analogous effect. Article 3.1(a) of the SCM 
Agreement applies to both de jure and de facto subsidies contingent upon EPRs,683 in addition 
to prohibiting subsidies contingent upon EPRs and LCRs per se, regardless of their effects.684 
By contrast, 42 IIAs685 among IIAs surveyed comprise PRPs that reiterate the statement found 
                                                
682 Merrill & Ring (n 167) paras 106, 108, 109, 118-119. 
683 Footnote 4 to Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement; EC Submission 31 (n 165) 2. 
684 Switzerland Submission 26 (n 161) 2. 
685 American FTAs: Article 10.5(4) of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 15.8(4) of the Singapore - U.S. 
FTA (2003); Article 10.8(4) of the Morocco - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.9(4) of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA 
(2004); Article 10.8(4) of the Oman - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(4) of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); 
Article 10.9(4) of the Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(4) of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 
11.8(3)(4) of the Korea - U.S. FTA (2007). American BITs: Article 8(4) of the U.S. - Uruguay BIT (2005); 
Article 8(4) of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT (2008). Australian Agreements: Article 14.9(8) of the Australia - 
Japan EPA (2014); Article 11.9(9) of the Australia - Korea FTA (2014); Article 5(4) of SAFTA Revised 
Chapter 8 (Investment) (2011); Article 7(8) of the CERTA Investment Protocol (2011); Article 10.7(4) of 
the Australia - Chile FTA (2008); Article 11.9(4) of the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004). Canadian FIPAs: 
Article 7(5) of the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006); Article 7(5) of the Canada - Jordan FIPA (2009) and Article 
10(5) of the Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 9(5) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); Article 9(5) 
of the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 9(5) of the Canada - Nigeria FIPA (2014); Article 9(5) of 
the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); Article 9(5) of the Canada - Senegal FIPA (2014); Article 9(5) of the 
Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); Article 9(5) of the Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 9(5) of 
the Canada - Guinea FIPA (2014); Article 9(5) of the Canada - Hong Kong, China FIPA (2016). Canadian 
TIPs: Article G-06(5) of the Canada - Chile FTA (1996); Article 807(5) of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); 
Article 807(5) of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008); Article 9.07(6) of the Canada - Panama FTA (2008); 
Article 10.7(5) of the Canada - Honduras FTA (2013); Article 8.8(7) of the Canada - Korea FTA (2014); 
Article 9.10(5) of the TPP (2015). Chilean Agreements: Article 10.8(9) of the Pacific Alliance Protocol 
(2014); Article 77(4) of the Chile - Japan EPA (2007); Article 9.6(4) of the Chile - Colombia FTA (2006); 
Article 11.6(4) of the Chile - Peru FTA (2006); Article 10.7(5) of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003); Article 9-
07(5) of the Chile - Mexico FTA (1998). 
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in NAFTA Article 1106(5)686 and specify that their PRPs apply only to the mandatory and 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements explicitly set out. These PRPs make no 
mention of de facto or de jure performance requirements.  
In Pope & Talbot v Canada, the Tribunal characterised NAFTA Article 1106(5) as vital to the 
interpretation of NAFTA Articles 1106(1) and 1106(3), which cannot “be broadened beyond their 
express terms” and which accordingly include limited lists respectively of seven mandatory and 
four advantage-conditioning requirements.687 In S.D. Myers v Canada, the Tribunal insisted on 
the necessity that a measure “fall squarely” within the requirements enumerated in NAFTA 
Articles 1106(1) and 1106(3); despite noting that the PCB Export Ban related to the “conduct or 
operation” of Myers Canada, the S.D. Myers Majority decided that the prohibitions of LCRs and 
LSRs “clearly do not apply” to export bans.688  
In Merrill & Ring v Canada, the Tribunal deemed “convincing” the arbitral awards of the Pope & 
Talbot and S.D. Myers Tribunals to the extent that they both underlined that NAFTA Article 
1106(5) warranted interpreting NAFTA Articles 1106(1) and 1106(3) within the limits of the 
requirements specifically enumerated.689 In spite of noting that the log cutting, sorting and 
scaling requirements may have some “incidentally adverse effect” on Merrill & Ring’s exports, 
the Merrill & Ring Tribunal decided that NAFTA Article 1106(1) does not capture measures 
which affect exports only indirectly or incidentally.690 While the Tribunal mistakenly considered 
that a requirement “needs to be directly and specifically connected to exports”691 to qualify as a 
performance requirement under NAFTA Article 1106 (since clearly not all performance 
requirements enumerated in NAFTA Article 1106 relate to exports), this decision shows that 
detailed and exhaustive PRPs apply only to measures whose true nature corresponds to the 
settled meaning of one of the specifically prohibited performance requirements, and not to 
measures whose effects may incidentally resemble those of prohibited performance 
requirements.  
By contrast, in Mobil & Murphy v Canada, the Tribunal was “mindful” of the importance of 
NAFTA Article 1106(5) in restricting the scope of NAFTA Articles 1106(1) and 1106(3), the 
                                                
686 NAFTA Article 1106(5) is also reproduced in Article 8(4) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, in Article 7(5) of 
the 2004 Canada Model FIPA, in Article 8(4) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and in Article 9(5) of the 2012 
Canada Model FIPA. 
687 Pope & Talbot (n 167) paras 57, 70-71; see also Pope & Talbot – Counter-Memorial of Canada (n 217) 
para 295. 
688 S.D. Myers – Majority (n 167) paras 154, 272, 275-276. 
689 Merrill & Ring (n 167) para 111. 
690 Merrill & Ring (n 167) paras 117, 120. 
691 Merrill & Ring (n 167) para 117. 
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Tribunal stated that Article 1106(5) “does not provide guidance on interpreting the exact 
coverage of the enumerated performance requirements.”692 While it is true that NAFTA Article 
1106(5) does not provide detailed indications as to the application or interpretation of the 
prohibition of mandatory and advantage-conditioning performance requirements, it clearly 
indicates that the priority should consist of determining whether a challenged measure 
constitutes a prohibited performance requirement and not whether its effects amount to those of 
a prohibited performance requirement. If stretched out too broadly, the notion of de facto 
performance requirements can nullify the intended predictability and the settled meaning of 
PRPs relying on detailed and exhaustive lists of performance requirements in order to clarify 
their scope and coverage. 
While identifying performance requirements could theoretically be done by reference to the 
characteristics of measures themselves or to their effects,693 the difficulty of basing a definition 
or the existence of a performance requirement on effects lies in pinpointing the diverse and 
erratic effects of investment measures on trade.694 Moreover, some performance requirements 
generate trade-distorting effects only in the presence of certain trade or macroeconomic 
conditions; conversely, the absence of such conditions may mean the absence of trade-
distorting effects in relation with those same performance requirements.695  
A large number of GATT Members accordingly argued during the GATT Uruguay Round of 
negotiations that no measure causes “inherently trade restrictive and distorting”696 effects, and 
that such effects cannot be assumed and must be proven on a case-by-case basis. 697 
Moreover, numerous States considered that incontrovertible empirical proof as to the trade 
effects of performance requirements was not indispensable to justifying their prohibition. It was 
further argued that the adverse trade effects of investment measures deemed to amount to 
TRIMs should be self-evident and accepted as a valid general proposition.698 This approach 
ultimately won the day and paved the way for drawing up lists of prohibited performance 
requirements. States set aside the analysis of the trade effects of investment measures as part 
of the definitional exercise of TRIMs and focused instead on identifying a list of measures that 
States would agree to prohibit without having to subsequently assess the trade impact of a 
given measure in order to determine whether it indeed ran afoul of trade disciplines or not. One 
                                                
692 Mobil & Murphy (Majority) (n 13) paras 189-191, 225 and fn 247. 
693 Moran and Pearson, TRPRs OPIC (n 31) 7. 
694 Switzerland Submission (n 42) 2. 
695 India Submission 18 (n 35) para 11; see also Switzerland Submission (n 42) 2. 
696 India and others, GATT Communication 25 (n 48) 2; GATT, Note on TRIMs (1987) (n 365) para 17. 
697 GATT, Note on Subsidies (1989) (n 164) para. 7; GATT GNG Report (1988) (n 156) para 82; GATT, 
Note on TRIMs (October 1990) (n 145) para 11 (Philippines), para 13 (Malaysia), para 25(iii) (Australia). 
698 GATT, Note on TRIMs (1987) (n 365) para 16. 
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can thus clearly see that States moved away from considering effects of performance 
requirements in order to focus instead on their essential features and characteristics, which led 
to developing a settled meaning for each specifically prohibited performance requirement. 
In Mobil & Murphy v Canada, Canada had argued that the local R&D requirement within the 
2004 Guidelines “only incidentally result[ed] in the purchase, use or accord of preference to 
local services.”699 The Tribunal distinguished the arbitral awards rendered in Merrill & Ring v 
Canada and Pope & Talbot v Canada based on its assessment that the local R&D spending 
requirements constituted a “central feature of the 2004 Guidelines, and not an ancillary objective 
or consequence,”700 and that the 2004 Guidelines did not impose only “incidental effects with 
respect to the purchase, use or accordance of a preference to local goods or services.”701 The 
Tribunal decided that the “central purpose of the 2004 Guidelines […] is to require expenditures 
in the Province”702 and that the 2004 Guidelines were aimed at “introduc[ing] an obligatory 
expenditure requirement.”703  
In reaching such a decision, the Tribunal misconstrued NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c) and 
disregarded its own previous characterisation of the 2004 Guidelines. The Tribunal had initially 
found that the 2004 Guidelines had been adopted for two main reasons: first, as a means to 
create “a lasting economic legacy for the people of the Province of NL” 704  through the 
improvement of the intellectual capital and human resources of the Province, and second, in 
order to combat significant decreases in R&D spending by Mobil and Murphy over the 1997-
2001 period.705 The Tribunal then disregarded these purposes, stating that the purpose of a 
measure was irrelevant under NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c): so long as a measure required an 
investor to utilise domestic sources of R&D, it “rather clearly” consisted of a prohibited LSR.706 
The Tribunal considered that neither the “furtherance of economic policy objectives”707 nor a 
policy purpose that exceeded “strictly economic”708 objectives, using measures that aimed at 
“[p]romoting economic development and improving the skills and education of Canadians”709 
would justify excluding such measures from the scope of NAFTA Article 1106(1).  
                                                
699 Mobil & Murphy (Majority) (n 13) para 194. 
700 ibid para 242. 
701 ibid para 240. 
702 ibid para 239. 
703 ibid para 234. Emphasis in the original.  
704 ibid para 46. 
705 ibid para 60, 74. 
706 ibid para 222. 
707 ibid para 222. 
708 ibid para 222. 
709 ibid para 222. 
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The Tribunal expressed reluctance at obscuring the text of NAFTA Article 1106(1) and the true 
nature of the 2004 Guidelines by grandiloquent statements as to the criticalness and nobleness 
of the 2004 Guidelines. However, the Tribunal’s willingness to focus on the nuts and bolts of the 
measure at issue and its effects eclipsed its true nature as a local R&D requirement and its 
clear differentiation from LCRs and LSRs.  
In reaching its decision that the 2004 Guidelines violated NAFTA Article 1106, the Tribunal 
discarded its own recognition that ways could be envisioned for Mobil and Murphy to comply 
with the local R&D requirement without directly purchasing domestic goods or services.710 
Construing the 2004 Guidelines in such a way would have made them fall outside the scope of 
NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c). Alongside this recognition, the Tribunal amplified its insistence on the 
effects of the 2004 Guidelines to reach the conclusion that, “in practice”711 and in accordance 
with “the realities of commercial and related activities,”712 the “hypothetical alternative spending 
examples”713 that Mobil and Murphy could undertake to implement the 2004 Guidelines in 
compliance with NAFTA Article 1106 had not distracted the Tribunal from spending examples 
that would be caught by NAFTA Article 1106. The Tribunal “in practice … failed to see how … in 
reality” Mobil and Murphy could comply with a requirement to spend millions of dollars on R&D 
locally without “in practice being required to purchase, use, or accord a preference to domestic 
goods or services.”714 The numerous possibilities of complying with the local R&D requirement 
without directly purchasing domestic goods or services should have conclusively tipped the 
Tribunal off on the nature of the 2004 Guidelines as local R&D requirements that accordingly do 
not amount to LSRs. The Tribunal accorded too much weight to effects and incidental aspects 
of the 2004 Guidelines instead of identifying its true nature by reference to its essential 
characteristics and features.  
E. Ensuring the Continued Lawfulness of Specific Performance Requirements  
This section investigates mechanisms used to ensure that specific performance requirements 
remain lawful in the presence of PRPs. This section singles out numerous mechanisms that 
achieve this and analyses: provisions included out of an abundance of caution; provisions that 
endorse the continued application of technology transfer requirements; provisions that permit 
conditioning the qualification to export promotion and foreign aid programmes and to 
preferential tariffs or quotas upon compliance with performance requirements; exceptions to 
                                                
710 ibid paras 237, 239. 
711 ibid paras 237. 
712 ibid paras 238. 
713 ibid paras 238. 
714 ibid paras 238. 
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disciplines on performance requirements akin to GATT Article XX; exceptions to PRPs aimed at 
favouring aboriginal peoples and/or socially or economically disadvantaged minorities; the 
exemption of cultural industries from PRPs; the carving out of taxation measures from PRPs; 
and miscellaneous exclusions to PRPs in line with varying national or regional interests. 
1.  “Clarifying” Provisions 
NAFTA Article 1106(4)715 and the 43 IIAs among those currently surveyed that reiterate such a 
provision in respect of their PRPs ensure that their State Parties can impose the following 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements: local R&D requirements, local employment 
and training requirements, investment localisation requirements, service supply requirements 
and construction or expansion requirements. 716  Two of these IIAs 717  explicitly ensure the 
lawfulness of these same requirements when mandatorily-imposed; four FTAs718 ensure the 
lawfulness of mandatory employee training requirements and one TIP719 validates mandatory 
local employment or employee training requirements, subject to their compliance with the 
                                                
715 NAFTA Article 1106(4) is identically reproduced in Article 8(3)(a) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, in Article 
8(3)(a) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, in Article 7(4) of the 2004 Canada Model FIPA and in Article 9(4)(a) 
of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA. 
716 American FTAs: Article 15.8(3)(a) of the Singapore - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 10.8(3)(a) of the 
Morocco - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.9(3)(a) of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.8(3)(a) of 
the Oman - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(a) of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(a) of the 
Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(a) of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 11.8(3)(a) of the 
Korea - U.S. FTA (2007). American BITs: Article 8(3)(a) of the U.S. - Uruguay BIT (2005); Article 8(3)(a) 
of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT (2008). Australian Agreements: Article 14.9(4) of the Australia - Japan EPA 
(2014); Article 11.9(3) of the Australia - Korea FTA (2014); Article 5(3)(a) of SAFTA Revised Chapter 8 
(Investment) (2011); Article 7(3) of the CERTA Investment Protocol (2011); Article 10.7(3)(a) of the 
Australia - Chile FTA (2008); Article 11.9(3)(a) of the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004). Canadian FIPAs: Article 
7(4) of the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006); Article 7(4) of the Canada - Jordan FIPA (2009); Article 10(4)(a) 
of the Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 9(4)(a) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); Article 9(4)(a) 
of the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 9(4)(a) of the Canada - Nigeria FIPA (2014); Article 
9(4)(a) of the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); Article 9(4)(a) of the Canada - Senegal FIPA (2014); Article 
9(4)(a) of the Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); Article 9(4)(a) of the Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA 
(2014); Article 9(4)(a) of the Canada - Guinea FIPA (2014); Article 9(4)(a) of the Canada - Hong Kong, 
China FIPA (2016). Canadian TIPs: Article G-06(4) of the Canada - Chile FTA (1996); Article 807(4) of 
the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); Article 807(4)(a) of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008); Article 9.07(4) of 
the Canada - Panama FTA (2008); Article 10.7(4) of the Canada - Honduras FTA (2013); Article 8.8(4) of 
the Canada - Korea FTA (2014); Article 8.5(3) of the Canada - EU CETA (2014); Article 9.10(3)(a) of the 
TPP (2015). Chilean Agreements: Article 9-07(4) of the Chile - Mexico FTA (1998); Article 10.5(3)(a) of 
the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 10.7(4) of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003); Article 9.6(3)(a) of the Chile - 
Colombia FTA (2006); Article 11.6(3)(a) of the Chile - Peru FTA (2006); Article 77(3)(a) of the Chile - 
Japan EPA (2007); Article 10.8(3) of the Pacific Alliance Protocol (2014). Article 10.7(4) of the Chile - 
Korea FTA (2003) adds as safeguard that the TRIMs Agreement would prevail in respect of any 
inconsistency between such requirements and the TRIMs Agreement. 
717 Footnote 5 to Article 11.8(3)(a) of the Korea - U.S. FTA (2007); Footnote 40 to Article 11.9(3) of the 
Australia - Korea FTA (2014). 
718 Footnote 4 to Article 807(1)(f) of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008); footnote 7 to Article 10.9(1)(f) of 
the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); footnote 7 to Article 10.9(1)(f) of the Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); footnote 13 
to Article 8(1)(f) of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT (2008).  
719 Article 9.10(4) of the TPP (2015). 
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prohibition of mandatory technology transfer requirements. NAFTA Article 1106(4) focuses on 
advantage-conditioning (as opposed to mandatory) performance requirements notably since 
Canada and the United States offered R&D tax credits and local R&D was rarely directed 
through mandatory requirements; moreover, the provision merely aimed at removing any doubt 
that a NAFTA Party could impose advantage-conditioning R&D requirements.720 
Twenty-three IIAs721 have reiterated NAFTA Article 1106(2)722 so as to clarify that a requirement 
to use a technology to meet generally applicable health, safety or environmental requirements 
does not violate the prohibition of technology transfer requirements. Similarly, at the request of 
Mozambique, paragraph 1 of the Protocol to the Mozambique - U.S. BIT (1998) clarifies that the 
PRP otherwise identical to that found in the 1994 U.S. Model BIT does not prohibit requirements 
to carry out environmental impact statements, environmental management plans, or other 
measures of public health and safety otherwise consistent with the remainder of the BIT.723 
Footnote 12 to Article 8(1)(f) of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT (2008) precludes a specific measure 
from amounting to a performance requirement. It states “[f]or greater certainty” that the 
enforcement of a commitment or undertaking to use a particular technology, a production 
process, or other proprietary knowledge is not in and of itself inconsistent with the prohibition of 
mandatory technology transfer requirements. 
In an abundance of caution, footnote 10 to Article 8(1) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT and footnote 
11 to Article 8(1) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT clarify, “for greater certainty,” that a condition for 
the receipt or continued receipt of an advantage does not constitute a “commitment or 
undertaking” for the purposes of their prohibitions of mandatory performance requirements.724 
                                                
720 Mobil & Murphy (n 13) – Rejoinder of Canada (9 June 2010) para 64. 
721 Footnote 9 to Article 10.8(1)(f) the Pacific Alliance Protocol (2014); Article 10.7(2) of the Chile - Korea 
FTA (2003); Article 9-07(2) of the Chile - Mexico FTA (1998); Article G-06(2) of the Canada - Chile FTA 
(1996); Article 807(2) of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); Article 807(2) of the Canada - Colombia FTA 
(2008); Article 9.07(2) of the Canada - Panama FTA (2008); Article 10.7(2) of the Canada - Honduras 
FTA (2013); Article 8.8(2) of the Canada - Korea FTA (2014). Canadian FIPAs: Article 7(2) of the Canada 
- Peru FIPA (2006); Article 7(2) of the Canada - Jordan FIPA (2009); Article 9(4) of the Canada - Kuwait 
FIPA (2011); Article 10(2) of the Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 9(2) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA 
(2013); Article 9(2) of the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 9(2) of the Canada - Nigeria FIPA 
(2014); Article 9(2) of the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); Article 9(2) of the Canada - Senegal FIPA (2014); 
Article 9(4) of the Canada - Mali FIPA (2014); Article 9(2) of the Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); 
Article 9(2) of the Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 9(2) of the Canada - Guinea FIPA (2014); 
Article 9(2) of the Canada - Hong Kong, China FIPA (2016). 
722 Article 7(2) of the 2004 Canada Model FIPA and Article 9(2) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA also 
reiterate NAFTA Article 1106(2). 
723 Mozambique - U.S. BIT (1998): Letter of Submittal from the Department of State to the President, 1 
May 2000, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., Senate Treaty Doc. 106-31, XVI. 
724 Fourteen IIAs reproduce such clarification in respect of their prohibition of mandatory performance 
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2. Preserving the Right to Impose Some Technology Transfer Requirements 
NAFTA Article 1106(1)(f), while prohibiting technology transfer requirements, also provides 
instances where they are permissible, namely when they aim at remedying an alleged violation 
of competition laws or at inducing behaviour not inconsistent with the NAFTA; 22 IIAs among 
those surveyed reproduce these exceptions integrally.725 Article VI(e) of the 1994 U.S. Model 
BIT and the 13 American BITs that reproduce such provision,726 10 Canadian FIPAs727 and two 
Canadian TIPs 728  also prohibit technology transfer requirements, but permit them only to 
remedy violations of competition laws and simply abandon permitting technology transfer 
requirements “to act in a manner not inconsistent with other provisions of this Agreement.” 
Article 8(3)(b) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT729 sets forth a partially altered formulation of permitted 
                                                                                                                                                       
requirements: footnote 8 to Article 10.8(1) of the Pacific Alliance Protocol (2014); footnote 39 to Article 
11.9(1) of the Australia - Korea FTA (2014); footnote 5 to Article 9.6(1) of the Chile - Colombia FTA 
(2006); Footnote 4 to Article 11.6(1) of the Chile - Peru FTA (2006); footnote 11-11 to Article 11.9(1) of 
the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004); footnote 3 to Article 807(1) of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008); 
footnote 5 to Article 10.8(1) of the Morocco - U.S. FTA (2004); footnote 3 to Article 10.8(1) of the Oman - 
U.S. FTA (2006); footnote 6 to Article 10.9(1) of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); footnote 6 to Article 10.9(1) 
of the Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); footnote 4 to Article 11.8(1) of the Korea - U.S. FTA (2007); footnote 4 
to Article 8.8(1) of the Canada - Korea FTA (2014). American BITs: footnote 11 to Article 8(1) of the U.S. - 
Uruguay BIT (2005); footnote 11 to Article 8(1) of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT (2008). 
725 Canadian FIPAs: Article V(2)(e) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994); Article V(2)(e) of the Canada - 
Trinidad and Tobago FIPA (1995); Article V(2)(e) of the Canada - Philippines FIPA (1995); Article V(2)(e) 
of the Canada - Ecuador FIPA (1996); Article II(6)(e) of the Annex to the Canada - Venezuela FIPA 
(1996); Article V(2)(e) of the Canada - Panama FIPA (1996); Article V(2)(e) of the Canada - Egypt FIPA 
(1996); Article V(2)(e) of the Barbados - Canada FIPA (1996); Article V(2)(b) of the Canada - Thailand 
FIPA (1997); Article VI(e) of the Canada - Croatia FIPA (1997); Article VI(e) of the Canada - Lebanon 
FIPA (1997); Article V(2)(e) of the Armenia - Canada FIPA (1997); Article VI(e) of the Canada - Uruguay 
FIPA (1997); Article 7(1)(f) of the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006); Article V(2)(e) of the Canada - Latvia FIPA 
(2009); Article V(2)(e) of the Canada - Romania FIPA (2009); Article 7(1)(f) of the Canada - Jordan FIPA 
(2009). Canadian FTAs: Article G-06(1)(f) of the Canada – Chile FTA (1996); Article 807(1)(f) of the 
Canada - Peru FTA (2008); Article 807(4)(b) of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008). Chilean Agreements: 
Article 9-07(1)(f) of the Chile - Mexico FTA (1998); Article 10.7(1)(f) of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003).  
726 Article VI(e) of the Georgia - U.S. BIT (1994); Article VI(e) of the U.S. - Uzbekistan BIT (signed in 
1994, but not in force); Article VI(e) of the Trinidad and Tobago - U.S. BIT (1994); Article VI(e) of the 
Albania - U.S. BIT (1995); Article VI(e) of the Honduras - U.S. BIT (1995); Article VI(e) of the Nicaragua - 
U.S. BIT (signed in 1995, but not in force); Article VII(e) of the Croatia - U.S. BIT (1996); Article VI(e) of 
the Jordan - U.S. BIT (1997); Article VI(e) of the Azerbaijan - U.S. BIT (1997); Article VI(e) of the Bolivia - 
U.S. BIT (1998); Article VI(e) of the Mozambique - U.S. BIT (1998); Article VI(e) of the El Salvador - U.S. 
BIT (signed in 1999, but not in force); Article VI(e) of the Bahrain - U.S. BIT (1999). 
727 Article 10(4)(b) of the Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 9(4)(b) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA 
(2013); Article 9(4)(b) of the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 9(4)(b) of the Canada - Nigeria 
FIPA (2014); Article 9(4)(b) of the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); Article 9(4)(b) of the Canada - Senegal 
FIPA (2014); Article 9(4)(b) of the Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); Article 9(4)(b) of the Burkina Faso 
- Canada FIPA (2014); Article 9(4)(b) of the Canada - Guinea FIPA (2014); Article 9(4)(b) of the Canada - 
Hong Kong, China FIPA (2016). Article 9(4)(b) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA also reproduces this 
provision. 
728 Article 9.07(5) of the Canada - Panama FTA (2008); Article 8.5(3) of the Canada - EU CETA (2014). 
729 Article 8(3)(b) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT is the same as Article 8(3)(b) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, 
except that it further applies to newly added Article 8(1)(h) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT (domestic 
technology preference granting requirements and technology prohibitions). 
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technology transfer requirements: it retains the permitted instance pertaining to competition laws 
and anticompetitive behaviour, but replaces the permissible instance of “acting not 
inconsistently with” the enclosing agreement by instances where a State Party authorises use of 
intellectual property pursuant to Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement,730 or requires disclosure of 
proprietary information pursuant to Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement. Twenty-five of the 
currently surveyed IIAs reproduce such text in their own PRPs.731 Ten Canadian FIPAs732 and 
four Canadian FTAs733 provide that the prohibition of technology transfer requirements may be 
derogated from as long as the derogating measure is in conformity with the TRIPs Agreement or 
with a waiver thereof. 
Annex 15C of the Singapore - U.S. FTA (2003) clarifies that regarding Singapore, Article 
15.8.1(f), which prohibits technology transfer requirements, does not apply with respect to the 
sale or other disposition of an investment of an investor of a non-Party in its territory. Singapore 
has therefore preserved the right to impose technology transfer requirements upon the sale or 
disposition of an investment.  
3. Excluding Qualification Requirements for Export Promotion and Foreign Aid 
Programmes 
NAFTA Article 1108(8)(a) provides that the prohibition of mandatory EPRs, LCRs and LSRs 
                                                
730 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (15 April 1994), Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, the Legal Texts: the Results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994). 
731 American FTAs: Article 15.8(3)(b) of the Singapore - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 10.8(3)(b) of the 
Morocco - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.9(3)(b) of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.8(3)(b) of 
the Oman - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(b) of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(b) of the 
Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(b) of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 11.8(3)(b) of the 
Korea - U.S. FTA (2007). American BITs: Article 8(3)(b) of the U.S. - Uruguay BIT (2005); Article 8(3)(b) 
of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT (2008). Australian Agreements: Article 14.9(1)(f) of the Australia - Japan EPA 
(2014); Article 11.9(4) of the Australia - Korea FTA (2014); Article 5(3)(b) of SAFTA Revised Chapter 8 
(Investment) (2011); Article 7(4) of the CERTA Investment Protocol (2011); Article 10.7(3)(b) of the 
Australia - Chile FTA (2008); Article 11.9(3)(b) of the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004). Canadian FTAs: Article 
8.8(5) of the Canada - Korea FTA (2014); Article 9.10(3)(b)(i) and (ii) of the TPP (2015). Chilean 
Agreements: Article 10.8(4) of the Pacific Alliance Protocol (2014); Article 77(1)(f) of the Chile - Japan 
EPA (2007); Article 9.6(3)(b) of the Chile - Colombia FTA (2006); Article 11.6(3)(b) of the Chile - Peru 
FTA (2006); Article 10.5(3)(b) of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003). Indian Agreements: Article 10.5(1)(f) of the 
India - Korea CEPA (2009) (refers simply to the TRIPs Agreement); Article 89(1)(h) of the India - Japan 
CEPA (2011) (refers simply to the TRIPs Agreement). 
732 Article 19(1) of the Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 16(5) of the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014); 
Article 17(4) of the Canada - Nigeria FIPA (2014); Article 17(5) of the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); 
Article 17(5) of the Canada - Senegal FIPA (2014); Article 16(5) of the Canada - Mali FIPA (2014); Article 
16(5) of the Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); Article 17(4) of the Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2014); 
Article 17(4) of the Canada - Guinea FIPA (2014); Article 16(4) of the Canada - Hong Kong, China FIPA 
(2016). Article 17(4) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA also reproduces this provision. 
733 Article 808(3) of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); Article 809(4) of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008); 




(NAFTA Articles 1106(1)(a), (b) and (c)), as well as the prohibition of advantage-conditioning 
LCRs and LSRs (NAFTA Articles 1106(3)(a) and (b)) do not apply to qualification requirements 
for goods or services with respect to export promotion and foreign aid programmes;734 this 
exception is identically reproduced in 42 IIAs among those currently surveyed,735 while Article 
5(3) of the ECT (1994) opts for the same exception to its TRIMs Agreement-like disciplines, but 
with a much simpler wording. Article 8.8(6)(a) of the Canada - Korea FTA (2014) uses the same 
wording as NAFTA Article 1108(8)(a), but expands the scope of the exception regarding export 
promotion and foreign aid programmes by rendering inapplicable the prohibition of mandatory 
LCRs, LSRs, technology transfer requirements and product mandating requirements, as well as 
the prohibition of advantage-conditioning LCRs and LSRs to qualification requirements for 
goods or services with respect to such initiatives.  
Article VI(2)(d) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) does not follow the wording of such 
exception and instead provides for the inapplicability of its PRP to existing or future bilateral or 
multilateral foreign aid economic development programmes. Sixteen Canadian IIAs provide for 
an identically worded exception.736 
                                                
734 This exception is identically reproduced in Article 8(3)(d) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, Article 8(3)(d) of 
the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and Article 9(6)(a) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA. 
735 American FTAs: Article 15.8(3)(d) of the Singapore - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 10.8(3)(d) of the 
Morocco - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.9(3)(d) of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.8(3)(d) of 
the Oman - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(d) of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(d) of the 
Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(d) of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 11.8(3)(d) of the 
Korea - U.S. FTA (2007). American BITs: Article 8(3)(d) of the U.S. - Uruguay BIT (2005); Article 8(3)(d) 
of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT (2008). Australian Agreements: Article 14.9(5) of the Australia - Japan EPA 
(2014); Articles 11.9(6) of the Australia - Korea FTA (2014); Article 5(3)(d) of SAFTA Revised Chapter 8 
(Investment) (2011); Article 7(5) of the CERTA Investment Protocol (2011); Article 10.7(3)(d) of the 
Australia - Chile FTA (2008); Article 11.9(3)(d) of the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004). Canadian TIPs: Article 
G-08(7)(a) of the Canada - Chile FTA (1996); Article 807(6)(a) of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); Article 
807(7)(a) of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008); Article 9.07(8)(a) of the Canada - Panama FTA (2008); 
Article 10.9(7)(a) of the Canada - Honduras FTA (2013); Article 8.5(5)(a) of the Canada - EU CETA 
(2014); Article 9.10(3)(e) of the TPP (2015). Canadian FIPAs: Article 7(6)(a) of the Canada - Peru FIPA 
(2006); Article 7(6)(a) of the Canada - Jordan FIPA (2009); Article 10(6)(a) of the Benin - Canada FIPA 
(2013); Article 9(6)(a) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); Article 9(6)(a) of the Cameroon - Canada 
FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(a) of the Canada - Nigeria FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(a) of the Canada - Serbia 
FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(a) of the Canada - Senegal FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(a) of the Canada - Côte 
d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(a) of the Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(a) of the 
Canada - Guinea FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(a) of the Canada - Hong Kong, China FIPA (2016). Chilean 
Agreements: Article 10.8(6) of the Pacific Alliance Protocol (2014); Article 77(3)(b) of the Chile - Japan 
EPA (2007); Article 9.6(3)(d) of the Chile - Colombia FTA (2006); Article 11.6(3)(d) of the Chile - Peru 
FTA (2006); Article 10.7(7)(a) of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003); Article 10.5(3)(d) of the Chile - U.S. FTA 
(2003); Article 9-09(7)(a) of the Chile - Mexico FTA (1998).  
736 Article VI(2)(d) of the Canada - Trinidad and Tobago FIPA (1995); Article VI(2)(c) of the Canada - 
Philippines FIPA (1995); Article VI(2)(d) of the Canada - South Africa FIPA (1995); Article VI(2)(d) of the 
Canada - Ecuador FIPA (1996); Article II(8)(d) of the Annex to the Canada - Venezuela FIPA (1996); 
Article VI(2)(d) of the Canada - Panama FIPA (1996); Article VI(2)(d) of the Canada - Egypt FIPA (1996); 
Article VI(2)(d) of the Barbados - Canada FIPA (1996); Article VI(2)(d) of the Canada - Thailand FIPA 
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4. Excluding Qualification Requirements for Preferential Tariffs or Quotas 
NAFTA Article 1108(8)(c) renders inapplicable the prohibition of advantage-conditioning LCRs 
and LSRs (NAFTA Articles 1106(3)(a) and (b))737 to the content of goods necessary to qualify 
for preferential tariffs or preferential quotas; this exception is also reproduced in 43 IIAs among 
the ones surveyed.738 In addition, Article 5(3) of the ECT (1994) opts for the same exception to 
its TRIMs Agreement-like disciplines, but with a much simpler wording. 
5. GATT Article XX-like Exceptions  
In a way clearly reminiscent of GATT Article XX, NAFTA Article 1106(6) provides that State 
Parties preserve their right to enact mandatory and advantage-conditioning LCRs and LSRs if 
such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner, if they do not constitute a 
disguised restriction on international trade or investment, and if they are necessary for one of 
the following purposes: 
(a) to secure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with the provisions of 
the NAFTA; 
                                                                                                                                                       
(1997); Article III(5)(d) of Annex I to the Canada - Croatia FIPA (1997); Article III(5)(d) of Annex I to the 
Canada - Lebanon FIPA (1997); Article VI(2)(d) of the Armenia - Canada FIPA (1997); Article III(5)(d) of 
Annex I to the Canada - Uruguay FIPA (1997); Article III(5)(d) of Annex I to the Canada - Costa Rica 
FIPA (1998); Article VI(2)(d) of the Canada - Latvia FIPA (2009); Article VI(2)(d) of the Canada - Romania 
FIPA (2009). 
737 This exception is also reproduced in Article 8(3)(f) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, in Article 7(6)(c) of the 
2004 Canada Model FIPA, in Article 8(3)(f) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and in Article 9(6)(c) of the 2012 
Canada Model FIPA. 
738 American FTAs: Article 15.8(3)(f) of the Singapore - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 10.8(3)(f) of the Morocco 
- U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.9(3)(f) of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.8(3)(f) of the Oman - 
U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(f) of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(f) of the Colombia - U.S. 
FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(f) of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 11.8(3)(f) of the Korea - U.S. FTA 
(2007). American BITs: Article 8(3)(f) of the U.S. - Uruguay BIT (2005); Article 8(3)(f) of the Rwanda - 
U.S. BIT (2008). Australian Agreements: Article 14.9(7) of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014); Article 
11.9(8) of the Australia - Korea FTA (2014); Article 5(3)(f) of SAFTA Revised Chapter 8 (Investment) 
(2011); Article 7(7) of the CERTA Investment Protocol (2011); Article 10.7(3)(f) of the Australia - Chile 
FTA (2008); Article 11.9(3)(f) of the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004). Canadian TIPs: Article 807(7)(c) of the 
Canada - Colombia FTA (2008); Article 807(6)(c) of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); Article 9.07(8)(c) of 
the Canada - Panama FTA (2008); Article 10.9(7)(c) of the Canada - Honduras FTA (2013); Article 
8.8(6)(c) of the Canada - Korea FTA (2014); Article 8.5(6) of the Canada - EU CETA (2014); Article 
9.10(3)(g) of the TPP (2015). Canadian FIPAs: Article 7(6)(c) of the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006); Article 
7(6)(c) of the Canada - Jordan FIPA (2009); Article 10(6)(c) of the Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 
9(6)(c) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); Article 9(6)(c) of the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014); 
Article 9(6)(c) of the Canada - Nigeria FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(c) of the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); 
Article 9(6)(c) of the Canada - Senegal FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(c) of the Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA 
(2014); Article 9(6)(c) of the Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(c) of the Canada - Guinea 
FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(c) of the Canada - Hong Kong, China FIPA (2016). Chilean Agreements: Article 
10.8(8) of the Pacific Alliance Protocol (2014); Article 77(3)(d) of the Chile - Japan EPA (2007); Article 
9.6(3)(f) of the Chile - Colombia FTA (2006); Article 11.6(3)(e) of the Chile - Peru FTA (2006); Article 
10.7(7)(c) of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003); Article 10.5(3)(f) of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 9-
09(7)(c) of the Chile - Mexico FTA (1998); Article G-08(7)(c) of the Canada - Chile FTA (1996).  
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(b) to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or 
(c) to conserve living or non-living exhaustible natural resources. 
Three FTAs have reproduced this exception to their PRPs in identical terms.739 Nineteen IIAs740 
followed instead the slightly diverging approach of Article 8(3)(c) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, 
which extends the availability of this same exception to mandatory technology transfer 
requirements and which eases the threshold in respect of exhaustible natural resources from 
necessary conservation measures to measures merely “related to” exhaustible natural 
resources.741  
Other IIAs have replicated the majority of NAFTA Article 1106(6), but tailored it to achieve 
slightly different outcomes. For instance, a number of IIAs provide that the exception applies to 
the entirety of their PRP. Both Article 14.15 of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014) and Article 19 
of the CERTA Investment Protocol (2011) opted for “general exceptions” applicable to multiple 
treaty provisions, including but not limited to the entirety of their respective PRPs. Article XVII(3) 
of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) establishes an exception identical to that of NAFTA Article 
1106(6), but for its applicability to the whole of the FIPA including its PRP; 21 Canadian FIPAs 
follow the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) in this respect.742 Ten Canadian FIPAs reproduce this 
                                                
739 Article 10.7(6) of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003); Article 9-07(6) of the Chile - Mexico FTA (1998); Article 
G-06(6) of the Canada - Chile FTA (1996). 
740 American TIPs: Article 15.8(3)(c) of the Singapore - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 10.8(3)(c) of the Morocco 
- U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.9(3)(c) of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.8(3)(c) of the Oman - 
U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(c) of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.9(3)(c) of the Colombia - U.S. 
FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(c) of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 11.8(3)(c) of the Korea - U.S. FTA 
(2007); Article 9.10(3)(d) of the TPP (2015). American BITs: Article 8(3)(c) of the U.S. - Uruguay BIT 
(2005); Article 8(3)(c) of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT (2008). Australian Agreements: Article 11.9(5) of the 
Australia - Korea FTA (2014); Article 5(3)(c) of SAFTA Revised Chapter 8 (Investment) (2011); Article 
10.7(3)(c) of the Australia - Chile FTA (2008); Article 11.9(3)(c) of the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004). Chilean 
Agreements: Article 10.8(5) of the Pacific Alliance Protocol (2014); Article 9.6(3)(c) of the Chile - 
Colombia FTA (2006); Article 11.6(3)(c) of the Chile - Peru FTA (2006); Article 10.5(3)(c) of the Chile - 
U.S. FTA (2003). 
741 Article 8(3)(c) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT as well as the equivalent provision in the TPP are the same 
as Article 8(3)(c) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, except that they are also made applicable to newly added 
Article 8(1)(h) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT (domestic technology preference granting requirements and 
technology prohibitions). 
742 Article XVII(3) of the Canada - Trinidad and Tobago FIPA (1995); Article XVII(3) of the Canada - 
Philippines FIPA (1995); Article XVII(3) of the Canada - South Africa FIPA (1995); Article XVII(3) of the 
Canada - Ecuador FIPA (1996); Article II(10)(b) of the Annex to the Canada - Venezuela FIPA (1996); 
Article XVII(3) of the Barbados - Canada FIPA (1996); Article 10(1) of the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006); 
Article XVII(3) of the Canada - Latvia FIPA (2009); Article XVII(3) of the Canada - Romania FIPA (2009); 
Article 10(1) of the Canada - Jordan FIPA (2009); Article 17(1) of the Canada - Kuwait FIPA (2011); 
Article 20(1) of the Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 17(1) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); 
Article 17(1) of the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 18(1) of the Canada - Nigeria FIPA (2014); 
Article 18(1) of the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); Article 18(1) of the Canada - Senegal FIPA (2014); 
Article 17(1) of the Canada - Mali FIPA (2014); Article 17(1) of the Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); 
Article 18(1) of the Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 18(1) of the Canada - Guinea FIPA (2014). 
Article 18(1) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA reproduces NAFTA Article 1106(6), save for its applicability 
 
 154 
same approach, but add to the exception regarding exhaustible natural resources the 
requirement that such measure be “made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.”743 Article 6.11 of the India - Singapore CECA (2005) and Article 
10.18(1) of the India - Korea CEPA (2009) adopt very similar exceptions with the same proviso 
to the exception regarding exhaustible natural resources. 
Three Canadian FTAs opt for exceptions nearly identical to NAFTA Article 1106(6), but make 
such exceptions applicable to the entirety of their respective chapters on investment;744 these 
FTAs provide that the exception in favour of protecting human, animal or plant life or health 
includes environmental measures necessary for such purposes.745  Article 807(4)(c) of the 
Canada - Colombia FTA (2008) adds, “for greater certainty,” that the general exception 
enshrined in Article 2201(3) of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008) (very similar to NAFTA 
Article 1106(6)) applies to Article the PRP found in Article 807. 
Article 4(4) of the India - Kuwait BIT (2001) opts for a broad exception to its PRP by allowing 
performance requirements “deemed vital for reasons of public order, public health or 
environmental concerns” when such performance requirements “are enforced by law of general 
application.” Article 11(1) and (2) of the India - Japan CEPA (2011) merely render the general 
exceptions of the GATT and the GATS applicable to multiple provisions including its PRP. 
In S.D. Myers v Canada, the S.D. Myers Majority decided that the PCB Export Ban did not 
breach NAFTA Article 1106,746 while Professor Bryan P. Schwartz dissented solely to the extent 
that he found a breach of Article 1106.747 Dissenting Arbitrator Schwartz is alone in having 
considered NAFTA Article 1106(6) and opined that while such exception could be invoked in 
principle, it was of no assistance to Canada in its attempt to justify the PCB Export Ban.748 First, 
the PCB Export Ban constituted a disguised barrier on international trade: the PCB Export Ban 
was adopted in order to protect the local PCB waste disposal industry, a finding corroborated 
                                                                                                                                                       
to the entirety of the Agreement including its PRP. 
743 Article XVII(3) of the Canada - Panama FIPA (1996); Article XVII(3) of the Canada - Egypt FIPA 
(1996); Article XVII(3) of the Canada - Thailand FIPA (1997); Article III(2) of Annex I to the Canada - 
Croatia FIPA (1997); Article III(2) of Annex I to the Canada - Lebanon FIPA (1997); Article XVII(3) of the 
Armenia - Canada FIPA (1997); Article III(2) of Annex I to the Canada - Uruguay FIPA (1997); Article III(2) 
of Annex I to the Canada - Costa Rica FIPA (1998); Article 33(2) of the Canada - China FIPA (2012); 
Article 17(1) of the Canada - Hong Kong, China FIPA (2016). 
744 Article 2201(3) of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); Article 2201(3) of the Canada - Colombia FTA 
(2008); Article 23.02(3) of the Canada - Panama FTA (2010). 
745 Article 2201(3)(a) of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); Article 2201(3)(a) of the Canada - Colombia FTA 
(2008); Article 23.02(3)(a)(i) of the Canada - Panama FTA (2010). 
746 S.D. Myers – Majority (n 167) paras 323. 
747 S.D. Myers – Dissent (n 197) para 4.  
748 ibid paras 21, 148-150, 174, 195, 198-200. 
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notably by a statement before Parliament of the Minister of the Environment of Canada to the 
effect that PCB wastes should be disposed of in Canada and by Canadians. That statement, 
along with additional evidence, had already led the Tribunal to unanimously find a violation of 
NAFTA Article 1102 (national treatment).749 Second, the PCB Export Ban was not necessary to 
protect life or health given that Canada could have addressed its safety and environmental 
concerns without preventing claimant SDMI from remediating Canadian PCB waste outside 
Canada. Third, the PCB Export Ban was applied in a way both arbitrary and unjustifiable on the 
basis that it constituted a disguised barrier to trade and was unnecessary. Dissenting Arbitrator 
Schwartz referred to GATT Article XX at length while conducting his analysis under NAFTA 
Article 1106(6).  
GATT Article XX and related decisions rendered pursuant to WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings can provide helpful interpretative guidance in the context of ISDS proceedings 
when the exception to a given PRP is similarly worded and when the claimant’s home State and 
the respondent State are WTO Members. 
6. Exceptions in Favour of Aboriginal Peoples and/or Socially or Economically 
Disadvantaged Minorities 
Article VI(2)(c) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) provides for an exception to its PRP in 
respect of measures that deny Ukrainian investors and investments any rights or preferences 
provided to the aboriginal peoples of Canada. Sixteen Canadian FIPAs provide for an identically 
worded exception.750  
Providing for an exception regarding aboriginal peoples within the texts of the FIPAs themselves 
departed markedly from the approach to aboriginal affairs elaborated in the NAFTA (1992). As 
will be analysed in greater detail below, NAFTA Article 1108(3) excludes from the scope of 
NAFTA Article 1106 any measure that State Parties adopt or maintain in sectors, subsectors or 
activities set out in Annex II. NAFTA Annex II allows State Parties to take reservations with 
respect to specific sectors, sub-sectors or activities for which State Parties may maintain 
                                                
749 ibid paras 148-150. 
750 Article VI(2)(c) of the Canada - Trinidad and Tobago FIPA (1995); Article XVII(4) and Annex, section 
2(b) of the Canada - Philippines FIPA (1995); Article VI(2)(c) of the Canada - South Africa FIPA (1995); 
Article VI(2)(c) of the Canada - Ecuador FIPA (1996); Article II(8)(c) of the Annex to the Canada - 
Venezuela FIPA (1996); Article VI(2)(c) of the Canada - Panama FIPA (1996); Article VI(2)(c) of the 
Canada - Egypt FIPA (1996); Article VI(2)(c) of the Barbados - Canada FIPA (1996); Article VI(2)(c) of the 
Canada - Thailand FIPA (1997); Article III(5)(c) of Annex I to the Canada - Croatia FIPA (1997); Article 
III(5)(c) of Annex I to the Canada - Lebanon FIPA (1997); Article VI(2)(c) of the Armenia - Canada FIPA 
(1997); Article III(5)(c) of Annex I to the Canada - Uruguay FIPA (1997); Article III(5)(c) of Annex I to the 
Canada - Costa Rica FIPA (1998); Article VI(2)(c) of the Canada - Latvia FIPA (2009); Article VI(2)(c) of 
the Canada - Romania FIPA (2009).  
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existing, or adopt new or more restrictive measures that do not conform to the PRP. In its 
Schedule to Annex II, Canada reserved the right to adopt or maintain any measure denying 
investors of another Party and their investments any rights or preferences provided to aboriginal 
peoples in violation of the PRP. In their respective Schedules to Annex II, Canada and the 
United States reserved the right to adopt or maintain any measure according rights or 
preferences to socially or economically disadvantaged minorities in violation of the PRP. The 
United States added a specific mention of Alaskan corporations organised in accordance with 
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Mexico adopted a similarly-worded reservation, 
except that it replaced “minorities” by “groups.” 
In a way both simpler than and reminiscent of the NAFTA, both Canada and Chile reserved, 
under the Canada - Chile FTA (1996), the right to adopt or maintain any measure that denied 
investors of the other State Party and their investments any rights or preferences provided to 
aboriginal peoples.751 Starting with the 2004 Canada Model FIPA, Canadian FIPAs ceased to 
provide a PRP exception regarding aboriginal peoples within the texts of the FIPAs themselves 
and adopted an approach more closely based on that of the NAFTA. In the first Canadian FIPA 
to follow the release of the 2004 Canada Model FIPA, Canada and Peru closely followed the 
approach developed in the NAFTA and adopted reservations to the PRP: Canada752 reserved 
the right to adopt or maintain any measure denying investors of the other Party and their 
investments any rights or preferences provided to aboriginal peoples or additionally to socially 
or economically disadvantaged minorities. Peru753 reserved the right to adopt or maintain any 
measure according rights or preferences to socially or economically disadvantaged minorities 
and ethnic groups. That provision defines “ethnic groups” as indigenous and native 
communities, while “minorities” include peasant (campesinos) communities. 
The application of the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006) was suspended as a result of the entry into 
force of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008) (Article 845), but remains in force in respect of pre-FTA 
breaches; moreover, Canada and Peru reiterated the same reservations in the Canada - Peru 
FTA (2008).754  Canada adopted these same reservations in the Canada - Colombia FTA 
(2008),755 while Colombia reserved the right to adopt or maintain any measure according rights 
                                                
751 Annex II - Schedule of Canada to the Canada - Chile FTA (1996); Annex II - Schedule of Chile to the 
Canada - Chile FTA (1996). 
752 Annex II - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedule of Canada to the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006) 
- Sector: Aboriginal Affairs and Sector: Minority Affairs. 
753 Annex II - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedule of Peru to the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006) - 
Sector: Indigenous Communities, Peasant, Native, and Minority Affairs. 
754 Annex II - Schedule of Canada to the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); Annex II - Schedule of Peru to the 
Canada - Peru FTA (2008). 
755 Annex II - Schedule of Canada to the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008). 
 
 157 
or preferences to socially or economically disadvantaged minorities and ethnic groups.756 
The application of the Canada - Panama FIPA (1996) was also suspended as a result of the 
entry into force of the Canada - Panama FTA (2010) (Article 9.38(1)), but remains in force in 
respect of pre-FTA breaches. Going forward, Canada and Panama replaced Article VI(2)(c) of 
the Canada - Panama FIPA (1996) with respective reservations of their right to adopt or 
maintain any measure denying investors of the other Party and their investments any rights or 
preferences provided to aboriginal peoples or to socially or economically disadvantaged 
minorities.757 Canada adopted the same reservations in the Canada - Honduras FTA (2013), 
while Honduras limited its similarly worded reservation to the benefit of socially and 
economically disadvantaged minorities.758 
Canada included similar reservations to the PRPs of an additional 11 post-2004 Canadian 
FIPAs.759 The Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014) displays the same formulation, but both State 
Parties (and not only Canada) made such reservations to the PRP.760 Canada adopted the 
same formulation for its reservations to the PRP in the Canada - Burkina Faso FIPA (2014), 
while Burkina Faso did the same, but only in respect of socially or economically disadvantaged 
minorities.761 Only the Canada - China FIPA (2012) does not provides for an exception or a 
reservation to its PRP in favour of aboriginal peoples or socially or economically disadvantaged 
minorities.  
With identical reservations in five of its FTAs, Australia preserved its right to adopt or maintain 
any measure which grants preferences or more favourable treatment to any indigenous person 
                                                
756 Annex II - Schedule of Colombia to the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008). 
757 Annex II - Schedule of Canada to the Canada - Panama FTA (2008); Annex II - Schedule of Panama 
to the Canada - Panama FTA (2008). 
758 Annex II – Schedule of Canada to the Canada - Honduras FTA (2013); Annex II – Schedule of 
Honduras to the Canada - Honduras FTA (2013). 
759 Annex II - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedule of Canada to the Canada - Jordan FIPA 
(2009); Annex I - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedule of Canada to the Canada - Kuwait FIPA 
(2011); Annex II - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedule of Canada, paragraphs (b) and (c) of the 
Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Annex II - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedule of Canada to the 
Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); Annex I - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedule of Canada to 
the Canada - Nigeria FIPA (2014); Annex II - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedule of Canada to 
the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); Annex I - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedule of Canada to 
the Canada - Senegal FIPA (2014); Annex II - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedule of Canada to 
the Canada - Mali FIPA (2014); Annex II - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedule of Canada to the 
Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); Annex I - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedule of Canada to 
the Canada to the Guinea FIPA (2014); Annex II - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedule of 
Canada, paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Canada - Hong Kong, China FIPA (2016). 
760 Annex II - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedules of Canada and of Cameroon to the 
Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014). 
761 Annex II - Reservations for Future Measures - Schedules of Canada and of Burkina Faso to the 
Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2014). 
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or organisation with respect to investments or in relation to the acquisition, establishment or 
operation of any commercial or industrial undertaking in the service sector. 762  Chile also 
reserved, in its FTA with Australia (2008), its right to adopt or maintain any measure denying 
Australian investors, investments and service suppliers any rights or preferences provided to 
indigenous peoples.763 
Article 23 of the CERTA Investment Protocol (2011) (in respect of investments) and Article 5 of 
AANZFTA Chapter 22 (2009) (in respect of trade in goods and services) both ensure that New 
Zealand preserves its unhindered right to enact measures deemed necessary to “accord more 
favourable treatment to Maori” for purposes of fulfilling its obligations under the Treaty of 
Waitangi of 1840 which essentially authorises the British Crown to develop British settlements in 
exchange for the guarantee of full protection of Maori interests and status. 
7. Exempting Cultural Industries from PRPs  
Cultural industries are basically exempted from the NAFTA’s application: Article 2106 and 
Annex 2106 of the NAFTA render Article 2005 of the CUSFTA (1988) applicable to NAFTA 
State Parties. Article 2005 of the CUSFTA (1988) exempts cultural industries from the CUSFTA 
except in respect of a limited number of treaty provisions which apply to cultural industries 
regarding tariff elimination, the sale of an indirectly acquired foreign-owned cultural enterprise, 
copyright protection and printing requirements. Article O-06 of and Annex O-06 to the Canada - 
Chile FTA (1996) follow the approach of the NAFTA, but use simpler language and render the 
FTA inapplicable to cultural industries except for specifically identified tariff elimination 
commitments. In much simpler and straightforward terms, Article VI(3) of the Canada - Ukraine 
FIPA (1994)764 excludes investments in cultural industries in Canada from the scope of the FIPA. 
Thirty-one Canadian FIPAs765 and five Canadian FTAs766 reproduce this exception in practically 
                                                
762 Annex 7 - Non-conforming Measures Relating to Paragraph 2 of Articles 9.7 and 14.10 - Part 1 - 
Schedule of Australia to the Australia - Japan EPA (2014); Annex II - Schedule of Australia to the 
Australia - Korea FTA (2014); Annex II - Schedule of Australia to the CERTA Investment Protocol (2011); 
Annex II - Schedule of Australia to the Australia - Chile FTA (2008); Annex II - Schedule of Australia to 
the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004); Annex 4-II(a) - Australia’s Reservations to Chapter 7 (Trade in Services) 
and Chapter 8 (Investment) of SAFTA (2011). 
763 Annex II - Schedule of Chile to the Australia - Chile FTA (2008). 
764 Article 10(6) of the 2004 Canada Model FIPA and Article 18(7) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA 
reproduce this approach. 
765 Article VI(3) of the Canada - Trinidad and Tobago FIPA (1995); Article XVII(4) and Annex, section 2(c) 
of the Canada - Philippines FIPA (1995); Article VI(3) of the Canada - South Africa FIPA (1995); Article 
VI(3) of the Canada - Ecuador FIPA (1996); Article II(9) of the Annex to the Canada - Venezuela FIPA 
(1996); Article VI(3) of the Canada - Panama FIPA (1996); Article VI(3) of the Canada - Egypt FIPA 
(1996); Article VI(3) of the Barbados - Canada FIPA (1996); Article VI(3) of the Canada - Thailand FIPA 
(1997); Article III(4) of Annex I to the Canada - Croatia FIPA (1997); Article III(4) of Annex I to the Canada 
- Lebanon FIPA (1997); Article VI(3) of the Armenia - Canada FIPA (1997); Article III(4) of Annex I to the 
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identical terms, but extend this exemption to the cultural industries of both their State Parties. 
8. Opting Taxation Measures in or out of PRPs  
Forming part of NAFTA Chapter 21 (on exceptions), Article 2103(1) (on taxation) states as a 
rule that the NAFTA does not apply to taxation measures unless the contrary is provided for in 
Article 2103. NAFTA Article 2103(5) specifies that Article 1106(3) applies to taxation measures: 
conditioning advantages upon LCRs, LSRs, trade-balancing requirements or domestic sales 
restrictions through taxation measures is therefore prohibited. NAFTA Article 2103(5) also 
renders applicable to taxation measures the following provisions of NAFTA’s PRP: Article 
1106(4), according to which State Parties preserve their rights to impose advantage-
conditioning requirements to locate production, supply a service, train or employ workers, 
construct or expand particular facilities, or carry out R&D in their territories, and Article 1106(5) 
which ensures that the PRP applies only to the performance requirements explicitly set out. 
Articles O-03(1) and O-03(5) of the Canada - Chile FTA (1996) follow the same approach 
regarding the relation between its PRP and taxation measures as the one laid out in NAFTA 
Article 2103.  
A number of other IIAs lay out specific rules that render their PRPs applicable to taxation 
measures and go about it in many different ways. Article 21(1) and 21(3) of the 2004 U.S. Model 
BIT and Article 21(1) and 21(3) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT 2012 operate in the same way as 
NAFTA Article 2103. The main difference consists of the contents of Article 8(3) of the 2004 
U.S. Model BIT and the nearly identical Article 8(3) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, which are much 
broader than any corresponding provision within NAFTA Article 1106 since it comprises 
numerous exceptions and limitations to its PRP, most of which are instead found in NAFTA 
Article 1108(8). Thirteen IIAs among the ones surveyed reproduce Article 21(1) and 21(3) of the 
2004 U.S. Model BIT and therefore provide for the same framework regarding the application of 
their PRPs to taxation measures: only the enumerated advantage-conditioning performance 
                                                                                                                                                       
Canada - Uruguay FIPA (1997); Article III(4) of Annex I to the Canada - Costa Rica FIPA (1998); Article 
10(6) of the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006); Article VI(3) of the Canada - Latvia FIPA (2009); Article VI(3) of 
the Canada - Romania FIPA (2009); Article 10(6) of the Canada - Jordan FIPA (2009); Article 17(8) of the 
Canada - Kuwait FIPA (2011); Article 33(1) of the Canada - China FIPA (2012); Article 20(7) of the Benin 
- Canada FIPA (2013); Article 17(7) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); Article 17(7) of the Cameroon 
- Canada FIPA (2014); Article 18(7) of the Canada - Nigeria FIPA (2014); Article 18(7) of the Canada - 
Serbia FIPA (2014); Article 18(7) of the Canada - Senegal FIPA (2014); Article 17(7) of the Canada - Mali 
FIPA (2014); Article 17(7) of the Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); Article 18(7) of the Burkina Faso - 
Canada FIPA (2014); Article 18(7) of the Canada - Guinea FIPA (2014); Article 17(7) of the Canada - 
Hong Kong, China FIPA (2016).  
766 Article 2205 of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); Article 2206 of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008); 
Article 23.06 of the Canada - Panama FTA (2008); Article 22.7 of the Canada - Honduras FTA (2013); 
Article 22.6 of the Canada - Korea FTA (2014).  
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requirements are prohibited in relation with taxation measures.767 Article 18.4(2) of the Pacific 
Alliance Protocol (2014) follows a similar approach and renders only the prohibition of 
enumerated advantage-conditioning performance requirements (as opposed to mandatory 
performance requirements) applicable to taxation measures. Article 22.3(1) of the Australia - 
Chile FTA (2008) and Article 22.3(1) of the Australia - Korea FTA (2014) also set inapplicability 
of their provisions to taxation measures as the by default setting; Article 22.3(4)(c) of the 
Australia - Chile FTA (2008) renders portions of its PRP (prohibition of advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements, exceptions and exclusions, limitation to measures explicitly set out) 
applicable to taxation measures, while Article 22.3(2)(e) of the Australia - Korea FTA (2014) 
goes on to render its PRP (all of it except for the prohibition of mandatory of performance 
requirements) applicable to taxation measures. Both FTAs therefore impose additional 
restrictions as to the applicability of their respective PRP provisions to taxation measures. 
Opting for a simpler approach, five Canadian TIPs768 and three IIAs769 state that nothing applies 
to taxation measures unless indicated otherwise and that taxation measures are subject to all of 
the provisions of the PRP within those IIAs. In total, 25 IIAs among those surveyed (including 
the NAFTA) have decided to subject taxation measures to part of or to the entirety of their 
PRPs.  
By contrast, 41 IIAs among the ones surveyed follow the example set by the accounted for 
Article XII(1) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994)770 and shield taxation measures from their 
respective PRPs: treaty provisions in these IIAs state that nothing in these IIAs applies to 
taxation measures unless indicated otherwise; in the absence of such contrary indication, their 
respective PRPs do not apply to taxation measures.771  
                                                
767 American TIPs: Articles 23.3(1), 23.3(5) and 10.5(3) of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Articles 21.3(1), 
21.3(5) and 15.8(3)(a) of the Singapore - U.S. FTA (2003); Articles 22.3(1), 22.3(5) and 11.9(3) of the 
Australia - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 21.3(1), 21.3(5) and 10.8(3) of the Morocco - U.S. FTA (2004); 
Articles 21.3(1), 21.3(5) and 10.9(3) of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Articles 21.3(1), 21.3(5) and 
10.8(3) of the Oman - U.S. FTA (2006); Articles 21.3(1), 21.3(5) and 10.9(3) of the Panama - U.S. FTA 
(2007); Articles 22.3(1), 22.3(5) and 11.8(3) of the Korea - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 29.4(2), 29.4(7) and 
9.10(2) of the TPP (2015). American BITs: Articles 21(1), 21(4) and 8(3) of the U.S. - Uruguay BIT (2005); 
Articles 21(1), 21(4) and 8(3) of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT (2008). Australian and Chilean FTAs: Articles 
21.4(1), 21.4(5) and 9.6(3) of the Chile - Colombia FTA (2006); Articles 17.3(1), 17.3(5) and 11.6(3) of the 
Chile - Peru FTA (2006). 
768 Article 2203(1), 2203(7) of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); Article 2204(1), 2204(6) of the Canada - 
Colombia FTA (2008); Article 23.04(1), 23.04(7) of the Canada - Panama FTA (2008); Article 22.4(1), 
22.4(7) of the Canada - Honduras FTA (2013); Article 22.3(1), 22.3(6) of the Canada - Korea FTA (2014). 
769 Articles 21(1) and 21(2)(b) of the CERTA Investment Protocol (2011); Articles 22.3(1) and 22.3(5) of 
the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); Articles 22.3(1) and 22.3(5) of the Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006). 
770 Article 14(1) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA and Article 16(1) of the 2004 Canada Model FIPA 
achieve the same result of rendering their PRP inapplicable to taxation measures. 
771 American Agreements: Article 4(1) of Chapter VII – General Articles to the U.S. - Vietnam TRA (2000); 
Australian Agreements: Article 1.8 (Taxation) of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014); Article 18.3(1) of the 
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Expressing a willingness to preserve unfettered tax policy-making powers, States have set as 
the default rule the inapplicability of a large number of surveyed IIAs to taxation measures, while 
a lesser number have carefully rendered parts of their PRPs applicable to taxation measures. 
This survey shows that States have expressed acute awareness as to the sensitivity of the 
relationship between PRPs and taxation measures.  
9. Tailored Exceptions to PRPs that Address Various Issues of National or Regional 
Concern  
a) Preserving Performance Requirements Necessary to Comply with EU Rules 
Article I of the EU - U.S. Additional Protocols (September 2003) in respect of eight American 
BITs each entered into with a different EU Member State (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic) preserves from the PRPs 
the ability of each of the eight European Parties to impose, as necessary under EU law, 
performance requirements in respect of agricultural and audio-visual goods or services.772 
Article I of the EU - U.S. Additional Protocols (September 2003), initially described as an 
“interpretation,” is duly acknowledged as an amendment to the PRPs within the eight BITs 
concerned.773 
                                                                                                                                                       
Australia - Malaysia FTA (2012); Article 2(3) (Scope of Application) of SAFTA Revised Chapter 8 
(Investment) (2011); Article 3(1) of AANZFTA (2009) Chapter 15 (General Provisions and Exceptions). 
Canadian FIPAs: Article XII(1) of the Canada - Trinidad and Tobago FIPA (1995); Article XII(1) of the 
Canada - Philippines FIPA (1995); Article XII(1) of the Canada - South Africa FIPA (1995); Article XII(1) of 
the Canada - Ecuador FIPA (1996); Article XI(1) of the Canada - Venezuela FIPA (1996); Article XII(1) of 
the Canada - Panama FIPA (1996); Article XII(1) of the Canada - Egypt FIPA (1996); Article XII(1) of the 
Barbados - Canada FIPA (1996); Article XII(1) of the Canada - Thailand FIPA (1997); Article XI(1) of the 
Canada - Croatia FIPA (1997); Article XI(1) of the Canada - Lebanon FIPA (1997); Article XII(1) of the 
Armenia - Canada FIPA (1997); Article XI(1) of the Canada - Uruguay FIPA (1997); Article XI(1) of the 
Canada - Costa Rica FIPA (1998); Article 16(1) of the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006); Article XII(1) of the 
Canada - Latvia FIPA (2009); Article XII(1) of the Canada - Romania FIPA (2009); Article 16(1) of the 
Canada - Jordan FIPA (2009); Article 14(1) of the Canada - Kuwait FIPA (2011); Article 14(1) of the 
Canada - China FIPA (2012); Article 17(1) of the Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 14(1) of the 
Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); Article 14(1) of the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 14(1) of the 
Canada - Nigeria FIPA (2014); Article 14(1) of the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); Article 14(1) of the 
Canada - Senegal FIPA (2014); Article 14(1) of the Canada - Mali FIPA (2014); Article 14(1) of the 
Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); Article 14(1) of the Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 14(1) 
of the Canada - Guinea FIPA (2014); Article 14(1) of the Canada - Hong Kong, China FIPA (2016). 
Chilean Agreements:  Article 194(1) of the Chile - Japan EPA (2007); Article 20.3(2) of the Chile - Korea 
FTA (2003); Article 19-05 of the Chile - Mexico FTA (1998). Indian Agreements: Article 10.2(8) of the 
India - Korea CEPA (2009); Article 10(1) of the India - Japan CEPA (2011).  
772 See e.g., Article I of the Additional Protocol Between the United States of America and the Czech 
Republic to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Czech And Slovak Federal 
Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment of October 22, 1991, 
signed at Brussels on 10 December 2003, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., Treaty Doc. 108–18. 
773 United States Senate Executive Report 108-13 – Protocols Amending Existing Bilateral Investment 
Treaties With new European Union Member Nations, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., 4 May 2004 (in respect of 
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Article V(3) of the Canada - Latvia FIPA (2009) and Article V(3) of the Canada - Romania FIPA 
(2009) clarify that their respective mandatory PRPs “shall not be interpreted to prohibit” 
performance requirements necessary under EU law regarding the production, processing and 
trade of agricultural and processed agricultural products; rather, this “clarification” operates as 
an exception or an exclusion to the PRP regarding agricultural products. 
b) Protecting National Treasures, Accessing Products in Short Supply, and Maintaining 
Public Order 
Article XVII(3)(d) of the Canada - Thailand FIPA (1997) adds an exception to its PRP in respect 
of measures aimed at protecting national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value. 
Article XVII(3)(e) of the Canada - Thailand FIPA (1997) provides an additional exception to its 
PRP in respect of temporary and non-discriminatory measures essential to acquiring or 
distributing products in general or local short supply. 
Article 14.15 of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014), Article 19 of the CERTA Investment Protocol 
(2011) and Article 6.11 of the India - Singapore CECA (2005) reiterate the exceptions to protect 
life or health and to conserve exhaustible natural resources available under NAFTA Article 
1106(6) and add two more exceptions to their PRPs: first, an exception in respect of measures 
necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order, and second, an exception in 
respect of measures imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or 
archaeological value. Article 10.18(1)(d) of the India - Korea CEPA (2009) also provides for a 
similar exception in respect of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value. 
Article 10.9(6) of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003) deems its PRP inapplicable to “any voluntary and 
special investment regime” and more particularly to that established in its Annex 10.9.6, which 
refers to Chile’s Decree Law 600 (1974), referred to as the Foreign Investment Statute. This 
exception means that Chile can impose performance requirements upon Korean investors in 
investor-State contracts so long as these contracts comply notably with the non-discrimination 
and free remittance requirements of Chile’s Decree Law 600 (1974).774 
                                                                                                                                                       
BITs with Acceding Countries Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovak Republic 
and Candidate Countries Bulgaria and Romania) 3, 7. 
774 The Decree Law provided that the Chilean State and a foreign investor enter into a contract as the way 
to authorise foreign investment in Chile. The Decree Law further set out rights and obligations of foreign 
investors. Chile adopted Law 20,780, on foreign investment on June 16, 2015 as replacement for the 
Decree Law set to be repealed on 1 January 2016. Rights and obligations of foreign investors under 
existing contracts with Chile continue to apply. See: Library of Congress, Global Legal Monitor, Chile: 
New Foreign Investment Law Enacted, <http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/chile-new-foreign-
investment-law-enacted/> accessed 9 February 2017.  
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Two French BITs provide for a public order exception within their PRPs: measures taken for 
public security, public health, public order or public morality do not breach FET that includes a 
PRP under the France - Nepal BIT (1983) 775  so long as they are neither abusive nor 
discriminatory, nor do measures with such justifications breach the MFN treatment that includes 
a PRP under the Bangladesh - France BIT (1985).776  
In the Canada - Korea FTA (2014),777 Canada and Korea confirmed a shared “understanding” 
that recycling obligations and low-emission motor vehicle distribution obligations are not 
inconsistent with the PRP, and that Korean rules regarding raw materials for liquor production 
are not inconsistent with the PRP so long as they are applied in conformity with the TRIMs 
Agreement. These “shared understandings” act more like exceptions or reservations to the 
otherwise applicable PRP. 
Contrary to what the free-wheeling approach of the Lemire Tribunal suggests, the detailed and 
complex nature, the intricacy of the fine-tuning and variations involved, the large number of 
different exceptions and exclusions, as well as the frequent reproduction of practically identical 
wording suggest that little improvisation or short-sightedness comes into drafting PRPs in IIAs. 
The willingness of State Parties to provide for all kinds of curbs to their PRPs reinforces the 
need to adhere to the wording of PRPs in IIAs very closely and to avoid creating unwritten 
exceptions or exclusions while interpreting and applying PRPs in IIAs. By contrast with 
previously discussed IIAs, France’s 64 BITs that include PRPs which replicate the French 
Model, the 13 American BITs with PRPs identical to Article VI of the 1994 U.S. Model BIT, as 
well as the 21 American BITs based on the 1983 or 1984 U.S. Model BITs do not provide for 
any of the previously discussed exceptions. Interpretations that depart from the clear wording of 
PRPs should be discouraged and should not result in creating exceptions or exclusions where 
none are provided for.  
For example, Article VI(3) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) was signed in the same year as 
the Ukraine - U.S. BIT (1994). The Canada - Ukraine FIPA excludes investments in cultural 
industries in Canada from its scope. However unfortunate, the PRP in the Ukraine - U.S. BIT 
(Article II(6)) clearly applied to the culturally-sensitive measure at issue and the Ukraine - U.S. 
BIT did not provide for an exception in favour of Ukraine’s cultural industries. The Lemire 
Tribunal should not have embarked on an unwieldy interpretation of the PRP at issue in order to 
exempt cultural industries from its scope in the absence of any such written exclusion. 
                                                
775 See Exchange of Letters No 1 dated 2 May 1983 to the France - Nepal BIT. 
776 See Exchange of Letters No 3 to the Bangladesh - France BIT (1985). 
777 See Chapter 9 – Exchange of Confirming Letters Between Korea and Canada. 
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F. Shielding Government Procurement from PRPs in IIAs 
The prevalence of excluding government procurement from PRPs clearly reflects the 
widespread practice among most, if not all countries of subjecting government procurement to 
performance requirements and especially LCRs.778 As detailed below, more than 60 IIAs among 
those surveyed exclude procurement from their PRPs. Article 1108(8)(b) of the NAFTA 
(1992) 779  specifies that the prohibition of mandatory LCRs, LSRs, technology transfer 
requirements and product mandating requirements (NAFTA Article 1106(1)(b), (c), (f) and (g)), 
as well as the prohibition of advantage-conditioning LCRs and LSRs (NAFTA Article 1106(3)(a) 
and (b)) do not apply to procurement by a Party or a state enterprise, an exception reiterated 
without change in 19 IIAs among the ones surveyed.780 Twenty IIAs reproduce this exception to 
their PRPs, except that these IIAs reproduce the slight tweak found in the otherwise identical 
Article 8(3)(e) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT 781  and use the expression “procurement” or 
“government procurement” instead of the expression “procurement by a Party or a state 
enterprise” used in the NAFTA. 782  Thirty-nine IIAs therefore closely follow the NAFTA’s 
exclusion of procurement from its PRP. In addition, Article 5(3) of the ECT (1994) opts for the 
same exception to its TRIMs Agreement-like disciplines, but with a much simpler wording. 
                                                
778 ADF (n 167) para 94. 
779 Article 7(6)(b) of the 2004 Canada Model FIPA and Article 9(6)(b) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA 
reproduce this provision. 
780 Chilean FTAs: Article 10.7(7)(b) of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003); Article 9-09(7)(b) of the Chile - 
Mexico FTA (1998). Canadian FTAs: Article G-08(7)(b) of the Canada - Chile FTA (1996); Article 
807(6)(b) of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); Article 807(7)(b) of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008); 
Article 9.07(8)(b) of the Canada - Panama FTA (2008); Article 10.9(7)(b) of the Canada - Honduras FTA 
(2013); Article 8.8(6)(b) of the Canada - Korea FTA (2014). Canadian FIPAs: Article 7(6)(b) of the Canada 
- Peru FIPA (2006); Article 7(6)(b) of the Canada - Jordan FIPA (2009); Article 10(6)(b) of the Benin - 
Canada FIPA (2013); Article 9(6)(b) of the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(b) of the Canada 
- Nigeria FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(b) of the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(b) of the Canada - 
Senegal FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(b) of the Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(b) of the 
Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(b) of the Canada - Guinea FIPA (2014); Article 9(6)(b) of 
the Canada - Hong Kong, China FIPA (2016).  
781 Article 8(3)(e) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT is the same, except that it is also made applicable to newly 
added Article 8(1)(h) of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT (domestic technology preference granting requirements 
and technology prohibitions). Article 9.10(3)(f) of the TPP (2015) follows the 2012 U.S. Model BIT in this 
respect. 
782 American FTAs: Article 10.5(3)(e) of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 15.8(3)(e) of the Singapore - 
U.S. FTA (2003); Article 10.8(3)(e) of the Morocco - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.9(3)(e) of the CAFTA-DR 
- U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.8(3)(e) of the Oman - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(e) of the Peru - U.S. 
FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(e) of the Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.9(3)(e) of the Panama - U.S. 
FTA (2007); Article 11.8(3)(e) of the Korea - U.S. FTA (2007). American BITs: Article 8(3)(e) of the U.S. - 
Uruguay BIT (2005); Article 8(3)(e) of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT (2008). Australian Agreements: Article 
14.9(6) of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014); Articles 11.9(7) of the Australia - Korea FTA (2014); Article 
5(3)(e) of SAFTA Revised Chapter 8 (Investment) (2011); Article 7(6) of the CERTA Investment Protocol 
(2011); Article 10.7(3)(e) of the Australia - Chile FTA (2008); Article 11.9(3)(e) of the Australia - U.S. FTA 
(2004). Chilean Agreements: Article 10.8(7) of the Pacific Alliance Protocol (2014); Article 77(3)(c) of the 
Chile - Japan EPA (2007); Article 9.6(3)(e) of the Chile - Colombia FTA (2006). 
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Opting for an approach that differs slightly from Article 1108(8)(b) of the NAFTA (1992), Article 
VI(2)(a) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) renders all of its PRP inapplicable to procurement 
by a government or state enterprise; 17 Canadian FIPAs follow this approach.783 Article 90(7) of 
the India - Japan CEPA (2011) similarly specifies that its PRP (Article 89) does not apply to 
government procurement. Article 11.1(4)(c) of the Chile - Peru FTA (2006) goes farther and 
excludes government procurement altogether from the scope of its investment chapter including 
its PRP. 
While Article 9(6)(b) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013) reproduces NAFTA Article 
1108(8)(b) and similarly excludes procurement “by a Party or a State enterprise” from a limited 
and targeted number of prohibited performance requirements, the Canada - Tanzania FIPA 
(2013) includes in Article 16(7) an additional exclusion from the scope of its PRP, this time 
excluding “procurement by a Party” from the entirety of its PRP. These two divergent exclusions 
appear difficult to reconcile; tentatively, one could argue that procurement by a State enterprise 
would be excluded only from the prohibition of mandatory LCRs, LSRs, technology transfer 
requirements and product mandating requirements, as well as the prohibition of advantage-
conditioning LCRs and LSRs, while procurement by a Party would be excluded altogether from 
the PRP. Article 8.5(5)(b) of the Canada - EU CETA (2014) opts for an altogether different 
approach by deeming its PRP inapplicable to purchases for governmental purposes, whether or 
not it amounts to “government procurement” as that expression is construed for purposes of the 
scope and coverage of its distinct chapter on government procurement.  
In ADF v United States, Canadian claimant ADF Group Inc. (“ADF Group”) and its American 
investment ADF International Inc. (“ADF International”) participated in the construction of the 
Springfield Interchange Project (the “Interchange Project”) in Northern Virginia. In 1998, the 
Commonwealth of Virginia (“Virginia”) applied for and received funding assistance from the 
Federal Highway Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation (“FHWA”) for 
                                                
783 Article VI(2)(a) of the Canada - Trinidad and Tobago FIPA (1995); Article VI(2)(a) of the Canada - 
Philippines FIPA (1995); Article VI(2)(a) of the Canada - South Africa FIPA (1995); Article VI(2)(a) of the 
Canada - Ecuador FIPA (1996); Article II(8)(a) of the Annex to the Canada - Venezuela FIPA (1996); 
Article VI(2)(a) of the Canada - Panama FIPA (1996); Article VI(2)(a) of the Canada - Egypt FIPA (1996); 
Article VI(2)(a) of the Barbados - Canada FIPA (1996); Article VI(2)(a) of the Canada - Thailand FIPA 
(1997); Article III(5)(a) of Annex I to the Canada - Croatia FIPA (1997); Article III(5)(a) of Annex I to the 
Canada - Lebanon FIPA (1997); Article VI(2)(a) of the Armenia - Canada FIPA (1997); Article III(5)(a) of 
Annex I to the Canada - Uruguay FIPA (1997); Article III(5)(a) of Annex I to the Canada - Costa Rica 
FIPA (1998); Article VI(2)(a) of the Canada - Latvia FIPA (2009); Article VI(2)(a) of the Canada - Romania 
FIPA (2009); Article 16(5) of the Canada - Kuwait FIPA (2011) (except that the provision refers to 
“procurement by a Party”).  
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construction designed to improve the safety and efficiency of the Springfield Interchange.784 
Shirley Contracting Corporation (“Shirley”) was awarded the contract for the Interchange Project 
(the “Main Contract”) in September 1998 following a public tender by Virginia’s Department of 
Transportation (the “VDOT”).785 Shirley and ADF International then signed a Sub-Contract for 
structural steel components (the “Sub-Contract”). ADF International proposed to perform part of 
its obligations in facilities owned by its parent ADF Group and located in Canada.786 The VDOT 
intimated that ADF International’s proposal did not comply with the Buy America clause of the 
Main Contract, which stipulated that all steel materials had to originate in the United States and 
all manufacturing processes necessary for producing steel and turning it into a suitable product 
for the Interchange Project had to be undertaken in the United States.787 
The Buy America Clause was mandated by the Buy America requirements under Section 
635.410 of the Federal Highway Administration Regulations (the “FHWA Regulations”) and 
Section 165 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (the “STAA”) as a condition 
for federal aid through cost reimbursement (all challenged measures are collectively referred to 
as the “Buy America Interchange Project Provisions”). 788  As a result, ADF International 
fabricated its steel products at five different locations in the United States, which “massively 
increased” ADF International’s costs.789 
ADF Group argued that the Buy America Interchange Project Provisions were connected with 
the “management, conduct or operation” of ADF International and violated Article 1106(1)(b), by 
imposing a 100% LCR, and NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c), by requiring that preference be given to 
American steel products.790 The United States acquiesced to characterising the Buy America 
Interchange Project Provisions as LCRs and as LSRs.791 The applicability of NAFTA Articles 
1106(1)(b) and (c) to the Buy America Interchange Project Provisions proved undisputed; hence 
the ADF Tribunal did not dwell on this issue.792 
The Tribunal identified the deciding question as whether the Interchange Project constituted 
“procurement by a Party” within the meaning of NAFTA Article 1108(8)(b), which provides an 
exception inter alia to NAFTA Articles 1106(1)(b) and (c) in respect of “procurement by a Party.” 
                                                
784 ADF (n 167) para 44. 
785 ibid para 46. 
786 ibid para 49. 
787 ibid paras, 50, 52. 
788 ibid paras 52, 56-58. 
789 ibid paras 54-55. 
790 ibid paras 81-82, 87. 
791 ibid para 159. 
792 ibid para 159. 
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This “crucial question” in turn raised two separate questions: first, whether the Interchange 
Project constituted “procurement,” and second, whether the “procurement” had been conducted 
by a “Party.”793 “Procurement” is not defined under NAFTA Chapter 11. The Tribunal drew from 
NAFTA Article 1001(5), within its Chapter 10 on Government Procurement, to define 
“procurement” as including purchases of goods by governmental entities and as excluding 
governmental assistance notably in the form of funding through grants to the state, provincial or 
regional governmental entity conducting the procurement. 794  Based on this definition, the 
Tribunal decided that the Interchange Project had involved government procurement conducted 
by the VDOT on behalf of Virginia, and that federal aid to the Interchange Project through cost 
reimbursement did not constitute government procurement.795 
In defining “Procurement ‘by a Party,’” the Tribunal relied on the “clear textual basis” of NAFTA 
Article 1001(1)(a), which identifies federal and state or provincial procurement as part of 
“government procurement.” The Tribunal further decided that there existed no distinction as to 
the meaning of “government procurement” (NAFTA Article 1001(1)(a)) and “procurement by a 
Party” (NAFTA Article 1108(8)(b)).796 The Tribunal drew further support for its interpretation of 
the term “Party” from NAFTA Article 1108(1), which specifies that the existing and maintained 
non-conforming measures that can benefit from a reservation include federal, state or provincial 
and local measures.797 
Accordingly, the Tribunal decided that NAFTA Article 1108(8)(b) precluded ADF Group from 
invoking NAFTA Article 1106 against the Buy America Interchange Project Provisions since the 
Interchange Project had involved government procurement conducted by the VDOT on behalf of 
Virginia and since “procurement by a Party” includes procurement by any organ or territorial unit 
of a Party, be it federal or state/provincial, and since granting funds to the VDOT for the 
Interchange Project did not constitute government procurement by the FHWA pursuant to 
NAFTA Article 1001(5)(a).798  
G. Disciplining Performance Requirements as “Offsets” in TIP Chapters on 
Government Procurement 
Although many IIAs exclude government procurement from the reach of their PRPs, some TIPs 
                                                
793 ibid para 160. 
794 ibid para 161. 
795 ibid para 162. 
796 ibid para 164. 
797 ibid para 165. 
798 ibid para. 170. 
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provide for disciplines in respect of performance requirements within their chapters on 
government procurement. NAFTA State Parties pioneered this approach by committing, in 
NAFTA Article 1006, not to “consider, seek or impose offsets” during the qualification and 
selection of suppliers, goods or services, the evaluation of bids or the award of contracts as part 
of procurement by a State Party. NAFTA Article 1006 defines offsets in an open-ended manner 
as any condition that encourages local development or improves a State Party’s balance-of-
payments accounts, including notably LCRs, technology licensing requirements, two elements 
vaguely described as “investment” and “counter-trade,” as well as “similar requirements.” 
Twenty-six IIAs use identical or nearly identical wording to prohibit “offsets” at any stage of 
government procurement and define “offsets” in a manner nearly identical to the definition put 
forward in NAFTA Article 1006: the term “offset” is defined by 21 TIPs799 in a manner nearly 
identical to the definition put forward in NAFTA Article 1006; many of these provisions merely 
add “undertakings” alongside “conditions” and “similar actions” alongside “similar requirements.” 
Article 9.5(3) of the Chile - Hong Kong FTA (2012), within the chapter on government 
procurement, prohibits some performance requirements in a manner nearly identical to the 
previously discussed “offset prohibition,” but without using the term “offset;” four American 
TIPs800 provide for very similar definitions of the term “offset,” but add requirements to use 
domestic suppliers in addition to LCRs applicable to goods and technology transfer 
requirements in addition to technology licensing requirements. 
NAFTA Article 1006 drew from the language of Article V(14)(h) of the GATT GPA (1979) and 
Article V(15)(h) of the Revised “Tokyo Round Code on Government Procurement” (1987)801 
                                                
799 American TIPs: Articles 9.2(4) and 9.20 of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Articles 15.2(5) and 15.15(7) of 
the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004); Articles 9.2(4) and 9.16 of the Morocco - U.S. FTA (2004); Articles 9.2(4) 
and 9.17 of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Articles 9.2(4) and 9.17 of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); 
Australian Agreements: Article 17.6 of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014); Articles 12.3(4) and 12.17 of the 
Australia - Korea FTA (2014); Articles 15.1(g) and 15.6 of the Australia-Chile FTA (2008). Canadian TIPs: 
Articles 1403(6) and 1417 of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); Articles 1403(6) and 1417 of the Canada - 
Colombia FTA (2008); Articles 16.01 and 16.04(6) of the Canada - Panama FTA (2010); Articles 17.1 and 
17.4(4) of the Canada - Honduras FTA (2013); Articles 19.1 and 19.4(6) of the Canada - EU CETA 
(2014); Article 15.1 and 15.4(6) of the TPP (2015); Articles 10.1 and 10.5(6) of the Canada - Ukraine FTA 
(2016). Chilean Agreements: Articles 16.01 and 16.04(3) of the Chile - Central American Common Market 
(“CACM”) (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) FTA (1999); Articles 138(j) 
and 140 of the Chile - EC Association Agreement (2002); Articles 49(d) and 51 of the Chile - European 
Free Trade Association (“EFTA”) FTA (2003); Articles 15.1 and 15.4 of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003); 
Articles 11.1 and 11.6 of the Trans-pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement between Brunei 
Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore (“P4 Agreement”) (2005); Article 139 of the Chile - 
Japan EPA (2007). Article 15.5(1)(b) of the TPP (2015) provides for transitional measures in respect of 
offsets imposed by developing countries. 
800 Articles 9.2(4) and 9.15 of the Bahrain - U.S. FTA (2004); Articles 9.2(4) and 9.15 of the Oman - U.S. 
FTA (2006); Articles 9.2(5) and 9.16 of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); Articles 9.2(5) and 9.16 of the 
Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006).  
801 Agreement on Government Procurement, adopted 12 April 1979, in force 1 January 1981 BISD 
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which stated that “entities should normally refrain from awarding contracts on the condition that 
the supplier provide offset procurement opportunities or similar conditions” and that “[l]icensing 
of technology should not normally be used as a condition of award.” 
NAFTA Article 1006 likely influenced the formulation of the prohibition of offsets under Article 
XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (“WTO GPA”) (1994)802 and Article 
IV(6) of the Revised WTO GPA (2012),803 as well as the definition of “offset” provided in footnote 
7 to Article XVI:1 of the WTO GPA (1994) and in Article I(l) of the Revised WTO GPA (2012), 
which are nearly identical to those of the NAFTA. The proximity between the WTO GPA (1994) 
and IIAs is laid bare by Article 13.3(1) of the Singapore - U.S. FTA (2007) and Article 17.3(1) of 
the Korea - U.S. FTA (2007) which incorporate notably the prohibition of offsets found in Article 
XVI:1 of the WTO GPA (1994).  
One needs to pay close attention to the sometimes strict and narrow conditions of applicability 
of disciplines within government procurement chapters of TIPs. In ADF v United States, having 
decided that NAFTA Article 1106 did not apply as a result of the exclusion of procurement by a 
Party pursuant to NAFTA Article 1108(8)(b), the Tribunal turned to NAFTA Chapter 10. NAFTA 
Article 1001(1)(a) provides that NAFTA Chapter 10 applies to measures “relating to 
procurement” conducted either by federal government entities set out in NAFTA Annex 1001.1a-
1 or by a state or provincial government entity set out in NAFTA Annex 1001.1a-3 in accordance 
with Article 1024. The United States then had listed 56 Federal Government entities in its 
Schedule. NAFTA Article 1024(1) commits State Parties to initiate further negotiations aimed at 
increasing the liberalisation of their respective government procurement markets prior to the end 
of 1998, while NAFTA Article 1024(3) invites State Parties to consider subjecting procurement 
by state and provincial government entities to the disciplines of Chapter 10. When the arbitral 
award was rendered in ADF v United States in January 2003, no state or provincial government 
entity was subject to NAFTA Chapter 10 since negotiations on such matters either had not 
                                                                                                                                                       
26S/33, 1235 UNTS 258, subsequently re-negotiated: the Protocol amending the Agreement on 
Government Procurement, adopted by the Committee on Government Procurement on 21 November 
1986, done at Geneva on 2 February 1987 and entered into force on 14 February 1988 [GATT GPA 
(1979) and Revised GATT GPA (1987)]. 
802 Agreement on Government Procurement, adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1996, 
1869 UNTS 508 (also available at 1915 UNTS 103). 
803 Annex to the Protocol Amending the Agreement on Government Procurement, adopted on 30 March 
2012, entered into force 6 April 2014: WTO Committee on Government Procurement, Adoption of the 
Results of the Negotiations Under Article XXIV:7 of the Agreement on Government Procurement, 
Following Their Verification and Review, as Required by the Ministerial Decision of 15 December 2011 
(GPA/112), paragraph 5; Action Taken by the Parties to the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement at a Formal Meeting of the Committee, at the Level of Geneva Heads of Delegations, on 30 
March 2012, GPA/113 (2 April 2012). 
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begun or had not been completed;804 moreover, no sub-federal governmental entity of any of the 
NAFTA Parties had voluntarily decided to subject its procurement practices to NAFTA Chapter 
10.805 The Tribunal decided that NAFTA Article 1006 did not apply since granting funds to the 
VDOT for the Interchange Project did not constitute government procurement by the FHWA 
pursuant to NAFTA Article 1001(5)(a), and since procurement by the VDOT was not subject to 
the disciplines of NAFTA Chapter 10 on the basis that neither the VDOT nor Virginia were listed 
in the United States’ Schedule to NAFTA Annex 1001.1a-3.806 
H. Reserving Existing or Future Non-Conforming Measures from PRPs  
While IIAs predominantly aim at attracting FDI notably by promoting a stable, predictable and 
transparent regulatory framework, host States attempt to soften the constraining character of 
intrusive commitments such as PRPs by preserving policy-making flexibility in areas deemed 
critical. Reservations for non-conforming measures within IIAs can provide much-needed 
regulatory space relief by softening the tight grip exerted on States by PRPs, notably in respect 
of sensitive economic and social matters of national sovereignty. Most IIAs operate on the basis 
of a “negative list” system: reservations play a critical role under such a system, since only non-
conforming measures that benefit from a reservation (in addition to exceptions) may lawfully 
derogate from the disciplines of an IIA. The importance of such relief is amplified in relation with 
the far-reaching nature of PRPs.807 This section investigates reservations as they relate to PRPs 
in order to assess their frequency and the variations within their formulations. 
1. Reserving Existing Non-Conforming Measures from PRPs 
A great number of IIAs specify that their PRPs do not apply to measures in respect of which 
State Parties have adopted reservations. Article 1108(1) of the NAFTA (1992)808 specifies that 
NAFTA Article 1106 does not apply to: any non-conforming measure that existed at the time of 
signing the NAFTA and that is maintained by the federal government (and is set out in Annex I 
or III), by a state or provincial government (and is set out in Annex I) or by a local government of 
a State Party (Article 1108(1)(a)); the continuation or prompt renewal of any such non-
conforming measure (Article 1108(1)(b)), as well as amendments to such measures, provided 
                                                
804 ADF (n 167) para 168. 
805 ibid para 168. 
806 ibid para 170. 
807 UNCTAD, “Preserving Flexibility in International Investment Agreements: the Use of Reservations” in 
UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development (2006), UN Doc 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/8, 5-12. 
808 Article 14(1) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, Article 9(1) of the 2004 Canada Model FIPA and Article 14(1) 
of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT reproduce this same approach. 
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that such amendments do “not decrease the conformity of the measure, as it existed 
immediately before the amendment” with NAFTA Article 1106 (Article 1108(1)(c)). NAFTA 
Article 1108(1) is replicated nearly without change in 34 IIAs among the ones surveyed as 
regards their respective PRPs.809 
Article IV(2)(a)(i) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994)810 follows closely NAFTA Article 1108(1), 
except that it mentions only a “Contracting Party” (as opposed to mentioning federal, state or 
provincial or local levels of government) regarding maintained existing non-conforming 
measures. Articles IV(2)(b) and (c) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) respectively reproduce 
NAFTA Article 1108(1)(b) with respect to the reserved continuation or prompt renewal of any 
such non-conforming measure, as well as NAFTA Article 1108(1)(c) with respect to 
amendments thereto. Sixteen Canadian FIPAs reproduce the approach of the Canada - Ukraine 
FIPA (1994).811 
While otherwise adopting the same structure and practically the same content as NAFTA Article 
1108(1), some IIAs will specify the application of reservations to maintained non-conforming 
                                                
809 American FTAs: Article 10.7(1) of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 15.12(1) of the Singapore - U.S. 
FTA (2003); Article 11.13(1) of the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.12(1) of the Morocco - U.S. FTA 
(2004); Article 10.13(1) of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.12(1) of the Oman - U.S. FTA 
(2006); Article 10.13(1) of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.13(1) of the Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); 
Article 10.13(1) of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 11.12(1) of the Korea - U.S. FTA (2007). 
American BITs: Article 14(1) of the U.S. - Uruguay BIT (2005); Article 14(1) of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT 
(2008). Australian Agreements: Article 10.9(1) of the Australia - Chile FTA  (2008); Article 9(1) of the 
CERTA Investment Protocol (2011); Article 14.10(1) of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014); Article 11.12(1) 
of the Australia - Korea FTA (2014). Canadian TIPs: Article G-08(1) of the Canada - Chile FTA (1996); 
Article 808(1) of the Canada - Peru FTA (2008); Article 809(1) of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008); 
Article 9.09(1) of the Canada - Panama FTA (2010); Article 10.9(1) of the Canada - Honduras FTA 
(2013); Article 8.9(1) of the Canada - Korea FTA (2014); Article 8.15(1) of the Canada - EU CETA (2014); 
Article 9.12(1) of the TPP (2015). Canadian FIPAs: Article 9(1) of the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006); Article 
9(1) of the Canada - Jordan FIPA (2009). Chilean Agreements: Article 9-09(1) of the Chile - Mexico FTA 
(1998); Article 10.9(1) of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003); Article 9.8(1) of the Chile - Colombia FTA (2006); 
Article 11.8(1) of the Chile - Peru FTA (2006); Article 79(1) of the Chile - Japan EPA (2007); Article 
10.10(1) of the Pacific Alliance Protocol (2014). Indian Agreements: Article 10.8(1) of the India - Korea 
CEPA (2009); Article 90(1) of the India - Japan CEPA (2011).  
810 Article 17(1) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA provides for reservations in the same way. 
811 Article IV(2) of the Canada - Trinidad and Tobago FIPA (1995); Article IV(2) of the Canada - 
Philippines FIPA (1995); Article IV(2) of the Canada - South Africa FIPA (1995, not in force); Article IV(2) 
of the Canada - Ecuador FIPA (1996); Article II(11)(a) to (c) of the Annex to the Canada - Venezuela 
FIPA (1996); Article IV(2)(a) to (c) of the Canada - Panama FIPA (1996); Article IV(2)(a) to (c) of the 
Canada - Egypt FIPA (1996); Article IV(2)(a) to (c) of the Barbados - Canada FIPA (1996); Article IV(2)(a) 
to (d) of the Canada - Thailand FIPA (1997); Article II(1)(a) and (b) of Annex I to the Canada - Croatia 
FIPA (1997); Article II(1)(a) to (c) of Annex I to the Canada - Lebanon FIPA (1997); Article IV(2)(a) to (c) 
of the Armenia - Canada FIPA (1997); Article II(1)(a) and (b) of Annex I to the Canada - Uruguay FIPA 
(1997); Article II(1)(a) and (b) of Annex I to the Canada - Costa Rica FIPA (1998); Article IV(1)(a) to (c) of 
the Canada - Latvia FIPA (2009); Article IV(1)(a) to (c) of the Canada - Romania FIPA (2009). Article 
IV(2) of the Canada - Philippines FIPA (1995) unfortunately includes a mistake, referring to Article IV 
twice and omitting to refer to Article V (which includes the PRP), a mistake which is not repeated in the 
French version thereof and which clearly makes reservations applicable to the PRP. 
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measures which existed on the date of entry into force of the IIA instead of on the date of its 
signature.812 Other IIAs may comprise reservations available only to specified State Parties: for 
example, Article 12 of AANZFTA Chapter 11 (Investment) (2009) provides for the same 
reservations to its PRP (which merely incorporates the WTO TRIMs Agreement) as the NAFTA, 
but only in respect of measures adopted by Lao PDR. State Parties may also opt for static, 
more predictable and more easily applicable reservations: for example, Article 7(1)(a) and 
7(1)(b) of SAFTA Revised Chapter 8 (Investment) (2011) uses wording identical to the NAFTA, 
but provides no reservation regarding amendments to existing non-conforming measures 
(NAFTA Article 1108(1)(c)).  
Article IV(2)(a)(ii) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) further renders the PRP inapplicable to 
any pre-existing and maintained and to any new, post-FIPA entry into force equity ownership 
limitations or prohibitions or senior management or director nationality requirements which apply 
to the disposition of a State Party’s equity interests in an existing State enterprise or 
governmental entity, or to the disposition of the assets of such State enterprise or entity. 
Twenty-eight Canadian FIPAs reproduce this exception using the same wording. 813  This 
exception is oddly positioned in the midst of these FIPAs’ reservations, 814  acts as an 
exception/exclusion and needlessly breaks up otherwise coherent provisions that lay out the 
framework applicable to measures excluded from the scope of PRPs through reservations. No 
compelling reason appears to justify its insertion in the midst amongst reservations on non-
conforming measures. This exception could have been inserted after the reservations on non-
conforming measures and in isolation from those provisions.  
                                                
812 Article 14.10(1)(a) and (b) of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014); note at the end of Article 90 of the 
India - Japan CEPA (2011). 
813 Article IV(2)(a)(ii) of the Canada - Trinidad and Tobago FIPA (1995); Article IV(2)(a)(ii) of the Canada - 
Philippines FIPA (1995); Article IV(2)(a)(ii) of the Canada - South Africa FIPA (1995); Article IV(2)(a)(ii) of 
the Canada - Ecuador FIPA (1996); Article II(11)(a)(ii) of the Annex to the Canada - Venezuela FIPA 
(1996); Article IV(2)(a)(ii) of the Canada - Panama FIPA (1996); Article IV(2)(a)(ii) of the Canada - Egypt 
FIPA (1996); Article IV(2)(a)(ii) of the Barbados - Canada FIPA (1996); Article IV(2)(b) of the Canada - 
Thailand FIPA (1997); Article II(1)(a) of Annex I to the Canada - Croatia FIPA (1997); Article II(1)(a)(ii) of 
Annex I to the Canada - Lebanon FIPA (1997); Article IV(2)(a)(ii) of the Armenia - Canada FIPA (1997); 
Article II(1)(a) of Annex I to the Canada - Uruguay FIPA (1997); Article II(1)(a) of Annex I to the Canada - 
Costa Rica FIPA (1998); Article IV(1)(a)(ii) of the Canada - Latvia FIPA (2009); Article IV(1)(a)(ii) of the 
Canada - Romania FIPA (2009); Article 16(1)(a)(2) of the Canada - Kuwait FIPA (2011); Article 
18(1)(a)(ii) of the Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); 
Article 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 17(1)(a)(ii) of the Canada - Nigeria 
FIPA (2014); Article 17(1)(a)(ii) of the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); Article 17(1)(a)(ii) of the Canada - 
Senegal FIPA (2014); Article 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Canada - Mali FIPA (2014); Article 16(1)(a)(ii) of the 
Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); Article 17(1)(a)(ii) of the Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 
17(1)(a)(ii) of the Canada - Guinea FIPA (2014); Article 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Canada - Hong Kong, China 
FIPA (2016). 
814 Except for Article II(1)(a) of Annex I to the Canada - Croatia FIPA (1997), which puts this exception 
ahead of the treaty provisions on reservations.  
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NAFTA Article 1108(2) allowed State Parties, for two years following NAFTA’s entry into force, 
to include within Annex I any existing and maintained state or provincial nonconforming 
measure; this provision has been reproduced only in five Canadian FIPAs.815   
2. The Unpredictable Scope of Open-Ended Reservations to PRPs in IIAs 
Six Canadian FIPAs816 reproduce in essence Article 1108(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the NAFTA 
(1992). However, these provisions on reservations depart from those of the NAFTA in an 
important fashion by not specifying that existing, non-conforming and maintained measures 
must be listed in an Annex to the FIPA; rather, the provisions within these six Canadian FIPAs 
stipulate that “to the extent possible” a State Party must set out in Annex I existing non-
conforming measures maintained at the national level, but doing so would be “without prejudice” 
to the provisions on non-conforming measures and for illustrative, guideline or information 
purposes only. Six Canadian FIPAs817 similarly differ from NAFTA Article 1108(1) and increase 
even further the uncertainty caused by their reservations by stipulating no obligation or 
recommendation for State Parties to set out in an Annex non-conforming measures that existed 
at the time of signing the FIPA. The approach to reservations within these 12 FIPAs causes 
significant unpredictability as to their outer reach by rendering lists of reserved measures by 
State Parties merely illustrative and non-limitative.  
In addition to non-exhaustive lists of non-conforming measures, the Canada - Tanzania FIPA 
(2013) integrates a distinct provision that further departs from the NAFTA. Article 16(1)(b) 
thereof ensures that the PRP does not apply to Tanzania’s incipient oil and gas legislation 
intended to ensure domestic supply, to impose foreign ownership restrictions and to stipulate 
requirements as to the composition of senior management and board of directors in these 
sectors by deeming such legislation an existing measure once in force and thus potentially 
benefitting from the inapplicability of the PRP reserved to existing, non-conforming and 
                                                
815 Article II(12) of the Annex to the Canada - Venezuela FIPA (1996); Article II(2) of Annex I to the 
Canada - Croatia FIPA (1997); Article II(2) of Annex I to the Canada - Lebanon FIPA (1997); Article II(2) 
of Annex I to the Canada - Uruguay FIPA (1997); Article II(2) of Annex I to the Canada - Costa Rica FIPA 
(1998). 
816 Articles 16(1)(a)(i), (c) and (d) and 16(2) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); Articles 16(2) and 
16(1)(a)(i), (b) and (c) of the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014); Articles 17(1)(a)(i), (b) and (c) and 17(2) of 
the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); Articles 17(1)(a)(i), (b) and (c) and 17(2) of the Canada - Senegal FIPA 
(2014); Articles 16(1)(a)(i), (b) and (c) and 16(2) of the Canada - Mali FIPA (2014); Articles 16(1)(a)(i), (b) 
and (c) and 16(2) of the Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014). 
817 Article 16(1)(a)(1), (b) and (c) of the Canada - Kuwait FIPA (2011); Article 18(1)(a)(i), (b) and (c) of the 
Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 17(1)(a)(i), (b) and (c) of the Canada - Nigeria FIPA (2014); Article 
17(1)(a)(i), (b) and (c) of the Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 17(1)(a)(i), (b) and (c) of the 





3. Sectoral Reservations to PRPs for Existing and Future Non-Conforming Measures 
Article 1108(3) of the NAFTA (1992)818 excludes from the scope of NAFTA Article 1106 any 
measure that State Parties adopt or maintain in sectors, subsectors or activities set out in Annex 
II, thus providing reservations for both existing and future measures; 64 IIAs among those 
surveyed reproduce that same type of reservation to their PRPs.819  
Some IIAs confine such reservation to specified State Parties: for example, Article 12(2) of 
AANZFTA Chapter 11 (Investment) (2009) provides that the PRP (Article 5) does not apply to 
any of Lao PDR’s measures adopted or maintained with respect to sectors, sub-sectors, or 
                                                
818 Article 14(2) of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, Article 9(2) of the 2004 Canada Model FIPA, Article 14(2) of 
the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and Article 17(2) of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA also reproduce this approach. 
819 American FTAs: Article 10.7(2) of the Chile - U.S. FTA (2003); Article 15.12(2) of the Singapore - U.S. 
FTA (2003); Article 11.13(2) of the Australia - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.12(2) of the Morocco - U.S. FTA 
(2004); Article 10.13(2) of the CAFTA-DR - U.S. FTA (2004); Article 10.12(2) of the Oman - U.S. FTA 
(2006); Article 10.13(2) of the Peru - U.S. FTA (2006); Article 10.13(2) of the Colombia - U.S. FTA (2006); 
Article 10.13(2) of the Panama - U.S. FTA (2007); Article 11.12(2) of the Korea - U.S. FTA (2007). 
American BITs: Article 14(2) of the U.S. - Uruguay BIT (2005); Article 14(2) of the Rwanda - U.S. BIT 
(2008). Australian Agreements: Article 14.10(2) of the Australia - Japan EPA (2014); Article 11.12(2) of 
the Australia - Korea FTA (2014); Article 7(2) of SAFTA Revised Chapter 8 (Investment) (2011); Article 
10.9(2) of the Australia-Chile FTA (2008); Article 9(2) of the CERTA Investment Protocol (2011). 
Canadian TIPs: Article G-08(2) of the Canada - Chile FTA (1996); Article 808(2) of the Canada - Peru 
FTA (2008); Article 809(2) of the Canada - Colombia FTA (2008); Article 9.09(2) of the Canada - Panama 
FTA (2010); Article 10.9(2) of the Canada - Honduras FTA (2013); Article 8.9(2) of the Canada - Korea 
FTA (2014); Article 8.15(2) of the Canada - EU CETA (2014); Article 9.12(2) of the TPP (2015). Canadian 
FIPAs: Article IV(2)(d) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994); Article IV(2)(d) of the Canada - Trinidad and 
Tobago FIPA (1995); Article IV(2)(d) of the Canada - Philippines FIPA (1995); Article IV(2) of the Canada 
- South Africa FIPA (1995, not in force); Article IV(2)(d) of the Canada - Ecuador FIPA (1996); Article 
II(11)(d) of the Annex to the Canada - Venezuela FIPA (1996) (lists excluded sectors instead of referring 
to an Annex); Article IV(2)(d) of the Canada - Panama FIPA (1996); Article IV(2)(d) of the Canada - Egypt 
FIPA (1996); Article IV(2)(d) of the Barbados - Canada FIPA (1996); Article IV(3) of the Canada - 
Thailand FIPA (1997); Article II(1)(c) of Annex I to the Canada - Croatia FIPA (1997) (lists excluded 
sectors instead of referring to an Annex); Article II(1)(d) of Annex I to the Canada - Lebanon FIPA (1997) 
(lists excluded sectors instead of referring to an Annex); Article IV(2)(d) of the Armenia - Canada FIPA 
(1997); Article II(1)(c) of Annex I to the Canada - Uruguay FIPA (1997) (which lists excluded sectors 
instead of referring to an Annex); Article II(1)(c) of Annex I to the Canada - Costa Rica FIPA (1998) (lists 
excluded sectors instead of referring to an Annex); Article 9(2) of the Canada - Peru FIPA (2006); Article 
IV(1)(d) of the Canada - Latvia FIPA (2009); Article IV(1)(d) of the Canada - Romania FIPA (2009); Article 
9(2) of the Canada - Jordan FIPA (2009); Article 16(2) of the Canada - Kuwait FIPA (2011); Article 18(2) 
of the Benin - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 16(3) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); Article 16(3) of 
the Cameroon - Canada FIPA (2014); Article 17(2) of the Canada - Nigeria FIPA (2013); Article 17(3) of 
the Canada - Serbia FIPA (2014); Article 17(3) of the Canada - Senegal FIPA (2014); Article 16(3) of the 
Canada - Mali FIPA (2014); Article 16(3) of the Canada - Côte d’Ivoire FIPA (2014); Article 17(2) of the 
Burkina Faso - Canada FIPA (2013); Article 17(2) of the Canada - Guinea FIPA (2013); Article 16(2) of 
the Canada - Hong Kong, China FIPA (2016). Chilean Agreements: Article 10.10(2) of the Pacific Alliance 
Protocol (2014); Article 79(2) of the Chile - Japan EPA (2007); Article 9.8(2) of the Chile - Colombia FTA 
(2006); Article 11.8(2) of the Chile - Peru FTA (2006); Article 10.9(2) of the Chile - Korea FTA (2003); 
Article 9-09(2) of the Chile - Mexico FTA (1998). Indian Agreements: Article 10.8(2) of the India - Korea 
CEPA (2009); Article 90(2) of the India - Japan CEPA (2011). 
 
 175 
activities set out in Lao PDR’s Schedule to List II. Other IIAs have confined such reservation to 
measures that existed at the time of signing the IIA: for example, Article 6.16(2)(b) of the India - 
Singapore CECA (2005) provides that the PRP (Article 6.23) does not apply to reservations 
made in respect of the measures maintained in the sectors, sub-sectors or activities as specified 
in Annexes 6A and 6B; the language used suggests that the reservations can apply only in 
respect of maintained non-conforming measures which existed at the time of signing the India - 
Singapore CECA (2005).  
Accordingly, 66 IIAs among those surveyed specify that their PRPs do not apply to measures in 
respect of which State Parties have adopted reservations. The India - Singapore CECA (2005) 
is the only IIA to have opted only for sectoral reservations without resorting to any language 
similar to NAFTA Article 1108(1). Within these IIAs, noteworthy departures from the NAFTA 
model for reservations include: extending reservations to maintained non-conforming measures 
which existed on the date of entry into force of an IIA instead of on the date of its signature; 
restricting the availability of reservations to specified (as opposed to all) State Parties; the 
absence of provisions pertaining to the consequences of amending existing non-conforming 
measures on the reservations in their favour; and relieving State Parties from any duty to 
exhaustively identify and list existing, non-conforming and maintained measures within Annexes 
to IIAs. 
4. The Unpredictable Application of Reservations to PRPs in IIAs  
Given the complexity of the terms used therein, interpreting and applying reservations to PRPs 
raise the delicate issue of predictability of international investment law. The Majority Award in 
Mobil & Murphy v Canada demonstrates the risk that arbitral tribunals may interpret reservations 
in unexpected ways and defeat carve-outs meant to protect and validate certain measures from 
the rigors of investment disciplines, including PRPs. Even though the ripple effect of the Majority 
Award and Dissent is hard to assess, as few investor–State disputes have surfaced regarding 
reservations under IIAs, the Mobil & Murphy v Canada arbitration is guaranteed to generate 
further shock waves when other disputes based on PRPs arise. 
Canada had argued that should the Mobil & Murphy Tribunal decide that the 2004 Guidelines 
violated NAFTA Article 1106, they were nonetheless exempt from Article 1106 by virtue of a 
reservation: Canada had taken a reservation for the Accord Acts, under whose authority the 
2004 Guidelines were adopted, in its Schedule to NAFTA Annex I as provided by NAFTA Article 
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1108(1)(a)(i) for existing and maintained non-conforming measures.820 
The Tribunal agreed with Mobil & Murphy and with Canada that the 2004 Guidelines did not 
amend the Accord Acts and confirmed the inapplicability of NAFTA Article 1108(1)(c) pertaining 
to amendments to non-conforming measures.821 NAFTA Article 1108(1)(c) causes a “ratchet 
effect” by automatically and irreversibly incorporating an amendment to a non-conforming 
measure into a reservation; an amendment to a non-conforming measure may thus erode the 
initial scope of the reservation should it reduce the non-complying character of the non-
conforming measure.822 
NAFTA Article (2)(f)(ii) of Annex I stipulates that the measure set out in an Annex I reservation 
“includes any subordinate measure adopted or maintained under the authority of and consistent 
with the measure.” [Emphasis added.] In spite of different wording, the Mobil & Murphy Majority 
attributed a “ratchet effect” to Article (2)(f)(ii) of NAFTA Annex I similar to that of NAFTA Article 
1108(1)(c). 
In deciding that the 2004 Guidelines could not benefit from a reservation that shielded the 
Accord Acts from NAFTA Article 1106, the Mobil & Murphy Majority rendered a controversial 
award in two main respects. First, the Mobil & Murphy Majority reduced regulatory flexibility by 
narrowing the scope of Canada’s reservation. Second, the Mobil & Murphy Majority reduced the 
predictability of international investment law by developing a complex analytical approach to 
assessing the validity of new measures under reservations.  
The Mobil & Murphy Majority decided that the ordinary meaning of “the measure,” as used at 
the end of Article (2)(f)(ii) of NAFTA Annex I, included prior subordinate measures: the Mobil & 
Murphy Majority interpreted “the measure” as meaning “the legal framework.”823 It is apparent 
that the Mobil & Murphy Majority assigned a meaning to the expression “the measure” well 
beyond its ordinary meaning.824  
                                                
820 ibid paras 105-106. 
821 Mobil & Murphy (Majority) (n 13) paras 307-308. 
822 UNCTAD, “Reservations” (n 807) 19, fn 5, 35. 
823 Mobil & Murphy (Majority) (n 13) paras 394, 410. 
824 According to Dissenting Arbitrator Sands, the concept of “legal framework” was “plucked out of the air” 
and its use meant discarding the ordinary meaning of the terms “the measure” as used in Article 2(f)(ii) of 
NAFTA Annex I, which refers only to the non-conforming measure, here the Accord Acts, and not to its 
subordinate measures: see Mobil Investments Canada Inc and Murphy Oil Corporation v Canada, ICSID 
Case No ARB(AF)/07/4, Partial Dissenting Opinion, Professor Philippe Sands QC (17 May 2012) paras 
28, 30-33. (Dissenting Arbitrator Sands was likely referring to the nearly identical federal and provincial 
Accord Acts as both were deemed covered by Canada’s reservation: Mobil & Murphy (Majority) (n 13) 
paras 35, 46, 248 and fn 272.) 
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The Accord Acts granted the Board discretionary power to issue guidelines regarding benefits 
plans.825 The Board had used that discretion to issue guidelines applicable to benefits plans in 
1986, 826  1987 827  and 1988. 828  These guidelines had couched the requirements for R&D 
expenditures in the Province in general terms and only required project proponents to submit 
proposed expenditures. Accordingly, the consistency of the new subordinate measure at issue 
(the 2004 Guidelines) was to be tested against the “legal framework” that existed prior to the 
2004 Guidelines which consisted of the existing non-conforming measure (the Accord Acts) plus 
subordinate measures (the pre-2004 benefits plans and related Board decisions) that had 
preceded the new subordinate measure.829 By using the existing “legal framework”830 as the 
base reference for the consistency test, the Mobil & Murphy Majority attributed a more stringent 
ratchet effect to Article (2)(f)(ii) of NAFTA Annex I in respect of new subordinate measures than 
that of NAFTA Article 1108(1)(c) in respect of amendments. 
Moreover, the Mobil & Murphy Majority assigned an expansive ordinary meaning to the terms 
“consistent with” used in Article (2)(f)(ii) of NAFTA Annex I, which stipulates that a new 
subordinate measure must be adopted “under the authority of and consistent with” the non-
conforming measure in order to remain within the scope of a reservation. Despite 
acknowledging the distinctiveness of the legal test under NAFTA Article 1108(1)(c),831 which 
mandates that an amendment to a non-conforming measure “not decrease the conformity” of 
the non-conforming measure, the Mobil & Murphy Majority construed the consistency test 
applicable to new subordinate measures in a way nearly identical to the “non-decreasing 
conformity” test applicable to amendments.832 The Mobil & Murphy Majority erroneously equated 
both treaty provisions notwithstanding their divergent wordings because of its concern that State 
Parties might circumvent the seemingly more demanding test for amendments by adopting a 
“disguised amendment, executed via a subordinate measure that was to unduly expand the 
non-conforming features of a reservation.”833  
The Mobil & Murphy Majority formulated the consistency test under Article (2)(f)(ii) of NAFTA 
                                                
825 Mobil & Murphy (Majority) (n 13) paras 37–8. 
826 ibid para 41. 
827 ibid para 42. 
828 ibid para 44. 
829 ibid paras 309-310, 315, 317, 324-327, 333, 336, 338, 380, 410. 
830 ibid para 394. 
831 ibid paras 305-307. 
832 Dissenting Arbitrator Sands insisted on distinguishing the authority and consistency tests for new 
subordinate measures (Article 2(f)(ii) of NAFTA Annex I) from the “non-decreasing conformity” test 
applicable to amendments (NAFTA Article 1108(1)(c)): see Mobil & Murphy (Dissent) (n 824) paras 21, 
24. 
833 Mobil & Murphy (Majority) (n 13) para 341. 
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Annex I as “whether the new measures enlarge [or unduly expand] the non-conforming features 
of the reservation”834 and “whether the changes are imposing such additional burdens that are 
of an inhospitable, inharmonious, incompatible, contradictory nature, and are otherwise 
inconsistent with the existing legal framework.”835 In other words, the new subordinate measure 
must not “alter the legal framework in a fundamental manner” in order to remain “consistent 
with” the measure.836 
The Mobil & Murphy Majority decided that the combination of additional spending requirements, 
new reporting and preauthorisation requirements, and a new funding mechanism amounted to 
“a substantial adjustment to the regulatory framework” that translated into a fundamentally 
different kind of regulatory oversight 837  whose additional burdens exceeded the requisite 
consistency threshold. 838  The 2004 Guidelines imposed “quantitatively and qualitatively 
different, and more burdensome” requirements,839 resulting in a “substantial expansion”840 that 
went beyond a mere change in “character.”841 Accordingly, the Mobil & Murphy Majority rejected 
Canada’s arguments regarding the application of its reservation under NAFTA Article 1108.842 
In order to reach this decision, the Mobil & Murphy Majority disregarded three of its own crucial 
acknowledgments which should have altered its approach to Article (2)(f)(ii) of NAFTA Annex I. 
First, that there exists no “statutory bright line test” for the consistency of additional spending 
requirements843 and that taken in isolation, neither a mere change in methodology,844 nor a 
requirement for additional spending would breach the consistency test.845 Second, reservations 
serve a specific purpose as alleged by Canada: Article (2)(f)(ii) of NAFTA Annex I meant to 
preserve “flexibility for the NAFTA Parties in sensitive areas through effective reservations.”846 
Third, NAFTA State Parties explicitly agreed that a new subordinate measure “could impose 
some additional and/or more onerous commitments than those that were imposed by the earlier 
measure.”847 
                                                
834 ibid paras 336, 341, 411. Dissenting Arbitrator Sands criticised the Majority’s aversion toward “undue” 
regulatory changes: see Mobil & Murphy (Dissent) (n 824) paras 27-29, 43. 
835 Mobil & Murphy (Majority) (n 13) para 394. 
836 ibid para 410. 
837 ibid para 398, 404. 
838 ibid para 410. 
839 ibid para 409. 
840 ibid para 401. 
841 ibid para 339. 
842 ibid para 490(3). 
843 ibid para 401. 
844 ibid para 398. 
845 ibid para 400. 
846 ibid para 323. 
847 ibid para 374, 400. Dissenting Arbitrator Sands disapproved the Majority’s disregard of NAFTA Parties’ 
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The Mobil & Murphy Majority acknowledged that its consistency test entailed holding State 
Parties accountable to an “evolving legal and regulatory framework”848 and admitted to not being 
troubled by “the implication that consistency, as well as authority, could be evaluated by 
reference to a different mix of measures.”849 While the standard for the consistency test of the 
2004 Guidelines could be equated to “the previously existing legal framework,”850 in this case 
the 2004 Guidelines were to be tested only against the non-conforming measure (the Accord 
Acts) to be deemed “under the authority” of “the measure.”851 
The Mobil & Murphy Majority explained the difference in standards between the consistency and 
authority tests on the basis that here the prior subordinate measures (the pre-2004 benefits 
plans and related Board decisions) and the new subordinate measure (the 2004 Guidelines) 
were authorised separately by the non-conforming measure (the Accord Acts) “in a vertical 
relationship” to the non-conforming measure and that the prior subordinate measures and the 
new subordinate measure were not “in a vertical relationship with each other.”852 The Mobil & 
Murphy Majority added a layer of complexity by deciding that authority constituted “a matter of 
domestic law,”853 while consistency constituted a NAFTA treaty-based test to be applied under 
international law after having considered relevant national laws.854 
By contrast, Dissenting Arbitrator Sands described reserved measures as providing a perennial 
ceiling that remained in place indefinitely absent any State Party commitment to phase out or 
liberalise non-conforming measures. 855  Dissenting Arbitrator Sands viewed Canada’s 
reservation in respect of the Accord Acts as broad, open-ended and not limited in time,856 which 
suggested the need to preserve the possibility for regulatory change as an “evolutionary 
process.”857 Dissenting Arbitrator Sands took the view that Article 2(f)(ii) of NAFTA Annex I aims 
at ensuring that new subordinate measures also benefit from a reservation taken for their 
                                                                                                                                                       
unanimous statements on this matter: see Mobil & Murphy (Dissent) (n 824) para 24. 
848 Mobil & Murphy (Majority) (n 13) para 338. Dissenting Arbitrator Sands criticised the silence of the 
Majority regarding practical difficulties stemming from a “continually evolving standard” for the 
consistency test in respect of new subordinate measures: see Mobil & Murphy (Dissent) (n 824) paras 35-
36. 
849 Mobil & Murphy (Majority) (n 13) para 335. Dissenting Arbitrator Sands argued that authority and 
consistency within Article 2(f)(ii) of NAFTA Annex I are connected and must both be determined by 
reference to the same standard and the same measure (here, the Accord Acts): see Mobil & Murphy 
(Dissent) (n 817) paras 22, 34, 41. 
850 Mobil & Murphy (Majority) (n 13) paras 398, 404. 
851 ibid paras 330, 332.  
852 ibid para 330. 
853 ibid para 350. 
854 ibid paras 355-356, 407-408. 
855 Mobil & Murphy (Dissent) (n 824) para 37. 
856 ibid paras 14-15. 
857 ibid para 43. 
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source non-conforming measure, and not that new subordinate measures would fall within the 
scope of prior subordinate measures.858 Accordingly, Dissenting Arbitrator Sands accepted 
Canada’s arguments regarding NAFTA Article 1108 and considered that Mobil and Murphy 
were precluded from raising a violation of NAFTA Article 1106 in respect of the 2004 Guidelines 
which could benefit from the reservation enacted in respect of the Accord Acts.859 
The fact that the United States and Mexico each made two Party submissions to the Tribunal 
under NAFTA Article 1128 underscores the importance of reservations and of the Mobil & 
Murphy v Canada decision for the NAFTA system as a whole. 860  Despite the Tribunal’s 
invitation, both Mexico and the United States declined to make submissions to the Tribunal as to 
whether the terms “the measure,” as used at the end of Article (2)(f)(ii) of NAFTA Annex I, 
included only the non-conforming measure or whether it also included prior subordinate 
measures.861  
NAFTA Article 1132 offers a disputing party that asserts a reservation as a defence the right to 
request that a tribunal request an interpretation from the Free Trade Commission on the 
relevant reservation. The Tribunal and Canada’s silence over Article 1132 suggests that 
Canada made the strategic decision not to request such interpretation and leaves unanswered 
the question of whether NAFTA State Parties agreed on how to interpret reservations. 
Although States can take solace from the Mobil & Murphy Dissent, which weakened the 
persuasiveness of the Mobil & Murphy Majority Award and provides useful ammunition for 
States in formulating future defences based on reservations, the Mobil & Murphy Majority Award 
should raise awareness among States when drafting reservations within IIAs. States should 
avoid treaty provisions on reservations that cause ratchet effects beyond their intended effects. 
States should also beware when drafting treaty provisions that govern the following categories 
of measures: amendments to non-conforming measures, non-conforming measures subsequent 
to the related reserved measures or non-conforming measures subordinate to the related 
reserved measures. The provisions governing such changes to non-conforming measures 
should not involuntarily turn out to cause ratchet effects that shrink the scope of the relevant 
reservation. 
The Mobil & Murphy Majority Award complicated the ability of States to concretely avail 
themselves of reservations regarding non-conforming measures. The Mobil & Murphy Majority 
                                                
858 ibid paras 28, 32-33. 
859 ibid para 3. 
860 Mobil & Murphy (Majority) (n 13) paras 249, 255; Mobil & Murphy (Dissent) (n 824) para 4. 
861 Mobil & Murphy (Majority) (n 13) paras 318-319. 
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set out to evaluate the validity of new subordinate measures by reference to a different mix of 
measures, and to hold State Parties accountable to an evolving legal and regulatory framework 
upon their adoption of new subordinate measures. This approach stirs up a thick layer of 
uncertainty that States can pierce through only with great care upon adopting new subordinate 
measures. Based on the Mobil & Murphy Majority’s approach, States cannot ascertain the 
validity of new subordinate measures simply by reference to the non-conforming measure 
provisions in their TIPs or to the related Annexes that accompany such TIPs. Rather, States 
would need to establish up-to-date registers of non-conforming measures and subordinate 
measures for each reservation taken under their TIPs in order to ensure compliance of every 
new subordinate measure with the totality of such prior (non-conforming plus subordinate) 
measures. The complexity of such an undertaking evokes a chillingly burdensome and costly 
scenario for States. Should States adopt new subordinate measures without having diligently 
verified whether these measures are consistent and under the authority of the evolving legal 
and regulatory framework relevant to a given reservation, they risk facing challenges from 
investors alleging that these measures fall outside the scope of a given reservation.  
VI. The Disruptive Broadening of PRPs by Virtue of MFN Treatment 
Clauses 
Generally speaking, MFN treatment clauses in the context of IIAs can be construed as 
guaranteeing foreign investors and investments covered by a basic treaty treatment no less 
favourable than that afforded to foreign investors and investments of any third country.862 By 
their very nature, MFN treatment clauses ensure that treatment accorded by a granting State to 
entities or persons that are nationals of a beneficiary State is not less favourable than treatment 
extended by the granting State to entities or persons that are nationals of a third State.863 MFN 
treatment clauses have been variously described as an insurance policy against poor 
draftsmanship, 864  as providing a rampart against discrimination, 865  thus ensuring equal 
competitive conditions between foreign investors from different countries, 866  and as a 
harmonisation device regarding the legal regime applicable to foreign investment among 
                                                
862 UNCTAD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements II, UN Doc UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/1 (2010) 13. 
863 Draft Article 5 of the International Law Commission Final Draft Articles with Commentaries on Most-
Favoured-Nation Clauses (1978), Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1978, Vol. II, Part 
Two, 21.  
864 Georg Schwarzenberger, “The Most-Favoured Nation Standard in British State Practice” 22 Brit. Y.B. 
Int’l L. 96 (1945) 99. 
865 Acconci (n 20) 365. See also Tony Cole, “The Boundaries of Most Favored Nation Treatment in 
International Investment Law” 33 Mich. J. Int'l L. 537 (Spring 2012) 540 and references in fn 13. 




The following hypothetical example raises questions that could arise upon attempting to apply 
an MFN treatment clause to a PRP. Article 8 of the U.S. - Uruguay BIT (2005) constitutes a 
comprehensive PRP applicable to a detailed list of performance requirements. Article 4 of the 
U.S. - Uruguay BIT entitles an investor and its investments to treatment no less favourable than 
that afforded to investors of a third State in a straightforward manner. Let’s suppose that a 
Uruguayan investor must comply with an LER imposed by the United States, a measure not 
prohibited under Article 8 of the U.S. - Uruguay BIT. Let’s further suppose that none of the 
reservations or restrictions within the U.S. - Uruguay BIT constrain the application of Article 4 to 
this hypothetical example. Could the Uruguayan investor invoke Article II(6) of the Ukraine - 
U.S. BIT (1994), assuming that he would successfully argue that its open-ended PRP prohibits 
LERs, and avail himself of its treatment more favourable than that afforded by Article 8 of the 
U.S. - Uruguay BIT? This question raises two sets of issues: first, to what extent can an MFN 
treatment clause serve to import substantive protections from a third treaty? And second, can a 
PRP from a third treaty that pre-dates a basic treaty nevertheless be imported into the 
subsequent basic treaty?  
In this hypothetical example, one would expect an arbitral tribunal to apply Article 4 (the MFN 
treatment clause) so as to afford the Uruguayan investor a more favourable PRP given the 
absence of any explicit wording to the contrary in the U.S. - Uruguay BIT. Nevertheless, a 
nascent trend among arbitral tribunals of restricting the applicability of MFN treatment clauses in 
respect of substantive protection standards warrants closer analysis. The following sections 
analyse the implications for PRPs of applying MFN treatment clauses to substantive protection 
standards, as well as the possibility of importing such standards from a prior third treaty. 
A. A Consensus Toward Applying MFN Treatment Clauses to Substantive 
Protections 
The controversy surrounding MFN treatment clauses, which erupted in 2000 with the decision of 
the Maffezini Tribunal,868 has been characterised as an evenly split and “fiercely contested no-
man’s land”869 subject to a “lively debate.”870 This controversy appears to have focused almost 
                                                
867 Cole (n 858) 539.  
868 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal 
on Objections to Jurisdiction (25 January 2000). 
869  Garanti Koza LLP v Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/20, Decision on the Objection to 
Jurisdiction for Lack of Consent (3 July 2013) paras 40-41. 
870 Daimler Financial Services AG v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award (22 August 
2012) para 219. 
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exclusively on ISDS provisions construed as pertaining to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and 
to the consent of States to arbitration.871  
Indeed, scholars are in broad agreement that MFN treatment clauses confer upon investors “the 
right to benefit from substantive guarantees contained in third treaties.” 872  The “no less 
favourable treatment” that MFN treatment clauses generally guarantee consists notably of the 
substantive rights conferred to investors by IIAs.873 In stark contrast to their application of MFN 
treatment clauses to ISDS provisions, arbitral tribunals had until recently developed a 
consensus to the effect that MFN treatment clauses apply so as to import into the basic treaty 
any and all substantive protection provisions found within third treaties.874 As sole generally 
recognised caveat, MFN treatment clauses had to comply with the ejusdem generis principle 
and could accordingly only operate in respect of matters within third treaties that belong to the 
same subject matter or category as those dealt with by the basic treaty.875 
MFN treatment clauses apply to substantive protections in two main ways. First, MFN treatment 
                                                
871 See e.g., ILC MFN Study Group Report (n 22) para 80; Garanti Koza (n 869) paras 40-41; see fn 53 
thereof for a list of Tribunals applying an MFN treatment clause to ISDS provisions, and see fn 54 thereof 
for a list of Tribunals refusing to apply an MFN treatment clause to ISDS provisions; see Daimler (n 870) 
para 268. See also: Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company 
v The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (28 April 2011) para 565; 
EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and León Participaciones Argentinas S.A. v Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Award (11 June 2012) para 935. 
872 Dumberry (n 20) 4 and fn 15, quoting the following scholars and sources: Dolzer and Schreuer (n 6) 
190-1; Acconci (n 20) 383, 401-4; Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment 
Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer, 2009) 228-9; August Reinisch, “Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment” in Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), International Investment Law: A Handbook (CH Beck, 
Hart, Nomos 2015) 820; Schill (n 21) 139-40; Nick Gallus, “Plama v Bulgaria and the Scope of Investment 
Treaty MFN Clauses” (2005) 3 Transnat’l Disp. Mgmt.; Institut de droit international, “Legal Aspects of 
Recourse to Arbitration by an Investor against the Authorities of the Host State under Inter-State Treaties” 
74 Annuaire Institut de droit international (2011) 504; Martins Paparinskis, The International Minimum 
Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment (OUP, 2013) 134.  
873 Dumberry (n 20) 4-5 and ILC MFN Study Group Report (n 22) para 98, both quoting Telenor Mobile 
Communications AS v Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/04/15, Award (13 September 2006) 
para 92; Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/04/14, Award (8 
December 2008) para 168. 
874 See e.g., Daimler (n 870) para 219 fn 376; Paushok (n 871) para 565; Dumberry (n 20) 5, quoting 
Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/87/3, Award (27 June 1990) para 54, and quoting Vladimir Berschader and Moïse Berschader v 
Russian Federation, SCC Case No 080/2004, Award (9 June 2006) para 179; HICEE B.V. v The Slovak 
Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-11, Partial Award (23 May 2011) para 149; Garanti Koza (n 
869) para 54; RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v The Russian Federation, SCC Case No. V079/2005, Award on 
Jurisdiction (1 October 2007), paras 131-132. 
875 See e.g., ILC MFN Study Group Report (n 22) paras 15-16, 35, 214; UNCTAD MFN (2010) (n 862) 24-
25; see also Maffezini (n 868) para 56; CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Republic of Argentina, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (12 May 2005) para 377; Hochtief AG v The Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on Jurisdiction (24 October 2011) para 77; Paushok (n 871) para 565; 
Garanti Koza (n 869) para 54; Hesham Talaat M Al-Warraq v Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Final 
Award (15 December 2014) para 551. 
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clauses can serve to incorporate into a basic treaty substantive protections that it lacks.876 The 
absence of a specific type of substantive protection from the basic treaty cannot be interpreted 
in and of itself as a refusal of its import through MFN treatment clauses.877 Second, at their very 
core, MFN treatment clauses seek to provide better treatment than what the basic treaty 
otherwise already guarantees.878 MFN treatment clauses can thus lead to more favourable 
provisions of a third treaty superseding existing provisions of a basic treaty.879  
Based on their prevailing understanding, MFN treatment clauses can operate so as to 
incorporate into a basic treaty a PRP from a third treaty while the basic treaty lacks a PRP, or to 
incorporate into a basic treaty (in our example, the U.S. - Uruguay BIT) a more favourable PRP 
from a third treaty (in our example, the Ukraine - U.S. BIT). However, the following section 
appraises recent arbitral awards that exemplify a trend of narrowly construing MFN treatment 
clauses. 
B. Cracks in the Consensus: Restricting the Application of MFN Treatment 
Clauses to Substantive Protections and Implications for PRPs 
Multiple MFN treatment clauses exhibit no explicit restrictions that would preclude importing 
PRPs from third treaties into a basic treaty that comprises no PRP or a less protective PRP. The 
Al-Warraq Tribunal summed up the two alternatives available to arbitral tribunals having to apply 
MFN treatment clauses. First, tribunals can follow the literal wording of MFN treatment clauses 
more closely, thereby expanding their application to all areas covered by third treaties subject to 
explicit exclusions and to the ejusdem generis rule.880 Second, tribunals can limit the operation 
                                                
876 Mr. Franck Charles Arif v Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, Award (8 April 2013) 
paras 395-396; EDF (n 871) paras 929, 931-938; ATA Construction, Industrial and Trading Company v 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2, Award (18 May 2010) para 125 fn 16; 
Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. RB/03/29, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (14 November 2005) paras 227-235; MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v 
Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award (25 May 2004) paras 100, 104, 179, 183, 187, 197, 204; Rumeli 
Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri AS v Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No 
ARB/05/16, Award (29 July 2008) paras 558, 581, 573-575, 591; L.E.S.I. S.p.A. and ASTALDI S.p.A. v 
People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case No ARB/05/3, Award (12 November 2008), paras 
150-151; Al-Warraq (n 875) paras 383, 540, 545, 551, 554. 
877 Dumberry (n 20) 5, quoting Bayindir (n 876) paras 153, 157; see also L.E.S.I. (n 876), paras 150-151.  
878 ILC MFN Study Group Report (n 22) para 115. 
879 Accession Mezzanine Capital L.P. and Danubius Kereskedöház Vagyonkezelö Zrt. v Hungary, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/3, Decision on Respondent's Objection under Arbitration Rule 41(5) (16 January 2013) 
paras 64, 73-74 and fn 56; CME Czech Republic B.V. v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award 
(14 March 2003), para 500; Paushok (n 871), paras 242, 254, 570-573, 596, 602, 609. See e.g., 
UNCTAD MFN (2010) (n 862) 58-60, where UNCTAD discusses two arbitral awards (AAPL v Sri Lanka (n 
874) and ADF (n 167)) in which attempts to invoke MFN treatment clauses in order to override 
substantive protections within basic treaties were unsuccessful on the basis that claimants failed to prove 
more favourable treatment within third treaties.  
880 Al-Warraq (n 875) para 544. 
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of MFN treatment clauses by superimposing unwritten restrictions “to the extent that a provision 
in another treaty is compatible in principle with the scheme negotiated by the parties in the basic 
treaty and departs from it only in a detail consistent with the broader scheme.”881 The Al-Warraq 
Tribunal clearly opted for the first alternative by importing an FET clause from a prior third 
treaty, which the basic treaty lacked.882 The first alternative appears to predominate in decisions 
of other tribunals.  
However, future arbitral tribunals might buckle under the pressure exercised by the systemic 
implications of applying MFN treatment clauses literally. They might then be tempted to follow 
the second alternative and turn to previous awards by arbitral tribunals that created unwritten 
restrictions when applying or refusing to apply MFN treatment clauses to ISDS provisions. For 
example, UNCTAD relied on the decision of the Maffezini Tribunal, on the application of MFN 
treatment clauses to ISDS provisions, to conclude that in the absence of a clear and 
demonstrable intention to that effect, a PRP-deprived basic treaty’s MFN treatment clause could 
not incorporate within such basic treaty a PRP from a third treaty.883 
Right from the start of the MFN treatment controversy in Maffezini v Spain, the Tribunal, which 
decided that MFN treatment clauses could apply to ISDS,884 considered that MFN treatment 
clauses cannot override public policy considerations deemed essential by State Parties to their 
agreeing to the basic treaty.885 The Tribunal considered that public policy considerations should 
be assigned even greater weight in narrowing the scope of MFN treatment clauses, which 
“might thus be narrower than it appears at first sight,” when the beneficiary of the MFN 
treatment clause is a private investor.886 The Tribunal thus opened the door to a number of 
unpredictable exclusions that an arbitral tribunal may erect so as to negate the applicability of 
MFN treatment clauses. The Tribunal put forward four types of ISDS-related provisions that 
MFN treatment clauses could not override.887 The Tribunal asserted the non-limitative nature of 
its unwritten exclusions to MFN treatment clauses, stating that “[o]ther elements of public policy 
limiting the operation of the clause will no doubt be identified by the parties or tribunals.”888  
                                                
881 ibid. 
882 ibid paras 545-546, 551, 555. 
883 UNCTAD (n 37) 123, 152-153. 
884 Maffezini (n 868) para 64. 
885 ibid paras 56, 62; see also Siemens A.G. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (3 August 2004), para 109. 





In Hochtief v Argentina,889 the Tribunal decided that MFN treatment clauses can serve to import 
more favourable third-treaty ISDS provisions and to override less-favourable provisions of a 
basic treaty, but stated that MFN treatment clauses are subject to unspecified “implicit 
limitations” and cannot serve to import “wholly new rights” absent from the basic treaty.890  
Instead, an MFN treatment clause can only impact how covered investors are treated in respect 
of rights already conferred in the basic treaty. Moreover, the Tribunal applied the ejusdem 
generis rule in a very strict manner by considering that similarity in subject matters had to be 
established between the specific rights at issue under a basic treaty and rights under a third 
treaty. The Hochtief Tribunal’s narrow approach to the ejusdem generis principle would prevent 
MFN treatment clauses from importing into a basic treaty more favourable treatment that the 
basic treaty lacks, but which can be found in a third treaty. This approach contradicts numerous 
arbitral awards that incorporated new rights into the basic treaty. Nevertheless, the broader 
approach to the ejusdem generis principle seems to have been more frequently and consistently 
applied so as to consider the subject matter of a basic treaty and of a third treaty the same 
when both aim at protecting foreign investment.891 For example, the Maffezini Tribunal itself had 
previously considered that foreign investment protection, as well as trade promotion, would 
constitute sufficiently similar subject matters in order to link two treaties through an MFN 
treatment clause.892 
In İçkale v Turkmenistan,893 the Tribunal considered that the terms “treatment accorded in 
similar situations” in an MFN treatment clause, which do not appear in all MFN treatment 
clauses, preclude the import of additional substantive protection standards from third treaties 
that are lacking from the basic treaty. Home State Party investors cannot be in a situation 
similar to that of third State investors who benefit from substantive protection standards under 
third treaties that are lacking in the basic treaty. Therefore, the MFN treatment clause cannot 
apply in such an instance. The dissonance of the İçkale award comes in full focus when 
contrasted with the arbitral awards in ATA v Jordan and in Bayindir v Pakistan, in which the 
basic treaties’ MFN treatment clauses also comprised the terms “in similar situations,” but were 
nevertheless applied so as to import substantive protection standards from third treaties without 
the slightest discussion by their respective arbitral tribunals of the terms “in similar situations.”894 
                                                
889 Hochtief (n 875) paras 77-79, 81, 83, 90. 
890 ibid paras 79, 81. 
891 See for example Al-Warraq (n 875) paras 544, 551. 
892 Maffezini (n 868) para 56. 
893 İçkale İnşaat Limited Şirketi v Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/24, Award (8 March 2016) paras 
314, 323, 328-329, 332, citing Hochtief (n 875) para 81.  
894 It must be noted that among others, arbitral tribunals in EDF (n 871) and in MTD (n 876) applied MFN 
treatment clauses so as to import substantive protection standards from third treaties applied MFN 
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The İçkale Tribunal foreshadows a restrictive application under which the MFN treatment clause 
of a basic treaty lacking a PRP could not serve to import a PRP from a third treaty.  
In Tecmed v Mexico,895 the Tribunal considered that the non-retroactive application of a basic 
treaty’s substantive provisions constitutes a core matter deemed specifically negotiated by State 
Parties and a determining factor for State Parties when consenting to a treaty. The Tribunal 
refused to contemplate applying the basic treaty’s MFN treatment clause to alter its non-
retroactive application. In reaching this decision, the Tribunal left undefined the expression “core 
of matters” deemed specifically negotiated by State Parties.” The uncertain contours of this 
expression could complicate the application of MFN treatment clauses to substantive 
protections including PRPs.  
In Accession Mezzanine v Hungary,896 the Tribunal applied the basic treaty’s MFN treatment 
clause to override the basic treaty’s provision on expropriation by more favourable ones, but 
formulated a general restriction applicable to the scope of MFN treatment clauses. The Tribunal 
stated that MFN treatment clauses should apply to rights and benefits that are “included within 
the arbitral scope” of the basic treaty, and that MFN treatment clauses should not create new 
causes of action, grant rights beyond those already in the basic treaty or fundamentally subvert 
“the carefully negotiated balance of the BIT in question.” The expression used by the Accession 
Mezzanine Tribunal could serve to underpin additional unwritten exclusions to MFN treatment 
clauses in the future that could impact their applicability to PRPs.   
The Maffezini Tribunal distinguished between two uses of MFN treatment clauses which instead 
appear as inseparable opposite faces of the MFN treatment coin: “the legitimate extension of 
rights and benefits by means of the operation of the clause, on the one hand, and disruptive 
treaty-shopping that would play havoc with the policy objectives of underlying specific treaty 
provisions, on the other hand.”897 However, it would appear that by their very nature, MFN 
treatment clauses both legitimately improve an investor’s rights under a basic treaty and disrupt 
the policy objectives of a basic treaty’s impacted provisions. Such improvement does not 
amount to treaty-shopping nor does it shroud MFN treatment clauses in a cloud of illegitimacy. 
Moreover, the Maffezini Tribunal’s statements increase unpredictability and inconsistency when 
applying MFN treatment clauses by entitling a tribunal to amplified discretion regarding MFN 
                                                                                                                                                       
treatment clauses that did not comprise the words “in similar situations.” 
895  Tecnicas Mediambientales Tecmed S.A. v the United Mexican States, ICSID Case no. ARB 
(AF)/00/02, Award (29 May 2003), para. 69. 
896 Accession Mezzanine (n 879) paras 64, 73-74 and fn 56, quoting McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger (n 
6) 254. 
897 Maffezini (n 868) para 63. 
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treatment clauses. In White Industries v India,898 the Tribunal applied an MFN treatment clause 
to import more favourable substantive protections from a third treaty (the obligation to provide 
effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights). In doing so, the Tribunal denied 
having subverted “the carefully negotiated balance” of the basic treaty and instead considered 
having achieved precisely the intended result of the MFN treatment clause.899  
Many substantive treaty provisions, including PRPs, address sensitive public policy concerns 
and “constitute an exercise of sovereignty by which States strike a delicate balance among their 
various internal policy considerations.”900 Excluding IIA provisions on an ad hoc basis from the 
scope of MFN treatment clauses increases unpredictability. All treaty provisions amount to 
exercises of State consent; concerns over the impacts on State sovereignty cannot serve to 
draw distinctions between substantive protections, ISDS provisions or other treaty provisions.901 
Indeed, the White Industries Tribunal noted that there should be “no room for creating a specific 
class of ‘specifically negotiated’ provisions of the basic treaty that is per se immune from 
circumvention by more favourable treatment in third-party BITs.”902  
Undoubtedly, MFN treatment clauses and the ejusdem generis principle must be interpreted 
and applied on a case-by-case basis based on the specific wording and surrounding context of 
a given MFN treatment clause.903 It remains to be seen whether superimposing restrictive tests 
upon MFN treatment clauses will impact their applicability to PRPs. As of August of 2015, no 
arbitral tribunal had invoked such public policy considerations to preclude the applicability of an 
MFN treatment clause to substantive protections standards.904  
State Parties that would prefer avoiding the application of MFN treatment clauses to PRPs 
should amend existing MFN treatment clauses and draft future MFN treatment clauses more 
narrowly. A straightforward application of MFN treatment clauses rooted in their explicit wording 
increases the importance of providing for explicit exclusions should State Parties intend to 
restrict their applicability. For example, based on the ejusdem generis principle, MFN treatment 
clauses could in principle apply to import within a BIT a PRP or a more favourable PRP from 
within the investment chapter of a TIP that comprises no PRP or a less favourable one and vice 
                                                
898 White Industries Australia Limited v The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award (30 November 
2011) paras 11.2.3-11.2.4, 11.2.9. 
899 ibid paras 11.2.1-11.2.4 and fn 73. 
900 Daimler (n 870) para 164. 
901 Daimler (n 870) para 168. 
902 ibid para 11.2.8, quoting Stephan Schill, “Mulitilateralizing Investment Treaties through Most-Favored-
Nation Clauses” 27(2) Berkeley J. Int’l L. 496 (2009) 524-525. 
903 ILC MFN Study Group Report (n 22) paras 147-149, 213-214. 
904 ibid para 140. 
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versa: BITs and investment chapters within TIPs both deal with the same subject matter – 
investment protection. However, many BITs explicitly exclude from the scope of their MFN 
treatment clauses the import of treatment afforded under agreements regarding free trade 
areas, customs union or other similar regional economic integration organisations.905 Exclusions 
of treatment afforded under TIPs from MFN treatment clauses in BITs play a critical role in 
preserving the treaty practice of States that have included PRPs in BITs much less frequently 
than in their TIPs. For example, none of Australia’s 22 BITs in force include a PRP, but eight out 
of Australia’s 13 TIPs in force comprise PRPs. Of all 54 BITs signed by Chile, only two include 
PRPs, while 17 of Chile’s 20 TIPs prohibit performance requirements one way or another. 
Among India’s 73 publicly available BITs, only one includes a PRP, while all three of its TIPs 
comprise PRPs.  
Explicitly worded exclusions within MFN treatment clauses provide the best rampart for States 
wishing to constrain their applicability. Alternatively, States can do away with MFN treatment 
clauses altogether. For example, the 2015 India Model BIPA comprises no MFN treatment 
clause. The hypothetical example discussed at the opening of this part raises an additional 
question stemming from the fact that the Ukraine - U.S. BIT pre-dates the U.S. - Uruguay BIT. 
The following section analyses the implications of an antecedent third treaty.  
C. The Uncertain Application of MFN Treatment Clauses to Incorporate More 
Favourable PRPs From Third Treaties that Pre-Date the Basic Treaty 
Applying MFN treatment clauses to PRPs could entail answering the question of whether PRPs 
from third treaties that pre-date a basic treaty could nevertheless be imported into the 
subsequent basic treaty absent any temporal limitation within the basic treaty’s MFN treatment 
clause. Numerous arbitral tribunals have decided that MFN treatment clauses can serve to 
import more favourable clauses from prior third treaties into a more recent basic treaty.906 
Moreover, the Bayindir Tribunal considered that the fact that a third treaty preceded a basic 
treaty did not in and of itself preclude the basic treaty’s MFN treatment clause from 
                                                
905 See for example: Article III(3)(a) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994); Article 9(3) and Annex III(2)(a) 
of the 2004 Canada Model FIPA; Article 17(3) and Annex II of the 2012 Canada Model FIPA; Article 
16(5)(a) of the Canada - Tanzania FIPA (2013); Article 6 of French Model BIT (undated); Article 5 of the 
French Model BIT (1998); Article 3(4) of the France - Turkey BIT (2006); Article 4(3)(a) of the India Model 
BIT (2003); Article 4(4)(a) of the Australia - India BIT (1999); Article 4(2)(a) of the Australia - Sri Lanka 
BIT (2002); Article 4(4) of the Australia - Mexico BIT (2005); Article 4(a) of the Chile - Denmark BIT 
(1993); Article 8 of the Chile - New Zealand BIT (1999, not in force); Article 4(2) of the Chile - Peru BIT 
(2000). 
906 ATA (n 876) para 125, fn 16; EDF (n 871) paras 929, 931-938; Arif (n 876) paras 395-396; L.E.S.I. (n 
876) para 150; Al-Warraq (n 875) paras 545, 551, 554; Dumberry (n 20) 10 and fn 64, 72.  
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incorporating more favourable treatment from such prior third treaty.907 
However, two arbitral tribunals 908  recently excluded the import of increased substantive 
protection from third treaties that pre-date a basic treaty even in the absence of any temporal 
limitation within the basic treaty’s MFN treatment clause. These two arbitral tribunals insisted, 
when dealing with ISDS provisions (an 18-month domestic litigation prerequisite) on conformity 
with the effet utile principle in order to avoid converting basic treaty provisions into “stillborn 
provisions … void ab initio” and “immediately superseded” by the MFN treatment clause. The 
two tribunals also called for conformity with the “principle of contemporaneity” which advocates 
for the interpretation of MFN treatment clauses in accordance with the State’s demonstrated 
treaty practice at the time when the basic treaty at issue is signed. On such grounds, MFN 
treatment clauses could be interpreted as excluding certain matters (for example, more 
favourable treatment conferred prior to signing the treaty at issue) which would not form part of 
the State Parties’ understanding of the terms “treatment” or “rights” as used in their MFN 
treatment clauses. Nevertheless, contemporaneity is no panacea: while it may provide important 
interpretative guidance, its application “cannot be regarded as necessarily definitive”909 and 
could collide with the clear wording of multiple MFN treatment clauses. 
In our hypothetical example, incorporating the PRP from the Ukraine - U.S. BIT into the 
subsequent U.S. - Uruguay BIT would improve upon the treatment afforded by its PRP, but 
would at the same time nullify its carefully crafted scope of application. This consequence is 
bound to fuel on-going debates regarding existing MFN treatment clauses that do not comprise 
temporal limitations. With respect to MFN treatment clauses to be drafted and negotiated in 
future IIAs, States that intend to restrict MFN treatment clauses to incorporate future more 
favourable treatment should specify its forward-looking scope.   
D. MFN Treatment Clauses, PRPs and Reservations 
An additional topic whose ramifications extend far beyond the scope of this thesis consists of 
determining the interaction between PRPs, reservations and MFN treatment clauses. This topic 
at the crossroads of these three types of treaty provisions has serious implications for all three 
                                                
907 Dumberry (n 20) 7-8; Bayindir (n 876) paras 151, 160, 165-167, 420. The Bayindir Tribunal ultimately 
rejected claimant’s recourse to the MFN treatment clause since one of the necessary requirements, the 
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908  ICS Inspection and Control Services Limited (United Kingdom) v The Republic of Argentina, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2010-9, Award on Jurisdiction (10 February 2012) paras 315-318; Kılıç İnşaat 
İthalat İhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/1, Award (2 July 
2013) paras 7.4.1-7.4.3. 
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of them, but would require additional, in-depth research focused on the inner-workings of 
reservations and MFN treatment clauses.  
In Mesa v. Canada,910 The Mesa Tribunal clarified that the MFN treatment clause of a basic 
treaty cannot serve to override exceptions to that MFN treatment clause which preclude its 
application.  The Mesa Tribunal reasoned that “one must first be under the treaty to claim 
through the treaty.” However, one could suggest that once an MFN treatment clause applies, it 
could serve to broaden the scope of application of a PRP in a basic treaty otherwise constrained 
by reservations and exceptions by importing a PRP from a third treaty unfettered by such 
exceptions or reservations. This preliminary hypothesis requires additional scrutiny that could 
form the basis of a distinct research endeavour.  
VII. General Conclusion and Proposals 
This thesis has made a number of findings while answering two research questions outlined in 
the introduction: how do States prohibit performance requirements in IIAs? And second, how 
should PRPs in IIAs be interpreted and applied? This Part sets forth a number of conclusions 
and proposals that can also help drafting future PRPs in a more deliberate and informed way. 
1. The meaning of terms used in PRPs is not readily apparent. General 
characteristics of performance requirements and their objectives, as well as their role in 
a bargaining process between States and investors help inform purposes of PRPs. At 
first, and even at second glance, the expression “performance requirement” and the numerous 
terms used recurrently within the nearly 200 PRPs that this thesis has investigated come into 
view as cryptic concepts wrapped into arcane configurations. PRPs developed as treaty-based 
disciplines in the 1970s and 1980s, in response to increasing FDI flows and to the increasing 
frequency of performance requirements. They were destined to remain in the shadows of better-
known substantive protection standards in IIAs. 
Scholarly attempts at defining performance requirements identify general shared characteristics 
helpful for understanding the broader context, the mechanics and the purposes of performance 
requirements. Performance requirements act as investment measures and investment 
disincentives because they aim at steering operational decisions of investors (both domestic 
and foreign) in a direction beneficial to the State imposing them regardless of investors’ 
interests. While TRIMs consist of a subset of performance requirements to some States, others 
                                                
910 Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-17, Final Award 
(24 March 2016), paras 400- 403.  
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equate TRIMs and performance requirements. Performance requirements are universally 
understood to impact trade; the debate centres on the direct and significant as opposed to 
indirect and remote impacts of individual categories of measures that constitute performance 
requirements. Ultimately, the lack of commonly accepted definition of either TRIMs or 
performance requirements compels States to spell out what measures they mean to prohibit 
within their PRPs. The terms used and indications provided within PRPs acquire increased 
importance in respect of concepts that lack universally accepted meanings.  
Cast in the simplest of terms, many performance requirements driven by trade considerations 
aim at improving a State’s balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves through the 
reduction of imports and the increase of exports. Beyond trade, some performance 
requirements aim at improving a State’s capacity to absorb spillovers from foreign investors and 
at fostering additional linkages between foreign investors and the local economy. 
While States impose performance requirements as standalone mandatory requirements, they 
also directly condition the conferral of investment incentives upon compliance with performance 
requirements. Host States often engage in bargaining processes with foreign investors. 
Referred to as “advantages” in the TRIMs Agreement and within PRPs in IIAs, investment 
incentives influence the location of FDI by increasing the attractiveness of host States offering 
them. Host States must often incentivise the localisation of high value-added operations of 
foreign investors within their territories. Host States often attempt to recoup part of what 
investment incentives cost them by imposing performance requirements meant to increase their 
benefits. 
PRPs thus emerged as a converging trade and investment policy response to the reliance of 
MNCs on integrated trade and investment production and sales chains. PRPs thus aim at 
ensuring the operational freedom of investors and at securing lasting trade benefits for home 
States that export goods, services and capital. 
2. Interpreting and applying PRPs in IIAs should entail cross-fertilisation and 
systemic integration. Cross-fertilisation refers to the process of understanding legal 
expressions through an analysis of the relationships and interactions between the various 
manifestations of such legal expressions. The “principle of systematic integration” stands for 
interpreting international obligations by reference to their wider normative environment. Cross-
fertilisation and systemic integration between PRPs scattered in autonomous and seemingly 
unrelated treaties can be justified in substantive terms (through the origins, content and wording 
of PRPs) and methodological terms (through treaty interpretation rules). Investigating the origins 
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and historical treaty-making context of PRPs in IIAs reveals the close interrelatedness and 
interconnectedness between PRPs found within a great number of IIAs. Our understanding of 
PRPs in IIAs can only improve by drawing up commonalities and differences within these treaty 
provisions. Three main justifications support cross-fertilisation and systemic integration in 
relation to PRPs. 
First, PRPs systematically reproduce successive and evolving approaches from PRPs in pre-
existing IIAs or Model BITs. While PRPs appear only in a handful of Model BITs, American, 
Canadian and French Model BITs comprise PRPs that have made their way, integrally or with 
limited alterations, into a great number of IIAs. Article 1106 of the NAFTA (1992) and Article 
V(2) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994) have also been extremely influential in the 
development and spread of PRPs in IIAs. Multiple instances of transplanted PRPs can be 
identified and traced back to these influential sources. Very few of the surveyed PRPs depart 
significantly from established treaty practice.  
Second, the U.S. BIT Programme exerted a significant influence on PRPs in IIAs. The United 
States deliberately attempted to sign uniform BITs in order to create a uniform body of State 
practice and new rules of international law. The PRP quickly emerged as a core provision within 
American BITs. The United States sought to include PRPs in all of its BITs, achieving little 
success during the 1980s, but constantly securing PRPs that closely reflected its Model BIT 
from 1990 onward. In order to ensure the greatest conformity possible between its BITs and its 
Model BITs and to leave the main text of the BIT unchanged, the United States would place 
clarifications, altering language and other departures from the Model BIT in protocols to BITs. 
The multiplication of similarly worded PRPs in BITs with countries from all over the world likely 
spread and increased the influence of the American approach to PRPs.    
Third, the TRIMs Agreement, the SCM Agreement and PRPs in IIAs are joined at the hip. 
GATT/WTO disciplines on performance requirements developed at the same time as the highly 
influential PRPs in American BITs during the 1980s and early 1990s, and both negotiating paths 
addressed disciplines on performance requirements. The United States doubled down on its 
bilateral negotiations on performance requirements in light of the slow and unfulfilling progress 
made in the GATT forum in respect of the future TRIMs Agreement and SCM Agreement. 
These three ideas demonstrate that PRPs use terms of art, share common normative content 
and origins and are even often identically worded. Moreover, these three ideas justify cross-
fertilisation and systemic integration when interpreting and applying PRPs in IIAs. The 
interpretation of PRPs in IIAs should reflect and enhance such synergies. The interconnection 
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between PRPs in IIAs and multilateral trade disciplines on performance requirements, as well as 
treaty interpretation rules call for their coherent interpretation and application while remaining 
fully attuned to their respective textual, contextual and purposive specificities. 
An accurate and holistic interpretative approach must look beyond the IIA of a given PRP to the 
normatively connected PRPs within other IIAs, as well as to the TRIMs Agreement and SCM 
Agreement and related documentation produced during the GATT Uruguay Round of 
negotiations and WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Such documentation notably provides 
enlightening information for properly construing the settled meanings of terms of art used in 
PRPs of IIAs. Future arbitral tribunals must overcome the methodological shortcomings of prior 
arbitral tribunals and their reluctance toward the extensive background of PRPs. Future arbitral 
tribunals must make full use of the elements made available to them by disputing parties 
pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT in order to elucidate the proper meaning of terms 
used in PRPs, their context and their object and purpose. Systemic integration and cross-
fertilisation, while acknowledging that PRPs constitute MSENs and transplanted treaty rules, 
can assist arbitral tribunals to situate PRPs in their continuum and to foster consistency with 
their awards. Proceeding with comprehensive interpretations of PRPs could help build up a 
supportive body of jurisprudence that would increase consistent and predictable arbitral 
decisions and offer better guidance as to what kind of State conduct would comply with or run 
afoul of PRPs. 
3. PRPs in IIAs reproduce a limited number of prevailing archetypes. PRPs followed a 
curve of increasing complexity and exhibited more precise language and increasing detail. First, 
as a testament to the refusal of numerous States to prohibit performance requirements, non-
binding PRPs with narrow coverage emerged as part of American BITs signed for the most part 
during the 1980s. Second, a number of PRPs incorporate the TRIMs Agreement. Third, 
numerous American, French and Indian BITs comprise open-ended PRPs in IIAs. Fourth, a 
large number of PRPs prohibit detailed and exhaustive lists of measures with numerous 
repeated patterns and slight variations.  
4. PRPs that incorporate the TRIMs Agreement raise thorny issues. Approximately a 
dozen IIAs among those surveyed reiterate, incorporate or refer specifically to the TRIMs 
Agreement in a variety of ways. While incorporating the TRIMs Agreement into an IIA may 
appear straightforward at first glance, numerous issues of compatibility and coherence with 
other provisions of the IIA arise. First, the TRIMs Agreement applies only to goods and not to 
services and only in instances of discrimination between goods of domestic investors and goods 
of foreign investors. Such PRPs would thus presumably apply only to a subset of investments 
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and activities covered by the presumably broader scope of a given IIA. Second, the TRIMs 
Agreement makes no attempt at defining TRIMs and provides a non-exhaustive Illustrative List 
as an Annex to its disciplines. Such PRPs would thus arguably apply to measures beyond those 
set out in the TRIMs Agreement’s Illustrative List. Third, such PRPs would arguably apply to 
both mandatory and advantage-conditioning performance requirements.  
5. Open-ended PRPs refer to an identifiable set of measures. State submissions on 
performance requirements made during the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations can improve 
our understanding of PRPs in IIAs notably when attempting to accomplish the following: first, 
unfurling the undefined expression “performance requirements,” and second, fleshing out open-
ended expressions such as “any other similar requirements.” The attempts at defining TRIMs 
during the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations simultaneously defined performance 
requirements. The United States, the EC, India and the OECD each identified the same 11 
measures as performance requirements in their GATT submissions on TRIMs.911 Given that a 
significant number of American and French BITs with open-ended PRPs, as well as the India - 
Kuwait BIT (2001), were negotiated at the same time as or within a few years following the 
conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round, one would expect that France, India and the United 
States were referring to performance requirements explicitly identified in their respective 
submissions made during the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations on TRIMs when using in 
their respective PRPs undefined expressions such as “performance requirements” and open-
ended expressions such as “any other similar requirements,” or “any other measures that have 
a similar effect.” 
6. Open-ended PRPs unaccompanied by reservations or exceptions constrain States 
cumbersomely. However, preserving the lawfulness of performance requirements 
deemed critical should be achieved through specific treaty-based exceptions, exclusions 
or reservations and not by departing from the clear meaning of PRPs. The Decision of the 
Lemire Tribunal illustrates the challenges and dilemmas that arbitral tribunals can face when 
interpreting and applying open-ended PRPs. The Lemire Tribunal disregarded the clear, broad 
and open-ended wording of a PRP unmitigated by reservations or exceptions in order to 
preserve regulatory flexibility in implementing cultural policies. Arbitral tribunals should resist 
using the noble objectives and/or the importance to national interests of certain performance 
requirements as exculpatory justifications when these performance requirements are specifically 
prohibited. The understandably delicate position of the Lemire Tribunal provides a compelling 
                                                
911 LCRs; EPRs; trade balancing requirements; LERs; technology transfer, licensing and local R&D 
requirements; foreign exchange restrictions; remittance restrictions; manufacturing requirements; 
manufacturing limitations; product mandating requirements; and domestic sales requirements. 
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justification for why broadly-worded PRPs with unfettered applicability should be abandoned 
and replaced by detailed PRPs applicable to a limited number of explicitly identified 
performance requirements and confined by a number of exceptions, exclusions and 
reservations. 
7. PRPs with detailed lists of mandatory performance requirements widely 
reproduce a limited number of prototypes. Article 1106 of the NAFTA (1992) signalled a 
more elaborate and complex approach to PRPs. The NAFTA was negotiated and signed at the 
same time as GATT Uruguay Round negotiations on TRIMs were taking place. Negotiations on 
TRIMs influenced NAFTA Article 1106, which in turn greatly influenced the 1994 U.S. Model 
BIT, the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994), the 2004 U.S. Model BIT and the 2004 Canada Model 
FIPA, as well as the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and the 2012 Canada Model FIPA. All seven 
instruments, as well as the IIAs that follow their lead, provide for detailed and exhaustive lists of 
prohibited performance requirements. Accounting for variations as to the precise number and 
formulation of prohibited performance requirements, the great majority of PRPs within surveyed 
IIAs remain very close to the standard set by NAFTA Article 1106 and rely upon very similar 
wording. This show of near-uniformity reinforces the need for a systemic understanding of PRPs 
within IIAs and for interpreting PRPs in accordance with their shared settled meanings, but also 
heightens the need to remain vigilant in respect of slight variations specific to a given PRP. The 
slightest feature specific to a given PRP may render it inapplicable to a given measure or may 
expand its scope of application beyond other PRPs more closely in line with predominant 
patterns. 
8. At least 14 categories of performance requirements that appear in PRPs with 
detailed and exhaustive lists make use of terms of art which have acquired settled 
meanings. By combining the American/EC/Indian/OECD list of 11 measures and the measures 
identified as performance requirements by UNCTAD, one reached 14 categories of measures 
consistently construed as performance requirements by States, IGOs and/or scholars which 
have acquired settled meanings that crystallised over time.912 These settled meanings should be 
carefully considered when interpreting and applying PRPs in IIAs in order to assign the proper 
scope, breadth and specificity to each prohibited performance requirement within PRPs. With its 
Decision, the Mobil & Murphy Tribunal accomplished the opposite. By deciding that the 
prohibition of LSRs under NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c) also prohibited R&D requirements and E&T 
                                                
912 LCRs/LSRs; EPRs; trade-balancing requirements; export controls or restrictions; local employment 
and employee training requirements; LERs and JVRs; technology transfer, licensing and local R&D 
requirements; foreign exchange restrictions and/or earning requirements; remittance restrictions; 
investment localisation requirements; manufacturing requirements; manufacturing limitations; domestic 
sales requirements; and product mandating requirements. 
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requirements, the Mobil & Murphy Tribunal incorrectly accorded too much weight to effects and 
incidental aspects of the measure at issue instead of identifying its true nature by reference to 
its essential characteristics and features. The Tribunal also transformed the prohibition of LSRs 
into a catchall provision, ignored its clear delimitations and also ignored the respective settled 
meanings of LSRs, R&D requirements and E&T requirements that differentiate one such set of 
measures from another. Finally, the Tribunal incorrectly isolated the term “services” from the 
rest of NAFTA Article 1106(1) and decontextualised such term before framing its ordinary 
meaning in an overly broad manner, mainly by relying on dictionary definitions of the term. 
9. PRPs are better understood when each prohibited performance requirement is 
considered separately from other performance requirements enumerated in that same 
PRP. Overarching statements as to purposes or the nature of performance requirements 
are best avoided. Not all prohibited performance requirements are equally trade-driven, 
import-related or export-related. Unfortunate pronouncements made by both the Pope & 
Talbot and the Merrill & Ring Tribunals, lumping all performance requirements into a one-
dimensional pool of export-driven trade policy instruments, are contradicted by the fact that 
clearly some performance requirements prohibited under PRPs relate only remotely and 
indirectly to exports, imports or even to trade. Such statements obscure the distinct and settled 
meanings of the various performance requirements prohibited under PRPs. The connection 
between a given measure and exports is not decisive for determining the existence of any type 
of performance requirement, but rather only for the existence of EPRs, trade-balancing 
requirements and other performance requirements closely related to exports.  
10. PRPs should explicitly address advantages in order to avoid the uncertainty that 
lingers over the applicability of advantage-silent PRPs to advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements. The United States expressed the views that “incentive-based 
commitments” do not amount to performance requirements, that the United States and many 
other countries resort to conditioned advantages, that States should be entitled to continue 
imposing such conditions, and that explicit statements within IIAs or accompanying instruments 
that legitimise advantage-conditioning performance requirements make explicit what advantage-
silent PRPs implicitly authorise. However, Canada and the United States, as well as their 
respective signatory partner countries, eventually considered it necessary to explicitly exclude 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements from their PRPs. The straightforward 
wording of advantage-silent PRPs in American, Canadian and French IIAs suggests that such 
PRPs cannot be categorically deemed inapplicable to advantage-conditioning performance 
requirements on that basis alone and in the absence of explicit language to that effect, either in 
the PRP itself or in an instrument forming part of the IIA or accompanying it. As a result, proving 
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the existence of an advantage conferred in relation with the imposition of a performance 
requirement should not automatically exclude such performance requirement from the scope of 
advantage-silent PRPs. Rather, one should consider whether the wording of a given PRP would 
encompass advantage-conditioning performance requirements, notably by considering them 
imposed as conditions for the establishment, operation, maintenance, expansion, sale or 
disposition of an investment. For example, advantage-conditioning performance requirements 
could be prohibited by advantage-silent PRPs notably if such PRPs use wording that refers to 
the establishment, expansion, operation, conduct or maintenance of investments, since 
advantage-conditioning performance requirements may indeed fall within such scenarios of 
investment-related activities. Advantage-conditioning performance requirements could also fall 
within broad expressions within open-ended PRPs such as “any other similar requirements” or 
“toutes autres mesures ayant un effet analogue.” Advantage-silent PRPs in American BITs may 
trigger a conflict between their wording and the intention of the United States expressed 
subsequently to their conclusion. States should avoid such conflicts and draft their PRPs in a 
way that clearly conveys their positions on advantage-conditioning performance requirements.  
11. The jurisprudential definition of the term “benefit” for purposes of the SCM 
Agreement can improve our understanding of the term “advantage” used in the TRIMs 
Agreement and within PRPs of IIAs. PRPs which address advantage-conditioning 
performance requirements within surveyed IIAs uniformly use the term “advantage,” yet none of 
these IIAs provides a definition for such term, and nor does the TRIMs Agreement. The notion 
of advantage is broad and its interpretation has yet to face any difficulties in the context of 
investor-State arbitration. Should any difficulties arise in the future, arbitral tribunals may turn to 
the interpretation of the term “benefit” carried out by WTO dispute settlement panels and the 
Appellate Body when deciding disputes under the SCM Agreement for guidance. WTO dispute 
settlement panels and the Appellate Body have equated “conferring a benefit” under Article 
1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement with “providing an advantage” under the TRIMs Agreement. As is 
the case for determining the conferral of a benefit, the existence of an advantage under the 
TRIMs Agreement and under PRPs within IIAs should remain simple. Identifying an advantage 
should depend on whether its alleged recipients are “better off” with the advantage than without 
it.  
12. PRPs should not be confined to the investment objectives of BITs or to the trade 
concerns of their most obvious trade-related performance requirements. PRPs should be 
construed in a way that accounts for the varying degrees of trade or investment 
relatedness of the distinct measures that they prohibit. Disciplining performance 
requirements in TIPs lends itself to adopting two separate PRPs: one that prohibits a number of 
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performance requirements directly related to trade in their trade-focused chapters, and one that 
prohibits the same performance requirements directly related to trade, along with other 
performance requirements, in their investment-focused chapters. The approach of creating 
trade-chapter PRPs and investment-chapter PRPs has the merit of greater clarity, can facilitate 
their interpretation and application and better addresses the interests of home States at stake in 
relation to performance requirements. Trade interests of home States figure prominently in 
PRPs, at least in respect of LCRs/LSRs, EPRs, export restrictions and trade-balancing 
requirements. Trade considerations therefore constitute an essential and definitional component 
of such performance requirements. Non-trade driven measures should therefore not fall within 
the meaning of LCRs/LSRs, EPRs or trade-balancing requirements. PRPs should therefore not 
be framed or construed solely by reference to the investors that must comply with performance 
requirements. The harm caused by directly trade-related performance requirements is often felt 
by home States of targeted investors and not by targeted investors themselves. PRPs should 
therefore be drafted and interpreted so as to address the negative impacts of performance 
requirements on the party effectively injured, including home States of targeted investors. The 
fact that only States can institute disputes over disciplines on performance requirements in trade 
chapters of TIPs adds clarity as to their purpose, their scope and their interpretation. 
13. The PRPs in IIAs surveyed in this thesis exhibit a wide variety of features that 
future drafters can resort to in order to modulate the scope and coverage of PRPs in IIAs. 
These features must be given full force and effect when interpreting and applying 
existing PRPs in IIAs. This thesis has identified numerous recurring attributes that allow 
tailoring and fine-tuning PRPs to the specific intentions of State Parties. States should consider 
these attributes carefully and make full use of the flexibility that they provide when negotiating 
PRPs in the future. Arbitral tribunals should consider these features conscientiously when 
deciding disputes arising under existing PRPs.  
First, PRPs can apply either to investments and investors originating from any State (State 
Parties and non-Party States) as well as to domestic investments and investors, or they can 
apply only to investments and investors originating from State Parties, but excluding 
investments of domestic investors of the home State. The State more likely to act as a home 
State in a cross-border investment relationship may wish to draft the PRP in a way that ensures 
that the PRP fully serves to promote its exports. To do so, the PRP must remove any home-
State export restrictive measure that a host State can impose on any investor (domestic, from 
the home-State or from a third State) in the host State. The PRP can secure greater host-State 
market access for home-State exporters by applying to all investors, thus granting them all the 
ability to import from the home State. Rendering a PRP applicable to all investors and 
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investments also avoids placing covered investors and investments at a disadvantage as a 
result of prohibiting advantage-conditioning performance requirements. PRPs applicable to all 
investors and investments make it impossible for host States to offer to any investor advantages 
in exchange for compliance with performance requirements. If a PRP applied only to covered 
investors or investments, nothing would prevent a host State from making compliance with 
performance requirements profitable for a non-covered investor or investment. This would harm 
the competitiveness of covered investors or investments. By contrast, a host State may prefer to 
retain greater discretion to impose performance requirements. States can achieve this by 
narrowing the applicability of a PRP to covered investors and investments. 
Second, PRPs can apply only to phases of investment activities specifically spelled out and can 
also apply to the pre-establishment phases of an investment, to its post-establishment phases 
or to both. PRPs can apply to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, sale or disposition of an investment or only to a subset of such investment phases. 
The more phases a PRP applies to, the more stringent and the broader its scope of application 
turns out to be.  
Third, advantage-conditioning performance requirements raise complex issues that warrant 
careful consideration prior to drafting, interpreting or applying PRPs. Regarding the drafting of 
future PRPs, making the prohibition of advantage-conditioning performance requirements 
conditional on the absence of a complying investor’s consent risks depriving such prohibition of 
any effectiveness. Advantage-conditioning performance requirements inherently apply only to 
investors who voluntarily complied with conditions preceding the conferral of an advantage. It is 
therefore difficult to envision a scenario where an advantage-conditioning performance 
requirement could be imposed upon an investor without that investor’s consent. Moreover, 
prohibitions of advantage-conditioning performance requirements are not intended to protect 
complying investors who receive advantages or to grant the right for investors to receive 
unencumbered advantages. They mean to achieve a level playing field among all investors in a 
host State by ensuring their equal treatment and by removing the conferral of State advantages 
and the imposition of State conditions that alter the competitive conditions between them. 
Regarding the interpretation of existing PRPs, the stipulation that an advantage-conditioning 
performance requirement be “in connection with an investment” must not be turned into a pre-
condition of standing for alleging a breach of such a prohibition. Prohibitions of advantage-
conditioning performance requirements such as NAFTA Article 1106(3) do not apply only in 
respect of performance requirements connected to a claimant’s investment. Their wording 
should not be converted into a standing test for claimants under ISDS provisions. Otherwise, a 
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claimant investor could never complain under NAFTA Article 1106(3) of a performance 
requirement acting as a condition for an advantage conferred to another investor even though 
such advantage causes loss or damage to the claimant investor, notably by detrimentally 
altering the competitive relationship between the recipient investor and the claimant investor. 
Fourth, PRPs can specify their applicability not only to requirements as such, but also to 
performance requirements that take the form of commitments or undertakings, so as to avoid an 
overly formalistic understanding of what constitutes a “requirement.” At the same time, PRPs 
can stipulate that they apply only to the mandatory and advantage-conditioning performance 
requirements explicitly set out. Detailed and exhaustive PRPs that comprise such a statement 
convey the intention of applying only to measures whose true nature corresponds to the settled 
meaning of one of the specifically prohibited performance requirements, and not to measures 
whose effects may incidentally resemble those of prohibited performance requirements. 
A measure must clearly compel the achievement of precisely what a prohibited performance 
requirement consists of. The equivalence between a given measure’s effects and those 
normally attributable to prohibited performance requirements provides insufficient grounds for 
characterising a given measure as a prohibited performance requirement. Stretching the 
meaning of categories of measures in PRPs too broadly can nullify their intended predictability 
and disregard their settled meanings. Moreover, effects of measures are erratic and difficult to 
prove. Relying on them for applying PRPs unduly and unnecessarily increases unpredictability. 
In Mobil & Murphy v Canada, the Tribunal misconstrued the prohibition of LSRs in NAFTA 
Article 1106(1)(c) and disregarded its own previous characterisation of the measure at issue. 
The Tribunal’s willingness to focus on the effects of the measure at issue eclipsed its true nature 
as a local R&D requirement and its clear differentiation from LCRs and LSRs. The Tribunal 
accorded too much weight to effects and incidental aspects of measure at issue instead of 
identifying its true nature by reference to their essential characteristics and features. 
Fifth, IIAs comprise provisions aimed at ensuring that specific performance requirements 
deemed sufficiently important to warrant explicit assurances remain lawful in the presence of 
PRPs. States have resorted to a great number of means to retain certain prerogatives. These 
include “clarifying” provisions that provide for the lawful application of mandatory or advantage-
conditioning local R&D requirements, local employment and training requirements, investment 
localisation requirements, service supply requirements, construction or expansion requirements 
or requirements to use a technology to meet generally applicable health, safety or 
environmental requirements. Numerous IIAs also comprise provisions that authorise technology 
transfer requirements when they aim at remedying an alleged violation of competition laws or 
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when they are imposed in conformity with the TRIPS Agreement. Several States have ensured 
that they retain the right to condition the qualification to export promotion and foreign aid 
programmes, as well as to preferential tariffs or quotas upon compliance with performance 
requirements.  
Numerous IIAs ensure that some or all of otherwise prohibited performance requirements can 
be justified under exception provisions akin to GATT Article XX. A great number of IIAs also 
provide exceptions to PRPs in order to enable State Parties to continue favouring aboriginal 
peoples and/or socially or economically disadvantaged minorities, to retain greater flexibility in 
cultural industries and with tax policy, as well as miscellaneous exclusions to PRPs in line with 
varying national or regional interests such as complying with EU rules, protecting national 
treasures, accessing products in short supply, and maintaining public order. 
Numerous States have reflected in their IIAs the intent of shielding government procurement 
from part or all of disciplines on performance requirements. While excluding government 
procurement from the PRPs in investment chapters, several TIPs provide for disciplines on 
performance requirements within TIP chapters focused on government procurement. These 
disciplines focus on the various stages of government procurement and have evolved in close 
connection with the GATT GPA and the WTO GPA. They have therefore adopted terms that 
differ from PRPs that serve as investment disciplines and are often applicable to an undefined, 
open-ended number of performance requirements.  
Finally, numerous IIAs comprise reservations that shield existing or future non-conforming 
measures from PRPs. Reservations play a crucial role in striking the appropriate balance 
between ensuring a stable regulatory framework for investors and preserving sufficient policy-
making flexibility for States, especially in policy-making areas deemed of critical importance. A 
number of complex practical implications of reservations leave the door open to considerable 
uncertainty.  
In terms of drafting reservations, States should avoid resorting to reservations that apply to an 
undefined and non-limitative set of measures, since such reservations undermine all disciplines 
in respect of which they apply. Reservations should provide clear, limited and predictable 
exclusions to preserve measures that would otherwise run afoul of IIA disciplines, including 
PRPs. Reservations should also compel States to disclose lists of reserved measures or 
sectors. Open-ended reservations cause significant unpredictability as to their outer reach when 
rendering lists of reserved measures by State Parties merely illustrative and non-limitative or 
when exempting State Parties from any obligation to provide indicative lists of reserved 
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measures or sectors. 
In terms of interpreting reservations, arbitral tribunals should avoid unexpected outcomes that 
defeat the carve-outs meant to protect and validate certain measures from the rigors of PRPs. 
The Mobil & Murphy Majority rendered a controversial award in two main respects. First, the 
Mobil & Murphy Majority reduced regulatory flexibility by narrowing the scope of the reservation 
at issue. Second, the Mobil & Murphy Majority reduced the predictability of international 
investment law by developing a complex analytical approach to assessing the validity of new 
measures under reservations. In achieving this outcome, the Mobil & Murphy Majority 
developed and applied a test that entailed assessing the validity of non-conforming measures 
against a progressively more stringent threshold. By contrast, Dissenting Arbitrator Sands in 
Mobil & Murphy v Canada described reserved measures as providing a perennial ceiling that 
remained in place indefinitely absent any State Party commitment to phase out or liberalise non-
conforming measures. Dissenting Arbitrator Sands viewed the reservation at issue as broad, 
open-ended and not limited in time. Arbitrator Sands preserved the possibility for regulatory 
change to fall within the scope of a given reservation. 
States should avoid treaty provisions on reservations that reduce the scope of reservations 
beyond their intended effects. States should also beware when drafting treaty provisions that 
govern the following categories of measures: amendments to non-conforming measures, non-
conforming measures subsequent to the related reserved measures or non-conforming 
measures subordinate to the related reserved measures. The provisions governing changes to 
non-conforming measures should not involuntarily shrink the scope of the relevant reservation. 
The Mobil & Murphy Majority Award complicated the ability of States to concretely avail 
themselves of reservations regarding non-conforming measures. Based on the Mobil & Murphy 
Majority’s approach, States would need to establish up-to-date registers of non-conforming 
measures and subordinate measures for each reservation taken under their TIPs in order to 
ensure compliance of every new subordinate measure with the totality of such prior (non-
conforming plus subordinate) measures. The complexity of such an undertaking evokes a 
chillingly burdensome and costly scenario for States. Should States adopt new subordinate 
measures without having diligently verified whether these measures are consistent and under 
the authority of the evolving legal and regulatory framework relevant to a given reservation, they 
risk facing challenges from investors alleging that these measures fall outside the scope of a 
given reservation.  
Contrary to what the free-wheeling approach of the Lemire Tribunal suggests, the detailed and 
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complex nature, the intricacy of the fine-tuning and variations involved, the large number of 
different exceptions and exclusions, as well as the frequent reproduction of practically identical 
wording suggest that little improvisation or short-sightedness comes into drafting PRPs in IIAs. 
The willingness of State Parties to provide for all kinds of curbs to their PRPs reinforces the 
need to adhere to the wording of PRPs in IIAs very closely and to avoid creating unwritten 
exceptions or exclusions while interpreting and applying PRPs in IIAs. IIAs that provide for no 
such exceptions or exclusions to their PRPs accordingly expose their State Parties to 
correspondingly more stringent PRPs.  
14. Applying MFN treatment clauses to PRPs would clearly add to the uncertainty and 
the destabilisation that MFN treatment clauses inherently bring about to treaties. Arbitral 
tribunals might then be tempted to turn to previous awards by arbitral tribunals that 
created unwritten restrictions when considering MFN treatment clauses in relation to 
ISDS provisions. With respect to existing MFN treatment clauses, the controversy surrounding 
MFN treatment clauses appears to have focused almost exclusively on ISDS provisions 
construed as pertaining to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and to the consent of States to 
arbitration. Nevertheless, future arbitral tribunals might buckle under the pressure exercised by 
the systemic implications of applying MFN treatment clauses literally to substantive protection 
standards, including PRPs. By their very nature, MFN treatment clauses both legitimately 
improve an investor’s rights under a basic treaty and disrupt the policy objectives of a basic 
treaty’s impacted provisions. Such improvement does not amount to treaty-shopping nor does it 
shroud MFN treatment clauses in a cloud of illegitimacy. The answer to such uncertainty does 
not reside in entitling arbitral tribunals to amplified discretion regarding MFN treatment clauses, 
which would only increase unpredictability and inconsistency when applying MFN treatment 
clauses.  
With respect to future MFN treatment clauses, State Parties that would prefer avoiding the 
application of MFN treatment clauses to PRPs should amend existing MFN treatment clauses 
and draft future MFN treatment clauses more narrowly. A straightforward application of MFN 
treatment clauses rooted in their explicit wording increases the importance of providing for 
explicit exclusions should State Parties intend to restrict their applicability. Explicitly worded 
exclusions within MFN treatment clauses provide the best rampart for States wishing to 
constrain their applicability. States that intend to restrict MFN treatment clauses to incorporate 
future more favourable treatment should specify its forward-looking scope. Alternatively, States 
can do away with MFN treatment clauses altogether. For example, the 2015 India Model BIPA 
comprises no MFN treatment clause. 
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Appendix – Examples of the Main Types of Performance Requirement 
Prohibitions and Related Treaty Provisions 
Non-Binding PRPs With Narrow Coverage 
Article II(6) of the Egypt - U.S. BIT (1982): 
6. In the context of its national economic policies and objectives, each Party shall seek to avoid 
the imposition of performance requirements of the investment of nationals and companies of the 
other Party. 
Scope and Coverage of the TRIMs Agreement 
Article 2 and the Annex of the TRIMs Agreement: 
Article 2 National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions 
1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994, no Member shall apply any 
TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994. 
2. An illustrative list of TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment 
provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 and the obligation of general elimination of 
quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the 
Annex to this Agreement. 
ANNEX 
Illustrative List 
1. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 
4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic 
law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an 
advantage, and which require: 
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic 
source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, 
or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production; 
or 
(b) that an enterprise’s purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to 
the volume or value of local products that it exports. 
2. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of general elimination of quantitative restrictions 
provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or 
enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is 
necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict: 
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production, generally 
or to an amount related to the volume or value of local production that it exports; 
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by 
restricting its access to foreign exchange to an amount related to the foreign exchange inflows 
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attributable to the enterprise; or 
(c) the exportation or sale for export by an enterprise of products, whether specified in terms of 
particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume 
or value of its local production. 
PRPs Which Incorporate the TRIMs Agreement 
Article 9 of the Canada - China FIPA (2012): 
Article 9 Performance Requirements  
The Contracting Parties reaffirm their obligations under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs), as amended from time to time. Article 2 and the Annex of the 
TRIMs are incorporated into and made part of this Agreement. 
Open-Ended PRPs in First-Generation American BITs (1982-1995) 
Article II(6) of the Ukraine - U.S. BIT (1994): 
ARTICLE II 
6. Neither Party shall impose performance requirements as a condition of establishment, 
expansion or maintenance of investments, which require or enforce commitments to export goods 
produced, or which specify that goods or services must be purchased locally, or which impose 
any other similar requirements. 
Open-Ended PRPs in French BITs 
Protocol regarding Article 3 of the Ethiopia - France BIT (2003): 
As regards Article 3 
In particular though not exclusively, shall be considered as de jure or de facto impediments to fair 
and equitable treatment any restriction on the purchase or transport of raw materials and auxiliary 
materials, energy and fuels, as well as the means of production and operation of all types, any 
hindrance of the sale or transport of products within the country and abroad, as well as any other 
measures that have a similar effect. 
Detailed and Exhaustive PRPs in IIAs 
Article 1106 of the NAFTA (1992): 
Article 1106: Performance Requirements 
1. No Party may impose or enforce any of the following requirements, or enforce any commitment 
or undertaking, in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct or operation of an investment of an investor of a Party or of a non-Party in its territory: 
(a) to export a given level or percentage of goods or services; 
(b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content; 
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(c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or services provided in its 
territory, or to purchase goods or services from persons in its territory; 
(d) to relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of exports or to the 
amount of foreign exchange inflows associated with such investment; 
(e) to restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such investment produces or provides 
by relating such sales in any way to the volume or value of its exports or foreign exchange 
earnings; 
(f) to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its 
territory, except when the requirement is imposed or the commitment or undertaking is enforced 
by a court, administrative tribunal or competition authority to remedy an alleged violation of 
competition laws or to act in a manner not inconsistent with other provisions of this Agreement; or 
(g) to act as the exclusive supplier of the goods it produces or services it provides to a specific 
region or world market. 
2. A measure that requires an investment to use a technology to meet generally applicable 
health, safety or environmental requirements shall not be construed to be inconsistent with 
paragraph 1(f). For greater certainty, Articles 1102 and 1103 apply to the measure. 
3. No Party may condition the receipt or continued receipt of an advantage, in connection with an 
investment in its territory of an investor of a Party or of a non-Party, on compliance with any of the 
following requirements: 
(a) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content; 
(b) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced in its territory, or to purchase 
goods from producers in its territory; 
(c) to relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of exports or to the 
amount of foreign exchange inflows associated with such investment; or 
(d) to restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such investment produces or provides 
by relating such sales in any way to the volume or value of its exports or foreign exchange 
earnings. 
4. Nothing in paragraph 3 shall be construed to prevent a Party from conditioning the receipt or 
continued receipt of an advantage, in connection with an investment in its territory of an investor 
of a Party or of a non-Party, on compliance with a requirement to locate production, provide a 
service, train or employ workers, construct or expand particular facilities, or carry out research 
and development, in its territory. 
5. Paragraphs 1 and 3 do not apply to any requirement other than the requirements set out in 
those paragraphs. 
6. Provided that such measures are not applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner, or do not 
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade or investment, nothing in paragraph 1(b) or 
(c) or 3(a) or (b) shall be construed to prevent any Party from adopting or maintaining measures, 
including environmental measures: 
(a) necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; or 
(c) necessary for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources. 
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Article V(2) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994): 
2. Neither Contracting Party may impose any of the following requirements in connection with 
permitting the establishment or acquisition of an investment or enforce any of the following 
requirements in connection with the subsequent regulation of that investment: 
(a) to export a given level or percentage of goods; 
(b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content; 
(c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or services provided in its 
territory, or to purchase goods or services from persons in its territory; 
(d) to relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of exports or to the 
amount of foreign exchange inflows associated with such investment; or 
(e) to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its 
territory unaffiliated with the transferor, except when the requirement is imposed or the 
commitment or undertaking is enforced by a court, administrative tribunal or competition authority, 
either to remedy an alleged violation of competition laws or acting in a manner not inconsistent 
with other provisions of this Agreement. 
Disciplines Applicable to Advantage-Conditioning Performance Requirements 
Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement: 
Article 3 Prohibition 
3.1 Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the 
meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited: 
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact4, whether solely or as one of several other 
conditions, upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I5; 
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of 
domestic over imported goods. 
4 This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without having been made 
legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export 
earnings. The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone 
be considered to be an export subsidy within the meaning of this provision. 
PRPs in Trade Chapters of TIPs 
Articles 304 and 318 of the NAFTA (1992): 
Chapter Three: National Treatment and Market Access for Goods 
Article 304: Waiver of Customs Duties 
1. Except as set out in Annex 304.1, no Party may adopt any new waiver of customs duties, or 
expand with respect to existing recipients or extend to any new recipient the application of an 
existing waiver of customs duties, where the waiver is conditioned, explicitly or implicitly, on the 
fulfillment of a performance requirement. 
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2. Except as set out in Annex 304.2, no Party may, explicitly or implicitly, condition on the 
fulfillment of a performance requirement the continuation of any existing waiver of customs duties. 
Article 318: Definitions 
For purposes of this Chapter: 
performance requirement means a requirement that: 
(a) a given level or percentage of goods or services be exported; 
(b) domestic goods or services of the Party granting a waiver of customs duties be substituted for 
imported goods or services; 
(c) a person benefitting from a waiver of customs duties purchase other goods or services in the 
territory of the Party granting the waiver or accord a preference to domestically produced goods 
or services; 
(d) a person benefitting from a waiver of customs duties produce goods or provide services, in the 
territory of the Party granting the waiver, with a given level or percentage of domestic content; or 
(e) relates in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of exports or to the 
amount of foreign exchange inflows; 
Exceptions and Reservations to PRPs in IIAs 
Articles 1108(1), 1108(2), 1108(3) and 1108(8) of the NAFTA (1992): 
Article 1108: Reservations and Exceptions 
1. Articles 1102, 1103, 1106 and 1107 do not apply to: 
(a) any existing non-conforming measure that is maintained by 
(i) a Party at the federal level, as set out in its Schedule to Annex I or III, 
(ii) a state or province, for two years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and 
thereafter as set out by a Party in its Schedule to Annex I in accordance with paragraph 2, or 
(iii) a local government; 
(b) the continuation or prompt renewal of any non-conforming measure referred to in 
subparagraph (a); or 
(c) an amendment to any non-conforming measure referred to in subparagraph (a) to the extent 
that the amendment does not decrease the conformity of the measure, as it existed immediately 
before the amendment, with Articles 1102, 1103, 1106 and 1107. 
2. Each Party may set out in its Schedule to Annex I, within two years of the date of entry into 
force of this Agreement, any existing nonconforming measure maintained by a state or province, 
not including a local government. 
3. Articles 1102, 1103, 1106 and 1107 do not apply to any measure that a Party adopts or 
maintains with respect to sectors, subsectors or activities, as set out in its Schedule to Annex II. 
8. The provisions of: 
 
 210 
(a) Article 1106(1)(a), (b) and (c), and (3)(a) and (b) do not apply to qualification requirements for 
goods or services with respect to export promotion and foreign aid programs; 
(b) Article 1106(1)(b), (c), (f) and (g), and (3)(a) and (b) do not apply to procurement by a Party or 
a state enterprise; and 
(c) Article 1106(3)(a) and (b) do not apply to requirements imposed by an importing Party relating 
to the content of goods necessary to qualify for preferential tariffs or preferential quotas. 
Article VI(3) of the Canada - Trinidad and Tobago FIPA (1995): 
ARTICLE VI: 
Miscellaneous Exceptions 
3. Investments in cultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this Agreement. "Cultural 
industries" means natural persons or enterprises engaged in any of the following activities: 
a. the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, periodicals or newspapers in print or 
machine readable form but not including the sole activity of printing or typesetting any of the 
foregoing; 
b. the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of film or video recordings; 
c. the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of audio or video music recordings; 
d. the publication, distribution, sale or exhibition of music in print or machine readable form; or 
e. radiocommunications in which the transmissions are intended for direct reception by the 
general public, and all radio, television or cable broadcasting undertakings and all satellite 
programming and broadcast network services. 
Article VI(2)(c) of the Canada - Ukraine FIPA (1994): 
(2) The provisions of Articles II, ill, IV and V of this Agreement do not apply to:  
(c) any measure denying investors of the other Contracting Party and their investments any rights 





Performance requirements act as policy instruments for achieving broadly-defined economic 
and developmental objectives of States, especially industrial and technological development 
objectives. Many States consider that performance requirements distort trade and investment 
flows, negatively impact global and national welfare and disrupt investment decisions compared 
to business-as-usual scenarios. As a result, a number of States have committed to prohibiting 
performance requirements in international investment agreements (“IIAs.”). Performance 
requirement prohibitions (“PRPs”) are meant to eliminate trade-distorting performance 
requirements and performance requirements which replace investor decision-making by State 
decision-making.   
This thesis focuses on providing answers to two research questions: first, how do States prohibit 
performance requirements in IIAs? And second, how should PRPs in IIAs be interpreted and 
applied?  
For the first time, this thesis: proposes a unitary understanding of PRPs in IIAs by drawing 
notably on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) Uruguay Round of 
negotiations and on the United States Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) Programme; develops 
a detailed typology and analysis of PRPs in IIAs through the identification of systematically 
reproduced drafting patterns; conducts the first critical and in-depth analysis of all arbitral 
awards which have decided claims based on PRPs in IIAs; analyses interpretation and 
application issues related to provisions that exempt government procurement from PRPs and to 
reservations that shield sensitive non-conforming measures or strategically important sectors 
from PRPs; and anticipates the application of most-favoured nation (“MFN”) treatment clauses 
to PRPs in the future.  
Finally, this thesis formulates proposals that can help interpret and apply existing PRPs and 




Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
Verboden op prestatie-eisen in internationale investeringsrecht 
Prestatie-eisen fungeren als beleidsinstrumenten voor het bereiken van breed gedefinieerde 
economische en ontwikkelingsdoelstellingen van staten, met name doelstellingen inzake 
industriële en technologische ontwikkeling. Veel staten zijn echter van mening dat prestatie-
eisen de handels- en investeringsstromen vervormen, het wereldwijde en nationale welzijn 
negatief beïnvloeden en investeringsbeslissingen verstoren in vergelijking met business-as-
usual scenario's. Als gevolg hebben een aantal staten zich gecommitteerd prestatie-eisen te 
verbieden in internationale investeringsakkoorden (IIAs). Verboden op prestatie-eisen 
(performance requirement prohibitions (PRPs)) zijn bedoeld om handel verstorende prestatie-
eisen en prestatie-eisen die er toe leiden dat de besluitvorming van de investeerders wordt 
vervangen door de besluitvorming van de staten, te elimineren.  
Dit proefschrift richt zich op het beantwoorden van twee onderzoeksvragen: ten eerste, hoe 
verbieden staten prestatie-eisen in IIAs? En ten tweede, hoe moeten deze PRPs in IIAs worden 
geïnterpreteerd en toegepast? 
Dit proefschrift stelt een unitair begrip van PRPs in IIAs voor door met name te putten uit de 
Uruguay-ronde van onderhandelingen onder de General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) en uit het bilateraal investeringsverdrag programma van de Verenigde Staten; 
ontwikkelt een gedetailleerde typologie en analyse van PRPs in IIAs door de identificatie van 
systematisch gereproduceerde patronen; voert de eerste kritische en diepgaande analyse van 
alle openbaar toegankelijke arbitrale vonnissen inzake claims gebaseerd op PRPs in IIAs; 
analyseert interpretatie- en toepassingskwesties in verband met bepalingen die 
overheidsopdrachten uitzonderen van PRPs en voorbehouden die gevoelige non-conforme 
maatregelen of strategisch belangrijke sectoren beschermen via PRPs; en loopt vooruit op de 
toepassing van most-favoured nation (MFN) behandelingsclausules in PRPs in de toekomst.  
Tenslotte formuleert dit proefschrift voorstellen die kunnen helpen bij het interpreteren en 
toepassen van bestaande PRPs en het opstellen van toekomstige PRPs op een meer 
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